Family, ambition and service : the French nobility and the emergence of the standing army, c. 1598-1635 by Thomas, Daniel
FAMILY, AMBITION AND SERVICE: THE FRENCH NOBILITY 
AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE STANDING ARMY, C. 1598-1635 
Daniel Thomas 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD 
at the 





Full metadata for this item is available in                                      













This item is protected by original copyright 
 
 
Family, Ambition and Service: The French Nobility and the
Emergence of the Standing Army, c. 1598-1635.
Daniel Thomas





I, Owen Daniel Thomas hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 80,000 words
in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has
not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.
I was admitted as a research student in September 2007 and as a candidate for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in June 2008; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out
in the University of St Andrews between 2007 and 2010.
Date: 28/03/2011 signature of candidate
2. Supervisor’s declaration:
I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and
Regulations appropriate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of St
Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree.
Date …… signature of supervisor ………
3. Permission for electronic publication: (to be signed by both candidate and supervisor)
In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews I understand that I am giving
permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the
University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work not
being affected thereby. I also understand that the title and the abstract will be published, and
that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker,
that my thesis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use unless exempt by
award of an embargo as requested below, and that the library has the right to migrate my thesis
into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued access to the thesis. I have obtained
any third-party copyright permissions that may be required in order to allow such access and
migration, or have requested the appropriate embargo below.
The following is an agreed request by candidate and supervisor regarding the electronic
publication of this thesis:
(ii) Access to all of the printed copy but embargo of all of electronic publication of thesis for a
period of five years on the following ground(s):
Publication would be commercially damaging to the researcher, or to the supervisor, or the
University;
Publication would preclude future publication
Date: 28/03/11 signature of candidate signature of supervisor ………
iii
ABSTRACT
This thesis will contend that a permanent body of military force under royal command,
a ‘standing army’, arose during the first three decades of the seventeenth century in
France. Such a development constituted a transformation in the nature of the
monarchy’s armed forces. It was achieved by encouraging elements of the French
nobility to become long-term office-holders within royal military institutions. Those
members of the nobility who joined the standing army were not coerced into doing so
by the crown, but joined the new body of force because it provided them with a means
of achieving one of the fundamental ambitions of the French nobility: social
advancement for their family.
The first four chapters of this thesis thus look at how the standing army emerged via
the entrenchment of a system of permanent infantry regiments within France. They
look at how certain families, particularly from the lower and middling nobility,
attempted to monopolise offices within the regiments due to the social benefits they
conferred. Some of the consequences that arose from the army becoming an institution
in which ‘careers’ could be pursued, such as promotion and venality, will be
examined, as will how elements of the the nobility were vital to the expansion of the
standing army beyond its initial core of units. Chapters Five and Six will investigate
how the emergence of this new type of force affected the most powerful noblemen of
the realm, the grands. In particular, it will focus on those grands who held the
prestigious supra-regimental military offices of Constable and Colonel General of the
Infantry.
The thesis concludes that the emergence of the standing army helped to alter
considerably the relationship between the monarchy and the nobility by the end of the
period in question. A more monarchy-centred army and state had begun to emerge in
France by the late 1620s; a polity which might be dubbed the early ‘absolute
monarchy’. However, such a state of affairs had only arisen due to the considerable
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1Introduction
The Nobility and Military Change in Early Modern France.
2The present thesis is concerned with the relationship between the French nobility and
the royal army during a period roughly spanning the first three decades of the
seventeenth century. At its heart, the dissertation will argue that there was a change in
the nature of royal military offices during this era owing to the emergence of a
standing army, and that elements of the French nobility were not only affected by this
process, but in many respects enabled it. This was not an imposed, top-down
development. Whilst at its base this work is one of military history, it is one which is
also fundamentally concerned with wider patterns of social, political and cultural
change in early modern France. As such, before the main lines of argument are laid
out, it is necessary to define some of the key issues with which the thesis is concerned,
and to explore the historiographical background that surrounds the nobility and
military change in early modern France and Europe.
I – The Nobility in Early Seventeenth-Century France
By the early sixteenth century, members of the French nobility were ‘persons of
superior status’, who enjoyed certain privileges.1 For example, nobles had separate law
courts to the rest of the population; they expected to play a leading role within the
realm’s governance; they enjoyed certain fiscal exemptions; and they engaged in
practices which were designed to emphasise their social superiority to the non-noble
masses, such as publicly carrying arms. Nobles were not expected to engage in
commerce or labour. Instead, they were to ‘live nobly’ through the revenues they
accrued from their seigneurial lands, although from the reign of Henri IV the state
began to encourage noble investment in wholesale trade and overseas commercial
ventures. Within France, these manifold privileges were attributed to whole families
and could be passed onto multiple inheritors.2 The nobility comprised just over 1% of
the French population by the early seventeenth century, which approximated to 40-
50,000 families.3
1 William Beik, A Social and Cultural History of Early Modern France, (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 70-72.
2 H.M. Scott and Christopher Storrs, ‘Introduction: the Consolidation of Noble Power in Europe, c.
1600-1800.’, in H.M. Scott (ed.), The European Nobilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,
(2 vols., London, 1995), I, p. 11-16.
3 Michel Nassiet, Parenté, noblesse et États dynastiques, XVe-XVIe siècles, (Paris, 2000), p. 23.
3Yet, the fact that a person benefited from special privileges did not
automatically make them a nobleman – members of the clergy also enjoyed certain
rights, for instance, and they formed a separate estate. Moreover, perceptions of what
constituted noble status had changed by the early seventeenth century. The medieval
image of nobility was largely that of a chivalric knight who held a position of semi-
independent authority. Yet, by the mid sixteenth century certain non-military
government offices had began to ennoble their incumbents. The rise of this new type
of nobleman – the so-called noblesse de robe, in contrast to the older noblesse d’épée
– helped entrench the idea that military service was not fundamental to noble status.4
Indeed, nobility was increasingly defined by the late sixteenth century as a status
based on birth, rather than occupation.5 Concurrently, the monarchy was pushing
harder than before its right to monopolise the conferral of nobility, against medieval
practices whereby noble status could potentially be acquired through a form of
customary social acceptance. Thus, by the early seventeenth century, nobility was ‘a
special legal status’ in France, which was ‘transmissible through the male line’, and
which marked a family as distinct from non-nobles.6
However, the nobility did not form a uniform group. Instead, they formed a
hierarchical pyramid, with a noble’s stature based on the wealth, offices, titles and
lineage they enjoyed. At the risk of over-generalisation, the nobility can broadly be
divided into three groups: the high nobility, or grands; the upper-middling nobility, or
noblesse seconde; and the lower nobility, or petite noblesse. The grands were the
kingdom’s aristocratic elite and included the royal family itself. They played a central
role in governing France, whether in terms of the offices they held at court, or in other
institutions in Paris and the provinces. They enjoyed incomes of over 50,000 livres per
year, were extremely wealthy by contemporary standards, and formed only around 1%
4 It should be noted that many of those who bought ennobling offices were already noble, and that in the
late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries there was little concept of a robe/sword distinction. This
developed in the late sixteenth century to distinguish those members of the nobility who were relative
newcomers to the estate and whose principal attribute were their “plume” offices, from others whose
noble origins dated back to the fifteenth century or earlier, and whose character continued to be defined
by matters such as military service or ‘living nobly’ on their estates. For more on relationship between
office-holding and the nobility, and between the robe and épée, see James Wood, The Nobility of the
Election of Bayeux, 1463-1666, (Princeton, 1980), pp. 43-98,
5 Ellery Schalk, From Valor to Pedigree: Ideas of Nobility in France in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Centuries, (Princeton, 1986), pp. xiv-xv, 3-35, 115, 208.
6 Wood, Nobility, quote on p.12, see also pp. 20-42
4of the nobility.7 Below the grands were the noblesse seconde. These families had
revenues of between 10-50,000 livres per year. They enjoyed greater income and
influence than the mass of provincial nobility, but did not form part of the very highest
noble elite. They constituted 13% of noble society by the eighteenth century, but may
have been less than 5% during the early seventeenth century.8
The remaining 90-95% of French nobles can be deemed petite noblesse. These
men often only held the title of ‘seigneur’, ‘écuyer’, or ‘baron’. By the early
seventeenth century, around 5% of French noble families would have enjoyed a
comfortable lifestyle, with revenues of 5-10,000 livres per year. The remaining 85-
90% of families would have had yearly incomes of less than 5,000 livres, which would
have enforced a significantly more modest existence, with very few servants and little
in the way of extravagant expenditure. Indeed, a large percentage of nobles had very
low revenues indeed. Within the élection of Bayeux, 51% of noble families in 1639
had an income of less than 400 livres per year, whilst in Brittany two-thirds of the
nobility had annual revenues of less than 500 livres by 1700. Below this level, there
existed a final grouping of nobles whose revenues were less than 100 livres per year.
By the late seventeenth- and early eighteenth century, Dewald has estimated their
numbers at around 8-14% of Norman noble society, whilst Nassiet has stated that they
were ‘nombreuses’ in Brittany. Thus, in the period of this dissertation between one-
half and two-thirds of all nobles had revenues of less than 1,000 livres per year, whilst
7 Guy Rowlands, The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest,
1661-1701, (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 363-4; David Parrott, ‘Richelieu, the Grands, and the French army’,
in Joe Bergin and Laurence Brockliss (eds.), Richelieu and his Age, (Oxford, 1992), pp. 136-138; Guy
Chaussinand-Nogaret, The French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century: From Feudalism to
Englightenment, (Cambridge, 1985), p. 52.
8 Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret stated that 13% of French nobles had revenues of 10-50,000 livres by the
eighteenth century, Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret, The French Nobility in the Eighteenth Century: From
Feudalism to Englightenment, (Cambridge, 1982), p. 52. By contrast, Wood has stated that in 1639 only
7% of nobles in the élection of Bayeux had an annual income of over 5,000 livres: Wood, Nobility, p.
121. Whilst Wood’s figure should not be overly-generalised, it would be difficult to argue that those
enjoying revenues and influence which would make them significant provincial power-brokers would
be higher than 5% of total noble society during the early seventeenth century. The use of the term
noblesse seconde within this thesis does not necessarily imply the acceptance of the arguments
advanced by Laurent Bourquin and Jean-Marie Constant, who have contended that such a group
received patronage directly from the monarchy in order to weaken the power of the grands. Such a
definition exaggerates the independence of the noblesse seconde from the grands and, as Robert
Descimon has argued, is difficult to transpose onto non-border provinces. J.-M. Constant, ‘Un groupe
socio-politique stratégique dans la France de la première moitié du XVIIe siècle: la noblesse seconde’ in
P. Contamine (ed.), L’État et les aristocracies: France, Angleterre, Écosse: XIIe-XVIIe siècles, (Paris,
1989), pp. 279-301; Laurent Bourquin, Noblesse seconde et pouvoir en Champagne aux XVIe et XVIIe
siècles, (Paris, 1994); Robert Descimon, ‘Chercher de nouvelles voies pour interpréter les phénomènes
nobiliaires dans la France moderne. La noblesse “essence” ou rapport social?’, Revue d’histoire
moderne et contemporaine, 46 (1999), pp. 11-12
5maybe one in ten nobles were ‘pauvres’, subsisting at a level barely above that of the
better-off peasantry.9
The boundaries between these three categories of nobility were often blurred.
The social standing of noble families could fluctuate, based on matters such as
changing royal favour,10 or declining revenues from seigneurial estates, and the only
unifying factor between the court elite and the noblesse pauvre was their legal status.
Indeed, it is important to re-state that military service was not an essential constituent
of noble status by the early seventeenth century. Perhaps fewer than 10% of nobles
performed regular military service in the century prior to Louis XIV’s ‘personal
rule’.11 Nevertheless, in propaganda, conduct manuals and noble mythology, military
service to the monarch and chivalric qualities were placed centre stage from the reign
of Henri IV. Further uncovering the exact relationship between the nobility and
military service is thus a central goal of this thesis.12
Such an investigation will reveal much about the nobility’s relationship to
wider governmental change in early modern France. Traditionally, the strong,
centralised states that were believed to have emerged in this period across Europe,
often labelled as ‘absolute monarchies’, were seen as requiring the destruction of
noble power, due to their independent authority and capacity for social discord. Yet, as
Ronald Asch has put it, modern research now portrays the nobility as ‘triumphant
rather than defeated’ in the seventeenth century.13 With reference to the early modern
nobility, terms such as ‘consolidation’ or ‘transformation’ are now favoured, rather
than ‘crisis’ or ‘decline’. These ideas have largely been accepted by historians of early
modern France. Instead of being engaged in a struggle for power, the monarchy is now
9 Chaussinand-Nogaret estimated that 87% of the French nobility had incomes of less than 10,000 livres
by the turn of the eighteenth century, Chaussinand-Nogaret, French Nobility, pp. 52-3. Based on the
figures cited by Wood, Dewald and Nassiet, and Wood’s contention that there were ‘substantial
increases in noble income’ between 1639 and 1666, I would argue that a higher percentage of nobles in
the early seventeenth century would have had lesser incomes than those in the eighteenth century, not
least because many of the poorest members of the nobility fell out of the order in the interim. Hence my
estimate that 85-90% of noble families had incomes of less than 5,000 livres per year. Wood, Nobility,
p.121; Jonathan Dewald, Pont-St-Pierre, 1398-1789: Lordship, Community and Capitalism in Early
Modern France, (London, 1987), pp.98-99; Michel Nassiet, Noblesse et pauvreté: la petite noblesse en
Bretagne XVe-XVIIIe siècles, (Rennes, 1993), pp. 125-126, 375-376.
10 See Nicolas Le Roux, La faveur du Roi: mignons et courtisans au temps des derniers Valois (vers
1547 – vers 1589), (Paris, 2000), for a study of the effects of royal favour in the sixteenth century.
11 Arlette Jouanna, Le devoir de révolte: la noblesse française et la gestation de l’État moderne, (1559-
1661), (Paris, 1989), p. 45; Wood, Nobility, pp. 81-90.
12 For a work which considers the wider importance of violence to the nobility, see Stuart Carroll, Blood
and Violence in Early Modern France, (Oxford, 2006).
13 Ronald G. Asch, Nobilities in Transition, 1550-1700: Courtiers and Rebels in Britain and Europe,
(London, 2003), p. 4.
6seen as using at least elements of the nobility as agents of growing royal authority,
with certain nobles accepting such a role due to the social and political advantages it
afforded them.14 The nobility’s vital role in the informal interpersonal networks of
‘clientage’ or ‘affinity’, which were perhaps more important to the flow of power than
formal avenues of administration, meant the monarchy could not easily dispense with
the nobility in the exercise of authority.15 Other historians have suggested how the
nobility adapted to change at a more conceptual level, in terms of evolving ideas of
merit, or how aspects of aristocratic experience allegedly prepared the nobility for
modernity.16 Naturally, notes of caution have been inserted into these discussions.17
Yet, overall, it would appear reasonably indisputable that the nobility was more firmly
in royal service by the final third of the seventeenth century than it had been a century
beforehand, and that this process helped to create a more powerful form of French
state headed by the monarchy. This dissertation will seek to understand how such an
evolution occurred in one of the monarchy’s central institutions: its armed forces.
However, before such an investigation can transpire, it is first necessary to understand
the wider context of early modern military change.
14 See, for example: Wood, Nobility, pp. 156-170; Ariane Boltanski, Les ducs de Nevers et l’État royal,
(Geneva, 2006); Katia Béguin, Les princes de Condé: rebelles, courtisans et mécènes dans La France
du grand siècle, (Seyssel, 1999); David Potter, War and Government in the French Provinces, Picardy
1470-1560, (Cambridge, 1993); Bourquin, Noblesse seconde; William Beik, Absolutism and Society in
Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Authority in Languedoc, (Cambridge, 1985);
Rowlands, Dynastic State. The work which perhaps most vividly portrays the nobility’s transition
between 1560 and 1660 from self-conceived independent guardians of the ‘bien public’ to advocates
‘d’un pouvoir royal fort’ is Jouanna, Devoir, particularly pp. 7-12, 219-223, 394-396.
15 The central interpretive work on early modern French clientage is Sharon Kettering, Patrons, Brokers
and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France, (Oxford, 1986). For examples of how noble affinities
operated see Mark Greengrass, ‘Noble Affinities in Early Modern France: The Case of Henri I de
Montmorency, Constable of France’, European Studies Quarterly, 16 (1986), pp. 275-311; Stuart
Carroll, Noble Power During the French Wars of Religion: The Guise Affinity and the Catholic Cause
in Normandy, (Cambridge, 1998); Malcolm Walsby, The Counts of Laval: Culture, Patronage and
Religion in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century France, (Aldershot, 2007). Certain historians have
questioned the strength of noble clientage networks during the sixteenth century: Kristin Neuschel,
Word of Honor: Interpreting Noble Culture in Sixteenth-Century France, (Ithaca, 1989); Robert R.
Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite: the Provincial Governors of Early Modern France, (New Haven,
1978).
16 Jay M. Smith, The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in
France, 1600-1789, (Ann Arbor, 1996); Jonathan Dewald, Aristocratic Experience and the Origins of
Modern Culture: France, 1570-1715, (Oxford, 1993).
17 Dewald has noted how certain nobles struggled to adapt to new capitalistic forms of economy:
Dewald, European Nobility, pp. 67-87, 105-106.
7II –Military Change in Early Modern Europe, and the Emergence of the
Standing Army in France
The European armies of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries were quite
clearly different to their medieval counterparts.18 The introduction of gunpowder had
led to the growing importance of infantry and artillery, at the expense of heavy cavalry
formations. Armies generally grew in size from, for instance, the 30,000 troops used
by Charles VIII of France in 1494, to the army of around 320,000 men fielded by
Louis XIV during the 1690s.19 Warfare had also become more continuous and
expensive in nature. Yet, beyond these statements, historians continue to debate how
these changes occurred, and the effect they had on wider government and society.
One means of exploring the transformation of early modern warfare has been
to explicitly link it to state-formation. This interpretation found perhaps its most
famous exponent in Michael Roberts’ theory of the ‘Military Revolution’, which has
provoked considerable discussion amongst historians over the exact relationship
between war and the state.20 A different approach can be found in the recent works of
David Parrott, who sees the system of military enterprise as the key to understanding
warfare between 1560 and 1660.21 Such a system saw the responsibility for the
administration of warfare devolved to military entrepreneurs – private individuals who
levied and commanded entire army groups on the behalf of a government. Only with
the widespread use of private investment could early modern warfare be successfully
propagated, rather than an anachronistic programme of centralised state construction.
Indeed, Parrott argued that many of the failings of the French army under Richelieu
resulted from the monarchy’s official rejection of such a system.22
18 Frank Tallett and D.J.B. Trim, ‘“Then was then and now is now”: an Overview of Change and
Continuity in late-Medieval and Early-Modern Warfare’ in Frank Tallett and D.J.B. Trim (eds.),
European Warfare, 1350-1750, (Cambridge, 2010).
19 Rowlands, Dynastic State, p. 1.
20 Michael Roberts, ‘The Military Revolution, 1560-1660’ in Michael Roberts (ed.), Essays in Swedish
History, (Minneapolis, 1967), pp. 195-218; Clifford J. Rogers (ed.), The Military Revolution Debate:
Readings on the Military Transformation of Europe, (Boulder, 1995); Geoffrey Parker, The Military
Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800, (Cambridge, 1983); Jeremy
Black, A Miltiary Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1500-1800, (Basingstoke, 1991).
21 David Parrott, ‘The Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe’, History Today, 42 (1992), pp. 21-
7. The fundamental work on early modern military enterprise remains Fritz Redlich, The German
Military Entrepreneur and his Work Force: a Study in European Economic and Social History, (2 vols.,
Wiesbaden, 1964).
22 David Parrott, Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624-1642, (Cambridge,
2001); David Parrott, ‘From Military Enterprise to Standing Armies: War, State and Society in Western
Europe, 1600-1700’, in Tallett and Trim (eds.), European Warfare, pp. 74-95.
8Parrott’s findings mesh well with other recent writings on the sixteenth- and
seventeenth-century French army.23 James Wood, for example, has concluded that the
royal army suffered from an ‘incomplete military revolution’ during the early Wars of
Religion: the French state had neither monopolised the means of waging war, nor did
the wars create structures which would have allowed the monarchy to easily defeat the
Huguenot rebels.24 Analysing a later period, Guy Rowlands has sought to explain how
Louis XIV was able to field larger armies and propagate more successful warfare
between 1661 and 1701. Whilst an improvement in administrative structures was
important, Rowlands concluded that such a change was fundamentally achieved by
turning the army into an institution which could more effectively satisfy the nobility’s
private interests, encouraging them to invest their credit in the institution25 The recent
work by Hervé Drévillon has also stressed the importance of satisfying the interests of
officers to forming a more successful army under Louis XIV, by the creation of a
career army that could satisfy the honour of the nobility through sustained royal
service.26
As can be seen through a comparison of the armies found in the works of
Wood on the one hand, and Rowlands and Drévillon on the other, the armed forces of
the late seventeenth century were significantly different from those of the early to mid
sixteenth century. Indeed, in many respects, the greatest military change of the
seventeenth century was the rise of what might be called the ‘standing army’. Robert
Frost’s definition of the ‘new armies’ that emerged between 1600 and 1720 in Europe
perhaps comes closest to capturing the essence of the ‘standing army’, even if he did
not use the term himself. They were:
[P]ermanent, regular armies composed of career soldiers and career officers. These
new forces possessed a permanent regimental and administrative structure, a clear
23 In addition to the works by Wood, Rowlands and Drévillon cited below, see David Potter,
Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c. 1480-1560, (Woodbridge, 2008); André
Corvisier and P Contamine (eds.), Histoire militaire de la France, vol. I, Des origines à 1715, (Paris,
1992); John Lynn, Giant of the Grand Siècle: the French Army, 1610-1715, (Cambridge, 1997); Jean
Chagniot, ‘Le régiment des Gardes du roi d’après les roles de montres conservés à la Bibliothèque
nationale de France (1584-1643)’ in B. Barbiche and Y.-M. Bercé (eds.), Études sur l’ancienne France
offertes en hommage à Michel Antoine, (Paris, 2003), pp. 101-114.
24 James Wood, The King’s Army: Warfare, Soldiers and Society During the Wars of Religion in
France, 1562-1576, (Cambridge, 1996).
25 Rowlands, Dynastic State.
26 Indeed, there are perhaps more similarities between Rowland and Drévillon’s interpretations than
might appear at first glance, as will be shown in Chapter Two, Section II. Hervé Drévillon, L’Impôt du
sang: le métier des armes sous Louis XIV, (Paris, 2005).
9hierarchy of rank, and the modern division into officers, non-commissioned officers
and private soldiers.
Such forces produced a ‘new military culture’ which was ‘recognisably modern’.
Esprit de corps was able to develop, especially amongst officers, as regiments
‘invented their traditions’. Indeed, such was the importance and spread of these new
armies in Europe by the late-seventeenth century, Frost has contended that they
justified Roberts’ overall concept of Military Revolution.27
However, it is perhaps unwise to dub the rise of the ‘standing army’ as a
‘military revolution’. As will be seen in Chapter One, the emergence of such a force in
France occurred in such a haphazard manner that the term ‘evolution’ might be more
appropriate. Moreover, the ‘statist’ connotations of the theory, as traditionally
conceived, might underplay the vital role of private interest in the construction of
standing armies.28 Nonetheless, this dissertation will argue that a force compatible
with that described by Frost had begun to emerge in France by the early seventeenth
century, when around a dozen royal regiments entrenched themselves as permanent
bodies. In particular, the regiments permitted administrative continuity between
peacetime and wartime forces to occur, and the pursuit of long-term military careers
by certain officers began to take place.
This was a significant contrast to the situation prior to the 1560s, when no
permanent French infantry forces had existed. The royal army was predominantly
made-up of foreign mercenaries, and was almost completely levied and disbanded at
the start and end of each campaign.29 The move towards a new, standing army in
France began during the second half of the sixteenth century, but was not truly
confirmed until the period of this dissertation. Hitherto, the vital era in the emergence
of a standing army in France has usually been dated to the second half of the
27 Especially as Frost interpreted Roberts’ thesis as a relatively broad ‘shift in the relationship between
communities, territorial states and the armed forces’ in early modern Europe. Robert Frost, The
Northern Wars: War, State and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558-1721, (London, 2000), pp. 307-
10. An alternative definition of a ‘standing army’ can be found in Olaf van Nimwegen, ‘The
transformation of Army Organisation in Early-Modern Western Europe, c. 1500-1789’, in Tallett and
Trim (eds.), European Warfare, p. 161. However, Frost’s definition is preferable to van Nimwegen’s, as
it can accommodate the presence of large numbers of foreign troops in a state’s ‘standing army’.
28 Indeed, it should be noted that not just governments but also military enterprisers such as Wallenstein
produced forces which were close to those of ‘standing armies’ during the Thirty Years’ War. Indeed, in
some respects, the armies of the enterprisers were models that governments subsequently followed,
rather than mere temporary anomalies in the nature of military force.
29 Wood, King’s Army, pp. 41-42. David Potter’s argument that the ‘birth’ of the French infantry
occurred during the first half of the sixteenth century will be addressed in Chapter One, Section I. David
Potter, Renaissance France, pp. 95-123.
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seventeenth century.30 Yet, many of the aspects of this later force can be found in the
early seventeenth-century army. Indeed, if the early seventeenth century is seen as an
odd period in which to make claims for military development, this is largely a product
of its neglect by French military historians, rather than it intrinsically being an era of
inertia or decline.31
Whether the regiments were the first standing army in French history is
perhaps debatable due to the creation of the permanent compagnies d’ordonnance in
1439. Better known as the gendarmes, these heavy cavalry units formed the elite of the
royal army until the outbreak of civil war in the 1560s. Yet there are several
difficulties in describing the gendarmerie as a standing army. Firstly, the gendarmerie
was not an entire army, but merely a branch of arms. Whilst this dissertation will focus
mainly on the royal regiments, a smaller portion of the new standing army was also
comprised of permanent cavalry and artillery units in order to form a complete body of
arms. Secondly, instead of grouping gendarme companies into intermediary corps,
such as regiments, the gendarmerie was essentially a disparate collection of stand-
alone units. This inhibited the creation of a collective identity, which was vital to the
mentality of a standing army. The cost of serving in a gendarme unit was also
prohibitively expensive for most of the nobility; a situation that progressively
worsened during the civil wars. Whether many nobles were able to pursue a coherent
‘career’ within the gendarmerie is thus questionable, even if they had managed to
obtain an officer’s commission. Finally, even during its pomp, the gendarmerie never
became the majority or even the core of royal forces, unlike the infantry regiments,
and by the end of the sixteenth century the gendarmerie was quite palpably in terminal
decline. By the 1620s, it formed little more than a tiny auxiliary force within the royal
army.
Thus, this thesis will argue that a new form of military organisation, the
‘standing army’, emerged in early seventeenth-century France, based on the
consolidation and adaptation of the system of infantry regiments that had emerged
during the second half of the sixteenth century. The regimental system was a response
to the changing demands of early modern warfare, although it is questionable whether
30 Drévillon, L’Impôt; van Nimwegen, ‘Transformation.’; Rowlands, Dynastic State.
31 Even David Parrott’s superb study of the army during Richelieu’s ministry, i.e. 1624-1642, largely
drew its conclusions from the period after France entered into war against Spain in 1635. Parrott,
Richelieu’s Army. For a notable exception, see Xavier Audoin, Histoire de l’administration de la
guerre, (4 vols., Paris, 1811), II, 142-90, which ascribed the vital role in early modern French military
reform to Henri IV, if in a rather crude, statist fashion.
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this formed part of any rational move towards ‘state-formation’ by the monarchy.
Indeed, the emergence of the standing army can only be understood through its
relationship to the private interests of a wider section of society: the nobility.
III – Family, Ambition, and Service: The French Nobility and the Emergence of the
Standing Army in France
This dissertation will contend that the French nobility not only adapted to military
change in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but that important elements of this
estate were vital to the creation and development of the standing army. The creation
and maintenance of the regiments was ultimately decided upon by the monarchy, and
the overall campaign objectives of the early seventeenth-century army were
determined by the priorities of the Bourbon dynasty. Yet, one should be sceptical of
any interpretation which alleges that either the crown, or an abstract ‘state’, could
somehow hoist new structures, such as the standing army, onto an unsuspecting
society. As David Parrott has put it, a ‘reified “state”’ did not exist ‘apart from the
wider social context’ in which ‘military systems operated’ in the early modern period.
Instead, ‘[a]rmies and military institutions represent the relationship between rulers
and political elites’. The development of armed forces necessitated the ‘willingness’
by societal ‘elites to “invest” – socially, financially, culturally – in military activity
and institutions’.32
The standing army thus emerged in France due to the willingness of a section
of the nobility to “invest” in such a structure, and it was thus partially shaped by their
interests and concerns. Why this occurred should be understood in terms of the words
which partly comprise this dissertation’s title: family, ambition and service. Put
simply, certain noble families sought out royal service in the standing army in order to
satisfy their ambitions of social advancement. Far from being comprehensively
threatening, changes in the nature of royal military offices were a source of new
opportunities for many noble families. Consequently, the men within the regiments
helped to reconfigure the wider relationship of service between the monarchy and the
nobility. During the early seventeenth century, the regimental system helped the
32 Parrott, ‘Miliary Enterprise’, p. 77. See also: Jan Glete, ‘Warfare, Entrepreneurship and the Fiscal-
Military State’ in Tallett and Trim, European Warfare, pp. 301-321; Tallet and Trim, “That was then”,
pp. 11-15.
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monarchy to make great strides towards enforcing a monopoly over the legitimate use
of armed force within France. Indeed, whilst certain nobles benefited from the new
regimental system, the standing army also forced an alteration to the family ambitions
of certain grands who held supra-regimental military offices. Increasingly, their social
ambitions and prestige were becoming defined by the royal military offices that they
held, rather than their independent military authority. Thus, much of this thesis will
ultimately consider the extent to which the nobility redefined themselves as a ‘military
service élite’ in the employ of the crown during the early seventeenth century, why
and how they did so, and to what extent this situation was reversible by 1635.33
The importance of satisfying family ambition to the French nobility will be
apparent throughout this study. Therefore, it is important that the exact meanings of
both ‘family’ and ‘ambition’ are defined, as early modern perceptions of these
concepts differed to our own. Indeed, as Nassiet has stated, the definition and
importance of familial links is a socio-cultural, rather than biological, construct.34
According to Beik, ‘[t]he family was the basic unit of society’ in early modern
France.35 As such, many works which have used a study of a noble families as their
starting point have not only revealed much about the ‘assumptions, aspirations,
mentalities and lifestyles of the nobles’ but have also provided profound insights ‘into
the impact of royal demands and state development, economic and financial problems
and social relations.’36 It has become clear that notions of ‘parenté’ and ‘parents’,
roughly understood as kinship and kin, not only encompassed blood relations in the
early modern period, ‘but also affinity caused by marriage’ and ‘spiritual kin in the
shape of godparents.’ There was also a greater consciousness of distant relatives and
their interests than exists today, seen through the myriad references to ‘cousins’ in
seventeenth-century sources. Overall, due to the stress placed on both ‘ancestry and
issue’, it is important to realise that early modern families conceived of themselves as
long-standing dynasties, whose futures required meticulous planning in order to
achieve continued stability and success.37 As Rowlands has demonstrated, the
33 Scott and Storrs, ‘Introduction’, pp. 41-46.
34 Nassiet, Parenté, pp. 11-13.
35 Beik, Social and Cultural, p. 225.
36 Quote from Rowlands, Dynastic State, p. 13. For examples of such studies see: Carroll, Noble Power;
Dewald, Pont-St-Pierre; Boltanski, Nevers; Béguin, Condé; Walsby, Laval; Raymond Mentzer, Blood
and Belief: Family Survival and Confessional Identity among the Huguenot Provincial Nobility, (West
Lafayette, 1994).
37 Rowlands, Dynastic State, pp. 13-14.
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importance of dynasticism to the nobility became perhaps most obvious during the
second-half of the seventeenth century. However, this dissertation will contend that a
concern for dynastic strategy is already quite evident amongst the nobility who
inhabited the standing army in the decades immediately after 1598.
The nobility’s concern for their family’s welfare, and their conception of this
unit in ‘dynastic’ terms, is vital to understanding French society and state-development
in this period.38 Dynasticism played a crucial role in the emergence of the state
because French noble families held ambitions towards improving their social standing,
and at least a section of noble society found an outlet for such desires within emerging
royal institutions. Admittedly, such an argument rests on a modern definition of
‘ambition’. As Jay Smith has contended, early seventeenth-century nobles would have
conceived of ambition in negative terms as an “uncontrolled passion for glory and
fortune”, which ‘epitomized the selfishness and cupidity’ of the peasantry or
bourgeoisie rather than the nobility.39 Smith’s argument is borne out by appearances of
the word in early seventeenth-century dictionaries and memoirs. As Richelieu, perhaps
ironically, put it: ‘ceux qui ont le moins de mérite ont d’ordinaire le plus
d’ambition’.40 Yet, the importance of ambition to the nobility should not be discounted
if understood in the non-pejorative present-day sense as ‘a desire to rise to high
position, or to attain rank, influence, distinction or other preferment.’41 This definition
of ambition lies at the heart of the actions of many noble families during the early
seventeenth century. Most considered it a matter of prime importance that the social
station of their dynasty was constantly improved, both in terms of their material
wealth, but also through the increased sense of honour and prestige that such
ascendancy entailed. Moreover, noble families realised that such ambitions could only
be achieved through a conscious planning of family strategy, especially with relation
to matters such as marriage and profession. Families were not always united in their
38 Rowlands argued that dynasticism played ‘the [...] crucial role’ in French state-formation, leading to
his conception of the ‘dynastic state’ under Louis XIV. Ibid.
39 Smith, Culture of Merit, p. 44. The first quote is a citation from Antoine Fuertière’s Dictionnaire
universel published in 1690.
40 Richelieu’s comment was directed against Charles d’Albert, duc de Luynes. Richelieu repeatedly
used ‘ambition’ in a pejorative sense both to defame Luynes and to explain his supposedly unjustified
rise to power: Richelieu, Mémoires, I, pp. 153, 154, 157, 222, citation on p. 154. Held for many years as
a classic example of an early modern ‘ambitieux’, Luynes reputation has recently received a boost in
Sharon Kettering, Power and Reputation at the Court of Louis XIII: the Career of Charles d’Albert, duc
de Luynes, (Manchester, 2008).
41 “ambition, n.”, The Oxford English Dictionary, (2nd ed., 1989).
<http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50006948> [6 September, 2010].
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actions. Due to contemporary perceptions of what constituted ‘parenté’, the sheer
breadth of certain dynasties inevitably led to intra-familial disputes.42 Yet, at least
within the standing army, the unity of family members in the pursuit of higher social
status is more evident than discord.
Overall, that a section of the French nobility realised that family ambitions
could be achieved through royal service in regimental offices is not just the key to
understanding the emergence of the standing army in France, but also to the
development of a new relationship between the nobility and the monarchy. Much of
this thesis is thus concerned with how a new type of state, with the monarch much
more firmly at the apex of power, would start being built in France, based on the
convergence of the dynastic interests of the crown and elements of wider noble
society.
To understand how an army functions in almost any era requires a historian to go
beyond research of a purely military nature, in order to comprehend the wider societal
context which both produces and moulds armed force. Accordingly, this thesis
employs both military and non-military sources in an attempt to uncover the
relationship between the emerging standing army and the nobility. As with most
studies of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, there are inherent
limitations placed on this study due to the amount of surviving documentation.
Moreover, as the administrative structures of the standing army were only emerging
during this period, many of the documents used to study the French military during
later periods simply do not exist. To cite one notable example, the mass of
correspondence housed in the French military archives at Vincennes, emanating
largely from the secretaries of state for war, does not truly begin until after 1631, and
thus little information has been mined from this location.43
The two fundamental types of archival sources on which this study is built are
thus found in the Bibliothèque nationale de France in Paris. Firstly, and at the heart of
this thesis, is an examination of 1,051 montres et revues, or muster rolls, within the
Manuscrits français.44 In an attempt to reduce fraud, each revue listed every soldier
42 Carroll, Blood and Violence, pp.29-37.
43 Thierry Sarmant, ‘Introduction’ in Jean-Claude Devos, Marie-Anne Corvisier de Villele, Thierry
Sarmant, Samuel Gibiat (eds.), Guide des archives et de la bibliothèque, (Vincennes, 2001), pp. 18-21.
44 Within BnF Ms.Fr. 25764-25901 there are some 12,859 revues covering the period between 1347 and
1716.
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within a military unit who was to receive payment from the crown, in order to
theoretically prevent commanders from reporting an artificially high number of
soldiers and pocketing the difference. The company and regiment of each unit were
listed on the revue, and its officers, often down to the level of sergeant, were
specified.45 The revues I have studied cover a forty year period beginning with the
accession of Henri IV to the throne, specifically the years 1589-1590, 1593, 1597-
1601, 1605-6 and finally 1609-1629.46 Given that a revue was meant to take place
every 36 days, and that a regiment consisted of around eighteen to twenty companies,
around 180-200 revues should have occurred each year for each permanent regiment.
Yet, the number of revues which remain for each year fluctuates quite dramatically:
there are 220 rolls preserved from 1593, in comparison to 250 in total between May
1610 and December 1619. On the basis of the 1,051 rolls I have studied, which contain
every roll from 1610-1629 and the majority from 1597-1609, there remain only 124
revues for the best preserved regiment, the Gardes. Nonetheless, enough revues
remain in total for an effective prosopographical analysis of regimental officers to be
undertaken. Indeed, it is not necessary to see every revue from this period to discern
general trends regarding the length of officer service, and how certain companies
changed in composition over time.47 This is especially the case when revues are used
in collaboration with états, documents which show the ‘state’ of a certain fraction of
royal military force at a given point in time. Whilst états often only show the name of
commanding officers, such as regimental captains, and rarely show subaltern ranks,
such as lieutenant and ensign, they are still an extremely useful resource for
information on the composition of the infantry officer corps.48
After using the états and revues to construct a database of regimental officers,
genealogical research was conducted on these men and their families. Hence, a major
source for this thesis is the Cabinet des Titres within the Bibliothèque Nationale. The
Cabinet contains a multitude of pieces relating to the family history of the French
nobility, most notably: notarial acts; essays on the history of individuals or families;
45 The date and location of each revue was also usually listed.
46 BnF Ms.Fr. 25817-25818, BnF Ms.Fr. 25825-25827, BnF Ms.Fr. 25831-25835, BnF Ms.Fr. 25837-
25839, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841-25849.
47 Unfortunately, whilst revues of gendarme and light-cavalry companies also exist within the Ms.Fr.
25000 series, they do not occur to the same extent as infantry companies, largely precluding an in-depth
analysis of their changing composition over time.
48 Collections of états for this period can be found at: BnF Ms.Fr. 16997-16730; BnF Na.Fr. 24841-
24842; BnF Cangé 5, f. 5r-8r; ‘lettres patentes du roy...’, 12 August 1588, SHDAT X14, n.p.; ‘estat des
regimens...’, January 1597, SHDAT X14, n.p.
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documents from the Chambre des Comptes; family-trees; and proofs of lineage. Due
to the fact that many officers within the permanent regiments emanated from the petite
noblesse, often only a very limited amount of documentation has survived for their
families. Nonetheless, when the data found in the revues, états and Cabinet des Titres
is combined with printed and non-printed letters and memoirs, along with printed
genealogical dictionaries (such as that of La Chesnaye Desbois), a picture emerges of
the dynastic strategies undertaken by a section of the nobility, and how these related to
royal military offices. As a whole, the research for this thesis is thus based upon an
array of relatively well-known printed sources, and a concerted degree of research
performed in several archives in both France and England, using a large number of
underused or neglected military and non-military sources.
The thesis is organised into six chapters, which investigate how each of the
three levels of the nobility defined in Section I of this introduction interacted with the
new military offices of the early seventeenth century. Chapter One gives an overview
of the emergence of the standing army via an investigation into the murky origins of
the royal regiments, and the significance of the decision to maintain permanently a
handful of such regiments in the late 1590s. The dominance of certain petite noblesse
families within the regiments will be explored in Chapter Two, as a consequence of
this new standing army. The relationships between families in the regiments will be
considered, as will their wider societal goals, to show how service within the royal
infantry began to provide a means by which the petite noblesse could achieve their
wider ambition of social advancement. Chapter Three will delineate how the royal
army began to be perceived as a ‘career’ army by its officers, which meant that
informal practices relating to promotion and venality started to occur. These two
factors militated against the dominance of a narrowly-constituted closed oligarchy
within the regiments, and precipitated future debates over how a noble’s ‘merit’
should be judged with respect to royal service. The bulk of the first three chapters will
focus on the vieux regiments of the Gardes, Picardie, Navarre, Piémont and
Champagne. These were the first regiments maintained on a permanent basis after
1598, and were recognised by contemporaries as being the elite units of the royal
infantry.49 A fourth chapter will explore how the standing army expanded through a
49 The Gardes will be consistently included within the vieux. Due to the intermittent differences
between the Gardes and the other vieux, the term quatre-vieux will be occasionally used to make
reference to Picardie, Navarre, Champagne and Piémont alone. Whilst formally designated as vieux
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study of Normandie and the petits-vieux – newer-regiments which followed in the
wake of the vieux. In particular, the chapter will investigate the critical role played by
members of the noblesse seconde in the formation of these regiments.
The final two chapters will investigate how the new standing army affected the
relationship between the grands and royal military offices, particularly with reference
to those members of the high nobility who held supra-regimental military charges.
Chapter Five will look at an office which was theoretically the most prestigious
military position of the realm, that of the Constable, between 1593 and 1626, a period
which saw both the revival and abolition of the charge. It will display how the
Constable’s overall lack of definite powers over the new standing army meant the
charge could be marginalised within royal military structures, precipitating its
extinction. The final chapter will focus on the duc d’Épernon, and his office of
Colonel General of the Infantry. In particular, the chapter will investigate the level of
both formal and informal authority he held over the standing army, how this was
affected by changing notions towards royal service amongst the lower nobility who
held regimental office, and the impact this had on Épernon’s overall military influence
within France. Across both final chapters, the argument will be made that the new
standing army began to lessen the reliance of the monarchy on the military power of
the grands – at least in periods of low-intensity warfare – and that members of the
high nobility increasingly turned to royal charges, rather than their independent
authority, as a means to achieve or consolidate their social prestige. This situation was,
however, by no means irrevocable in 1635.
This dissertation’s focus on the nobility is partially forced. The officer corps of
the army, down to the level of company subalterns within the regiments, was almost
completely dominated by nobles. Uncovering the details of soldiers’ lives below the
level of company officers is fraught with difficulties due to a lack of available source
material; it would not be until the mid- to later-seventeenth century that military
administrators began to record greater amounts of information about the ‘ordinary’
soldiers who formed the mass of the French army. Thus, whilst Robert Chaboche was
able to give some idea of the social background of troops during the second third of
regiment from c. 1617, the use of the term vieux in this dissertation does not include Normandie unless
otherwise stated. This owes to the fact that Normandie belonged to a different era of regimental
creation, as will be shown in Chapter Four, Section II.
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the seventeenth century,50 it is only from around the 1670s, when sources such as the
contrôles de troupes began to materialize, that a huge amount of information relating
to the ‘ordinary’ French soldier appears for historians to exploit.51
Yet, in other respects, the decision to focus on the nobility’s relationship to the
army is a conscious choice. Based on the research conducted for this thesis, it would
appear that a, if not the crucial determinant in the evolution of the French early
modern army was whether the private interests of the nobility, or at least elements of
it, could be achieved through the holding of royal military office. That the monarchy
was increasingly able to satisfy noble ambitions within the royal army during the early
seventeenth century explains the higher level of functionality, and even success of this
force than those of the preceding and succeeding periods described by Wood and
Parrott. Indeed, through the following analysis of the early standing army, a fuller
picture of not only the relationship between the monarchy and the nobility, but also of
the mutating early seventeenth-century French state, will hopefully be provided.
50 Robert Chaboche, ‘Les soldats français de la guerre de trente ans: une tentative d’approche’, Revue
d’histoire moderne et contemporaine, 20 (1973), p.10-24.
51 Accordingly, it is no surprise that the first in-depth study of the French soldiery uses material which
dates from the late-seventeenth/early-eighteenth century: André Corvisier, L’armeé française de la fin
du XVII siècle au ministère de Choiseul: le soldat, (2 vols., Paris, 1964).
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Chapter One
The Emergence of the Standing army: the Rise of the Regimental system in
France, c. 1550-1635
20
In the sixteenth- and early seventeenth century, a regiment was an intermediary unit of
military administration. It existed between a company, the smallest unit of military
organisation, and an army group. The regiment’s commanding officer, after whom the
regiment was sometimes named, was called the mestre de camp. A regiment was
constructed from several smaller groups, known as companies, which were each
commanded by a captain. The mestre de camp would also personally command one of
the regiment’s companies. There was no set-figure for how many companies a
regiment should have, but it was rare for a regiment to have less than five or more than
twenty during the early seventeenth century. The strength of each company varied
according to political and military circumstance. Regiments could vary from a few
hundred men, to a top-end figure of around 4,000. Overall, the regiment was intended
to be a unit that was large enough to undertake reasonably significant military action,
but small enough to alleviate problems relating to logistics and discipline. Disorder
would be reduced through placing a more manageable number of troops under the
control of low-ranking officers than in previous infantry formations, whilst the new
mestres des camp could further monitor the actions of company officers.1
This section will explain when this form of military organisation came into
being in France, not least because there have been surprisingly few recent attempts to
survey the early history of the French regimental system.2 One has to return to studies
published prior to the twentieth century - and especially the militarised nationalism of
the nineteenth century - to find sustained analyses of the regiments prior to and during
the period of this dissertation.3 More importantly, this chapter will examine at what
1 Wood, King’s Army, p. 106. It is important to note that regiments and regimental companies were
largely administrative units, rather than tactical. During warfare, companies from several regiments
could be temporarily amalgamated to form battalions. See, for example, the deployment of royal troops
at the Ile-de-Ré in 1622: Robert Arnaud d’Andilly, Journal inédit de Arnaud d’Andilly, (6 vols., Paris,
1888-1909), I, 1622, p. 23.
2 The best overview of the early French infantry is found in Potter, Renaissance France, pp. 95-119.
Jean Chagniot makes some extremely illuminating comments in a short article on the Gardes between
1584 and 1643: Chagniot, ‘Gardes’. James Wood provided a short discussion of the early regiments
during the 1560s and 1570s: Wood, King’s Army, pp. 106-110. Parrott does not offer a sustained
analysis of the regiments in his work, but did present a wealth of details on how this form of
organisation related to matters such as tactics, size, venality and clientage: Parrot, Richelieu’s Army, pp.
42-56, 226, 333-4, 471, 552. Rowlands and Drévillon both provided detailed analyses of the regiments
and their officer corps, but their works focused on the second half of the seventeenth century:
Rowlands, Dynastic State, pp. 153-226; Drévillon, L’Impôt, passim.
3 Gabriel Daniel remains an invaluable starting point for analyses of the early regimental system:
Gabriel Daniel, Histoire de la milice françoise [...], (2 vols., Paris, 1721), II, pp. 260-284, 331-434.
However, the fundamental work on the French regimental system remains Louis Susane, Histoire de
l’ancienne infanterie française, (8 vols., Paris, 1849-1853), even if it is not entirely reliable. This should
be read in conjunction with his more general survey, Louis Susane, Histoire de l’infanterie française, (5
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point certain regiments achieved a guaranteed level of permanency within the royal
army, an estimate of the numbers of troops that were maintained within them, and
where these units were stationed in the early seventeenth century. Finally, it will
demonstrate that the security afforded to regiments was extended to the officers who
composed them.
The achievement of stability by certain royal regiments was a critical moment
in the history of the early modern French army. It marked a point when the monarchy
began to maintain permanently a core of infantry units and officers regardless of
whether a state of war existed or not. Accordingly, the royal army began to enjoy a
degree of administrative continuity that had previously not existed. The regiments in
this chapter thus provided the basis for a new standing army, compatible with the
definition found in the introduction to this thesis. This army would persist for the
remainder of the Ancien Régime, whilst the regiments, as an overall form of infantry
organisation, remain in use by the French state to this day.
I – French Infantry Organisation c.1450-1590: the Origins of the Regimental System
The regiments were not the first form of infantry organisation employed by the French
monarchy. Indeed, the starting point for most discussions of the royal infantry remains
the ordonnance of 1448, which outlined the creation of a notably new form of force,
the francs-archers. This force was formed from around 18,000 troops by the 1470s.4 A
few historians have ascribed some importance to these units, arguing that they marked
vols., Paris, 1876-7). The nineteenth century produced a number of other analyses that contain
interesting interpretations and information on the early regiments: Audoin, Histoire, II, pp. 82-190; Lt-
Col Victor Belhomme, Histoire de l’infanterie en France, (5 vols., Paris, 1893-1902), I, pp. 308-333;
Edgard Boutaric, Institutions militaires de la France avant les armées permanentes, (Paris, 1863), pp.
317-347, 370; Edouard de La Barre Duparcq, Histoire sommaire de l’infanterie, (Paris, 1853), pp. 25-
30; A. Dareste de La Chavane, Histoire de l’administration en France, (4 vols., Paris, 1848), II, pp.
304-307. Many individual regimental histories appeared in the late nineteenth century. These were often
written by infantry officers, and were undoubtedly an attempt to restore national pride in the wake of
France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. Many of these authors attempted to trace the
history of nineteenth century infantry units back to sixteenth-century formations, whilst stressing the
mutations that the regiments had undergone in the interim. For example, see: Benjamin-Charles-Lucien
Amiot, Historique du 24e régiment d’infanterie, (Paris, 1893); Cpt Faivre d’Arcier and Lt Roye,
Historique du 37e régiment d’infanterie, ancien régiment de Turenne, 1587-1593, (Paris, 1895); Marius
Bourgue, Historique du 3e régiment d’infanterie, ex-Piémont, 1569-1891, (Paris, 1894); Émile Coste,
Historique du 40e régiment d’infanterie de Ligne, (Paris, 1887); Henri Demiau, Histoire du 5e régiment
d’infanterie de ligne, 1569-1890, (Caen, 1890); Louis-Victor-Alfred Jeanneney, Glorieux passé d’un
régiment, 1562-1899, (Calais, 1899); Noël Lacolle, Histoire des Gardes-françaises, (Paris, 1901); M.
Méjécaze, Historique du 6e régiment d’infanterie, (Paris, 1889).
4 Potter, Renaissance France, p. 102.
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a notable improvement in the discipline, permanency and pay of French infantry
forces.5 Yet, this method of organisation was ultimately abortive: Louis XI initially
abolished the francs-archers in 1481, and, despite intermittently appearing afterwards,
their definitive abolition occurred in 1535.6 François I’s system of legions, consciously
modelled on the ancient Roman method of organisation, fared little better. An
ordonnance of 1534 stated that seven legions of 6,000 troops each were to be raised in
certain provinces, in an attempt to reduce the monarchy’s reliance on foreign troops.
Each legion would have six captains commanding 1,000 troops each, with one of them
also named as colonel of the legion. All officers were to be from the provinces to
which the legion was ascribed. Despite some initial success, problems of indiscipline
soon arose and largely overwhelmed the force. After attempts to modify the system
during the 1550s, the legions appear to have fallen into disrepute by the early 1560s.7
However, by the first half of the sixteenth century, another form of royal
infantry organisation had emerged: the bandes. These were divided into two types:
‘old’ and ‘new’. According to Susane, the ‘old’ bandes emerged during the
monarchy’s wars of the late fifteenth century. They were recruited in one province,
commanded by local nobles, and were maintained on a permanent setting, being
dispersed into garrisons during peacetime. The units which had been fighting in the
duchy of Burgundy and northern France became known as the bandes de Picardie,
whilst those engaged against the Habsburgs in Italy were called the bandes de
Piémont. This in turn led to the division of royal forces between those ‘deçà les monts’
and those ‘delà les monts’. Whilst the ‘monts’ in question were thus originally the
Alps, the authority of the administration ‘delà les monts’ gradually extended to
encompass all the southern provinces during the sixteenth century. Thus, the ‘old’
bandes may have provided the framework by which the increasingly dominant section
of royal military accounts, the trésorerie de l’extraordinaire des guerres, became
organised for the majority of the ancien régime.8 The ‘new’ bandes arose in the 1530s
as it became clear that the legions had been a failure. Whilst both ‘old’ and ‘new’
bandes had similar organisational structures, the ‘new’ bandes were not considered
permanent, and were disbanded at the end of each campaign. Moreover, the ‘new’
5 La Chavane, Histoire, II, pp. 293-7; Belhomme, Histoire, I, pp. 110-117; Boutaric, Institutions, p. 319.
6 Potter, Renaissance France, pp. 103-104.
7 Potter, Renaissance France, pp. 112-117; Belhomme, Histoire, pp. 304-305.
8 Susane, Infanterie, I, pp. 31-64; David Potter, War and Government in the French provinces, Picardy
1470-1560, (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 170-1. For the extraordinaire des guerres, see Potter, Renaissance
France, pp. 220-224; Rowlands, Dynastic State, pp. 112-114.
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bandes were widely held to be filled with ‘aventuriers’, a pejorative term which had
the meaning of both ‘foot soldier’ and ‘pillager’.9
Whilst Susane and Potter were sceptical about the success of the ‘new’ bandes,
both stressed the importance of the ‘old’ bandes to the development of the French
infantry. Potter stated that the ‘old’ bandes had ‘effectively evolved into regiments by
the 1540s’, as they were ‘kept on a permanent footing and regularly paid’, with some
already based on systems of ensigns commanded by a colonel. Overall, Potter
concluded that ‘a recognisable French infantry’ had come into being by the middle of
the sixteenth century, with the ‘volunteer battle-hardened veterans’ of the ‘old bands’
of Picardy and Piedmont being the basis of a ‘permanent and top-class’ force.10
Certainly, Potter was right to argue that the origin of the French regiments was
not a clear-cut event. The bandes of Picardy and Piedmont were far more permanent
and regularised than previous forms of French infantry. Some noblemen had even
begun to divide the troops under their command into smaller units, along the lines of
regimental organisation, by the mid-sixteenth century. Yet the size, unwieldiness and
impermanency of command within the bandes show that they can only be considered
an imperfect step towards an infantry-based standing army. The bandes meant that
French infantry before 1561 was largely divided under the authority of two Colonels
General of the Infantry, based on the administrative division of military France into
‘deçà’ and ‘delà les monts’.11 Both Colonels only maintained a very small number of
permanent captains under their command. Susane himself conceded that the bandes
were only permanent as an overall framework – indeed shell – of organisation; their
actual composition was subject to frequent mutation. Troops from Picardie were sent
into the bandes de Piémont when war erupted, and regular, arbitrary disbanding of
troops occurred according to political and military circumstance.12 Large numbers of
captains had to be levied at the start of each war, each could be in control of up to
2,000 men,13 and they were organised in such a manner that created ‘confusing lines of
authority’.14 Moreover, there remained no real form of intermediary organisational
level between the company and the army group. Whether any form of esprit de corps
could possibly have emerged from such a system is highly questionable. It is,
9 Potter, Renaissance France, p. 107.
10 Susane, Ancienne, II, pp. 228-9; Potter, Renaissance France, pp. 108, 110, 122-123.
11 These posts would be combined into one position in 1569, Belhomme, Histoire, pp. 261-2.
12 Susane, Ancienne, II, pp. 229-230.
13 Susane, Infanterie, I, p. 90.
14 Wood, King’s Army, p. 106.
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therefore, difficult to see the bandes as true precursors of a proper regimental system,
nor do they appear to meet the requirements for a standing army as defined in this
thesis’ introduction.15
The foundation of the first truly recognisable royal infantry regiments can
therefore still be seen as occurring in 1561, when the duc de Guise placed three units,
consisting of 12 companies of 200 men, under the command of a mestre de camp.
These regiments formed the core of the royal army which fought in the campaign of
1562-1563. Guise’s steps should not be over-estimated, however. All the regiments
that were levied for the first civil war had been disbanded by the outbreak of the
second in 1567. The only regiment that survived was the Gardes, which was
established from the best companies of the disbanded regiments in 1563 to provide a
bodyguard of veteran soldiers for Charles IX. As such, the Gardes has the best claim
to being the monarchy’s first permanent infantry regiment.16 After the start of the
second civil war in 1567, certain other regiments began to be maintained during
peacetime. However, the majority of regiments raised between 1567 and 1598
continued to be levied at the start of each war and disbanded at their end.17 Moreover,
even the regiments that were maintained during peacetime, from the late 1560s, were
not necessarily the same units that fought during subsequent conflicts, or which were
maintained during resulting periods of peace, such was the flux of reformation,
redistribution and disbandment.
No regiment could count on a long-term lifespan during the first twenty years
of the civil wars; even the Gardes underwent significant re-organisation during this
15 It does appear, however, that many officers and troops from the bandes were re-deployed into the
new regiments during the 1560s: Susane, Infanterie, I, pp. 126-150; Susane, Ancienne, II, pp. 236-7;
Lacolle, Gardes, pp. 5-14; Demiau, Histoire, pp. 13-14; Bourgue, Piémont, pp. 13-27. However, given
the continued flux seen in the new regiments during the early civil wars, as the rest of this section will
show, it would be simplistic to state that the regiments were merely a re-branding of the existing bandes
system; the reorganisation appears both more fundamental and haphazard than that. As will be seen
below, certain contemporaries did try to claim seniority for a regiment based on links that it allegedly
held to older forms of infantry organisation such as the bandes. These claims were frequently driven by
self-interest, and thus contain a fair degree of ahistorical manipulation.
16 Wood, King’s Army, pp. 107-8. The Gardes was thus part of the royal infantry throughout the period
under examination, rather than the Maison du roi. The regiment was not a detached bodyguard unit, and
should be considered as central to any discussion of the early evolution of the royal infantry. It is only
during the reign of Louis XIV that one might contend that the Gardes became part of the Maison du
Roi, as Chagniot and Drévillon have done: Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 101; Drévillon, L’Impôt, pp. 61, 72-3.
However, Rowlands has argued against such a belief: Guy Rowlands, ‘Louis XIV, Aristocratic Power
and the Elite Units of the French Army’, French History, 13, (1999), p. 316.
17 Whilst he does include Protestant and foreign units as well, Susane lists over 300 regiments as being
levied between 1561 and 1597, of which the overwhelming majority did not survive past 1598: Susane,
Ancienne, VIII, pp. 18-67
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period. In 1566, the regiment was broken-up, with certain units maintained in garrison
in Picardy, and the unit confusingly referred to as either the regiment de Strozzi or de
Picardie, after its mestre de camp and location. After more coherent reorganisation in
the late 1560s and early 1570s, the regiment was again disbanded by Charles IX in
1573. Susane has plausibly ascribed this action to the king’s suspicions that the
Gardes was becoming overly favourable to his brother, the duc d’Anjou. Indeed, one
of the duc’s first acts on becoming king, as Henri III, was to re-establish the
regiment.18 In any case, it was only from the mid-1570s that the Gardes enjoyed a
reasonably stable existence.
Similarly, it is convenient to state that the origins of Picardie, Piémont, and
Champagne can be traced to a reorganisation of royal forces that occurred in 1569.19
Yet, these units were born from the debris of disbanded regiments in the late 1560s,
which themselves had been little more than a haphazard re-deployment of certain units
from the ‘old’ bandes. The new regiments would then be subject to further bouts of
reorganisation during the 1570s and early 1580s. Indeed, until the mid-1580s, both
Picardie and Piémont continued to be known under the name of whichever mestre de
camp commanded the regiment.20 It was not until the 1580s, therefore, that a more
stable existence for the Gardes, Picardie, Champagne and Piémont was assured. As
Wood has put it, ‘it is difficult to trace an incontrovertibly continuous life for even a
single French regiment’ until ‘well past’ 1576.21
The early life of the other vieux regiment, Navarre, is even murkier, as it did
not enter the royal army until Henri IV’s accession to the throne in 1589. Until this
date it had been known as the ‘Gardes du Roy de Navarre’, a Protestant regiment
founded in 1569 to protect Henri, who was then prince and heir-apparent of the
kingdom of Navarre. The regiment appears to have been initially formed from the
remnants of disbanded local bandes which had been serving in the south-west of
France.22 When it officially entered into royal service in 1589, the regiment promptly
took the name of its mestre de camp, François de Valirault, undoubtedly in deference
to the royal Gardes now under Henri’s control. It only took the name of the Régiment
de Navarre on Valirault’s death in 1594, a moment when Henri also elevated Navarre
18 Susane, Ancienne, II, pp. 19-22; Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 112.
19 Susane, Ancienne, VIII, p. 34.
20 Ibid., II., p. 240; Bourgue, Piémont, p. 27.
21 Wood, King’s army, pp. 108-9.
22 Susane, Ancienne, III, pp. 1-10; Demiau, Histoire, p. 16; Daniel, Milice, II, p. 358.
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to vieux status.23 Thus, Navarre only became part of the royal army due to Henri IV’s
accession to the throne, a major dynastic accident given there were three adult male
Valois still living at the time of the regiment’s foundation in 1569. Prior to 1589, it
was merely a private defence-force under the control of a junior sovereign prince.
Moreover, if one were to accept the 1560s for the regiment’s date of origin, it is still
necessary to recognise that this unit was probably only a reorganisation of pre-existing
south-western defence forces.
The ambiguous origins of the vieux are significant, as by the latter part of the
sixteenth-century seniority disputes began to arise amongst regimental commanders. A
regulation of 1588 stated that the regiments of the Gardes, Picardie and Champagne
should march based on the date on which they had entered into royal service. If
necessary, the date of the commission of their mestre de camp would act as a
tiebreaker.24 Later, at the siege of Chartres in 1591, Valirault had argued with the
commander of Picardie over which was the senior regiment. Henri ruled, undoubtedly
for political reasons, in Picardie’s favour. This manoeuvre entrenched Picardie’s
position as the second most senior regiment below the Gardes, but did not end the
disputes between the remaining three vieux. In 1620, Fontenay-Mareuil stated how the
army’s operation continued to be occasionally hindered by disputes among Piémont,
Navarre, and Champagne over regimental seniority. Each had its own argument as to
why it ‘devoir aller le premier’. Champagne simply stated ‘l’ancienneté de creation’,
Piémont claimed it could trace its origins back to the Colonel général ‘delà les monts’,
whilst Navarre argued that its seniority derived from its former status as the ‘Gardes
du Roy de Navarre’. Fontenay-Mareuil claimed that this dispute was ended by Louis
XIII in 1620. The king enforced a compromise whereby each regiment was declared of
equal rank, and that ‘de six mois en six mois ils auroient la preference les uns sur les
autres’.25 Other evidence suggests that Louis did not make this ruling until 1629, and,
in any case, seniority disputes would continue into Louis XIV’s reign, as the army
grew to encompass more permanent regiments from the 1620s.26
The very existence of these disputes over seniority attests to the ambiguous
origins of the royal regimental system. The transition from a system of impermanent
23 Demiau, Histoire, pp. 16-27; Susane, Ancienne, III, p. 29.
24 ‘Ordre et le Reglement que le Roy veut estre desormais gardé en la presence de marches des regimens
de ses gens de pied Francoise’, 12 November 1588, BnF Cangé, 5, f. 15r. Additional tiebreakers also
existed if the mestre de camp had received their commissions on the same day.
25 Fontenay-Mareuil, Mémoires, p. 149.
26 ‘Rang des regiments d’infanterie’, BnF Cangé, 5, ff. 276r, 278r-280v.
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infantry to bandes, and subsequently to permanent regiments was confused and by no
means certain. Indeed, Susane’s histories, and those of other nineteenth-century
regimental historians, were partly attempts to uncover a definite hierarchy in the early
French infantry that was unclear to many of those who had actually fought in the
regiments. Yet, it is probably significant that arguments of seniority began to emerge
in the late 1580s and early 1590s. It was not until this period that the vieux had
developed enough institutional self-consciousness to begin to conceive of themselves
as permanent bodies with discernable histories, even if they could not exactly
determine their origins.
II - The Retrenchments of the 1590s and the Maintenance of the Regiments
after 1598
The preceding section has shown the difficulties in trying to pin-point the exact period,
let alone year, in which regiments definitively came into existence, due to their linkage
to older forms of military organisation, coupled with the constant reorganisation and
disbanding of regiments which occurred for much of the second half of the sixteenth
century. Rather than attempting to uncover the exact moment of their creation, it is
more instructive to approximate the period in which the organisational stability of
certain core regiments was truly confirmed, if one wishes to develop a more precise
understanding of the evolution of the royal army into a permanent force.
This did not happen until 1598 and the succeeding decade. Due to the signing
of the Edict of Nantes, which ended the crown’s wars against the Ligue, and the Peace
of Vervins, which terminated hostilities with Spain, a mass disbandment of royal
troops occurred in the summer of 1598. This was a moment of reckoning for the royal
infantry. The monarchy had to decide which regiments would have their status as
permanent units of force confirmed. Most did not survive. In the wake of the peace
treaties of 1598, almost the entire French infantry was disbanded. This was the first
such réformation to occur since the start of the eighth war of religion in the early
1580s, when only the Gardes, out of all the infantry regiments, had truly assured
permanent status. As such, if the earlier wars of religion had given birth to the
regiments, only after 1598 did the monarchy categorically recognise which regiments
had earned the right to exist on a permanent and secure basis, warfare or not.
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Such a situation was partly borne from necessity. Maximilien de Béthune,
baron de Rosny and future duc de Sully, had written to Henri in April 1598 to tell him
that once the general peace was declared, the monarchy would have to retrench a
‘bonne partie’ of the infantry regiments along with certain garrisons, a situation which
reflected the dire financial straits of the monarchy by the late 1590s.27 In November
1598, Henri wrote to Sully that he was pleased a payment had been made to ‘le
regiment de mes gardes, comme quatre aultres regimens’, and, by May 1599, Sully
had begun to regularise payments to these units.28 Thus, only the original five vieux
regiments had been confirmed as permanent in 1598. That these regiments were
maintained from this date can be seen through their consistent appearance on revues
and états. The revues analysed for this dissertation in the Ms.Fr. 25000 series show
company musters from vieux regiments throughout 1598 to 1601 and 1605 to 1606.
There is no reason to believe that they were disbanded between these dates. Together
with their appearance on états from 1608 to 1610, this demonstrates that the vieux
were maintained throughout the 1600s, despite the decade being perhaps the most
peaceful of the 1560 to 1660 century.
However, whilst the regiments as an overall unit of infantry organisation were
consistently maintained after 1598, the size of each regiment was variable. Indeed, it is
difficult to give any definite number for the size of the vieux during this period, not
least because any historian who attempts to calculate the size of an early modern army
is faced with multiple methodological problems.29 For one, deciding on a specific
moment when one should record an army’s size as representative of a whole period is
fraught with difficulties, and borders on the futile, at least until the improvements in
military administration that occurred under Louis XIV. Accordingly, the following
paragraphs will merely give an overview of both the royal attempts at standardisation,
and the actual fluctuations in company and regimental size, of the vieux during the
first thirty years of the seventeenth century.
27 Sully, Mémoires, I, p. 281.
28 Henri IV to Sully, 6 November 1598, 8 May 1599, LMHIV, V, p. 64, VIII, p. 732. For convenience,
Maximilien de Béthune will be referred to as Sully throughout this dissertation, despite the fact he did
not acquire the baronnie of Sully until 1602, which became a duché in 1606.
29 The most pertinent of these issues is when and what does one record as army size? The peak size it
reaches during mobilisation? Its final strength after a long campaign? The most realistic number that the
monarchy could maintain over an entire campaign? Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, pp. 164-222, considers
many of these issues, whilst also attempting to give a very reasonable estimate of French army size
during a slightly later period to that of this thesis.
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Unfortunately, no états remain from the immediate post-retrenchment years of
1598 or 1599 to judge how the coming of peace affected the regiments in the extreme
short-term. Yet, it is clear that the general trend between 1598 and 1610 was one of
contraction. Between 1597 and April 1598, the theoretical maximum strength of vieux
companies seems to have been set at 100 men.30 At the same time, the number of
companies in each regiment varied. In January 1597, the Gardes had twenty
companies, Picardie forty-six, Navarre twenty-five, Piémont twenty, and Champagne
twenty-seven. In the aftermath of the peace treaties, the prestige of the Gardes was
emphasised as its companies were larger than those in the other vieux. Between 1601
and 1610, the regiment had a peacetime strength of 80 men per company.31 In contrast,
most of the other companies in the quatre-vieux were reduced to a peacetime strength
of thirty-five men per company by 1601.32 The only exceptions were a small number
of companies from Navarre, Champagne and Piémont maintained in Provence, which
had eighty-five men per company. Efforts at reducing the number of companies per
regiment to around twenty also appear to have occurred during the 1600s.33 By the end
of the decade, the Gardes had been reduced to eighteen companies, Picardie fifteen,
Navarre twenty, Piémont eighteen, and Champagne nineteen. Thus, by Henri IV’s
death, the total theoretical peacetime strength of the Gardes and quatre-vieux was
4,505 men. To this figure can be added two companies of ‘gens de guerre a pied
Suisses de cent hommes chacune servans pres sa Majesté pour sa garde’. These may
well have been the Cent-Suisses de la garde, although it is notable that two companies
of 100 Swiss are listed. Additionally, there were ten companies of sixty men in Bourg,
and five companies of 100 men in Nerestang, which were also permanently
maintained from the mid-1600s.34 This gives the permanent infantry a total theoretical
peacetime strength of 5,805 men between 1607 and early 1610.35
Further attempts to standardise both the size and number of companies in the
permanent regiments occurred in the aftermath of Henri IV’s assassination. In a
peacetime état from 1611, the number of companies in the Gardes was set at twenty,
with each company composed of 120 men. The other vieux were also to contain
30 Revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25832 (1391, 1416-7, 1427, 1430); Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 107.
31 Revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1940-3) for June 1605, and BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2183-6) for April 1609.
32 Revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835.
33État, BnF Na.Fr., ff. 140r-170r; état, BnF Na.Fr. 24842, ff. 130r-146v.
34 The origins of Bourg and Nerestang will be discussed in detail in Chapter Four.
35 In addition, approximately 6,500 troops were maintained solely for garrison purposes across the
kingdom during the same period: État, BnF Na.Fr. 24842, ff. 1r-126r.
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twenty companies, yet at a uniform strength of fifty men each, causing a decrease in
troop numbers for those companies stationed in Provence, and an increase for the
remainder. The regiments of Nerestang and Bourg were to maintain ten companies of
fifty soldiers. Finally, the Swiss were to increase the strength of each of their two
companies from 100 to 300 soldiers.36 This increased the permanent peacetime royal
infantry forces to a theoretical strength of 8,000 men. On the basis of surviving revues,
the measures of this état appear to have taken hold, although fluctuations are visible.37
During periods of warfare, company sizes naturally increased, yet there
remained a difference between companies in the Gardes and quatre-vieux. 100 men
per company was the theoretical campaign strength of quatre-vieux companies during
the warfare of the 1620s, just as it had been during the siege of Amiens.38 In contrast,
Gardes companies technically had a combat strength of 200 men per company
between 1610 and 1629, although their actual size was usually between 160 and 180
persons. However, during the Mantuan campaign in 1630, the size of Gardes
companies was increased still further to 300 men.39
It would thus be misleading to give a definitive figure for company or
regimental size in this period, other than to say companies tended to range between 80
and 200 men for the Gardes, 35 and 100 for the quatre-vieux, and that vieux regiments
contained around twenty companies after 1598. Official company size was dependent
on whether the monarchy was at peace or at war, and attrition rates caused the wartime
sizes of companies to further vary. Whilst regimental sizes may have fluctuated, the
key contention of this section is that a certain number of infantry units were
permanently maintained throughout the early seventeenth century. This force was built
on the basis of several permanent regiments: the Gardes, quatre-vieux and, from the
mid-1600s, Nerestang and Bourg. These regiments were thus increased and decreased
in response to war and peace, instead of completely new units being levied at the start
36 État, BnF Cangé, 21, ff. 21r-22r. This document does not list the names of any of the officers within
the regiments, and merely outlines their proposed organisational structure.
37 For example, in early 1620, i.e. between the first and second Wars of the Mother and Son, many
quatre-vieux companies appear to have been reduced to 35 men: état, BnF Ms.Fr. 16718 ff. 185r-198r.
38 A revue en masse took place in Poitiers in September 1620 of the quatre-vieux, where both their
theoretical strength of 100 was listed, and their actual size, which varied between sixty-eight and ninety
men per company. Subsequent revues from September 1621, March 1622, and October 1628 confirm
that 100 was the theoretical maximum warfare company size after 1620 for the quatre-vieux. État, BnF
Ms.Fr. 16718 ff. 205v-252v; revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (285); revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (293); revues,
BnF Ms.Fr. 25849 (518).
39 Revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (149-152); revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25849 (540, 543-7); Chagniot, ‘Gardes’,
p.107.
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of each campaign. They constituted a core of permanent infantry force under the
monarchy’s command.
III - The Stationing of the Regiments during Peacetime, 1598-1610.
The revues and états can also be used as a means of ascertaining where the vieux were
stationed after the 1598 retrenchment and during the largely peaceful 1600s.
Attempting to expand the discussion beyond this date is problematic. Firstly, many
more revues have survived from the period between 1598 and 1610 than that of 1611
to 1629. Secondly, certain états do not state where units were stationed. On the 1608-
10 états, sixteen out of eighteen Gardes companies, all fifteen in Picardie, sixteen out
of twenty in Navarre, fourteen out of eighteen in Piémont and five out of nineteen in
Champagne, are noted as merely ‘serviront a la campagne et autres lieux selon et ainsy
qu’ilz seront ordonnez et departies par Sa Majestie’. Finally, after 1610, most of the
revues and états that have survived were taken whilst the army was on campaign, and
thus can only be taken as a temporary representation of where the regiments were
located.
These caveats aside, certain trends are discernable with relation to vieux
stationing during the 1600s. Père Daniel stated that the Gardes was headquartered in
Paris, but that its companies were stationed in various suburbs around the city.40 From
the remaining evidence, this contention appears to be broadly correct. Fifty-one of the
sixty-seven revues of the Gardes between May 1598 and the end of 1610 took place in
Paris or its immediate vicinity. Three rolls from January 1598 state that the revues
were occurring in the ‘plaine de Vaugirard’ near the ‘châteaux de Paris’, which at that
point was located on the south-west outskirts of the city.41 Whether these revues
merely occurred outside Paris due to the necessity of finding space to effectively
muster so many men, or whether they reflected the fact the regiment was not
garrisoned inside the city itself is unclear. However – and whilst neither part of the
Maison du Roi, nor an outright bodyguard regiment – the location of the Gardes was
probably linked to the king’s movements, given the access to the Court that many
Gardes captains clearly enjoyed.42 Indeed, certain revues took place at or near royal
40 Daniel, Milice, II, p. 180.
41 Revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25852 (1413, 1415-6)
42 See Chapter Two, Section II of this dissertation.
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palaces, with two occurring in Fontainebleau, and one in St Germain-en-Laye,43 whilst
seven revues occurred at Melun or Montereau-Fault-Yonne, both within reasonable
proximity to Fontainebleau. This kept the regiment, during the 1600s, at least within
the Île-de-France, if not within the wider confines of Paris itself.
Companies from the other vieux regiments were mainly stationed in border
provinces. On the revues, regimental companies were noted as being in a certain place
‘pour le service du roy’, and thus appear to have been considered temporary adjuncts
to, rather than parts of, the permanent garrisons in the towns in which they were
located. Picardie seems to have been based mainly in Picardy, with thirty-three of the
thirty-seven revues occurring in towns of this province. For the three other vieux, the
états state that four companies from Navarre, four from Piémont and five from
Champagne were ‘present en plusieurs endroicts du pais de Provence’; eight
companies from Champagne were stationed in ‘plusieurs lieux du pais de Bresse’; and
the mestre de camp company of Champagne was named as being in Champagne. The
revues help confirm this information, but also hint to other places where the regiments
were stationed. Thus, whilst six of Navarre’s thirty-five revues were made in Provence
(all in Toulon), twenty-two occur in Picardy, with the remainder made in Normandy,
Burgundy, and Bourg-en-Bresse. For Piémont, twenty-two out of thirty-five revues
occurred in Picardy, with the remainder in Provence, Champagne, Bourg-en-Bresse,
and Verdun. Finally, for Champagne, all but three of its revues occurred in
Champagne itself.
The vieux thus seem to have been mainly distributed between towns within
Picardy, Champagne, Provence, Bresse and the Three Bishoprics of Metz, Toul and
Verdun. The presence of units in Provence and Bresse may well have been a hangover
from the Savoy War of 1600-1601. Bresse had been acquired in the treaty of Lyon in
1601, and garrisoning the area allowed the French to threaten the passage of Habsburg
troops along the Spanish Road. Troops may also have been sent into Provence to
bolster the security of France’s south-western frontier due to the loss of Saluzzo to
Savoy.44 Indeed, the overall spread of vieux troops probably reflected the monarchy’s
belief that any threat to the kingdom was most likely to come at its north-east, east,
and south-eastern borders. Moreover, the notably high presence of vieux troops in
43 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25834 (1592); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1947); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2182).
44 Geoffrey Parker, ‘The Treaty of Lyon (1601) and the Spanish Road’, in Empire, War and Faith in
Early Modern Europe, (London, 2002), pp. 126-142.
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Picardy not only reflected where much of the conflict of the 1590s had occurred, but
strengthens Potter’s argument regarding the royal militarisation of this province during
the first half of the sixteenth century.45 Presumably, the monarchy’s regular garrisons
in the south-west and west of France were felt to be sufficient to defend the kingdom
from any form of direct attack from Spain or on France’s western seaboard, or that the
likelihood of such events was considered slim. It is perhaps notable, however, that this
area corresponds to that part of the Midi with a major Huguenot presence. Indeed,
regimental troops do not seem to have been stationed in this region until after the
campaigns of the early 1620s, when Champagne was kept in garrison near La
Rochelle, and Picardie and Normandie were stationed in Montpellier, in the aftermath
of the peace treaty of 1622. Henri IV may have thus considered this area to be
relatively pacified during the 1600s, or may not have had, or wished to spend, the
finance necessary to raise additional regimental troops to form adjunct-garrisons in
these areas or to contest Huguenot military authority. In any case, that the three major
mobilisations of the royal army between 1598 and 1610 occurred in Savoy, Sedan and
Jülich appears to vindicate the monarchy’s positioning of its regiments.
Despite these regional concentrations, the standing army thus appears to have
been a much more of a kingdom-wide body than previous royal forces such as the
bandes, which had often followed the relatively rigid division of troops into those
‘decà’ and ‘délà les monts’. A few other points are worthy of note. Firstly, troops from
more than one regiment were rarely placed together in the same town. The main
exceptions to this rule are in Picardy, where troops from Picardie and Navarre are
found in certain towns in similar periods,46 and in Metz, where companies from the
Gardes, Picardie, and Champagne can all be found during the 1600s.47 Additionally,
that units from Navarre, Champagne, and Piémont were all stationed in Bresse may
suggest that they served in relatively close-quarters. Secondly, several units were
stationed in the same town for fairly considerable periods of time. For example, the
Navarre company under Jacques de Laur can be found in Montreuil in late 1599,
before four revues place it in Doullens between 1601 and 1611.48 This may have
45 Potter, War and the Provinces, pp. 15-20.
46 For instance in Ardres, Revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1934-5), and Doullens, revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835
(1660, 1692).
47 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1674); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25837 (1898); revue, BnF PO 609 (14320),
piece 9.
48Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25384 (1583); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1692); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25839 (1991);
revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (86).
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given regimental captains the opportunity to interact with the nobility of the local area,
as will be explored below.49 Whether or not captains remained in the same area or not,
the repeated appearance of certain captains on revues hints at a trend which will now
be more fully discussed: the permanency of regimental companies, and the security of
officer positions within them.
IV– Companies: Steps towards Permanence and Stability within the Vieux
As has been stated in the previous section, a regiment was divided up into a number of
smaller sub-units called companies.50 Each company was commanded by a captain.
Serving under him were a number of subordinate officers, including men in the
subaltern ranks of lieutenant and ensign, and lower officers such as sergeants and
corporals. The stability of company composition within the regiments during the
period of this dissertation has not previously been investigated, yet is a matter which
says much about the evolution of royal military office during the early modern
period.51 Indeed, permanency of regimental organisation does not necessarily imply
stability among the command and organisation of companies. As can be seen after
1635, the crown frequently exercised its ability to disband and reorganise regimental
companies when it saw fit;52 a policy which echoed, in many respects, royal attitudes
toward regimental companies during the early stages of the civil wars.
Tracking the stability of regimental captains during the period of this
dissertation can be primarily achieved through tracking the names of captains who are
recorded in a series of états between 1588 and 1623.53 As Jean-Louis de Nogaret de La
Valette, duc d’Épernon was technically always captain of the compagnie colonelle,
49 See Chapter Two, Section II of this dissertation.
50 Companies are occasionally referred to as ensigns in contemporary documents, a hangover from the
sixteenth century.
51 The closest to such an analysis is a ‘chronologie des capitaines des trente-trois compagnies des gardes
francoises depuis leur creation’ found in Noeufville, Abrégé Chronologique, III, pp. 191-280. In this
work, the captains of each Gardes company are listed (although their full names are not always stated)
from a company’s inception until 1734-5. The companies are listed in deference to their hierarchy in the
early eighteenth century, rather than the date of their first levy. Unfortunately, no similar chronology
exists for the other regiments.
52 Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, pp. 328-330.
53 Unfortunately, I have been unable to locate an état from 1629-30, which would have shown how the
regiments were disrupted by the warfare of the 1620s. All subsequent reference to états will come from
the following sources: ‘Lettres patentes du Roy…’, 12 August, 1588, SHDAT, X14, n.p.; ‘Estat des
regimens …’ January 1597, SHDAT, X14, n.p.; état, 1600, BnF Cangé, 5 ,8r; état, 1610, BnF Na.Fr.
24842, ff. 130r-146v; état, 1620, BnF Ms.Fr. 16718 ff. 156v-163r, 205v-252v; état, 1623, BnF Ms.Fr.
16726 ff. 203r-206v and 293r-297r.
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this company will be discounted from this discussion unless it is possible to identify
and compare changes to its lieutenancy, as the person who held this position was both
the lieutenant colonel of the regiment and the de facto commander of the company.54
This section will note whether ‘new’ captains were actually ‘new’ to the regimental
system, or whether they had merely been promoted from other positions of regimental
command, whilst leaving a detailed examination of the mechanics of promotion for
discussion in another chapter. Whilst this section will mainly focus on regimental
captains, certain references to the permanency of subaltern positions will also be made
to emphasise the wider security of regimental office during this period. Finally, for the
sake of brevity, examples will be taken mainly from companies within the Gardes,
Picardie and Navarre.
On the basis of the only vieux regiments recorded on the 1588 état – the
Gardes, Picardie, and Champagne – relatively high levels of fluctuation among
captains are visible during the warfare between 1588 and 1597. Of the twelve Gardes
captains listed in 1588, only ‘Saincte Colombe’, ‘Campagno’, and ‘Crillon’ (the
mestre de camp) are still present in 1597. Additionally, the ‘Montigny’ listed in 1588
was Antoine de La Grange de Montigny, sieur d’Arquien, who had become lieutenant
colonel by 1597. Of the fifteen Picardie captains named in 1588, only two re-appear in
any sense in 1597. Captain ‘Forille’ was Blaise de Chaumejean, sieur and later
marquis de Fourilles, who would become a Gardes captain in 1594, and thus
subsequently appears on the 1597 état within the Gardes regiment.55 The ‘La Serre’
who appears as a Picardie captain in 1588, reappears on the états of 1597, 1620 and
1623. Three muster rolls from 1605, 1609 and 1611 have Antoine de La Serre as a
captain in Picardie, with Paul Cochon, sieur de Goupillon as lieutenant and Charles de
Blecourt as ensign. Given that a ‘Goupillon’ is again listed as being the lieutenant of a
‘La Serre’ on the 1623 état, there is the possibility that the same ‘La Serre’ had
command of this company from at least 1588 to 1623.56 None of the captains listed in
the Champagne état of 1588 appears to be still serving by 1597.
54 The compagnie colonelle was a regimental company in which the Colonel General technically held
the power of appointment over all company positions. They are listed on all the above états for each
vieux regiment, except for Champagne between 1588 and 1610, for unknown reasons. Whilst Parrott
has stated that these companies existed in every régiment entretenu, the extent to which they were
present in non-vieux regiments will be considered in Chapter Six of this thesis. Parrott, Richelieu’s
Army, p. 471.
55 Anonymous biography, BnF DB 178 (4640) f. 15r.
56 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1934); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2171); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25842 (74).
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Thus, of the thirty-one captains named in the three vieux regiments in 1588,
only six definitely survived, in any sense, until 1597. Whilst this number may appear
low, it should be recalled that the period 1588-97 saw the vieux almost continuously
engaged in warfare against the Ligue and Spain, during which a number of regimental
captains were killed in action. Moreover, even in the 1690s, only a minority of officers
enjoyed a military career lasting more than ten years in total, including their time spent
as subalterns.57 That several captains can already be found, by the 1590s, holding their
positions for at least a decade points to a degree of stability having emerged within the
regiments with regard to company-level office-holding. This trend may well have
emerged over the course of the eighth War of Religion, when the vieux regiments
appear to have no longer been subjected to the periodic bouts of reorganisation that
they had previously suffered.
If the picture in the decade prior to 1597 suggests that office-holding within
vieux companies had begun to stabilise, and that captaincies could be held for lengthy
periods of time, this trend is confirmed in the thirty years after the Peace of Vervins.
Three of the captains recorded in the Gardes in 1588 are still present in the état of
1620: the sieurs de Sainte-Colombe, Campaigno and Fourilles.58 These numbers
increase if the états from 1597 and 1620 are compared, with an additional six
companies appearing under the same name throughout: ‘Tilladet’, ‘Drouet’, ‘Valence’,
‘La Salle’, ‘Castelnau’, and ‘Meux’. Whilst this number is high in itself, especially
compared to the flux of the 1588-97 period, it would still imply that almost half of the
captains in the Gardes changed in the twenty-three years after 1597.
However the actual level of fluctuation of company command can be
questioned through a more detailed study of changes between 1597 and 1610. Two
companies – those commanded by the Gaillard de Salerne and Daniel Germaincourt,
sieur de Buffé – were disbanded, reducing the size of the regiment from twenty to
eighteen companies. Out of the remaining eighteen companies, only five captaincies
changed command. One did so after 1600, when Charles de Blanchefort, marquis de
Créquy took over the position of mestre de camp from Crillon. The other four all
received their appointments between 1597 and 1598. The sieur d’Arquien was
appointed to the position of lieutenant colonel, at some point in 1597. The three other
positions were vacated by Jean de Salbeuf, François de Colleville and Jonathan de
57 Rowlands, Dynastic State, p. 253.
58 Sainte-Colombe was promoted to lieutenant colonel of the regiment in 1610.
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Thianges, sieur de Roulet who had all died at the siege of Amiens.59 They were filled
by ‘Mansan’, ‘Casteljaloux’ and ‘Mainville’ between 1597 and 1598. All of these
names were listed as captains on the 1597 état for Picardie, and they remained in the
Gardes until the 1620 état and beyond. Thus, after the 1597 état one of the five
captaincy changes within the Gardes came from the promotion of an existing captain
within the Gardes, and another three may have come from captains promoted from
Picardie. Moreover, the Gardes only underwent one change of company commander
between the 1598 retrenchment and the beginning of 1610. Overall, therefore, few
captaincies within the Gardes changed hands in the 1600s, and those.vacancies which
did arise may largely have been filled by existing captains within the permanent
regiments.
By 1620, nine of the companies remained under the same command as they
had been in 1610. The Gardes had been re-set to twenty companies in 1612. Three of
the ‘new’ captains were products of internal promotion. Sainte-Colombe was made
lieutenant colonel at some point after Arquien’s resignation in 1610, whilst
‘Montigny’ and ‘Besne’ had previously been colonel-ensign and a lieutenant within
the regiment, respectively, and took over the companies previously commanded by
Sainte-Colombe and Bellay. One of the new captains, ‘Toiras’, had only taken over the
company of Joachim de Montagu, sieur de Frémigières in 1620 itself, after the latter
had been appointed to command it at some point between 1588 and 1596.
Applaincourt took over the company of the sieur de Bours on his death in 1616. Of the
other new captains, ‘Bourdet’, had received one of the newly levied companies in
1612, ‘Gohas’ was a Biran, and thus related to the Casteljaloux, and ‘Roderie’
subsequently left his company to a family member at an unspecified future date.60 Due
to the absence of a full état of any of the regiments in the later 1620s, it can only be
speculated how the Gardes was affected by the warfare of this decade. Of the new
captains that it is possible to identify, continuity of overall company command and
further appointments from the other vieux are visible. ‘Porcheux’ was promoted from
Navarre, whilst Toiras left his company to Restinclières, his brother, after being
appointed mestre de camp of Champagne. Overall, therefore, there was a significant
level of stability at a company level within the Gardes. Almost half of the regiment’s
59 J. François d’Hozier, L’impôt du sang, ou la noblesse de France sur les champs de bataille, (3 vols.,
Paris, 1874-1881), III, p. 326; état, BnF Cangé, 5, f. 5r.
60 État, BnF Cangé, 5, f. 9v; Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 110.
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companies are recorded as being under the same name between 1597 and 1620, around
three-quarters of captains maintained their offices throughout the shorter 1597 to 1610
period, and many ‘new’ captains may have in fact been promoted from other vieux
regiments.
Owing to its larger number of companies in 1597, the composition of Picardie
was initially subject to a greater degree of flux than the Gardes. Picardie, in January
1597, had been composed of a colossal forty-six companies.61 By the 1608 état,
recorded in late 1607, Picardie was comprised of only 15 companies, before being
increased to twenty companies in 1611. Yet, and despite Picardie shrinking to almost
a third of the size that it had been at the end of the eighth civil war, continuity amongst
its captains is still evident after 1597. Aside from the three captains who had possibly
moved into the Gardes regiment, seven of the captains on the 1610 état are under the
same name as those on the 1597 état. Of the twenty-three companies listed in 1620,
eleven are listed under the same name as in 1610, including the continuation of the
Sieur de Salcède as lieutenant colonel. The état for March, 1623, taken whilst the
regiment was stationed in Montpellier, saw the regiment reduced to twenty companies,
of which nine were listed under the same name as in 1620. Thus, despite Picardie’s
role at the forefront of much of the warfare which had taken place in the first three
years of the 1620s, around half the captains had ostensibly managed to retain their
command. If the composition of Picardie in 1597 is compared to 1623, prima facie
only four captains appear to have stayed the course. However, two other captains
present on the 1610, 1620 and 1623 états can also be found on muster rolls dating
back to 1600-1601, and would thus have had a captaincy within the regiment for at
least twenty years.62 Thus, just as in the Gardes there is enough evidence to suggest
that stability of command was reasonably assured in Picardie after the 1598
retrenchment. Whilst many captains did lose their company in the first decade of the
century, this was largely due to the bloated nature of the regiment by the culmination
of the warfare of the 1590s. Continuity in captaincy holding was therefore a far more
achievable goal in Picardie in the early seventeenth century than it had been in the
second half of the sixteenth century.
Of all the vieux, the regiment which most clearly exhibits continuity of
command after 1598 is Navarre. Unfortunately, a full état of company commanders
61 Forty-nine if one counts the three companies that are listed as having been ‘licentiées’
62 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25834 (1620); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1660).
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does not appear to have survived from the late 1580s or the early 1590s, so it is not
possible to detect how much flux there was within its companies during the period
when it became part of the royal army. However, on the basis of two revues that
survive from 1593, continuity does appear to be present between certain captains of
the 1590s and the post-1598 period. Bertrand de Mazelière, a captain in 1593, had
risen to the position of lieutenant colonel by at least 1601, and retained this position
until some point before 1617 when the sieur de Joffre was promoted.63 Similarly,
Valirault’s lieutenant in 1593, Antoine de Montamet, may well be the ‘Montamet’
listed as a captain on the 1597 état.64
Some captains clearly lost their commissions in the decade after 1597 as by
1610 the regiment was reduced to twenty companies from twenty-five. However, of
these twenty captains, fifteen are listed under a name which also appeared in 1597. If
Mazelière had obtained the position of lieutenant colonel by 1597, which is probable,
this would increase the figure to sixteen.65 Moreover, of the four remaining ‘new
captains’ in 1610, Laur is found on a muster roll as Jacques de Laur in September
1597, whilst a member of the Saint-Cricq can be found commanding a Navarre
company in rolls from 1600.66 When one compares the états of 1610 to 1620, twelve
of the commanders are listed under the same name (thirteen if Joffre’s promotion to
lieutenant colonel is counted). Finally, if one compares the 1597 état to the 1620, nine
of the captains appear under the same name, to which number should be added the
other long-term commanders Joffre, Laur and Saint-Cricq. Thus, after 1597, Navarre
enjoyed a great degree of stability, with over half the regiment’s companies recorded
under the same family name over a twenty-year period.
The appearance of the same name across multiple états does not necessarily
imply that the exact same individual held the captaincy for the entire period in
question. Determining whether this is the case or not can be achieved in two main
ways. Firstly, where possible, names on the états can be cross-referenced with revues
from the same period. These revues not only give a better impression of an
individual’s full name, and hence whether they are being recorded on the état by their
surname or seigneurie, but can also give an immediate answer as to whether the same
person is commanding the same company. Moreover, the revues can also be used to
63 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25826 (857); Bassompierre, Mémoires, II, p.185; Le Roux, Faveur, p. 531.
64 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25826 (836).
65 The 1597 état does not list any of the lieutenant colonels.
66 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25832 (1393); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25834 (1613).
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demonstrate that security of office had spread to the lower company grades within the
vieux during the same period. Secondly, documents within the Cabinet des Titres, and
other genealogical sources, are often helpful in fleshing out the service records of
certain individuals and families.
Clearly some of those named on the états refer to the same individual
commanding the same companies throughout the period. ‘Bonnouvrier’, who appears
on the 1588, 1597, 1600 and 1610 états clearly refers to Pepin de Bonnouvrier, who
had been provided with a Gardes captaincy in 1583, maintained it until his death in
1617, and who appears as a captain on muster rolls in 1598, 1603, 1609 and 1615. One
of his subalterns and one sergeant are also consistently seen, showing that Pepin was
commanding the same company throughout.67 Other examples can be found within the
Gardes. ‘La Salle’, found on 1597, 1600, 1610 and 1620 états is Louis I de Caillebot,
sieur de La Salle, who can be found in revues from 1598, 1605, 1613 and 1621
captaining a company with the same lieutenant and two sergeants. Louis I de Caillebot
had received his Gardes commission in 1596, and commanded the same company
until his death in 1624.68 ‘Castelnau’ who appears on the états of 1597, 1610 and
1620, is Mathurin de Castelnau, a figure never referred to on revues by his full title,
the sieur de Rouvre, and who can be found commanding the same company in revues
from 1598, 1605, 1609 and 1613. He held the captaincy of this company from 1596
until his death in 1622.69
Similar examples can be pieced together from the other vieux. ‘Busca’ found on
the 1597, 1610, 1620 and 1623 Picardie états is Barthélemy de Montlezun, sieur de
Busca, found captaining the same company on revues from 1601 and 1605. A
marriage contract from 1632 states that Barthélemy was still a captain in the regiment
which, together with a ‘commission de capitaine’ from May 1589 for a company
within Picardie, shows Barthélemy de Montlezun served as a captain within the same
regiment for at least forty-three years.70 ‘Hames’, on the 1597, 1610 and 1620
67 Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, p. 253; revue BnF Ms.Fr. 25832 (1451); revue, BnF Ms.Fr.
25841 (2186); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (152); revue, BnF PO 413 (9211), p. 4.
68 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1500); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1975); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (113);
revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (271); revue, BnF DB 148 (3722) f. 10r.
69 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1485); revue, BnF Ms.Fr 25838 (1966); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2233);
revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (111); Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 111; Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, p.
250.
70 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1665); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1958); marriage contract, 30 January
1632, ‘Commission de capitaine d’une compagnie [...]’, 6 May 1589, BnF Cabinet 246 (6504), ff. 22r,
23v.
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Picardie états, can be found as Paul de Hames, sieur du Fresnoy in revues from 1597,
1598 1600 and 1611. The composition of the subalterns and sergeants within his
company remained entirely stable between 1597 and 1600, suggesting that captains
that were maintained sur pied after the 1598 retrenchment were allowed to keep the
same companies as they had done previously.71 Finally, within Navarre, the
‘Porcheux’ on the 1597, 1610 and 1620 états is Charles d’Aubourg, sieur de Porcheux,
who can be found commanding a company with the same lieutenant between 1601 and
1622, and the same ensign between at least 1605 and 1620.72
However, other cases show that companies did change hands between relatives in
this period, despite being recorded under the same name on the états. The name
Campaigno, appears in a variety of spellings, on the Gardes états for 1588, 1597,
1600, 1610, 1620, along with being on the Picardie état for 1588. The Campaigno
named in the Gardes in 1588 is Bertrand Patras, sieur de Campaigno. He had held a
commission in Picardie until 1584 when he resigned it in favour of his brother, Michel
Patras de Campaigno, who still held the charge in 1588, but who no longer did so by
1597. Judging by revues on which he is present, Bertrand continued to hold his
captaincy in the Gardes until at least 1609. As Bertrand died in 1617, and a
Campaigno can be found on the 1620 Gardes état, the company must have changed
hands whilst remaining under the control of the Patras. Indeed, Chagniot has stated
that the family commanded the company until 1622. As such, the case advanced by de
Noeufville is plausible: that a ‘Michel de Patras de Campagnols’ inherited the
company from Bertrand, who was probably the brother listed above, and that the
company was subsequently commanded by Gaspard de Coligny, sieur de Saligny (who
was not related to them).73
Within the quatre-vieux similar examples exist which are even harder to flesh-
out. In 1597, 1610 and 1620 a company appears on the Champagne états under the
name of ‘Lezines’. However, on the basis of two muster rolls found, the company
seems to have changed hands between a Jean de Lezines found in 1599 and a Charles
71 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25831 (1378); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1502); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25834 (1612);
revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25842 (72).
72 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1667); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25837 (1899); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (295).
Porcheux’s ensign is listed on the 1620 état.
73Unfortunately, Noeufville does not give dates for when these changes in command occurred:
Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, p. 247. See also: J.B. de Luppé, Mémoires et caravanes de J.B.
de Luppé du Garrané. Suivis des Mémoires de son neveu, J.B. de Larrocan d'Aiguebère, (ed.) Joseph
Louis, comte de Luppé, (Paris, 1865), p.200; revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25832 (1463); revues, BnF Ms.Fr.
25838 (1974); revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2185); Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 110.
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de Lezines recorded in 1620. Due to a lack of genealogical information, the exact
relationship between these two men is unclear.74 Finally, within Navarre, a ‘Trion’
found on the 1597, 1610 and 1620 états appears three times in the revues, twice as
Pierre de Trion in 1599 and 1601 and then as François de Trion in 1622. A nineteenth-
century historian, Émile Coët, cited evidence that Pierre de Trion, sieur de Dancourt
was an ‘ancien capitaine’ of Navarre by 1625, yet did not die until 1630.75 In the cases
of both the Trion and Lezines, the two men named may well have been related, but
this cannot be confirmed.
Lastly, even in cases where the command of a company did change during this
period, subaltern and lower-ranked company officers usually remained in place.76 This
can be seen quite clearly in the Gardes. Créquy maintained Crillon’s subalterns and
NCOs when he took over the latter’s company in 1605.77 When François de Jussac
d’Ambleville, sieur de Saint-Preuil took over the captaincy of Saligny’s company in
1627 (Saligny himself probably having received his appointment in 1622), he
maintained Saligny’s subalterns in place, including Louis de Pontis as lieutenant.78
Overall, therefore, the stability of company office within the vieux during the
period of this dissertation is quite striking. Many units are recorded as being under the
same command for periods of over ten years. When a company did change hands, the
‘new’ captain had often been promoted from another vieux company or had some form
of relation to the previous incumbent. Moreover, due to the security of office also
enjoyed by subalterns and sergeants, it can be seen that many ‘new’ captains were in
fact taking over pre-existing companies, rather than levying completely new units.
Thus, vieux companies do not seem to have been subjected to either frequent changes
in commander, or wider reformation or reorganisation during the early seventeenth
century.
74 Revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1551); revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25845 (261). Another sieur de Lezines is also
found in the 1620 Picardie état.
75 Revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1557); revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1661); Émile Coët, Histoire de la Ville
de Roye, (2 vols., Paris, 1880), I, p. 134.
76 This contention, and its repercussions, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three, Section II.
77 If revues from 1601 and 1609 are compared, Crillon’s former lieutenant – Albert de Grillet, sieur de
Brissac - had moved up to ensign, and both his sergeants remained in the company. Revue, BnF Ms.Fr.
25835 (1717); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2183).
78 Pontis, Mémoires, II, 12-23; revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25849 (543).
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V – Bridging the Gap between Peace and War: Captains ‘retenuz’ in Service
Interestingly, a certain number of vieux captains can be found in a different section of
the 1608 to 1610 états to the rest of their regiments. In this part of the document, the
monarchy stated that it was to provide for ‘l’entretenment’ of a certain number of
mestres de camp and captains ‘appoinctez qui estoient des Regimens cy apres declarez
que Sa Majesté a choisis et retenuz pour estre appointez a son service et entrer cy
apres en la place de ceulz qui seront retenuz ausdites Regimens vaccation d’iceulx
advenant’. These were, therefore, officers who had previously served in royal
regiments, who had lost their companies during a period of disbandment, and who
were being retained on lower pay until a commission became available for them to
fill.79 Thirteen of these captains were listed under Picardie, compared to only one for
Piémont and three for Champagne, with thirty-four other captains listed under the
names of regiments which were not permanently kept sur pied. The tone of the
document thus suggests that captains would be placed back into regiments in which
they had previously held commissions, although this is not explicitly spelt out. Four of
the captains on the Picardie 1597 état – ‘Bidache’, ‘Brussailles’, ‘Brasse’, and
‘Baradat’ – are listed as being captains ‘retenuz’ in the Picardie section of the 1610
état. Thus, the monarchy was showing an eagerness to retain captains in royal service
even if they had lost their regimental companies, in order that they could be placed
back into their old regiments when positions became available. These ‘retained’
captains were paid about a third less than their full-time compatriots, earning 100
livres per montre as opposed to 150. Yet, this still equated to a fairly sizeable pension
of 1,000 livres per year.
By paying these captains, the monarchy showed it had grasped the advantages
of having an officer corps of experienced soldiers ready at the start of each war that
extended past the number of total companies kept permanently sur pied. These
captains could be used to ensure that newly levied companies did not have to have
‘freshman’ officers. For captains within the regiments, it further enhanced the idea that
their commission was permanent, even in times of peace when the army would
undergo retrenchment, although it must have introduced some doubt as to whether
79 None of the mestres de camp correspond to those found on the 1597 état, BnF Na.Fr. 24842 f. 163r.
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they would always have a company to command. The existence of these captains
would seem to foreshadow that of the officiers réformés found under Louis XIV: a
system of support (usually half-pay) for officers who had lost their commissions in a
post-war demobilisation or ‘réforme’. Rowlands’ contention that ‘there was no real
support for “reformed” officers’ before 1659 may not be completely true therefore as
at least one of the captains ‘retenuz’, ‘Brusailles’, had regained the command of a
company within Picardie.80 Whilst slim, there thus remained a chance that a captain
could regain a company after being reduced to ‘retenuz’ status, and if war broke out
these chances were undoubtedly improved.
The civil wars that engulfed France after 1561 gave rise to a new form of military
organisation within the royal army: the regiment. Determining the exact moment when
certain regiments came into existence is, in many respects, an unanswerable question,
due to the multiple, confused links between these newer forms of military
administration and older institutions such as the bandes. Moreover, the early existence
of even the vieux regiments was unstable, with the units being subject to arbitrary
moments of reorganisation and even disbandment, as occurred with the Gardes in
1573. Instead, this chapter has sought to focus on a more discernable and important
moment: the point at which certain royal regiments achieved a degree of security
which confirmed that they were permanent administrative units. As such, 1598 has
been taken as a key date in the evolution of the royal infantry regiments, and thus of
the standing army. The peace treaties of that year, and the dire financial situation of
the French monarchy, forced it to decide which part of the forces it had raised for the
wars of the 1580s and 1590s would be maintained in peacetime, if any. The answer to
this question, at least in terms of the infantry, was the vieux. Accordingly, and despite
their more or less continual existence from the late 1570s to early 1580s, it is possibly
only from 1598 that one can categorically consider them as régiments entretenus.
This chapter has also sought to show that not only were the vieux confirmed as
permanent at a regimental level, the companies which constituted them also achieved
security of tenure, as did the men who officered them. Many of the captains cited in
this chapter were able to hold their captaincies for periods of between ten and twenty
years. This would appear to match, if not better, the figures cited by historians for
80 Rowlands, Dynastic State, p. 175.
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officers under Louis XIV. Moreover, it also appears that those holding company
offices below the level of captain, such as subalterns and sergeants, were also able to
securely hold their positions. If anything, the period of relative peace and low-level
international conflict in the 1600s and 1610s may have favoured the long-term holding
of office within the vieux more than the high-levels of warfare during the 1690s and
1700s. At the very least, it should be recognised that long-term holding of regimental
office can be found in the early seventeenth century. In holding their positions,
captains could command the same company for lengthy periods of time, rather than
being subject to reassignment or regular reorganisations of companies. Indeed, save
for a few rare cases where vieux regiment captains were removed from their
commission for committing demonstrable acts of fraud or disloyalty to the monarchy
(which will be discussed below), captains were able to maintain command within the
same company for as long as they wished to exercise their charge. There was,
therefore, a significantly higher level of personnel and administrative continuity within
the regiments and their companies after 1598 than during the second half of the
sixteenth century.
Overall, this chapter has used prosoprographical data to provide a
comprehensive analysis of how the standing army emerged during the early
seventeenth century. It has demonstrated the central importance of detailed
investigations into office-holding as a means of charting how a permanent body of
royal regiments arose, rather than relying on the largely anecdotal evidence that
hitherto has been the basis for much of the historical discussion on the early standing
army. In doing so, it has shown that the rise of permanent infantry force in France was
dependent on the monarchy finding a body of men who were able, and willing, to
enter into long-term office-holding within royal military structures. Accordingly, the
next chapter of this thesis will explore the relationship between elements of the petite
noblesse and this new form of military force, as these families constituted the bulk of
the regimental officer corps.
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Chapter Two
The Satisfaction of Private Interest: Family Ambition, Social Relations and the
Early Standing Army.
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The stability of company composition demonstrated in the previous chapter allowed
certain noble families to dominate the royal army’s regimental structures. As has
already been implied, it is evident that many captains were able to pass their captaincy
on to a relative when they relinquished their command, thus keeping the company
under family control. Captains also had a considerable degree of influence over the
appointment to vacant positions within their companies, and usually took the
opportunity to implant family members or amis within subaltern positions wherever
possible. Such was the commitment of some families to the regiments, some were able
to obtain the command of more than one company within the vieux. Indeed, the
implantation of petite noblesse families within the regiments is so marked that it is
necessary to consider why they sought commissions within the infantry so fervently.
This chapter will advance the overall contention that families sought service
within the royal regiments as they were a means by which they could achieve social
advancement. Military service still remained the main means by which a family could
prove their nobility and hence status; a factor which had become even more marked
due to the wide-scale re-militarisation of the French nobility during the Wars of
Religion. Regimental service offered the potential for financial gain, promotion to the
higher ranks of the army, and, particularly within the Gardes, the ability to put one’s
self in the ‘royal gaze’. Many vieux officers were personally known to the king due to
the prominent role they played in warfare, placing them in a prime position to both
receive and distribute royal patronage. Moreover, service within the regiments allowed
families to enter into a new social environment, within which they could forge new
relationships. These were often formed with other noble families within the army.
Many of the bonds that regimental officers developed were thus with families of a
similar social station to themselves; ‘horizontal links’ that allowed them to entrench
their new-found social status as part of a group of families who constituted the
regimental officer corps. This chapter will focus on how the army’s new found
stability allowed such links of affinity to occur, leaving an examination of the more
‘vertical’ clienteles within the army to part two of this thesis.
Overall, when placed in a larger context, it becomes clear that regimental
service became part of the wider family strategy of members of the petite noblesse,
which was governed, above all, by their dynastic ambitions for social ascension.
Indeed, the ability of the early standing army to satisfy the private interests of at least a
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section of the French nobility was central to the evolution of royal military offices
during the early seventeenth century.
I – The Implantation of Noble Families within the vieux Regiments.
The French monarchy attempted to maintain control over appointments to its infantry
from an early stage in its development. Parrott has cited the 1439 ordonnance which
stated that a ‘certain nombre de gens d’armes et de traict sera ordonné pour la
conduite de la guerre, lesquels capitaines seront nommez et esleuz par le Roy’. The
conditions of this ordonnance were frequently republished up to at least the 1580s.1
Indeed, an ordonnance first published by François I in 1514, and subsequently
republished by Henri III, regarding ‘la levee, amas et conduite des compaignies des
gens de pied’ stated that no levies of infantry troops could be made ‘sans expresse
commission de nous [the crown]’ and that all ‘capitaines […] auront charge &
commission’ from the monarchy. Those captains who ‘tiennent la campagne sans
charge’ were to be ‘tailler en pieces’.2 This would seem to imply that the monarchy
sought to maintain full control over the appointment of infantry captains over the
course of the sixteenth century. Indeed, the king does appear to have intervened on
occasion with appointments to vacant company positions, and formal approval of the
inheritance of companies by family members remained necessary. However, the terms
of these ordonannces say nothing of the subaltern positions within the company.
Moreover, between the 1580s and the Code Michau of 1629, infantry ordonnances
failed to set forth any further guidelines relating to appointment within the infantry
regiments during a crucial period in their development, as the primary concern of
military legislation was a largely futile attempt to maintain discipline amongst soldiers
during the civil wars.3
1 ‘Gens de traict’ would have referred to archers within the army in the fifteenth century, and this
definition may well have expanded to more broadly encompass other infantry by the sixteenth century.
Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, p. 288. My emphasis.
2 Barnabé Brisson and Nicolas Frerort (eds.), Les basiliques ou edicts et ordonnances des roys de
France […], (Paris, 1611), pp. 1376-7.
3 See, for example, Brisson and Frerort, Les basiliques, pp. 1345-8, 1375-6, 1378-85, 1385-91, 1393-6
for ordonannces specifically relating to ‘gens de pied’ before 1589. The infantry ordonnances published
under Henri IV seem to have focussed almost entirely on maintaining discipline, e.g., ordonnances, BnF
Cangé 20, ff. 20-26v, 109r-111r from 1596 and 1603, the latter being a reprint of a document from
1590.
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Whatever powers the king theoretically maintained over regimental
appointments, it is quite clear that, in practice, regimental captains had an enormous
influence over the choice of their subalterns and even their successor to the company
command. This can be seen through the many cases of progressive installation of
family members within a company during the period of this dissertation. Barthélemy-
Scipion de Biran, sieur de Casteljaloux acquired his Gardes company in August 1597
due to the death of Jean de Salbeuf at the siege of Amiens. Five muster rolls then
appear between 1598 and 1629 which show firstly that Barthélemy-Scipion
maintained control of the company for the entirety of this period – at least one of his
sergeants, Ramond de Luquet, stayed in the company for the entire period in question.
In 1598, Barthélemy-Scipion had Royal de Montbel, and Nicolas Möy, sieur de
Riberpré as his lieutenant and ensign, persons to whom he does not appear to have had
a close relation, and who may have been Salbeuf’s subalterns. But by 1613, Alexandre
de Biran, sieur de Carbon, and Fabien de Biran, sieur de Osseboc had become
lieutenant and ensign within the company, both of whom were younger brothers of
Barthélemy-Scipion, and who were both still holding their charges in a revue
conducted in 1629. According to a document from 1631, Jean de Biran de
Casteljaloux, Barthélemy-Scipion’s son, had become the ensign of his father’s
company, by this date. How long Barthélemy-Scipion commanded the company after
this date is unclear, but it would seem that Alexandre, Barthélemy-Scipion’s brother,
was the inheritor of the company, and the seigneurie of Casteljaloux, rather than Jean.
It appears likely that the family resigned their company by 1640, due to the provision
of a commission from that year for a company in the Gardes ‘vacante par la demission
du sieur de Casteljaloux’. It would thus appear that the Biran de Casteljaloux had
control of this Gardes company for at least forty-three years, and that Barthélemy-
Scipion progressively filled its subaltern positions with family members, facilitating
the probable passing of the company from either brother to brother or father to son.4
4 Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, p. 215, states that the company was not resigned until 1644.
Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 110; revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1487); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1698); revue,
BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (110); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25849 (537); minute, 5 July 1631, AN MC ET/XII, f. 61
quoted in Madeleine Alcover, ‘Le Bret, Cuigy, Casteljaloux, Bignon, Royer de Prade et Regnault des
Boisclairs: du nouveau sur quelques bons amis de Cyrano et sur l’édition posthume des États et Empires
de la Lune (1657)’, Les Dossiers du Grihl, 24 February 2009, <http://dossiersgrihl.revues.org/3414>
[10 February 2010], p. 52; Luppé, Mémoires, p. 201; letters of commission for a Gardes company, BnF
Carrés 145, f. 149r.
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A similar example can be cited for the Chaumejean de Fourilles, who
controlled a Gardes company for at least 60 years. Blaise de Chaumejean, marquis de
Fourilles, had received his captaincy in 1594, and a ‘Fourilles’ is subsequently found
on the 1597, 1600, 1610, and 1620 états. On the basis of musters which survive for
this company, family implantation is not immediately clear, yet the revues only cover
the period between 1597 and 1609. Through reference to the Dossiers Bleu, however,
it is clear that family members began to be parachuted into the regiment after 1609. By
1617, when Blaise resigned his captaincy due to a higher charge he had received, his
eldest son René was lieutenant in the company. A commission signed by Louis XIII
and Secretary of State Villeroy in 1617 allowed René to receive his father’s company
‘en survivance’, with his younger brother Michel as lieutenant. Michel would become
captain of the company in 1632, when his brother resigned the charge, and would
continue holding it until appointed lieutenant colonel in 1655.5
It was not just within the Gardes that these trends were occurring. Barthélemy
de Montlezun, sieur de Busca, controlled a company within Picardie from 1589 to at
least 1632. The two revues found for his company only relate to 1601 and 1605, and
do not seem to indicate the presence of family members within the company.
However, in a marriage contract from 1622, Jean de Montlezun, sieur de Saint-
Léonard, is named as the ensign of his father’s company. By 1632, François de
Montlezun, sieur de Lianne, was similarly named the ensign of his father’s company,
and thus, in the intervening period, his elder brother may have become lieutenant.6
Paul de Hames, sieur du Fresnoy, who appears on all the Picardie états between 1597
and 1623, initially had no family members on a revue from 1597, yet between March
and September 1598 – during which time the company was at the siege of Amiens –
his brother Abdias de Hames had entered into the company as ensign and, on a
subsequent revue from 1611, Abdias now occupied the position of lieutenant.7 Similar
examples exist for families for whom we do not appear to have any remaining
genealogical information. Within Piémont, a ‘Realz’ on the 1597, 1610 and 1620 états
may well be linked to the Cesar de Realz who appears on several revues between 1599
5 Genealogy, anonymous family biographies, BnF DB 178 (4640) ff. 8r, 15r-18r; revue, BnF Ms.Fr
25831 (1377); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2198); La Chesnaye, IV, p. 389.
6 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1665); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1958); marriage contracts, 30 January
1632, 1622, BnF Cabinet 246 (6504) ff. 22r, 30v.
7 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25831 (1378); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25832 (1427); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1502);
revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25834 (1612); revue BnF Ms.Fr. 25842 (72); genealogy, BnF DB 345 (8902), f. 3r.
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and 1610, with a Constantin de Realz as his lieutenant throughout.8 The ‘Du Belloy’
who appears on états for Navarre in 1610 and 1620 appears on one revue in 1605 with
another Du Belloy at ensign.9 In each of these cases, whilst family implantation within
companies is clear, it is not possible to discern whether family members subsequently
inherited the companies.
Captains were also clearly able to place more distantly related ‘parents’ and
non-related ‘amis’ in their companies. Between 1609 and 1615, Pepin de Bonnouvrier
appointed Philippe de Garges ensign in his company, someone who was undoubtedly a
relation of Bonnouvrier’s wife, Charlotte de Garges.10 Individuals attempted to exploit
remote links of ‘parenté’ to try and gain positions within the regiments. Pontis
received his first commission as ensign in the Champagne company of his ‘parent’
Boulogne in 1605.11
However, captains showed a preference towards favouring immediate family
members – particularly brothers, sons and nephews – wherever possible, as the
evolution of the Gardes company under the Raynier de Droué demonstrates. The
company was initially commanded by Elie du Raynier who received his commission
in 1591, and who is still listed in 1596 as being the commander of the company.12
Isaac du Raynier, sieur de Droué, took over command of the company on his brother
Elie’s death in 1597. Isaac can be found as captain on five revues between 1601 and
1609, in which none of the three subalterns listed have the Raynier patronym.
However, at least two of these individuals had connections to the Raynier. Jean de
Herce, lieutenant throughout this shorter period, was Isaac and Elie’s brother in law,
whilst Valentin de Coutances, ensign from 1601 to 1605, was named as godfather to
Isaac’s son, Valentin I, in 1604 and his family were territorial neighbours of the
Raynier. Despite having sublaterns who were clearly family ‘amis’, Isaac seems to
have placed direct relations in the company as soon as possible. By 1620, his eldest
surviving son, Charles du Raynier, was a lieutenant in the Gardes before dying at the
siege of Montpellier in 1622. Isaac’s next son, Valentin I, become a lieutenant in the
Gardes by 1627. Whilst it is not possible to determine absolutely whether Charles and
Valentin I held lieutenancies within their father’s company, it is quite probably the
8 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1548); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25842 (1-2).
9 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1964).
10 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2237); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (152); revue, BnF DB 112 (2764) f. 2r.
11 Pontis, Mémoires, I, pp. 242 and 253.
12 État, BnF Cangé, 5, f. 5r.
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case with at least Valentin I, as in 1629 he became captain of this company due to
Isaac’s resignation. Indeed, by 1632, Louis and René du Raynier, two of Valentin I’s
brothers, were his lieutenant and ensign. Given that Jean de Herce lived until at least
1649, he had clearly left the regiment to make way for one of Isaac’s sons to take his
charge, although whether he voluntarily resigned his position, and/or was
compensated for it, is unclear.
On Valentin I’s death in 1632, Isaac was able to reassume command of the
company, until resigning it again in 1634, in order that his other son Louis could take
up the captaincy. Whilst Chagniot has argued that René in turn succeeded Louis to the
position of company commander, other accounts suggest that René acquired his own
Gardes captaincy in 1643, and that the Raynier subsequently controlled two
companies within the regiment. There is some debate as to the exact date Louis and
René resigned their charges, but they both seem to have done so between 1654 and
1661.13 In any case, the Raynier dominated at least one Gardes company for around
sixty years, with several successive family members becoming captain in order of
seniority, and may well have acquired a second company by the 1640s. The family
were able to place ‘amis’ and non-immediate ‘parents’ into Isaac’s company as
subalterns, before more immediate family members were eventually implanted into the
unit. This helped to guarantee the maintenance of the company under Raynier
command.14
A similar example concerns the company under the command of the Cassagnet
de Tilladet. Bernard de Cassagnet, sieur de Tilladet, had received his Gardes captaincy
from Henri IV in August 1589. His family subsequently monopolised positions within
the company until 1644. Revues show that several non-immediate ‘parents’ were
placed within subaltern positions by the late 1590s, such as Brandelis de Bézolles,
ensign from 1599 to 1607, and François du Bouzet, Sieur de Rocquépine, as lieutenant
in 1615. However, by 1613, Paul-Antoine de Cassagnet, Bernard’s eldest son, had
become ensign and by 1615 he had risen to lieutenant, with the fate of Bézolles
13 BnF DB 555 (14592), p. 4; Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p.110. Christian Leger cites a document from 1646
which stated that a condition of Louis’ marriage of that year was that ‘sa charge de capitaine aux Gardes
du Roi destiné à ses héritieres “de son côté et ligné” seulement’: Christian Leger, Droué et son passé:
recueil de documents pour servir à l’histoire de la commune, (Blois, 1985), quote on p. 66, also see
pp.58-9, 64-7. Noeufville has more explicitly claimed that the Raynier controlled two Gardes
companies: Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, pp. 211 (where René is listed under his seigneurie,
Boisseleau), 225.
14 Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, pp. 110-1; Leger, Droué pp. 45-53; revue, BnF MS.Fr. 25835 (1710); revue, BnF
Ms.Fr. 25837 (1896); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1976); revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2199, 2208).
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unknown.15 On Bernard’s death in 1622, Louis XIII issued a commission to Paul-
Antoine in order that he could take control of his father’s company. By 1623, one of
his brothers, Roger, was Paul-Antoine’s lieutenant, and may well have succeeded to
the company captaincy, had he not died in 1629. Instead, it appears that another
brother, Gabriel, inherited the company captaincy from Paul-Antoine, until selling the
charge in 1644.16 Thus, the Cassagnet de Tilladet’s forty-plus year control of its
company followed similar lines to that of the Raynier de Droué: an initial implantation
of ‘amis’ and/or non-immediate ‘parents’, followed by a progressive appointment of
immediate family members over time, in order that when the company became vacant,
either by resignation or death, a relative was in a position to be allowed by the king to
take up the captaincy.
The ambition of regimental officers went beyond merely dominating their own
company. Indeed, and as the Raynier quite possibly show, several examples exist of
families implanting relatives in multiple companies, either within or without the same
regiment. A clear example of multiple implantations can be seen in Picardie in the
early 1620s with the Faudoas. The family had clear military heritage in the nascent
regiments, with Jean de Faudoas, sieur de Sérillac having been the third mestre de
camp of the regiment that would become Picardie between 1579 and 1585, and two of
his brothers having been captains in the Gardes. Two of Sérillac’s sons can be found
captaining Picardie companies in the early seventeenth century: Pierre de Faudoas,
sieur de La Mothe-Sérillac, who received his commission between the 1597 and 1610
états, and Jean-François, sieur de L’Isle-Sérillac, who was given a company by the
king in Picardie in 1621. In addition, another brother would achieve a commission in
La Marine.17 Within the Gardes, family ties also existed between the companies under
the control of the sieur de Casteljaloux and the sieur de Gohas. Both were members of
the Biran family, with the Gohas branch having split from the Casteljaloux in the late
fifteenth century.18 Whilst this link seems remote, to modern eyes, they would
undoubtedly have recognised each other as ‘parents’ if not ‘cousins’.
15 Bernard’s father, Antoine, had married Jeanne de Bézolles, and Bernard’s grandfather, Bertrand, had
married Marguerite de Bouzet. Genealogy, BnF DB 156 (4069) f. 2v; revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25831 (1376);
revue, BnF PO 609 (14320) p. 4; revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (118); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (149)
16 Gardes company commission, 4 August 1622, genealogy, BnF DB 156 (4069) ff. 8v, 17r; La
Chesnaye, III, pp. 532-533; Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, pp. 238-239.
17 La Chesnaye, VI, pp. 265-266; revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (285); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25849 (518).
18 Genealogy, BnF Cabinet 46 (1135), ff. 3r-v.
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Examples of families holding multiple commissions within the same regiment
are relatively rare in comparison to the holding of captaincies in different regiments.
This trend can be seen when, on the 1588 état, a ‘de Campagnol’ can be found as a
captain in both the Gardes and Picardie, referring to Bernard Patras de Campaigno,
who held a commission in the Gardes until the mid-1610s and his brother, Michel
Patras de Campaigno. Similarly, on the 1597 état, two ‘de Baradat’ can be found: one
in Picardie and the other in Navarre. By 1610, a ‘de Baradat’ still appeared on the
Navarre état, but the one in Picardie had been reduced to a ‘capitaine retenuz’. The
‘de Baradat’ commanding the Navarre company was Lizander de Baradat, vicomte de
Verneuil, who also appears as a captain on revues between 1599 and 1601. This is
confirmed by a royal act of 1613, which recognised Lizander as the captain of a
Navarre company. The act also stated that his elder brother Jean de Baradat, sieur de
Cahusac, was the captain of an infantry company ‘entretenue’ for royal service;
although it is not specified whether this captaincy was in Picardie, nor whether Jean
had regained his status as a full captain.19
An even more successful case of family implantation across multiple
companies and regiments can be seen with the Aubourg. None of the revues of the
companies of Charles d’Aubourg, sieur de Porcheux, between 1601 and 1622, whilst
he was a captain in Navarre, or the revue of his Gardes company in 1627, after his
1626 promotion, reveal the presence of his family. Moreover, none of the subalterns or
sergeants listed on his final remaining revue from Navarre in 1622 appear on the only
revue of his Gardes company in 1627, suggesting that none had made the inter-
regimental crossing with him. However, it is also clear that three of his sons, Charles
II, Henri, and Louis, all became captains in Navarre. Thus, the picture of family
implantation is rather nuanced. Charles II had received his own Navarre captaincy in
1622, rather than assuming command of his father’s company in the same regiment. It
is also clear that when Charles II subsequently received a commission into the Gardes
during the 1630s, he took over the company previously belonging to the sieur de
Saint-Preuil, rather than inheriting the company of his father, who had died in 1628.
However, it does appear that, by royal ‘gratification’, a nephew of Charles II received
his Gardes company after his death in 1643, whilst Louis is named as becoming a
captain in Navarre ‘apres son frere’ Henri, suggesting that he had inherited a company
19 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1558); revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25834 (1635, 1649); genealogies, BnF DB 55
(1288) ff. 2r, 5r.
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under his brother’s command. Thus, whilst the revues of Charles d’Aubourg’s
companies do not reveal it, implantation of the Aubourg at a company level surely did
occur, if at least two members of his family were able to inherit companies from
relatives in both Navarre and the Gardes, with the family as a whole establishing a
cross-regimental position of influence.20
However, and as has already been seen, it should be noted that the king’s
explicit approval was still a prerequisite for passing on a company between relatives.
Gaining this was not a fait accompli, even if family members had been implanted.
When Mathurin de Castelnau died in 1622 his company in the Gardes was given to an
illegitimate son of the duc d’Épernon – Jean-Louis Nogaret, Chevalier de La Valette –
despite Mathurin having succeeded in placing his eldest son, Charles, as a subaltern in
his company by 1613. Whether Charles had been in a position to obtain the company
in 1622 is not clear, but it would appear that La Valette was an external appointment
to the company. A revue from 1627 records Louis de Castelnau, Mathurin’s younger
son, as La Valette’s lieutenant, showing the family had not completely lost their
position within the regiment or company.21 In a similar case, Louis I de Caillebot de
La Salle, after having received his commission in 1596, succeeded in placing his
brother, Louis, and son, Jacques, as lieutenant and ensign in his Gardes company by
1621, allowing the captaincy to pass to Louis I’s brother on his death in 1624.
However, the brother was subsequently stripped of his command by the king in 1627/8
on charges of muster fraud, with the king installing Charles Cruzy, sieur de Marcillac
in the company as captain.22 It is perhaps telling, nonetheless, that both families
ultimately regained their position within the Gardes, with Louis I de Caillebot’s son,
Louis II, and Mathurin de Castelnau’s son, also Louis, obtaining captaincies in the
regiment in 1640 and 1633. Clearly, the ties of some families to the vieux were
extremely deep, and could be restored even after temporary losses of royal favour.
Thus, certain families clearly attempted to exploit the new-found stability of
the vieux by monopolising appointments at a company level, and even gaining charges
in multiple regimental companies. Captains did this by placing, wherever possible,
either ‘amis’, distant relatives or, and in what was clearly the best-case scenario,
20 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1667); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25837 (1899); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (85);
revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (295); revue, genealogy, BnF PO 126 (2579) pieces 10, 118; anonymous
biographical information, BnF DB 37 (333), f. 2.
21 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (111); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25848 (480); anonymous biography, BnF DB 157
(4109), f. 23r.
22 Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 110; revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 258346 (271); genealogy, BnF DB 148 (3722) f. 10r.
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immediate relatives such as sons, brothers or nephews as their subalterns. By installing
them in these positions, not only did other members of the family receive the benefits
of permanent military office, a position might also be created whereby the company
could be retained in family possession when a captain was either voluntarily or
involuntarily removed from office. As André Corvisier has previously stated with
relation to the domination of certain families within the ingénieurs du roi during the
seventeenth century, the ability of regimental officers to ‘accorder une place au fils’
within the officer corps may well have been a means by which the monarchy could
‘récompenser les services du père’.23 That the king had to approve the inheritance of
the company by a new family member may have thus created a perception that service
within the regiments could bring demonstrable royal favour to a family. Kinship-based
affinities are thus clearly visible within the regimental officer corps. They had
probably been allowed to prosper due to a royal desire to recompense loyal military
officers for long-term service. Indeed this idea of ‘recompense for service’, where
recompense is understood in not just a material sense but also in terms of improved
social status, was fundamental to the reasons why petite noblesse families sought
positions within the army, as the following section will show.
II- The Nobility and the Reasons for Regimental Service
That petite noblesse families coveted officerships within the regiments is
unquestionable. Wherever possible, families sought to dominate the composition of
company offices, and to gain as many companies under their control as they could,
commensurate with their wealth and demographic nature. It is critical to understand,
therefore, why they did so, if one is to comprehend both the motivations of the lower
nobility in this period, and why the royal army evolved in the way it did during the
early part of the seventeenth century.
At a symbolic level, service within the royal regiments tapped into a potent seam
of ideas concerning the relationship between nobility and military service. War might
not have been a prerequisite for noble status, but, as Arlette Jouanna has put it, ‘l’épée
23 André Corvisier, ‘Clientèles et fidélités dans l’armée française aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles’ in Yves
Durand (ed.), Homage à Roland Mousnier: clientèles et fidélités en Europe à l’époque moderne, (Paris,
1981), p. 228.
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restait le signe distinctif par excellence de la noblesse’.24 If the civil wars of the
sixteenth century had done much to destroy ideas of chivalry and military valour, the
near continuous campaigning had also done much to militarise the French nobility and
wider society on a much larger scale than during the more intermittent and external
conflict of the Habsburg-Valois Wars of c.1480-1560.25 Indeed, the importance of
warfare to noble status certainly permeated down to the petite noblesse, for whom the
holding of royal military office helped construct ‘an aura of nobility’, which was
crucial to building up subsequent social status. If nothing else, the holding of office
itself demonstrated that a person was ‘in the ranks of the governors, not the
governed’.26
This is not to say, as John Lynn has implied, that the holding of military office
was almost an end in itself. For Lynn, the French nobility appear to have sought
military office primarily for ‘cultural reasons’. It allowed them to display courage on
the battlefield, and thus acquire family honour and gloire. Such was their desire to
acquire these cultural markers, regimental officers were willing to sacrifice their
personal fortunes in a fiscal-military system which saw the monarchy massively
exploit their credit.27 Another, more nuanced approach which has stressed the
importance of honour to military service is found in the work of Hervé Drévillon, who
focused mainly on the later stages of Louis XIV’s reign. Drévillon argued that a new
army was created under Louis XIV, which improved procedures for officer promotion,
and allowed the creation of a ‘nouvelle culture de mérite’. Louis thus succeeded in
moulding a force which satisfied the French nobility’s desire for ‘honneur’,
understood not only in the sense of heroic battlefield actions, but also through serving
the monarchy with ‘exactitude et discipline.28 Drévillon’s wider conception of honour
as a motivation for service is more plausible than Lynn’s excessive concentration of
24 Arlette Jouanna, ‘La noblesse française et les valeurs guerrières au XVIe siècle’ in (eds.) G.-A.
Pérouse, A. Thierry, A. Tournon, L’Homme de guerre au XVIe siècle, (Saint-Étienne, 1992), pp. 205-
217, quote on p. 206. For more on the importance of warfare to perceptions of nobility during the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries see Potter, Renaissance France, pp. 88-95; Parrott, Richelieu’s
Army, pp. 313-320.
25 At the very least, the French nobility became considerably more predisposed towards feuding and the
use of violence during the second half of the sixteenth century: Carroll, Blood and Violence, pp. 264-
284. For the violence of wider society, one could point to the multiple ordonnances passed between the
late 1590s and 1620s which sought to restrict the use of firearms among the general populace: BnF
Cangé, 20, ff. 66v-68v; BnF Cangé, 21, ff. 11v-12v, 23r, 147r-149r.
26 Parrot, Richelieu’s Army, p. 317.
27 Lynn, Giant, pp. 221-3, 238, 251-2.
28 Drévillon, L’Impôt, passim, quotes from p. 14. However, Drévillon does at times seem to share
Lynn’s beliefs regarding the central importance of gloire: ‘John Lynn a raison de souligner que la gloire
et le courage demeuraient des horizons indépassables’, p. 393.
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battlefield gloire, which so downplays the importance of materialist motivations to the
French officer corps that it reduces them to vain, ‘self-deluding idealists’ as Rowlands
has put it.29
Whilst one should not dismiss the importance of battlefield conduct to the
nobility, Lynn’s ideas do not plausibly explain why certain members of the French
nobility remained in military service during relatively lengthy periods of peace, such
as those in the early seventeenth century. Indeed, Drévillon’s argument is perhaps
closer to Rowlands than he admits, as Rowlands did not solely conceive of ‘private
interest’ in the materialist terms that Drévillon ascribed to him. Drévillon’s focus on
the importance of rationalised career structures demonstrated that an officer’s
conception of his honour was not static, and that he sought to improve it, and hence his
social standing, by progressing through the army’s ranks. These arguments are
important as they can be transposed onto the earlier period studied in this thesis.
Ultimately, and just as Rowlands has described for the men who inhabited the officer
corps under Louis XIV, the men who staffed the nascent regimental structures did so
for the same reason that drove many of the major actions in their lives: military service
offered the prospect of tangible social advancement, which would help improve their
status of their dynasty.
Indeed, at a practical level, the possibility of a regular and fairly sizeable salary
could make a regimental officership desirable. In 1610, a Gardes captain would
receive 306 livres per montre, with a lieutenant and ensign paid 110 livres and sixty-
six livres each. The amount was less within the other vieux, with all four having the
same pay scale of 150 livres per captain, sixty livres per lieutenant, and forty-five
livres per ensign.30 Those within the Gardes thus earned almost twice as much as their
counterparts, and despite the recognised superiority of Picardie over Navarre,
Champagne and Piémont, its officers were not paid a higher salary. The prospect of
doubling one’s salary by staying in the regiments for long-enough to receive a
promotion to the Gardes may have been an incentive for long-term service.
Whilst these amounts might appear small, it should be recognised that most
regimental officers, below the level of mestre de camp, came from the petite noblesse
and were of extremely modest financial means. As shown in this thesis’ Introduction,
the petite noblesse constituted 95-90% of noble society, with 85-90% of French nobles
29 Rowlands, Dynastic State, pp. 155-7.
30 État, BnF Na.Fr. 24842, ff. 131r-v, 133r, 134r-v, and 135v. There were ten montres per year.
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enjoying yearly incomes of less than 5,000 livres, and around 50-60% of the nobility
having incomes of less than 1,000 livres per year.31 If one considers that the annual
income for a Gardes captain was 3,060 livres, and 1,500 livres for a captain in the
quatre-vieux, it is clear that the salary of a regimental officer would have represented a
sizeable amount of money for the majority of the nobility. Even if a proportion of
wages had to be put aside for work-related expenditure, the wages of regimental
officers had the potential to move a person out of the poorest 50% of noble society.
Jean Guezille, sieur de La Barre-Chevrie can be seen as an example of how the
warfare of this era, and the new military structures it spawned, could dramatically
improve the living standards of nobles who became officers. La Barre-Chevrie earned
yearly revenue of 62.5 livres from his seigneurial lands, yet on becoming a captain in
the royal infantry in 1594 he began to receive a wage of 100 livres per month.
Accordingly, Michel Nassiet has argued that careers within royal military structures
were extremely lucrative (in a relative sense) for members of the petite noblesse,
although he has also contended that it was only from 1636 that a substantial number of
durable military offices became available for members of the Breton nobility.32 Whilst
La Barre-Cheverie might be a somewhat extreme example, and one should not forget
the expenses that military service entailed, it would be plausible to suggest that serving
as an officer may well have led to an increase in income for many nobles within the
regiments.
Indeed, a number of officers may well have turned to regimental service in
order to avoid becoming financially destitute, due to practices relating to inheritance.
Louis de Pontis recounted how in 1597, at the age of fourteen, ‘tout le bien’ of his
family had passed to his older brother when their parents had died, ‘selon la costume
du pays’.33 His subsequent entry into the regiments thus not only helped him to
demonstrate his nobility symbolically, but also brought him a much needed form of
reasonably steady income. As such, when payment problems did arise, such as when
the army began to undertake a greater amount of relatively high-intensity warfare in
31 Due to the relative lack of genealogical evidence, it has not been possible to calculate an average for
the yearly revenues that regimental officers received, yet few seem to have enjoyed incomes above that
of the petite noblesse.
32 Nassiet does not state whether Barre-Chevrie was part of a to-be-permanent regiment, or merely a
temporary infantry formation employed in the wars against the Ligue in Brittany during the 1590s.
Nassiet, Pauvreté, p. 140-146.
33 Pontis Mémoires, I, pp. 213-4. By ‘bien’, Pontis probably referred to property. He may well have
received a proportion of the family’s other wealth, even if, as it would appear, this was not considerable.
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the 1620s, they could not easily be ignored. In 1627, Pontis stated to Louis XIII that
his current position as a Gardes lieutenant had recently caused him a ‘dépense
beaucoup plus grande que mon bien […] je m’endettois beaucoup dans ma charge’.34
For a person like Pontis, no matter how important honour or gloire was, it was still
necessary for him to earn enough money from positions of regimental command to at
least remain solvent; there was a limit to the financial sacrifices he was prepared to
make in the exercise of his command.
Pontis may well have exaggerated the state of his impoverishment in 1597, yet
his story is not implausible. Even taking into account regional variations in inheritance
law, the practice of primogeniture was deeply ingrained in French noble society, with
eldest sons often inheriting over two-thirds of their family’s property.35 Amongst
petite noblesse families with very few assets to begin with, a younger brother could
often be left with very little, even if they were not completely disbarred from the
inheritance. Indeed, that a notable amount of regimental officers were younger
brothers, particularly amongst those who had entered service prior to 1598, may
suggest that Pontis’ experience was far from unusual.36 Regimental service may well
have been increasingly seen as an attractive career option for the relatively
disenfranchised younger brothers of petite noblesse families by the late sixteenth
century, giving them the practical and symbolic means to maintain their noble status.
But, by the 1620s, the growing costs of service in the vieux as a captain, even if not as
a subaltern, may have given the advantage to better-endowed eldest sons in
competition for this rank.
During the period of this thesis, it does seem that the monarchy was reasonably
successful in maintaining regular wage payments to its officers. Pontis’ complaints in
1627 were largely based on the fact that this income had only recently become less
reliable. Moreover, officers could receive other financial benefits. Pierre du Bellay,
34 Ibid., II, 21-3.
35 Mentzer, Blood and Belief, pp.104-106. See also Nassiet, Parenté, pp. 45-56, for a discussion of the
concept of ‘l’aînesse’.
36 Whilst it has not been possible to uncover the genealogies of all regimental officers, from the Gardes
alone at least Mathurin de Castelnau, Blaise de Chaumejean, Pierre du Bellay, Jean-Jacques de
Montesquiou, and Albert de Grillet were all junior members of their families when they entered the
regiments. Interestingly, some of these younger brothers’ eldest sons subsequently joined the regiments
after 1600, showing how the benefits of regimental service were increasingly becoming desirable
enough to attract senior family members. Genealogy, BnF Cabinet 79 (2066), ff. 10v-11r; genealogy,
anonymous biography, BnF DB 178 (4640), ff. 8r, 15r-16r, 18r-19v; genealogy, BnF DB 81 (1848), f.
4v; genealogy, BnF DB 459, ff. 11v; genealogies, BnF DB 333 (8474), ff. 1v-3r, 35v. The importance
of military service to younger sons in the nobility has already been recognised: Scott and Storrs,
‘Introduction’, p. 45.
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sieur de La Courbe, was granted a delay of three years to pay his debts during the
siege of Amiens.37 Whether these debts had been acquired due to military service or
not, it showed that captains within the permanent regiments were able to acquire
significant financial favour due to their proximity to the king. The monarchy
undoubtedly did not want to see its closest body of militarily-loyal families fatally
impoverished. Furthermore, the value of a captain’s office, and the guaranteed income
they received, or were at least meant to receive, as a company commander may well
have assisted regimental captains when it came to acquiring credit. This must only
have entrenched the perception that becoming a regimental officer was not a
financially ruinous form of employment, and could even be profitable. Thus,
Drévillon’s statement that, during the reign of Louis XIV, ‘l’économie de la guerre
avait la particularité de n’enrichir personne’ does not appear to hold true for the early
seventeenth century.38
This assessment can only have been strengthened by other financial rewards
that could be distributed on the basis of loyal service. For example, Fabien de Biran,
ensign of his father Barthélemy-Scipion de Biran, sieur de Casteljaloux, received an
exceptional gratification of 600 livres in October 1621.39 The most significant
financial recompense were the pensions that the monarchy occasionally accorded to its
regimental officers. Such was the desire to maintain the Grillet de Brissac in royal
service, the pension of 2,400 livres granted to Albert de Grillet, sieur de Brissac, in
1636 was passed on to his children in 1647.40 Isaac du Raynier, sieur de Droué, was
accorded a pension of 3,000 livres per year in 1613, not only for the ‘bons fidelles et
agreable services’ to the monarchy over ‘vingt six ans de batailles rencontres et autres
occasions’, but also so that Isaac would have ‘moyen’ of continuing these services in
the future.41 Isaac’s pension was thus a reward for past service, but also a bribe for
continued loyalty to the monarchy, and specifically to Marie de Médicis, in the
politically uncertain mid-1610s. Similarly, Bernard de Cassagnet, sieur de La Tilladet,
was granted a pension of 3,000 livres in 1619 together with orders to increase the size
of his Gardes company, thus simultaneously buying, ordering and rewarding his
37 ‘Lettres données par le Roy’, 29 July 1597, BnF DB 81 (1848), f. 85r
38 Drévillon, L’Impôt, pp. 440-441.
39 Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 101.
40 Genealogy, BnF DB 333, f. 35v; letters patent, 22 March 1647, BnF Cabinet 174 (4411), f. 4r.
41 Letters patent, 17 January 1613, AAE MD 769, f. 2r.
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continued loyalty.42 This would suggest that the levels of expenditure that Gardes’
captains had to make on their units was high, and that even with levels of pay above
those of the other vieux it was still necessary to grant additional monies during periods
of company expansion.
Aside from strictly financial matters, the holding of regimental office also
allowed persons to prove that they were worthy of consideration for higher military
posts. Isaac du Raynier became maréchal de camp in 1640, after almost fifty years of
regimental service, whilst Blaise de Chaumejean received a similar commission on
resigning his Gardes company in 1617. His sons, René and Michel-Denis, who in turn
took over the captaincy of Blaise’s former Gardes company, also eventually received
higher promotions, with René reaching the rank of grand maréchal de logis by 1638
and Michel-Denis eventually rising to the position of lieutenant général des armées in
the late 1650s.43 Jean du Caylar de Saint-Bonnet, marquis de Toiras, underwent an
extremely rapid ascension after acquiring his Gardes company in 1620. After
becoming mestre de camp of Champagne in 1624, he acquired the position of
maréchal de camp in 1625, and was awarded the dignity of maréchal de France in
1630 due to a string of military successes at La Rochelle and in northern Italy. Had he
stayed as Louis XIII’s capitaine de la volière, the position he had held before his
Gardes commission, it seems unlikely he would have enjoyed such a rise.44
Regimental service also offered the chance of receiving town-command commissions.
Albert de Grillet, sieur de Brissac was appointed commandant of the citadel of Nancy
in 1635, Bernard de Cassagnet, sieur de Tilladet had been appointed gouverneur of
Bourg-sur-Mer by the time he made his will in 1618, whilst Isaac du Raynier was
made gouverneur of Royan after the town was taken during the 1622 campaign.45 The
prospect of further advancement through the royal military establishment was thus
achieved by at least some vieux officers.
Finally, becoming an officer in the vieux allowed a member of the lower
nobility to place themselves in the ‘king’s gaze’, and to potentially earn his favour. For
example, Henri IV asked the Constable, in 1597, to write letters on his behalf to
captains in the Gardes in order that Henri could praise them for the speed in which
42 Commission to increase size of Gardes company, 6 May 1602, BnF DB 156 (4069), f. 8r.
43 La Chesnaye, IV, p. 389.
44 E. de Balincourt, ‘Le maréchal de Toiras, 1585-1636’, Revue du Midi, 3, (1889), pp. 113-123.
45 Genealogy, BnF DB 156 (4069), f. 3v; genealogy, BnF DB 333, f. 35v; Charles Bernard, Histoire des
guerres de Louis XIII contre les religionnaires rebelles de son estat (Paris, 1633?), p. 301.
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they had assembled their companies during the siege of Amiens.46 Henri can also be
found writing directly to a captain ‘Des Combes’ in 1597, who held a commission in
Navarre, and to Paul d’Hames in 1610.47 Whilst Henri’s tone was not necessarily
positive – Henri lambasted Combes for not being at the siege of Amiens, and de
Hames for not properly organising his company prior to the Jülich campaign – both
letters demonstrate that regimental officers were known by the king, and had some
form of direct relationship with him. This relationship led to many regimental
commanders receiving highly coveted positions within the court and central
government. That these positions had been earned through military service can be seen
in a letter of 1622, in which Louis XIII stated that ‘les services que me rendz le sr des
Bolez capitaine au regiment de Navarre m’obligent d’avoir soing de sa personne’. The
captain was subsequently appointed to the position of ‘maitre de la maison du roi’ due
to his service ‘pendant toutes ces guerres passees’.48 Bernard de Cassagnet had
become a gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi by 1618, whilst Isaac du
Raynier by the 1630s also held this position, along with that of ‘conseiller du Roi en
ses conseils d’Etat’.
These positions were important as they emphasised the proximity of officers to
royal favour, something which was key to their exercise of patronage, and to the
perception of their social standing.49 Officers prized almost any position or activity
which displayed a direct relationship to royal power: by 1607, the long-standing
Picardie captain Barthélemy de Montlezun had found service in the royal ‘paneterie’.
This charge might appear humble, yet, as the document which recorded his charge
showed, it meant he had access to the king’s council.50 Moreover, military service also
allowed the possibility of further honorific charges and activities tied to the monarchy.
Paul d’Antist, sieur de Mansan was made the gouverneur of Gaston d’Orléans during
the 1600s; Blaise de Chaumejean’s son, René, was ‘nourri enfant dhonneur [sic]’ of
Louis XIII.51 Albert de Grillet was able to engineer a marriage with the daughter of
François Tardieu, who served on royal councils and was maître des requêtes de l’hôtel
46 Henri IV to Montmorency, 22 April 1597, LMHIV, IV, p. 747.
47 Henri IV to ‘Cappitaine des Combes’, 2 July 1597, Henri IV to ‘Cappitaine Hames’, 31 March, 23, 25
April 1610, Ibid., IV, p. 795, VII, pp. 879, 887, 889.
48BnF Ms.Fr. 3722, ff. 71v-72r, 73r. My emphasis. The captain referred to is probably the sieur des
Boullets found on the 1597, 1610 and 1620 états, a 1597 revue, (BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1505)), and in
Bassompierre, II, p. 185.
49 Walsby, Laval, p. 79.
50 ‘Lettres de Comittimus’, 4 August 1597, BnF Cabinet 246 (6504), f. 23v.
51 Luppé, Mémoires, pp. 14, 214; anonymous biography, BnF DB 178 (4460), f. 16r.
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du roi. Tardieu’s daughter was a ‘fille d’honneur de la Reine’, and both the queen and
Louis XIII’s sisters were present at his wedding which took place in the Louvre.52
Whilst their presence and the location of the wedding undoubtedly owed more to his
bride than Grillet, without his lengthy years of service in the Gardes Grillet would not
have been able to pull off such a marriage, with all the attendant benefits to his social
standing that it conferred. Indeed, on the basis of where the regiment seems to have
been stationed,53 the Gardes’ close proximity to the king and the royal court can only
have helped its officers form connections such as these.
These were the advantages of prominent military service. On the downside, it
obviously brought great risks. In the Gardes, seven captains were killed in action
between 1620 and 1629, whilst Andilly lists eleven other vieux and petits-vieux
captains who were killed or crippled during the 1621 campaign alone.54 Yet even
death could not stop certain families. The Aubourg de Porcheux lost two family
members who held commissions in the vieux during the warfare at La Rochelle in
1627-8, but still maintained a captaincy in Navarre and would ultimately regain a
captaincy in the Gardes. Indeed, the attempt to place as many family members in
regimental positions as possible was an attempt to ensure that their position within the
vieux could be maintained if disaster struck.
Families spread their bets in this manner because regimental service satisfied
many of the dynastic ambitions that they held. Indeed, service within the new standing
army appears to justify Parrott’s statement that early modern elites sought to engage in
military service for cultural, social and financial reasons.55 At a cultural level, waging
war was patently still an important part of a French nobleman’s self-perception and
justification of their elite status within society. However, military service in itself, and
any subsequent attainment of gloire, was not enough for the men who formed the
regimental officer corps. Financially, as Pontis pointed out, few officers wished to be
bankrupted for the pleasure of royal military service. Even if outlays could be
extensive, officers were paid very reasonable wages, especially within the Gardes,
with even more substantial pensions, or other forms of financial benefit, a potential
prospect. That these financial rewards became larger as one progressed through the
ranks and regiments encouraged lengthy periods of service, as did the special legal
52 La Chesnaye, VII, p. 456; genealogy, BnF DB 333 (8474), f. 3r.
53 See above, Chapter One, Section III.
54 Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, p. 273; Andilly, Journal, I, 1621, p. 150.
55 Parrott, ‘Military Enterprise’, pp. 78-79.
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privileges that members of the Gardes received.56 In terms of social aspirations,
regimental service could lead to promotion to higher positions within the royal
military establishment and even to the command of towns and citadels. It also meant
that an officer became known to the king, increasing the likelihood of directly
receiving royal patronage and improving the perception of their social standing.
Members of the petite noblesse thus coveted regimental positions as they allowed
them to enter a world where they could potentially improve the position of themselves
and their family within the vertical hierarchy of French society. Indeed, not only did
regimental service in itself lead to the progressive attainment of benefits, it allowed
men to cultivate new kinship links within a new social environment, both within and
without the regiments. The following sections will explore how officers exploited this
opportunity.
III- The Standing Army and Social Networking: Horizontal Links of Kinship and
Affinity between Regimental Families
Many of the noble families who held commissions within the vieux entered into
relationships with each other. Indeed, much of what has been written on affinities in
late sixteenth-century France can be transposed onto the regimental system. An
affinity, like the standing army, constituted ‘a pyramid of authority’, with the greater
nobility and ultimately the king at its apex.57 Within an affinity, members of the lower
nobility entered into ‘fluctuating ties and diverse bonds’ with patrons of a higher
social status but also amongst other families of similar social standing.58 Indeed, for
Stuart Carroll, ‘horizontal ties of sociability and kinship were as important as vertical
bonds of deference, loyalty and material security’ to nobles within the Guise affinity.59
Another instructive example can be found in the work of Raymond Mentzer, who has
56 All officers above the level of ensign in the Gardes had the right to have their ‘causes commises’ in
the first instance before the ‘gens tenans les requestes de nostre palais à Paris’, just like other royal
officers and servants. Letters patent, BnF Cangé, 20, ff. 123r-4r.
57 Walsby, Laval, pp. 45-7. André Corvisier has similarly stated that for much of the ancien régime the
French army was formed from a ‘pyramide de contrats d’homme à homme’: Corvisier, ‘Clientèles’, p.
219.
58 Carroll, Noble Power, pp. 6-7. Mark Greengrass, ‘Functions and Limits of Political Clientelism in
France before Cardinal Richelieu’, in Neithard Bulst, Robert Descimon and Alain Guerreau (eds.),
L’État ou le Roi: Les foundations de la modernité monarchique en France (XIVe-XVIIe siècles), (Paris,
1996), p. 73. Connections between regimental officers and the high nobility will be explored in the final
two chapters of this thesis.
59 Carroll, Noble Power, p. 53.
66
shown how families from the provincial lower nobility in Castres focused on
‘nurturing and maintaining’ the day-to-day horizontal links they had with houses of
similar political and social standing, rather than the weaker links they had with
members of the higher nobility.60
These comparisons are valid because the regiments were also a structure in
which social networking transpired. Not only did military service itself confer benefits
upon regimental officers, obtaining an office within the regiments allowed members of
the lower nobility to enter into a new social framework, often on a broader
geographical basis due to the stationing of their companies, where officers could mix
with nobles of both their own and higher social station. And to many officers, it would
be the horizontal links they cultivated which would impact most on their lives. By
relying solely on the friendship of a non-related and more powerful patron, an officer
was subject to the caprices of favour and health.61 Through entering into ties of
horizontal kinship, regimental families could act in unison to protect their interests and
the improved social standing that military service could bring.
The importance of constructing firm bonds with other officers can be
demonstrated by examining the vicissitudes of the life of Louis de Pontis. Whilst
familial links were central to him receiving a commission in the company of his
‘parent’ Boulogne, Pontis’ career became more volatile when he left this company,
and followed an ami, Jean de Zamet, who was mestre de camp of Picardie between
1617 and 1622. Despite initially receiving a promotion to the newly created position of
‘lieutenant de la mestre de camp’ company, Zamet subsequently resigned his
command and, in effect, abandoned Pontis, who was fortunate that Zamet’s successor,
the sieur de Liancourt, showed himself to be well-disposed towards Pontis. Similarly,
when he received a promotion into the Gardes, Pontis had to earn the amitié of his
captains, Saligny and Saint-Preuil, in order to make his position comfortable. Pontis
himself seems to have recognised the difficulty in only relying on amitié to further his
military career, writing an emotional letter to Zamet on the latter’s resignation from
Picardie in 1622, in which Pontis stated how he had voluntarily left a stable position
in Champagne in order to be ‘uniquement attaché’ to Zamet.62 The subtext of this
letter was something that clearly must have weighed heavily on the minds of many
60 Mentzer, Blood and Belief, pp. 153-161.
61 As Corvisier put it, ‘La mort du protecteur risque d’être prejudiciable au protégé’, Corvisier,
‘Clientèles’, p. 233.
62 Pontis, Mémoires, I, pp. 300-6, 344-6, II, pp. 10-18. Quote on I, p.344.
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lesser nobles. By relying solely on the amitié of a non-related and demonstrably more
powerful patron, a person was subject to their caprices. Through entering into ties of
kinship, regimental families could act in unison to protect their interests and the
improved social standing that military service could bring.
Several regimental officers formed marital bonds between their families. Jean-
Jacques de Montesquiou, sieur de Sainte-Colombe, captain and subsequently
lieutenant colonel of the Gardes, married Antoinette de Chaumejean, the sister of
Blaise de Chaumejean, another Gardes captain, in 1610.63 The daughter of
Barthélemy-Scipion de Biran married another Gardes captain, Jean-Jacques de La
Barthe, sieur de Giscaro, in 1623.64 Yet another Gardes marriage may have taken
place between the Gardes captain Pierre de Guigneaudeau de Montigny and Anne de
Chesnel, the daughter of another Gardes captain, Charles de Chesnel, sieur de Meux,
although this is disputed.65 Siblings of the Faudoas brothers in Picardie also seem to
have entered into two marriages involving other families within the regiments. Their
sister, Marguerite, married Antoine d’Esparbez, a Picardie captain found on the 1597
état and a revue from 1599, but who was no longer a captain by 1610. Pierre de
Faudoas, Baron de Sérillac, a nephew of Marguerite and the Faudoas in Picardie,
married Susane de Biran in 1640, the daughter of the Gardes captain, the sieur de
Gohas.66
Other marriages which were not directly between regimental families still
display evidence of horizontal linkage. When the Gardes captain Louis I de Caillebot,
sieur de La Salle married Léonore de Molitard in the early 1600s, another Gardes
captain, Isaac du Raynier, sieur de Droué, was present at the wedding in his capacity
as the brother-in-law of the bride’s father.67 A kinship bond now existed between the
two captains as they had both married into the same family. At the wedding of Jacques
du Laur, another captain from Navarre was present, Gratian de Saint-Cricq.68 At the
marriage of Fabien de Biran, son of Barthélemy-Scipion de Biran, sieur de
Casteljaloux, Joachim de Montagu, sieur de Frémigières was present. That
63 Genealogy, BnF DB 178 (4640), f. 8r; genealogy, BnF DB 459 f. 11v.
64Gabriel O’Gilvy and Pierre Jules de Bourrousse de Laffore, Nobiliaire de Guienne et de Gascogne, (4
vols, Paris, 1856- 1890) I, p. 245.
65 The Beauchet-Filleau alleged that Anne de Chesnel may have been the daughter of Josias de Chesnel,
sieur de Reaux, who was not a regimental officer. Henri and Paul Beauchet-Filleau, Dictionnaire
historique et généalogique des familles du Poitou, 2nd ed. (7 vols., Poitiers, 1891- ), IV, pp. 601-2.
66 La Chesnaye, VI, pp. 266, 268.
67 Marriage contract, undated, probably early 1600s, BnF Carrés 145, f. 145r.
68 Genealogy, BnF DB 386 (378), f. 4v.
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Frémigières was noted as being ‘ambassadeur de Malte’ demonstrated the elevated
level of French society that some Gardes captains could reach.69 These examples of
officers being present at each other’s weddings hint at a potentially deep relationship
between certain regimental families.
Nevertheless, not all regimental officers were so cordial towards each other,
and examples also exist of disputes within the vieux. In 1604, a quarrel between two
lieutenants in Piémont reached the point where it had to be settled by the Constable.70
A gambling dispute between the sieurs de Canaples and Saligny led to the latter
resigning his charge in the Gardes.71 Isaac du Raynier’s son, Valentin I, who took
over command of Isaac’s company in 1629, died in a duel in 1632. The second of his
opponent, Bouchavannes, was named ‘Careget’, and was the ensign in the sieur de
Tilladet’s Gardes company. Louis XIII was angry enough to condemn the two
survivors of the duel to death, although he allowed the Raynier to maintain control of
their Gardes company.72 Even within these disputes, however, the close bonds
between officers are visible. The argument between the two Piémont officers had
arisen when one lieutenant felt he had to defend the honour of his absent captain,
presumably against the slurs of the opposing lieutenant. And Pontis alleged that he
was willing to support Saligny in any action he wished to take against Canaples.
That a degree of friction existed between the men who staffed the regiments is
hardly surprising. These were men highly attuned to violence in a society which
generally held few qualms about resorting to severe acts of aggression, even over
relatively trivial matters. Moreover, as the duel in which Valentin I du Raynier was
involved shows, the petite noblesse could hardly escape from the notions of honour
and vindicatory inter-personal violence that coloured much of the nobility’s actions in
this period.73 However, it would appear that links of amitié and kinship between
regimental families largely outweighed negative bonds. These horizontal links
demonstrate that most petite noblesse families in the regiments preferred to work
69 Marriage contract, 2 October 1617, BnF Cabinet 46 (1135), f.16r. Frémigières was Ambassadeur de
l’ordre de Malte in France between 1617 and 1624: Claude Petiet, Le roi et le grand maître: l’Ordre de
Malte et la France au XVIIe siècle, (Paris, 2002), p. 604.
70 ‘Accord de la querelle de Capitaine Capdeuille [...] et Capitaine Mesples [...]’, 15 October 1604, BnF
Cangé, 20, f. 122r.
71 Pontis, Mémoires, II, pp. 16-18.
72 Leger, Droué, p. 53.
73 For an overall examination of the role of violence in early modern society, and the greater
acceptability of its use see Julius Ruff, Violence in Early Modern Europe, (Cambridge, 2001); for an
examination of noble feuds, and the extremely prevalent use of violence within them, see Carroll, Blood
and Violence, passim.
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together rather than against each other. Entering into kinship alliances with other
regimental officers solidified the impression that both were part of the body of
families from which the officer corps was primarily drawn, entrenching the idea that
they belonged to the wider military social milieu that included the most powerful
members of the French nobility. The links which existed between them were thus
constructed for the same reasons families sought to gain multiple commissions within
the regiments. They were both means by which a family could entrench their position
within the regimental military structures, in order to continue to gain the social
benefits that could be accrued from holding such office.
IV- Links of Kinship, Military Service and the Wider Strategy of Noble Families
That the petite noblesse entered into ties with each other to consolidate and improve
their social standing can be seen through the wider family strategies they pursued.
Gaining a company command exposed officers to a variety of new opportunities
within wider military structures and society. Indeed, to understand why families
sought commissions in the army, and why they entered into horizontal bonds with
each other, one often has to look at their actions outside of the military.
The relationship between the Montlezun de Busca and the Patras de
Campaigno offers an example of such wider strategy. As stated earlier, a member of
the Patras family had attended the wedding of a Montlezun in 1622, hinting at a
relationship between the two families. One quite clearly did exist, based partly on
military service within the regiments. Barthélemy de Montlezun is recorded as being
the lieutenant in the company of ‘M. de Campagnol’ in 1587, referring to the Picardie
company controlled by Michel Patras.74 Yet, not only did the families have ties due to
shared regimental service, both had significant links to the town of Boulogne.
Bertrand Patras, sieur de Campaigno, was, in addition to his Gardes captaincy,
commander of a company within the Boulogne garrison, and, from 1597, sénéchal of
Boulonnais.75 He passed this latter position to his nephew on his death in 1617. Both
positions were undoubtedly a reward for loyal service to the monarchy throughout the
1580s and 1590s, which had culminated in Bertrand’s successful defence of Boulogne
74 Marriage contract, 7 June 1587, BnF Cabinet 246 (6504), f. 22v.
75 État, BnF Na.Fr. 24842, ff. 8v-9r.
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in 1597.76 Marriage contracts relating to the Montlezun de Busca also show that the
family had clear links to Boulogne by the late 1580s, and that these ties were still in
place by the early 1630s.77 Moreover, both families had only relatively recently settled
in Boulogne, as both were of Gascon origin. Thus, it is not hard to imagine why links
existed between the two families. Both shared a common heritage, had improved their
social standing through serving in the regiments, with the Montlezun clearly benefiting
from the slightly higher social standing that the Patras enjoyed, and subsequently both
had become part of the Boulonnais elite. Regimental service had offered new
opportunities to both families, forming a basis on which they became notable
provincial families. Maintaining links of affinity with each other, drawing on long-
standing ties, was one means by which to consolidate the social advances they both
had made.
At least two members of the regiments arranged marriages based on where
their unit had been stationed. The Navarre company under the command of Pierre de
Trion can be found stationed in Rue, Picardy, between 1599 and 1601. In 1617, his
daughter married the son of Antoine de Séricourt, sieur d’Esclainvilliers, who was the
royal lieutenant in the town and citadel of Rue. That this was part of a wider attempt to
aggrandise Trion power in Picardy can be seen through Pierre’s subsequent
appointment as gouverneur of the town and chateau of Roye after 1625, by which
point he no longer held his commission in Navarre.78 In a comparable case, the
Navarre company of Lizander de Baradat, vicomte de Verneuil was stationed in
Montreuil between at least 1599 and 1601.79 Lizander would subsequently marry Anne
des Essarts, a relative of Charles des Essarts, sieur de Maigneux, who was the
gouverneur of the town and citadel of Montreuil. That Verneuil was made gouverneur
of Château-Thierry in 1613 shows that, like Trion, he was attempting to build up a
dynastic power-base in Picardy.80 Both men had thus built affinity links based on
76 M. Lefebvre, Histoire générale et particulière de la ville de Calais et du Calaisis, ou Pays reconquis,
(2 vols, Paris, 1766), II, p. 408; ‘Campagno’ to Montmorency, 2 August 1597, AMC, L, XXXV, f. 25,
shows how desperate the defence of Boulogne had become by August 1597. Bertrand’s rise may also
have been linked to a possible connection to the duc d’Épernon, who was gouverneur of the town.
77 Marriage contracts, 30 January 1632, 1622, BnF Cabinet, 246 (6504), ff. 22r-v, 30v-31r.
78 Villefosse, ‘Histoire de l’Abbaye d’Orbais’, Revue de Champagne et de Brie, 19, (1885), p.157;
Émile Coët, Histoire de la Ville de Roye, (2 vols., Paris, 1880), I, p. 137.
79 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1558); Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25834 (1649).
80 Genealogy, BnF DB 55 (1288), f. 2v; Baron de Saint-Pern and Mle. de l’Estourbeillon, ‘Réformation
de la noblesse de Bretagne’, Revue de l’Ouest, 12, (1896), p. 242.
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where their regimental companies had been based, in order to consolidate the advances
in social standing they had achieved due to regimental service.
Finally, the life of Isaac du Raynier quite clearly displays the priorities of the
petite noblesse families who officered the regiments. Isaac married his daughter,
Marie, to Étienne de Vallée, sieur de Pescheray, the son of a Ligueur captain, Louis de
Vallée. Isaac subsequently employed his new son-in-law as a lieutenant in the
gouvernement of Royan, until Étienne’s untimely death in 1622. From Marie’s second
marriage, she married her third daughter Madeleine to Henri de Senneterre, duc de La
Ferté in 1655, who had become a maréchal de France in 1651. The Raynier’s
acquisition of a direct kinship link to a maréchal de France represented a mark of
considerable social ascension from the social station they had occupied in the 1580s.
Indeed, René du Raynier, Marie’s brother and Isaac’s son, was subsequently able to
obtain the charges of gouverneur of Mirecourt and bailli of the Vosges thanks to La
Ferté’s intervention.
Isaac also dedicated much of his time to the aggressive acquisition of terres
and seigneuries. He acquired the seigneuries of Fontenalle and Ancize, but employed
much of his energies to improving the seigneurie of Droué, which had been of only
minor importance prior to the seventeenth century. The process was not
straightforward, and in 1644 Isaac married the daughter of a local landowner, Joachim
de Fromentières, in order to end several disputes between the two which had arisen
over Isaac’s acquisitions. Despite these difficulties, Isaac constructed roads, houses, a
church and, perhaps most significantly, a château, improving Droué to the extent that
he can be considered the ‘veritable fondateur’ of the town.81
That Isaac chose to crown his municipal improvements with a château is telling. The
building was a symbol of the ambition of the petite noblesse officers within the royal
regiments, an expression of dynastic power through architecture in a way comparable
to the prestige towns constructed by Charles de Gonzague, duc de Nevers at
Charleville or the duc de Sully at Henrichemont.82 Whilst Isaac had come from a noble
81 Leger, Droué, pp.49-59; La Chesnaye, VI, p.361; Christophe Levantal, Ducs et pairs et duchés-
pairies laïques à l’époque moderne (1519-1790): dictionnaire prosographique, généalogique,
chronologique, topographique et heuristique, (Paris, 1996), p. 666.
82 David Parrott, ‘A “prince souverain” and the French crown: Charles de Nevers, 1580-1637’ in (eds.)
R. Oresko, G.C. Gibbs and H.M. Scott, Royal and republican sovereignty in early modern Europe,
(Cambridge, 1997), p. 159; Simon D. Hodson, ‘Sovereigns and Subjects: The Princes of Sedan and
Dukes of Bouillon in Early Modern France, c.1490-1652’, (D.Phil. dissertation, University of Oxford,
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background, he had risen far beyond the social standing he had been born into, and the
château was an expression of the family’s new-found elevated status. This ascension
had been achieved primarily through service within the new standing army. The
permanency of regimental offices at a company level had allowed Isaac to rise through
the ranks not just to the position of captain, but also to enter a higher social milieu, one
in which he was recognised by the king and where he could construct both horizontal
and vertical alliances to benefit his family. Further service, coupled with the
considerable influence that captains held over appointments to their companies in this
period, had allowed Isaac to first place relatives within his company, before
bequeathing the unit to his sons, and the attendant benefits that came with it, whilst he
himself moved on to higher charges.
The Raynier might have been one of the more successful families within the
royal regiments, but their story is by no means entirely unique. The entrenchment of
permanent offices within the regiments, and the clear social benefits that holding such
positions allowed, meant the vieux were incorporated into the wider strategy that the
lower nobility pursued in order to achieve its fundamental ambition: the improvement
of their family’s social standing. That certain families quite clearly attempted to
dominate and even monopolise company positions not only provides evidence that the
lower nobility possessed and pursued recognisable strategies for dynastic
advancement; it also demonstrates how important regimental commissions began to be
seen to this strategy. Service within the royal regiments thus became part of the larger
goal for the petite noblesse that the Droué château symbolised: their ambition to be
perceived as powerful, notable members of French society, petits rois of their own
domains.
The rise of the standing army thus meant that a body of noble families came
together to form the royal infantry’s first permanent officer corps. Indeed, the inter-
and intra-regimental links between noble officers evidenced in this chapter creates the
impression that one needs to see the vieux as a bloc of units, rather than as separate
and enclosed regiments or regimental companies. More generally, one could argue that
if the regiments had not satisfied the ambitions of the petite noblesse which constituted
the officer corps, the standing army may well have evolved in a different manner, or
may not have emerged at all during this period. Only by making service within its
1999), pp. 171-2; Bernard Barbiche and Ségolène de Dainville-Barbiche, Sully: l’homme et ses fidèles,
(Paris, 1997), pp. 312-6.
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ranks attractive to a section of the French nobility could the standing army have found
the officers necessary for its formation. In the light of the remilitarisation of the wider
nobility in the later sixteenth century, a new corps of military officers could not be
imposed on French society; it had to materialize from that body. Accordingly, the
emergence of the standing army hints at a wider change between the monarchy, royal
military offices, and the nobility, in which at least a section of the latter placed
themselves more solidly in royal service, as it was in both their and the crown’s
interests. The consequences of such an evolution were potentially profound with
regard to the power of the grands within royal military structures, as the final two
chapters of this dissertation will show. For now, the next chapter will discuss certain
factors that helped to determine which noble families would enjoy the privilege of
service within the standing army.
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Chapter Three
Adjudicating Appointment: Promotion, Venality and Merit within a Career
Army.
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The picture painted hitherto is one of the almost untrammelled dominance that certain
lower nobility families enjoyed within the permanent regiments, and the benefits they
could accrue through such service. This chapter will nuance this impression by
exploring some of the other major consequences of permanent regimental office,
which placed restraints on the formation of a closed military oligarchy within the
infantry. Firstly, a form of customary law emerged influencing how promotion
occurred; secondly, venality began to appear within the regiments, placing financial
constraints on the pursuit of military office. Both these developments arose due to the
rise of a standing army which allowed the pursuit of military careers in the early
seventeenth century.
The early seventeenth-century army has not previously been seen as a body in
which a ‘career’ could be pursued. In some respects this might appear justifiable. It
was not until the Code Michau of 1629 that a royal document was promulgated which
explicitly set out regulations relating to a practice invariably found in career armies:
promotion.1 Moreover, certain historians have argued that it was not until the second
half of the seventeenth century that career structures within the royal infantry truly
began to take shape. Chagniot has stated that it was not until 1651 that subaltern
officers in the Gardes were regularly promised at their ‘tour d’ancienneté’ a captaincy
within any regimental company that became vacant.2 Drévillon has argued that it was
not until 1664 that a regimental captaincy would go to the lieutenant who possessed ‘la
plus grande ancienneté’ within the regiment, thus ensuring that promotion followed
‘une norme objective et équitable’. Moreover, he has asserted that it was not until the
status of officier réformé emerged in 1668 that structures were erected to support
officers in royal service during periods of peace between wars. As such, it was only
after this moment that the principle of ‘continuité du service’ was established, which
‘ouvrait la possibilité de faire carrière’ in the army, leading to the ‘professionalisation
de la fonction d’officier’.3
1 The ordonnance stated that ‘le soldat’ could, ‘par ses services’, rise through the charges of his
company ‘de degré en degré, iusques à celle du Capitaine’, and even beyond, ‘s’il s’en rend digne’.
Code Michau, art. 229.
2 Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 109-110.
3 Drévillon, L’Impôt, pp. 52, 218-221, 440.
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Whatever the merits of Drévillon’s arguments,4 this chapter will contend that
the stability of regimental office evidenced in the first two chapters gave rise to the
idea of a ‘career army’ much earlier than the 1660s. This can be seen by the
emergence of certain practices surrounding regimental appointment associated with
permanent bodies of force in the period of this dissertation. This chapter will firstly
demonstrate that by the late 1620s, ad hoc conventions relating to promotion had
emerged within the infantry. In certain cases, these allowed officers to pursue long-
term structured careers, limiting the ability of certain families to dominate regimental
appointments completely. Moreover, another practice linked to long-term office-
holding also emerged within the permanent infantry: venality. As regimental offices
were both limited in number, and prized because of the social benefits they could
confer, certain noble families were able to sell their positions if they were unable to
pass them onto a designated successor. As royal regulations did not keep pace with the
evolution of the infantry into a standing army, neither the system of promotion nor
venality was formally codified, and both can be seen as ‘bottom-up’ evolutions in
French military thinking. Accordingly, neither was always respected by the monarchy.
Overall, as it became clear that the regiments were a permanent structure in
which socially beneficial careers could be pursued, three main factors organically
emerged which began to profoundly, yet unofficially, affect how appointments
occurred to this body: money, ‘ancienneté’, and nepotism. A person could gain an
office within the standing army based on either their previous service within the
regiments (‘ancienneté’), the ability to buy regimental charges, an individual’s
nepotistic connections, or a mixture of these influences. And whilst they were not
mutually exclusive, a tension could exist between these factors. Beneath these
considerations, it also appears that only noblemen were considered for regimental
officerships. A noble’s ‘merit’ for office within the new standing army was thus
4 As already noted, the ‘officers retenuz’ found on the 1608-10 états heavily prefigure the officiers
réformés of the second half the seventeenth century. See Chapter One, Section IV. Moreover, Rowlands
has also questioned how equitable systems of promotion were under Louis XIV. He has contended that
even after the 1660s very few subalterns actually attained the position of a captaincy, and were only
kept in royal service by an enormous degree of ‘hope’. Indeed, Rowlands argued that officer posts
within the Gardes were increasingly monopolised by a ‘narrow elite pool of the court, of senior robin
families, and of families with existing connections to the Gardes’ in the final third of the seventeenth
century. Moreover, the ‘huge price increases for posts’, caused by the increased prestige of certain
positions and the rising cost of warfare, further reduced the number of potential officers. Thus,
patronage and money weighed heavily on the practice of appointment within at least certain regiments
until the end of the seventeenth century: Rowlands, Dynastic State, pp. 157-8; Rowlands, ‘Aristocratic
Power’, pp. 321-8.
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judged in a variety of uncodified ways, and the monarchy did not always take the lead
in the process of adjudication. These factors meant that a wider section of the petite
noblesse could aspire to both service and progressive reward within the regiments than
if a narrow and closed military oligarchy of office-holders had entrenched themselves
throughout the emergent standing army.
I – the Tension between Promotion Based on Service and Family Domination
Within the regiments, an unwritten system of promotion is clearly visible during the
period of this thesis. This system was primarily based on factors such as the
‘ancienneté’ of a person within a company, and the recognised hierarchy between the
vieux. If ‘merit’ was used as a consideration for promotion, it thus seems to have been
primarily conceived of in terms of the length of an individual’s regimental service.
This form of customary law had arisen due to the ambiguity of official procedures for
regimental promotion and appointment before 1635. As many officers undoubtedly
desired some form of progressive system of reward in return for their long-term
service, they essentially encouraged unofficial procedures of promotion to address this
need, rather than waiting for royal legislation.
Such trends are firstly visible with relation to the position of lieutenant colonel
within the compagnies colonelle of the vieux, as this person had to have previously
held a captaincy of his own before his appointment to the office.5 For example, within
the Gardes, when Antoine de La Grange de Montigny, sieur d’Arquien was appointed
to the position of lieutenant colonel by 1597, it was due to his ‘ancienneté’ and
‘merite’, after having being made a Gardes captain in 1577.6 Admittedly, that
Antoine’s brother was François de La Grange – who would become maréchal de
Montigny in 1616, and who was powerful enough in 1597 to have been placed in
charge of the light cavalry at the siege of Amiens – would have helped Antoine’s
cause, as would the family’s connections to the constable.7 Yet his appointment
appears to have also been made, at least in part, on the basis of his lengthy regimental
5 Chagniot has recognised that this was already occurring in the Gardes during the first half of the
seventeenth century, despite stating that an overall system of graduated promotion based on length of
service did not come into existence before the 1650s. Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 109.
6 Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, p. 59.
7 Anselme de Sainte-Marie, Histoire généalogique et chronologique de la maison royale de France [...],
3rd ed., (9 vols., Paris, 1726-1733), VII, p. 424.
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service. He certainly did not earn the role on the basis of any amity to the Colonel
General of the Infantry, the duc d’Épernon.8
When Arquien resigned the charge of lieutenant colonel in 1610, his
replacement was Jean-Jacques de Montesquiou, who had been a captain in the Gardes
since 1577, and who had been recognised as the ‘premier capitaine’ of the regiment by
1600.9 This designation, which appears frequently in contemporary accounts, was not
noted on revues, yet was often implied on états through the order in which captains are
listed. The term seems to designate the most senior captain in the regiment, after the
lieutenant colonel and the mestre de camp. As such, Montesquiou was already the
third captain listed, and thus ‘premier capitaine’, on the 1597 état, indicating that he
had inherited this position from Arquien after the latter’s promotion.10 In turn, the
‘premier capitaine’ seems to have been the first in line for the position of lieutenant
colonel when the charge became available. Bonnouvrier became ‘premier capitaine’
after Montesquiou’s promotion, and was succeeded after his death in 1617 by Isaac du
Raynier. Again, it would appear that each succeeded to the rather ad hoc position of
‘premier capitaine’ on the basis of length of service, with Bonnouvrier having held a
captaincy in the Gardes since the mid-1580s, as opposed to Raynier who had only
done so since the 1590s.11 Similar trends can be seen in Navarre. Bertrand de
Mazelière can be found commanding a company in the regiment de Valirault in 1593,
and by 1601 he had reached the position of lieutenant colonel.12 That this progression
was based on some form of relation to seniority can be seen in the career of his
successor, the sieur de Joffre. Joffre had been designated ‘premier capitaine’ of
Navarre since at least 1602, appearing third on the list of captains on the 1610 état,
before undoubtedly succeeding Mazelière as lieutenant colonel in 1617.13
The positions of lieutenant colonel and ‘premier capitaine’ both seem,
therefore, to have linked ideas of seniority and length of service to career progression.
8 Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, pp. 59-60, 256. The relationship between Arquien and
Épernon, and Épernon’s influence over appointments to the compagnie colonelle, will be considered
more fully in Chapter Six, below.
9 Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, pp. 60-1.
10 Once in place, the lieutenant colonel appears to have wielded some influence with regard to
appointment; by 1621, a Bernard de Montesquiou was ensign of the compagnie colonelle, who may
have been either Jean-Jacque’s son, or his first cousin once-removed. Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (272);
genealogy, BnF Ms.Fr. DB 459 f. 11v; La Chesnaye, X, pp. 338-339.
11 Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, p. 253; Leger, Droué, pp.47-8.
12 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25826 (836); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25834 (1655).
13 Jean Martellière, ‘Généalogie du la famille du bienheureux Agathange de Vendôme’, Bulletin de la
société archéologique, scientifique et littéraire du Vendômois, 45, (1906) p.123; Bassompierre,
Mémoires, II, p.185.
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That this service was considered meritorious was often taken as implied due to its
length. These ideas were by no means limited to these two positions, however, and
examples exist within the regiments of subalterns gradually working their way up the
company officer grades. For example, Albert de Grillet, sieur de Brissac can first be
found as an ensign in the Gardes company of the compagnie mestre de camp of the
sieur de Crillon in 1601, an appointment he had probably gained on the basis of a
shared Avignonese heritage with his captain. In 1609, after Créquy had taken over the
position of mestre de camp, and command of Crillon’s specific company, Brissac had
not only maintained his position within the company, but had risen to the rank of
lieutenant. Subsequently, Brissac was appointed captain of Bonnouvrier’s Gardes
company on his death in 1617, in reward for thirty-three years of service within the
regiment. Thus, even before the second half of the century, examples can be found of a
lieutenant with, quite possibly, ‘la plus grande ancienneté’ being rewarded with a
promotion to the captaincy of another company within the regiment.14 Examples of
individuals rising through the ranks within a single regimental company can also be
found. To name but one, Jules César de Gastault was recorded in 1599 as the
lieutenant of Barthélemy de Robert in Champagne, a position that Gastault was still
holding in 1605. After Robert’s death in 1621, Gastault can be found captaining the
company in 1623, with Robert’s ensign between 1599 and 1621 also promoted to the
position of lieutenant.15
Despite the success of these individuals, the unwritten nature of the customs
relating to promotion ensured much ambiguity remained within the nascent system, as
exemplified in an anecdote recounted by Louis de Pontis. When an ensign of a
Champagne company died in 1624, the captain of the company wished to give the
charge to ‘un des messieurs ses parens qui sembloit n’avoir guères d’autre mérite pour
cette charge que celui d’être son parent’. Pierre de La Mothe, sieur d’Arnaud, the
regiment’s mestre de camp, by contrast stated that too many regimental appointments
were being given to ‘parens’ of captains ‘sans regarder au mérite’, and that he wanted
to appoint a ‘brave soldat qui avoit bien servi le Roi dans les armées’ instead. Pontis
14 Although, as Chapter Five, Section II will suggest, Brissac’s possible connections to Épernon may
also have helped secure him the promotion. Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, p. 254; revue, BnF
Ms.Fr. 25835 (1717); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2183); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (116); revue, BnF
Ms.Fr. 25848 (460); ‘Lettres patentes’, 22 March 1647, BnF Cabinet 174 (4411), f. 4v; genealogy, BnF
DB 333 (8474) f. 3r.
15 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1550); Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1918); Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (319);
Pontis, Mémoires, I, p.303.
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does not record how the incident was resolved.16 Either way, the episode showed that a
potential tension existed in the regimental appointment system between captains
attempting to place family members at any given opportunity into their companies, in
contrast to ideas that only those with records of regimental service should receive such
positions.
These tensions are apparent even in cases where captains did succeed in
appointing multiple family members to companies. In the aforementioned case of
Brissac, for instance, by the time of a revue in 1627 he had still not been able to place
any family members within his company – some ten years after his appointment as
captain. It would appear, however, that Brissac did eventually succeed in gaining a
subaltern position for his nephew, and it has also been suggested that Brissac’s son-in-
law inherited the company in 1639. Similarly, when Paul de Hames appointed his
brother to the Picardie company under his command during 1598, he can be initially
found in the position of ensign. Jean Musnier, Hames’ lieutenant, remained in place.
This situation changed at some point between the two other rolls for this company
from 1600 and 1611, when Hames’ brother became lieutenant and Musnier disappears
from the roll.17 Thus, Hames had only been able to place his brother within his
company due to the position of ensign becoming vacant. He had not been able to
parachute him straight into the position of lieutenant, and again, had to wait until this
position had been vacated. Clearly, existing officers could not be arbitrarily removed
from their posts on the nepotistic whim of their captain.
Indeed, examples exist of precedence being given to seniority of service in
situations where family members might also have been considered for a company
captaincy. In 1597 the ensign of the Gardes company of Pierre du Bellay, sieur de La
Courbe was Abraham de La Besne. Besne had risen to the position of lieutenant by
1605, and by 1609 Guy du Bellay, Pierre’s only son, can be found as the company
ensign. When Pierre du Bellay died in 1615, Besne was promoted to the captaincy of
the company. This was despite the fact that Guy clearly wanted to inherit the company
from his father, and that Guy’s claim was supported by the duc d’Épernon. As no
revues exist for the company after this date, it is unclear how long, and indeed
whether, Guy stayed in the company after 1615. However, Andilly stated that in early
16 Pontis, Mémoires, I, pp.428-30.
17 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25831 (1378); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25832 (1427); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1502);
revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25834 (1612); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25842 (72); genealogy, BnF DB 345 (8902), f. 3r.
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1617 a duel was fought between ‘La Courbe fils d’un capitaine des gardes, et la Beyne
(qui a eu la compagnie)’.18 Whilst the duel does not appear to have been fatal, one
might doubt whether Guy remained in the company after the event, even if he had
initially done so after La Besne’s promotion. It is not unreasonable to infer from this
example that the rivalry over promotion had contributed to bad blood between the two
officers, as it might have done in other cases. Thus, on the one hand, certain noble
families may have begun to conceive of their companies as near-heritable property,
with the right to maintain command after a relative’s death or resignation; on the
other, long-serving regimental officers appear to have increasingly felt that they
should be progressively rewarded by promotion for long-term service, even if this was
at the expense of a captain’s designated successor.
La Besne’s story of progressive promotion trumping family nepotism was far
from unique. Within Piémont, similar events occurred within the company of Hector
Damon. His lieutenant in 1598 was Jean de La Marque who remained in the company
by a revue of 1616. Between this revue and one in 1601, Hector had succeeded in
placing a relative, Jean Damon, at ensign, with La Marque blocking any higher
appointment or progression. By the 1620 état, a ‘La Marque’ is listed as a captain,
with no member of the Damon on the list.19 Similar examples can be found
elsewhere.20
These cases illustrate that whilst a captain clearly wielded a significant level of
influence over company appointments, this authority was limited by emerging customs
relating to promotion that the standing army had engendered. In general, ensigns do
not seem to have been able to jump straight from their grade to that of captain, nor
does the arbitrary dismissal of a company’s subalterns by a captain seem to have
occurred with any great frequency. Family members had to enter the company at the
position of ensign and rise to the position of lieutenant if they wished to maintain the
18 I.e., that Guy was the son of a former Gardes captain, but that Besne was the current company
captain. Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25831 (1375); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25837 (1901); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841
(2182); genealogy, BnF Cabinet 37 (873), f. 2r; genealogies, BnF DB 81 (1848), ff. 5r, 16v-17r;
genealogy, BnF Cabinet 43 (1061), f. 2r; Guillaume Girard, Histoire de la vie du duc d’Espernon, (3
vols., Paris, 1730), III, pp. 18-19; Robert Arnaud d’Andilly, Journal inédit d’Arnauld d’Andilly (1614-
1620), ed. Achille Halphen, (Paris, 1857), p. 257. For more on the implications of this appointment, see
Chapter Six, Section II.
19 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1496); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (163).
20 See, for instance, the failure of Josias de Montmorency de Bours to pass the captaincy of his Gardes
company onto his son after Bours’ death in 1616, despite his son having acquired the position of
company ensign prior to this date: Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2175); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (275);
René de Belleval, ‘Les Montmorency du Ponthieu’, Revue nobiliaire, nouvelle série, 1, (1865), p. 253.
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company in family hands when the previous captain vacated his position. If relatives
had not managed to rise to this grade, and if no external appointment was forthcoming,
the company lieutenant could be considered for promotion instead. This may have
especially occurred in cases such as those involving the Bellay and Besne, where the
issue of military experience may have been considered. Besne had clearly taken part in
the wars of the 1590s whilst Guy du Bellay had only been born in the late 1580s.
Hence, in 1615, when the company became vacant, he probably had little to no combat
experience, in contrast to Besne. Longevity of service, and perhaps even military
talent, were thus considerations in regimental appointments, potentially to the chagrin
of certain noble captains’ nepotistic designs. Whilst the pressures of ancienneté and
nepotism on regimental appointment often came into conflict, both could only have
emerged as structural issues due to the perception that the royal army had become a
permanent body, capable of offering long-term service to noble families; put simply, a
career army.
II – Inter-Regimental Promotion and the Security of Subaltern Positions.
Not only do cases exist of promotion occurring within regimental companies, there are
also examples of promotions which crossed regimental boundaries. As previously
mentioned, something approaching a hierarchy existed among the permanent
regiments by the early seventeenth century, with the Gardes seen as the top regiment,
followed by Picardie, and the other three vieux contesting for pre-eminence before
their equality was established by the king in the 1620s. Most inter-regimental
promotion was thus centred on eventually receiving a commission to the Gardes, and
had been since perhaps the 1570s.
For example, Isaac du Raynier, Bertrand Patras and Blaise de Chaumejean had
all received commissions to hold captaincies within the Gardes after holding Picardie
captaincies.21 Other captains skipped straight to the Gardes from one of the other vieux
companies without holding a Picardie commission in the interim. Pepin de
Bonnouvrier had earlier been promoted to a Gardes captaincy from Champagne in
1583, whilst Charles d’Aubourg was promoted straight into the Gardes from Navarre
21 Leger, Droué, p. 47; Luppé, Mémoires, p. 200; BnF DB 178 (4640), f. 15r. As implied above on p.
37, Barthélemy-Scipion de Biran, sieur de Casteljaloux, Paul d’Antist, sieur de Mansan and François de
Mainville may also have been promoted from Picardie to the Gardes between 1597 and 1598.
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in 1626. A Gardes captaincy may have even be considered more prestigious than the
position of lieutenant colonel in other vieux regiments. ‘Pigeolet’ and ‘Miraumont’
were lieutenant colonels of Champagne and Picardie respectively before receiving
Gardes captaincies in 1622 and 1631.22 Indeed, holding the position of lieutenant
colonel in a quatre-vieux regiment may have been a means by which an officer could
demonstrate that he had sufficient seniority to receive a Gardes captaincy. In many
cases, therefore, it may well have been considered the pinnacle of a petite noblesse
officer’s career to receive a commission in the Gardes, explaining why many families
tried so hard to maintain companies in this regiment under their command once they
had received one.
Yet, due to the uncodified nature of the promotion system, there was no right
to receive a promotion to the Gardes, even after lengthy service. Moreover, some
officers may have preferred to maintain or receive positions in the lower regiments if
they considered them more prestigious. Whilst it is unclear whether he ever received
an offer to take up a Gardes captaincy, an officer such as Jean de Montlezun, sieur de
Busca may well have preferred to retain his position as ‘premier capitaine’ in Picardie
rather than being an ordinary captain in the Gardes, possibly explaining why he still
remained in this regiment in 1632 after over forty years of service as a captain.
Conversely, any promotion out of the Gardes into other regimental positions could
sometimes actually be seen in a questionable light. When Jean de Toiras received the
position of mestre de camp of Champagne in 1624, after having held a captain’s
commission in the Gardes for five years, it was portrayed by Richelieu as a form of
disgrace, especially as Toiras had to travel to La Rochelle to take up the position. Even
Toiras’ own biographer Baudier noted how much of the court felt that the position
entailed a form of voluntary exile, despite the fact that the position of mestre de camp
of Champagne was clearly higher up the regimental scale than a Gardes captaincy.
This would seemingly strengthen the aforementioned argument that the Gardes was
often stationed near the king and his entourage, and hence promotions into the
regiment were extremely promising in terms of the connections that could be made at
the royal court.23
22 I have not been able to determine the full name of these officers, who are merely listed as such in:
Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, pp.213, 263.
23 See Chapter One, Section III. Baudier, Histoire du Maréchal de Toiras, (Paris, 1666), p.64;
Richelieu, Mémoires, p.499.
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The de facto recognition of subaltern security of tenure posed another
complicating factor. If officers received a promotion into a different regiment, the
subalterns of their new companies remained in place; their old subalterns could not be
brought with them. For example, after serving as a captain in first Navarre and then
Champagne, on his appointment to the Gardes in 1613 Julien de Burosse had a
completely new set of subalterns to that of his Champagne company in 1610. When
Leon d’Albert, sieur de Brante took over the company on Burosse’s death in 1617,
Brante’s subalterns and sergeants in 1618 are identical to those listed under Burosse’s
command in 1613. Given that two of Burosse’s sons had become captains in Piémont
by the early 1630s, it is conceivable that Burosse would have placed relatives in his
Gardes and Champagne companies if he had been able to do so.
This again suggests that families could not implant members into companies in
the short-term, and had to wait for positions to become vacant. Receiving an inter-
regimental promotion could thus draw out this process even further, even if they held a
more prestigious position in the short-term.24 The appointment of both Burosse and
Brante to the company also illustrates how pre-existing company lieutenants could be
overlooked if vacant captaincies were subject to essentially arbitrary moments of
external appointment by the monarchy. However, when the Gardes companies of
Daniel Germaincourt, sieur de Buffé and Gaillard de Salerne were disbanded after
their deaths in 1600-1, the subalterns either received life pensions in compensation for
their positions, or were re-deployed into other Gardes companies.25 Similarly, in the
1610 état, payments can be found to the lieutenants and ensigns of Champagne and
Picardie companies that had been suppressed on the death of their captain. They were
to receive the same amount as full-time quatre-vieux subalterns over the course of the
year, although it was not stated whether these were pensions that had been granted in
perpetuity. Even the king, it would seem, was being forced to recognise that officer
positions could not be distributed and disbanded merely as he saw fit; and even if
24 Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, p.266; Courcelles, Dictionnaire Universel, III, pp.121-2; La
Chesnaye, I, 124; revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (112); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25845 (207).
25 Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, pp.105-6. Chagniot lists three subalterns from the two companies who received
these pensions. However, at least one of these three officers, Robert de Cromy, appears to have received
a commission into a new company, that of Pierre du Bellay, rather than, or in addition, to his pension by
1605. Additionally, one of Bellay’s sergeants, who had entered the company between 1599 and 1605,
Louis du Val, matches the name of a sergeant in Buffé’s company in 1598. Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833
(1501); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1515, 1530); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25837 (1901).
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subalterns were not always rewarded by promotion in turn, there are notable occasions
where they received compensation for the loss of their charge.
The potential difficulties that families faced due to these customs relating to
promotion and subaltern security were clearly not insurmountable, as can be seen in
the aforementioned cases of Brissac and Hames. Families, working within the ad hoc
structures of intra-company and inter-regimental promotion, had to bide their time
before implanting family members wherever possible. Whilst it might prolong this
process, taking inter-regimental promotions seems to have been the norm if they were
offered, as they boosted the family’s overall gravitas within the military establishment.
The stability of the regiments thus encouraged nobles to think of their offices, and thus
military service within the standing army, as long-term investments for their families,
in which career progression was possible. This stability may have established customs
which limited the nepotistic dominance of certain dynasties, but patient families could
certainly work within these unwritten guidelines to their benefit.
III – the Necessity of Nobility: Lower Ranking Officers and Promotion
The security of regimental structures extended beyond the level of the subalterns to the
two company sergeants who were usually listed on revues. Indeed, it is clear that many
sergeants served for long periods of time within the same company, and exploited the
new-found permanency of the regiments to undertake long-term military careers.26
Just as with the higher company grades, sergeants seemed to enjoy security of tenure
and do not appear to have been frequently threatened by arbitrary dismissal. Moreover,
the tone of the Code Michau would seem to give credence to the belief that sergeants
could achieve higher office, as it stated that ‘le soldat’ could rise from the ranks to the
position of subaltern, captain or beyond.27 Whilst ambiguous, the tone of the article
would seem to suggest that any infantry soldier could achieve this rise, not just a
nobleman who had entered at the rank of ensign.
26 To name but two examples, see the thrity years of service of Jean La Planche in the Gardes company
of Emmanuel de Valence, or the minimum of fourteen years that Elie Chefart spent as a sergeant in the
Navarre company of Jacques du Laur: Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25832 (1421); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25849
(547); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25832 (1393); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25843 (86).
27 Code Michau, art. 229.
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Certain examples can be found of lower ranking officers who did manage to
acquire higher company positions.28 Yet, on the basis of the revues, it does not appear
that many sergeants rose above this rank during the period of this dissertation. Indeed
the inertia of many sergeants can be contrasted to the subalterns within their
companies who could be promoted to higher company grades. When Brissac moved
from ensign to lieutenant between 1601 and 1609 in the Crillon/Créquy company, a
new ensign was appointed, whilst the two company sergeants remained in place.29
Gabriel de Saint Martin is listed as a sergeant on four revues between 1609 and 1627
of a Gardes company in which the ensign changed three times during the same
period.30
Thus, it was clearly not standard practice to consider sergeants for promotion
to subaltern positions, even if they had served for considerable periods of time. The
Code Michau regulation pertaining to promotion was not a reflection of the existing
situation within the permanent infantry regiments by 1629, at least with regard to
sergeants. If anything, the beginnings of a distinction between those considered
commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers appears to have begun to
emerge by the late 1620s. The requirements necessary for such a commission are
unclear, due to the lack of regulations with regard to appointment, but it would appear
that some form of title of nobility, or the recognition that they were ‘living nobly’,
however small, may have been needed. Certainly, no form of officer-training college
existed as a prerequisite to a commission.31 Thus, the early seventeenth-century army
does not appear to have offered much hope to non-nobles of acquiring officerships
within the regiments. Just like wider French society, the army’s elite positions, even
28 Chagniot cites one example of a sergeant reaching the position of lieutenant within the Gardes
between 1603 and 1621, but also states that such ascenscion was not the norm. Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p.
112.
29 Revue, BnNF Ms.Fr. 25835 (1717); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2183).
30 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2175); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (275); revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25848 (479,
481).
31 See Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, pp. 38-41 for the lack of formal military education in this period, in
contrast to the arguments of John Lynn, ‘Tactical Evolution in the French Army, 1560-1660’, French
Historical Studies, 14 (1985), pp. 189-190. The educational focus of the new noble academies that
appeared in the first half of the seventeenth century was on teaching ‘courtly graces’ such as riding,
dancing and fencing rather than the training of military officers, even if the study of military
mathematics, or ‘fortifications’, could also occur. In any case, only a small fraction of the French
nobility would have attended such institutions, and there existed little alternative in terms of officer
training colleges: Mark Motley, Becoming a French Aristocrat: The Education of the Court Nobility,
1580-1715, (Princeton, NJ, 1990), pp. 103, 124-139; Laurence Brockliss, ‘Richelieu, education and the
state’, in J. Bergin and L. Brockliss (eds.), Richelieu and his Age, (Oxford, 1992), pp. 237-245.
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down to the relatively humble position of company ensign, were dominated by the
nobility.
IV- the Acceptance of Venality within the Early Standing Army
In addition to unwritten customs relating to promotion, there is evidence that the
practice of venality began to emerge within the new standing army, with certain
officers able (or indeed unable) to purchase military office within the regiments during
the early seventeenth century. Prior to 1598, regimental offices had either been too
short-term or indeterminate in nature for notions of ownership to arise. Only when
regimental officerships began to be seen as both permanent and prized possessions did
those who held them increasingly begin to feel that they were the proprietors of their
charge, and that they should receive some form of compensation on resignation of
their offices, if they were unable to pass them on to a designated successor. This
phenomenon only began to occur in the French infantry as it became a standing army.
Indeed, Fritz Redlich describes a similar phenomenon occurring in the Empire
between 1600 and 1650, where the greater permanency of military units encouraged
certain officers to conceive of themselves as both ‘a businessmen and a soldier’, with a
long-term economic stake in the unit under their command.32 Certainly, the vigour
with which certain families pursued the domination of regimental companies would
encourage them to believe they had a role in determining its future.
It is important to note that from the late 1620s venality was ostensibly
outlawed within the French military. Indeed, this formal interdiction was part of what
David Parrott has called the ‘French rejection of [military] entrepreneurship’.33 As
outlined in this dissertation’s introduction, few states attempted to field armies which
were ‘centrally organized and centrally funded’ during the period of the Thirty Years’
War. Instead, the period was characterised by an almost wholesale devolution of
military responsibility to entrepreneurs, who would raise forces on behalf of their
employers. Entrepreneurs (especially those with the legal right to raise forces) were
turned to, as they had a greater degree of expertise than central government officials in
raising troops and were often willing to make initial levies based on their own credit.
32 Fritz Redlich, The German Military Entrepreneur and his Work Force, a Study in European
Economic and Social History, (2 vols., Wiesbaden, 1964) pp. 171-178.
33 Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, pp. 313-365.
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Yet, the French crown rejected this system, based largely on political considerations.
The Code Michau of 1629 explicitly rejected venality and any concept of
entrepreneurial ownership of military charges. The monarchy prohibited ‘toute
vénalité d’offices […] de toutes charges militaires, capitaineries et gouvernements de
provinces, places et fortresses’, with no person holding a charge in the infantry
allowed ‘de vendre ni résigner celles qu’ils auront, non plus que d’en achepter’.34 In
theory, all office-holders within the regiments were ‘direct employees of the crown’.
They received a salary and additional expenses for the costs they encountered in the
levy of their unit. Their commissions were revocable, and they ‘held no rights of
survivance or inheritance’. An officer could be chosen and replaced at will by the
monarchy. This, in some respects, might actually make the charge attractive to
members of the nobility; theoretically, men were chosen for positions within the
military on the basis of ability and past service, rather than their financial means.35
It is not difficult to discern why the monarchy chose to officially reject
independent ownership of military office so vigorously by the late 1620s. If the
confusion of private and public property had been a concern since at least the 1570s
within the financial and judicial sphere,36 it was ostensibly utterly unacceptable to
legitimise the practice with regard to military force. If the half-century of civil wars
before 1598 had not deterred the monarchy sufficiently from devolving military
authority into the hands of its subjects, the re-emergence of internal conflict during the
regency of Marie de Médicis, and the subsequent wars of the 1620s against the
Huguenots certainly appears to have done so.37
However, it is telling that only one royal statement regarding regimental
venality appears to have been made before the Code Michau. This act, written in
November 1618, stated that ‘tous gens de guerre de quelque qualité ou condition qu’ils
soient’ were forbidden from buying or selling any ‘charges militaires’ or faced being
deprived of any charges they held, prevented from military service in the future, and
other ‘peines exemplaires’. However, this act appears to have been primarily targeted
at venality within the Gendarmes de la garde, a company of the Maison militaire, as it
stated that the king was unhappy that several persons had bought a place within ‘nostre
34 Code Michau, art. 190 and 230.
35 Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, pp. 320-1.
36 Mark Greengrass, Governing Passions: Peace and Reform in the French Kingdom, 1576-1585
(Oxford, 2007), pp. 260-312.
37 Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, pp. 287-90.
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compagnie’. As such, the sections of the declaration regarding the infantry may well
have been added as an afterthought, and do not appear to have had any effect.
Drévillon has stated that this document was not registered in a parlement, and was
probably a dead letter, particularly with regard to the regiments.38
Just as in the case of promotion, therefore, there seems to have been a
regulatory vacuum with regard to regimental venality during the first thirty years of
the seventeenth century. And, if anything, the monarchy’s policy towards the practice
within the standing army was one of tacit acceptance. In 1610, Charles Loyseau stated
that in the permanent regiments there ‘commence déjà bien fort d’en vendre les
charges, non par le Roi, mais les particuliers par sa tolérance’.39 Indeed, if one looks
outside the vieux, military venality had been occurring since at least the early 1580s.
The monarchy even seems to have been prepared to accept independent levies of
troops without a royal commission during the 1610s, as long as they were put toward
royal service.40
Sale of office was thus quite clearly accepted within the regiments during the
early seventeenth century, and it far from apparent that the Code Michau did much to
end the practice in the years immediately after its promulgation. Firstly, it is plainly
visible at the level of mestre de camp. Not all appointments to this position were of a
venal nature. Jean d’Escodeca, baron de Boisse-Pardaillan had been a captain in
Navarre before his promotion in 1593; Jean de Toiras had been a captain in the
Gardes before being appointed mestre de camp of Champagne in 1624.41 It does not
appear that either man paid for their new charge. However, some of those who
acquired mestre de camp positions within the vieux during this period were men
external to the regiments, and in several cases they obtained their commissions via
purchase. In 1605, the sieur de Crillon received 30,000 écus in compensation when he
resigned the position of mestre de camp of the Gardes.42 Fontenay-Mareuil noted that
at the start of the revolt of 1616-1617, all the mestres de camp of the quatre-vieux sold
their charges, as ‘se trouvant trop vieux’ to serve in the conflict. Unfortunately, he
38 ‘Declaration du Roy portant deffense de vendre a l’avenir les charges et employs militaires sur les
peynes cy contenuez’, 4 November 1618, BnF Cangé 21, ff. 167r-168r; Drévillon, L’Impôt, p. 183.
39 Quoted in Drévillon, L’Impôt, p. 181.
40 Greengrass, Governing passions, p. 284; Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, p. 289.
41 Haag, La France Protestante, IV, pp. 543-545.
42 Sully, Mémoires, II, p. 49. There was a conversion rate of 3 livres per écu during the period of this
thesis: Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, p.xv; Richard Bonney, The King’s Debts: Finance and Politics in
France, 1589-1661, (Oxford, 1981), p. x.
90
does not record the price they received for their positions.43 In July 1622, Henri de
Neufville de Villeroi, comte de Bury had ‘achette le regiment de Navarre de
Frontenac’ for 66,000 livres ‘dont le roy luy [Frontenac] en donne 20,000’.44 Not only
was the king aware of the venality among his mestres de camp, he appeared willing to
participate in such transactions in order that they were conducted smoothly. Mestres
de camp could also make arrangements to ensure amis benefitted. When Jean de
Zamet sold the mestre de camp of Picardie to Roger du Plessis, sieur de Liancourt for
22,000 écus in 1622, Zamet ensured that Louis de Pontis, Zamet’s specially appointed
‘lieutenant de la mestre de camp’, would receive 1,000 écus of the proceeds.45
Purchase of captaincies within the regiments can be found, even if, as Parrott
has noted, ‘the market for officerships was closed and depended primarily upon the
deployment of influence and favour’.46 This was especially the case due to the
increasingly high demand for positions within these units. In practice, those
purchasing commissions within the Gardes and the quatre-vieux often already had to
have some form of pre-existing link to the core regiments. Thus, when Jean de Toiras
bought his Gardes company in 1620 he did so from the sieur de Frémigières, who
Baudier noted was a ‘parent’ of Toiras, and he was able to do so thanks to the royal
favour he had accrued through rising to the position of captain in the royal volière.47
Similarly, Charles II d’Aubourg’s ability to ‘traiter’ with the sieur de Saint-Preuil for
his company in the 1630s was undoubtedly based on Charles II’s position as a captain
in Navarre, and his family’s connections to the Gardes, after his father had held a
captaincy within the regiment in the late 1620s.48 Louis de Castelnau re-attained his
father’s old Gardes company from the Chevalier de La Valette in 1633 by obtaining
the agreement of the court to ‘traiter’ for the company. The Castelnau were thus
formally allowed to engage in a practice which had seemingly been outlawed only
four years previously, presumably due to the family’s previous service in the regiment.
Nepotism and regimental venality were, therefore, often closely linked.49
Venality also appears to have spread to subaltern positions within the vieux.
Jacques de Chastenet de Puységur claims to have sold his position of ensign within the
43 Fontenay-Mareuil, Mémoires, pp. 111-2.
44 Louis de Marillac to Richelieu, 3 July 1622, AAE MD 775, f. 180r.
45 Pontis, Mémoires, I, pp. 345-6.
46 Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, p. 334.
47 Baudier, Toiras, p. 12; Balincourt, ‘Toiras’, pp. 113-4.
48 BnF DB 37 (333), f. 2.
49 I have not been able to determine, in any of these cases, the exact figures paid for the captaincies.
91
Gardes for 18,000 livres, before spending 15,000 livres and 12,000 livres respectively
to obtain and co-jointly hold the positions of both major and captain in Piémont.50
Similarly, in 1634, Pontis sold his Gardes lieutenancy for 36,000 livres; a figure that
he noted was a third higher than the usual price paid for lieutenancies in the Gardes, as
the king himself had acted as an ‘entremetteur’ in the sale.51 Indeed, it is difficult to
state with any precision if there was a ‘standard price’ for regimental offices in this
period. Parrott has argued that the figure of 12,000 livres cited by Puységur for a
captaincy within Piémont is probably exaggerated, and that 6,000 livres may have
been closer to the norm for a vieux company by 1635. However, Parrott also notes that
‘[t]he price of captaincies fluctuated according to levels of demand’, and by 1656
Puyégur’s son paid only 3,000 livres for a company in Piémont.52 As military venality
was not officially legal before 1629, and was technically illegal after that date,
purchase of regimental office was usually done with a degree of circumspection.
Determining the number of regimental offices sold in this period, or a normative price
for which they were purchased, is therefore almost impossible.
What is undeniable, however, is that by the 1620s the role of money in the
regimental appointment system was beginning to come into conflict with the ad hoc
customs relating to promotion, as can be seen in 1627 when the sieur de Saligny
decided to resign his Gardes company. Tellingly, Saligny decided to ‘vendre sa
charge’, not merely resign it, and he first offered the position to Pontis, for 2,000 écus,
as he was the company lieutenant. Pontis could not afford this amount. Boulogne,
Pontis’ relative, exhorted Pontis to borrow the money, even offering to act as a
guarantor. Saint-Preuil, an ami of Pontis, and at that time ensign in the colonel-
company of Picardie, wished to buy the company himself, yet stated that he would
lend Pontis up to 4,000 écus in order to buy the company as he recognised Pontis’
superior claim to the captaincy. Pontis rejected both these offers on the alleged
grounds that he did not wish to mix money with friendship. Moreover, he stated that
the king had promised him the charge when he had received his initial promotion into
the Gardes in 1623. Pontis thus hoped for the ‘liberalité’ of the king in receiving the
captaincy: that the king would merely grant Pontis the charge, rather than essentially
forcing him to buy it, as he had done in the case of Saligny himself. This was clearly
50 Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, p. 332.
51 Pontis, Mémoires, II, p. 201.
52 Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, p.332. Rowlands has stated that standard infantry companies were being
sold for only c.1,000-3,000 livres under Louis XIV.
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not forthcoming. Pontis thus spelt out his complaint to the king: ‘ayant donné parole
de me gratifier de cette charge il avoit permis qu’elle fût vendue’. Even though Louis
XIII was distinctly unimpressed with Pontis’ tone, he still awarded him 4,000 livres in
return for not receiving the captaincy. Pontis can subsequently be found as Saint-
Preuil’s lieutenant in 1629.53
Venality had thus trumped the unwritten customs relating to promotion. Even
if someone had put themselves in a position of first refusal by becoming a company
lieutenant, they might still have to afford a promotion if they were not related to the
company captain and they decided to sell rather than merely resign their charge. Louis
XIII appears as a king who was not only aware of venality and the unwritten customs
relating to promotion within his regiments, but one who was willing to respect these
conventions, and who was even ready to inject royal money into the process of
regimental purchase, when necessary, in order to grease the system and keep officers
happy.
That venality was occurring within the regiments by 1620s is thus reasonably
clear. Yet the question of why regimental offices were being purchased and sold also
needs to be explored, beyond the fact that there was an increasing perception that these
offices could be securely held in the long-term. The practice may have been, in part, a
recognition of the wider financial burden that regimental officers were potentially
expected to shoulder. In 1623, regulations stated that if commissaires could not supply
the soldiers’ vivres, ‘le chef sera tenu s’obliger en son privé nom de payer ou faire
payer à la prochaine monstre ce qui se trouvera estre deub’.54 Even in 1610, with the
monarchy at a level of financial health that it would not enjoy again until perhaps the
1660s, the potential for exploiting the financial resources of regimental officers was
one that the monarchy visibly recognised. Will Becher noted that in the military build-
up to the Jülich campaign in 1610, Henri had already spent 300,000 ‘crowns’55 by
mid-March, and had ‘husbanded his expenses as neere as possibly he could’.
Consequently, Henri had given the responsibility of levying additional regimental
units to ‘gentlemen of rich howses’ rather than his ‘most able soldiers’ in order to give
53 Pontis, Mémoires, II, pp. 12-23, quotes from pp. 16, 18, 21; revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25849 (543).
54 ‘Reglement’, 14 August 1623, BnF Cangé, 21, ff. 251r-v.
55 The English translation of écus.
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them ‘hope, that having beene at some charge, for the setting on foote of theyre
regiments and companies they shall be afterwards still mayntayned’.56
The statement said much about the state of venality within royal military forces
in 1610. Even nobles who were being asked to pour their own money into the raising
of royal regiments and companies did not officially hold the proprietary rights to the
forces under their command, and could only hope that the monarchy chose to maintain
permanently their offices after the conflict. Thus, whilst the monarchy did not
significantly over-extend itself in the wars it fought in the early seventeenth century
(at least in comparison to the warfare it engaged in after 1635) regimental officer
credit may still have been exploited on occasions of mobilisation. Regimental venality
may have been, at least partially, an attempt by officers to recoup some of the
expenses they had incurred during their tenure of their charge.
Yet, financial reasoning does not fully explain the practice of venality in the
1620s. Saligny, for example, had only received his company in 1622 when he sold it in
1627, and, as Pontis noted, he had been given the charge for free by the monarchy. It
would seem unlikely that Saligny had made substantial financial investments in his
company during the five mainly peaceful years in which he held it. When Pontis
himself sold his lieutenancy in 1634, he did so because Louis XIII was helping him to
raise sufficient funds to purchase the position of Commissaire général des Suisses. As
the charge Louis wished Pontis to obtain would cost 90,000 livres to purchase, there
was obviously a financial dimension to the sale of Pontis’ lieutenancy. Yet he had, like
Saligny, received his regimental office for free from the king. Moreover, Louis XIII
stated that he wished to get ‘le plus d’argent qu’il se pourroit’ for Pontis, implying that
the figure he hoped to raise for Pontis might be higher than any sums he had invested
during the tenure of his charge.57
As Drévillon has suggested for the later seventeenth century, therefore, those
buying military office were not doing so due to a ‘stricte confrontation des pertes et
des gains financiers’. In his view, venality occurred because it was possible to plan a
career within the army by this later period; as such, one could purchase higher charges
in order to ‘achète des années de service’. Venality could advance an officer up the
military hierarchy quicker than if they waited for non-venal advancement; it could thus
56 Will Becher to the Earl of Salisbury, 19 April 1610, NA SP 78/56 f. 42v. Becher was the English
chargé d’affaires in Paris.
57 Pontis, Mémoires, II, p. 200.
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more rapidly increase their military grandeur and honour, the primary reasons for
which they served.58 Saligny and Pontis were thus both able to sell offices that they
had freely acquired because they knew that a market existed for them; one comprised
of families who wanted to join the regimental system due to the social benefits it could
confer, and who were willing to pay a premium to do so. Indeed, the purchaser of
Pontis’ lieutenancy was a ‘M. de Chenoise’ who bought it not for himself, but for his
son, the baron de Boucaut. Chenoise may well have hoped to obtain honour for his son
by obtaining a Gardes lieutenancy for him, but, at a cost of 36,000 livres, it might not
be perverse to contend that he hoped to gain some form of wider and more tangible
social benefit for his family as well. Indeed, if one is to take the figure Chenoise paid
at face value, the relatively small number of permanent regiments in the late 1620s
may well have led to inflation in the cost of acquiring regimental office before a
number of new regiments were created in the 1630s, which allowed families to more
easily acquire regimental office.
That Louis brokered this deal himself, and fought to get the highest price
possible for Pontis’ position, showed that the monarchy recognised that families were
willing to pay large amounts of money in order join a regimental system comprised of
secure offices with demonstrable social benefits. Far from stamping out the practice,
the monarchy was thus moderating the purchase of military office within the vieux by
the 1630s. Indeed, it would be outside of the régiments entretenus that the continued
official illegality of venality would be felt hardest, especially once the army began to
considerably expand after the beginning of the war against Spain in 1635.59 Overall, as
a number of cases in this section have evidenced, money had become a factor in the
acquisition of regimental office by the 1620s. As such, certain nobles were priced out
of acquiring promotions or entry into the permanent regiments. The early stages of a
system in which royal military service above a certain level was a privilege which had
to be invested in, due to the social benefits it could bestow, are thus visible.
Determining how to regulate appointments to an infantry officer-corps was by no
means a dilemma specific to the early seventeenth-century royal army. At the heart of
this issue was a larger problem: how to adjudicate the merit of potential appointees to
an office. As Fernando González de León has shown, the contemporary Spanish Army
58 Drévillon, L’Impôt, p. 210.
59 Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, pp. 349-362.
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of Flanders went from appointing officers based largely on their military expertise and
service during the sixteenth century, to one which increasingly required noble birth
and nepotistic connections for an officership during the seventeenth century.60 Within
France, the criteria for admission to an officership continued to be contested after
1635, as Rafe Blaufarb has demonstrated for the period between 1750 and 1820. Pre-
and post-revolutionaries debated whether a person’s ‘merit’, and hence suitability for
an officership, should be based on the nobility of their birth and family circumstances,
their expertise in military matters, or the loyalty and length of their service in royal
structures. That the French officer corps was purged on more than one occasion during
this later period showed how the dominant criteria for promotion and appointment
could change quite dramatically from one regime to the next, and that the composition
of the officer corps could be affected by changing political circumstances.61
The question of how to assess the ‘merit’ of nobles for infantry officerships
was only in its infancy in the early seventeenth century, as the rise of the standing
army was only itself becoming clear. All that can be said with certainty is that money,
and the influence of the idea that long-term service should be rewarded through
progressive promotion, prevented the formation of a closed military oligarchy within
the regiments. It also appears that an officer had to hold a title of nobility, or at least be
perceived to be ‘living nobly’, before they could be considered for regimental office.
That these factors appear to have evolved organically into criteria for ‘merit’ amongst
military officers, rather than being explicitly imposed as grounds for regimental
appointment by the monarchy, might question Jay Smith’s idea that the ‘sovereign’s
gaze’ was the sole adjudicator of merit during this period.62 Even if the crown,
officially at least, had to approve all regimental appointments, the monarch’s
conceptions of merit at least partially had to reflect those held by the wider nobility, if
he wished to retain them in royal service.
In any case, the potential for noble families to join the regimental system, and
hence royal military service, and for it to satisfy their ambitions of social
60 Whilst much of his analysis is insightful, González de Léon’s contention that the sixteenth-century
Army of Flanders had a ‘remarkably meritocratic ideology and structure of promotion’ fails to take into
account that ‘merit’ could be conceived of by contemporaries in a variety of ways, and not just in terms
of military expertise, as Blaufarb shows below. Fernando González de Léon, The Road to Rocroi:
Class, Culture and Command in the Spanish Army of Flanders, 1567-1659, (Leiden, 2009), pp. 55-87,
159-203, 373-4, quote on p. 373.
61 Rafe Blaufarb, The French Army, 1750-1820: Careers, Talent, Merit, (Manchester, 2002).
62 The argument regarding the ‘sovereign’s gaze’ can be found throughout Smith, Culture of Merit. For
its application to the first half of the seventeenth century, see pp. 11-56.
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advancement, remained a possibility throughout the period of this thesis. A narrow and
closed military oligarchy of office-holders was not allowed to take shape fully within
the standing army. Indeed, if the benefits of regimental service were limited to a
certain group of noble families, this was mainly due to the relative lack of regimental
offices available, rather than any innate inadequacies of the officer framework. How
the regimental system was expanded to account for the demands of additional noble
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The preceding two chapters have demonstrated the ardour with which a section of the
French nobility, largely from its lower echelons, wished to achieve commissions
within the new standing army. Indeed, the premiums that some noblemen had begun to
pay for regimental officerships reflected the limited number of charges available
within the vieux. As such, it should not be surprising to discover that attempts were
made to extend this system, and that the standing army that emerged in the first third
of the seventeenth century contained more than a handful of regiments and guard
companies. By 1635, it contained a further eight regiments, which will be discussed in
this chapter. One of these was added to the ranks of the vieux; the others formed a new
cohort, and were dubbed the petits-vieux. Several of the petits-vieux had attained the
status of entretenu by the late 1620s, and had earned the right to carry the drapeau
blanc (the king’s standard). This honour signified that they were considered elite
regiments, with a status below the vieux, but above the temporary regiments, in the
infantry hierarchy.
The term petits-vieux does not appear to have been in usage until the reign of
Louis XIII; before 1610, many of these regiments either did not exist or had not had
their permanency assured. As such, the origins of the petits-vieux are often unclear,
much like the vieux, and even the exact number of petits-vieux regiments which
existed during the first thirty years of the seventeenth century is a matter of contention.
Père Daniel cited only five in his study on the French army, Susane stated there were
six between 1616 and 1635, whilst Parrott recorded seven regiments as having attained
this status by 1635.1 The closest to a definitive list of permanent regiments by the late
1620s can be found on an état of 1627, on which the following eleven regiments are
listed as permanent: the Gardes, Picardie, Navarre, Piémont, Champagne,
Normandie, Chappes, Estissac, Rambures, Vaubecourt and Beaumont.2 However, it is
difficult to give a definitive list of the names of the petits-vieux, as their name changed
if the position of mestre de camp was taken over by a different family. Susane’s list of
Chappes, Rambures, Bourg de l’Espinasse (often merely referred to as Bourg), Sault,
Vaubecourt and Beaumont thus seems most representative of the names of the petits-
vieux for most of the period of this thesis.3
1 Daniel, Milice, II, pp. 390-392; Susane, Ancienne, I, pp. 214-5; Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, p. xvi.
2 ‘Etat de la depense pour l’entretenement de l’infanterie et cavalerie’, ‘Pour l’année 1627’, SHDAT
X15, n.p.
3 Parrott lists the names of the petits-vieux in 1635 as being Nerestang (previously Chappes), Sault,
Rambures (previously Balagny), Vaubecourt, Maugiron (previously, amongst others, Bourg), Bellenaue
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This section will not consider all the regiments which have been deemed petits-
vieux. Instead, it will focus on three of these regiments, together with Normandie, a
regiment that one can consider a ‘lesser’ vieux, in order to flesh out the dynamics
which were central to the evolution of all these units, and why some had greater levels
of status attached to them than others. This section will start with a consideration of
the first petits-vieux regiments – Bourg and Nerestang – focusing on their uncertain
origins, how they became permanent bodies, and the consequences of this process.
The origins of Normandie will then be investigated, in order to demonstrate that the
regiment has its foundations in the noble factionalism of the mid-1610s, and that the
perception of Normandie as a vieux regiment was due to dynastic politics, rather than
the inherent ‘ancienneté’ of the unit. The final section will then analyse the emergence
of Vaubecourt, particularly making reference to the position of the Nettancourt de
Vaubecourt as a bi-confessional family from an area of ambiguous sovereignty.
Just like the vieux, the evolution of the petits-vieux into permanent
administrative units was a rather haphazard set of developments, yet one which was
fundamentally driven by the dynastic ambitions of the nobility who officered the
regiments. Rather than explicitly ordering this process, the monarchy appears to have
merely allowed the number of permanent regiments to expand as circumstances arose,
because it grasped the benefit of having an increased number of noblemen in its
service. This dynamic can firstly be seen with the position of mestre de camp, where
the interests of the monarchy, but also, critically, certain members of the noblesse
seconde, led to the levying of these regiments, and their subsequent maintenance as
entretenus. Secondly, the dynastic interests of petits-vieux mestres de camp and also
petite noblesse captains can be seen at work at a company level. Unfortunately, very
few états and revues exist for these regiments during this period, so a reconstruction of
the patterns of military office-holding on the scale seen in the preceding chapters
cannot be achieved, even if sufficient evidence does exist to allow the highlighting of
certain general trends. Ultimately, the new regiments of this chapter came into
existence because there was a pool of noblemen outside of the vieux who wished to
join the new standing army, owing to the social benefits that serving within it could
confer.
(previously Beaumont and Chastellier-Barlot), and Saint-Luc (levied in 1620 and known as La Valette
between 1622 and 1627). Information in brackets based on Susane, Ancienne, VIII, pp. 63-5, 69, 80.
100
I- Nerestang and Bourg: the Initial Extension of the Standing Army, c.1590-
c.1620.
The original petits-vieux regiments had their origins in the warfare of the 1590s: both
Bourg and Nerestang were levied in response to the Spanish threat to Picardy in 1597.
According to Susane, Nerestang was formed in 1597 from ‘quelques vieilles
compagnies’ garrisoned in Provence, whose presence could be traced back to the
‘enseignes de Piémont’ which had returned to France from Italy in 1559. For Bourg,
he merely stated that it was formed from ‘des bandes anciennes’ which had served the
Ligue from 1589. Indeed, the two mestres de camp had rather different backgrounds.
Philibert de Nerestang had been a captain in Piémont since the 1560s, and faithfully
served the monarchy throughout the civil wars. Antoine de Maine, baron du Bourg de
L’Espinasse had, by contrast, commanded a Ligue regiment during the siege of Paris
in 1589, and did not enter royal service until the beginning of 1595. Owing to a lack of
evidence, it has not been possible to test Susane’s hypotheses, but, at least in the case
of Philibert de Nerestang, some of his ideas do appear to ring true.4 Whatever their
origins, both Bourg and Nerestang appear to be the only non-vieux regiments to have
survived the 1598 retrenchment. A document from 1616 states that in 1598 ‘tout
linfantereye francaise feust licentyée a lexeption des garde, picardye, champagne,
piedmont, Navarre, nerestan & Bourg’.5 However, the lack of any complete états
between 1597 and 1608 means that it is impossible to state definitively exactly how
these regiments survived the immediate aftermath of the Peace of Vervins. If they did,
Bourg and Nerestang were probably much more substantially reduced in size than the
vieux. Indeed, Susane has contended that both regiments had been reduced to a sole
mestre de camp company by the end of 1598. Given that Susane also lists eleven royal
regiments as being levied in 1597 which were subject to complete disbandment in
1598,6 it is unclear why Bourg and Nerestang were chosen to maintain their regiments,
in any form, sur pied. It would fit Henri IV’s overall policy that both an ex-Ligueur
and a long-standing royal servant were equally rewarded in the late 1590s, though
admittedly this is pure conjecture.
4 Susane, Ancienne, III, pp. 290-1, 388-390; anonymous biography, BnF DB 485 (12731), f. 11r.
5 ‘Memoire sur le rang de ce regiment’, SHDAT A113, f. 37.
6 Susane, Ancienne, VIII, pp. 65-67.
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The evolution of these two regiments into permanent regiments after 1598 is
far from clear, but probably occurred earlier than Susane has claimed. For both
regiments, he stated that the 1600s saw their levying and disbanding – or, at best,
reduction to a single mestre de camp company – as royal military needs saw fit. The
regiments both served in the Savoy War and were active in the mobilisation of 1602,
without becoming fully entretenus. It was not until the mid-1600s that Susane was
willing to accept that Bourg might have been maintaining a relatively sizeable amount
of force permanently under arms, whilst, in his opinion, Nerestang was not
‘définitivement rétabli’ as a full regiment until 1610.7 Daniel has cited that both men
can be found recorded as mestres de camp in the Extraordinaire des guerres by 1606.8
However, indications of permanency are present before this date. A brevet
from 1602 stated that Henri had given ‘il y a quelque temps’ the position of mestre de
camp to Nerestang and Bourg, in order that they could form regiments to serve on the
frontiers of Burgundy and Bresse and ‘autres lieux’ where Henri required them.
Indeed, the brevet’s purpose was to establish that Nerestang ‘procedera et marchera en
ordre debvant’ Bourg.9 This suggests that by this date the two regiments had already
gained enough security that their positional in the regimental hierarchy required
formal recognition and regulation. By the mid-1600s, revues can be found for both
regiments, who appear to be garrisoning towns in the south-east of France. Both
regiments additionally had a presence in the Lyonnais, whilst revues can also be found
for Nerestang companies stationed in nearby Bourg-en Bresse.10 It may well be the
case, therefore, that these two regiments were kept in the south-east after the Savoy
War, or the mobilisation of 1602, either to garrison newly acquired territory, or more
generally to bolster frontier defences in the area. By 1607 both regiments appear after
the vieux on the accounts of the Extraordinaire des guerres as permanent regiments.
The accounts of this year state that ten captains in Bourg and five captains in
Nerestang, together with their subalterns, were to receive monthly payments
throughout the year in the same manner as the vieux.11 Additionally, a provision of 30
livres per month was made for ten ‘cappitaines refformez qui seront appoinctez audict
7 Ibid, III, pp. 291-2, 392-3.
8 Daniel, Milice, II, pp. 393-4.
9 ‘Brevet par lequel le Roy a ordonné que le regiment de Nerestang procedera celuy du Bourg’, 2
August 1602, BnF Cangé 5, f. 256.
10 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25837 (1904); revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1912, 1967); revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838
(1983-1984).
11 And at the same level of pay as the quatre-vieux.
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regiment’ of Nerestang. Whilst a similar concession was not made for Bourg, this
shows that the effort to keep old captains ‘retenuz’ in royal service extended past the
vieux, and it is highly unlikely that reformed officers would have been attached to an
empty shell of a regiment.12
It would thus appear that by the mid-1600s, both Bourg and Nerestang had
been added to the ranks of the royal army’s permanent regiments. Calculating the
exact date this occurred is impossible, but is most likely to have occurred after either
the mobilisation of the army in 1602 or the Sedan campaign of 1606. In any case, by
1607 both regiments were consistently maintained sur pied from that date; something
which can be seen in the continuity of service of the regiments’ captains. Of the fifteen
captains named in the two regiments in 1608, all were again named on the 1609 and
1610 états. Between 1610 and 1620, further continuity is visible, despite both
regiments changing their mestre de camp. Bourg had become Suze in 1619 when the
regiment was taken over by Gaspard de Champagne, comte de La Suze,13 whilst
Nerestang had become Chappes in 1611 after Jacques d’Aumont, baron de Chappes
assumed command. An état for both regiments can be found from 1620.14 Of the ten
captains named in Suze, six names correlate with those named in Bourg in 1610:
‘Chantelot’, ‘Langeron’, ‘La Molliere’, ‘Poiviere’, ‘Toulouson’, and ‘Moulin’.
Similarly, of the five captains recorded in Nerestang in 1610, three names are repeated
among the ten captains maintained in Chappes: ‘La Maison’, ‘Faure’, and ‘Vandemar’.
Further information relating to continuity of service can be found with reference to the
few revues which have survived for these regiments.15 The ‘Moulin’ recorded in
Bourg/Suze can be found as Jean du Moulin in regimental revues from 1610 and 1616
with the same lieutenant.16 The ‘La Maison’ on the Nerestang/Chappes états can be
found as Jean de Pantrieu, sieur de La Maison in revues from 1605, 1609, 1610 and
1614.17 The subaltern and sergeant composition of La Maison’s own company is
identical in 1605, 1609 and 1614.
12 État, BnF Na.Fr. 24841, ff.168r-170r for 1608 (signed December 1607); état, BnF Na.Fr. 24842, ff.
145r-147r for 1610 (signed December 1609).
13 Suze’s tenure over the regiment would be short-lived. Charles, marquis de Lauzieres would become
mestre de camp in 1620, and this position would change hands another three times before Claude,
comte de Maugiron took control of the regiment in 1633. Susane, Ancienne, VIII, pp.299, 388-397.
14 État, BnF Ms.Fr. 16718, ff. 198v-199v;
15 Fourteen revues remain for Nerestang/Chappes, and nine for Bourg/Suze/Estissac.
16 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25842 (37); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (156).
17 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1967); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25841 (2216); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25842 (8);
revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (133).
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Thus, by the mid-1600s at least, the stability of regimental office-holding
found in the vieux had been extended to a notable degree to the newer regiments of
Bourg and Nerestang. These regiments were being permanently maintained, and
security of office had been made possible for the captains and subalterns who
inhabited them. These new, permanent regiments would eventually become known as
the petits-vieux. This symbolised that they shared many characteristics with the vieux
regiments, and were part of the standing army, but that they were considered to be of a
lesser rank within the regimental hierarchy. In the case of Bourg and Nerestang, one
might assume this lesser status was attributed to them as they had been formed and
entrenched in a period quite clearly after that of the vieux. However, as will be seen in
the subsequent section, the status of regiments entrenched after 1590 was often based
on factors other than regimental age and lineage.
II- Factionalism, Dynastic Survival and the Creation of a Vieux: Normandie
The regiment which most clearly shows the central importance of the dynastic
ambition of the nobility to the process of regimental creation and entrenchment in the
early seventeenth century is Normandie. This can be shown through an exploration of
a central contradiction relating to the regiment’s origins. The regiment was younger
than the petits-vieux regiments of Bourg and Nerestang and possibly even Vaubecourt
if the date of first levy is taken, yet almost immediately after its foundation it was
classed amongst the vieux. Indeed, if, as Père Daniel put it, the regiment was only
definitively founded between 1615 and 1617, ‘ce Regiment étant si nouveau
[comment] a-t-il eu son rang immediatement après les quatre premiers vieux Corps, &
comment a-t-il acquis le titre même de vieux corps?’18
For Susane, Normandie was a vieux as, just like the other regiments afforded
this status, it could ultimately trace its origins from ‘bandes anciennes’ and ‘vieilles
enseignes françaises’ dating back to at least the 1560s, even if the regiment had not
definitively taken shape until the 1610s.19 Yet, whilst Susane’s history is wonderfully
evocative of the confusing nature of provincial military administration during the civil
wars, it is difficult to draw a direct line between the somewhat amorphous forces of
18 This period, and the status of Normandie as a vieux is accepted among the few historians who have
discussed the regiment’s origins. Daniel, Milice, pp. 384-8; Susane, Ancienne, VIII, pp. 176-87. Parrott,
Richelieu’s Army, p. xvi, accepts Daniel’s ‘c.1617’ as the date of Normandie’s origin.
19 Susane, Ancienne, III, pp. 177, 180, 182, 186.
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this earlier period and Normandie. In the états for 1608-10 there is no mention of any
form of local defence force or ‘vieilles bandes’ in Normandy beyond those troops paid
to garrison the province’s towns, nor is there a mention of Normandie in the ‘gens de
campagne’ section of the accounts.20 There remains the possibility, of course, that
these older forces may have formed part of the province’s garrison, without being
recorded as such in the royal accounts. In any case, as Daniel notes, a regiment entitled
Normandie cannot be found in the accounts of the Extraordinaire des guerres until
1617. As such, instead of attempting to ascribe Normandie’s vieux status to potentially
tenuous connections with older military forces, it is better to look for the origins of the
regiment in the factionalism of the mid-1610s, and, in particular, the struggle between
Concini and Longueville to dominate Picardy.
Concino Concini, marquis then maréchal d’Ancre, had arrived in France in
1600 after marrying one of Marie de Médicis’ ladies-in-waiting, Leonora Galigaï.21
Whilst he had already manoeuvred himself into a position of favour prior to 1610,22
his ascension to pre-eminence and position of court-favourite truly began after Henri
IV’s assassination, and the beginning of Marie’s regency. However, Concini did not
dominate royal government for the entire period between 1610 and 1617, and Jean-
François Dubost has helpfully divided Concini’s life into three stages during these
years. Firstly, between 1610 and 1614, Concini and his wife concentrated on amassing
money, land and offices, with government power largely in the hand of the Secretary
of State, Nicolas de Neufville, sieur de Villeroy; from 1614 to 1616, Concini
broadened his influence, and made his first interventions in politics. It was thus only
from the Peace of Loudun onwards (May 1616) that Concini played a ‘full part in the
political direction of the kingdom’, especially as he was essentially able to form a new
ministry through placing creatures in key governmental positions, such as those
relating to finance and foreign affairs.23
20 État, BnF Na.Fr. 24842, ff. 51r-56r, for troops paid for by the Extraordinaire des guerres to garrison
Normandy.
21 The most recent biography of Concini is Hélène Duccini, Concini: grandeur et misère du favori de
Marie de Médicis, (Paris, 1991).
22 From 1608 Concini was already strongly ‘en vogue’ in court, and was in-line to receive a
gouvernement. F. Pouy, Concini, maréchal d’Ancre, son gouvernement en Picardie, 1611-1617,
(Amiens, 1885), p. 23.
23 It is worthy of note that the client who Concini placed in the position of foreign minister was
Richelieu: J.-F. Dubost, ‘Between Mignons and Principal Ministers: Concini, 1610-1617’, in L
Brockliss and J.H. Elliot (eds.), The World of the Favourite,(New Haven and London, 1999), p. 72.
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Between 1610 and 1614, therefore, the Concini acquired enormous pensions
from Marie de Médicis, through which Concini was able to buy the charge of premier
gentilhomme de la chambre, and the terre of Ancre by the end of 1610. This began a
process by which Concini attempted to solidify his rise to favour, in which he acquired
military titles and sought to build a provincial power-base for himself in Picardy. After
buying the charge of gouverneur of Péronne, Roye and Montdidier from the marquis
de Créqui in late 1610, Concini was appointed lieutenant général of Picardy in 1611.
Concini then obtained almost complete control over Amiens, through acquiring the
largely military position of gouverneur of both the town and citadel, and judicial
power as the bailli of the town. He duly began a programme of improving the citadel,
and placing clients inside it to command the garrison. Only lacking a distinguished
military position to cap his ascendancy, this was received when, on the death of
Guillaume de Hautemer, maréchal de Fervarques, Concini was appointed maréchal de
France in 1613.24 Not only had he thus gained a significant position of military
authority, he had brought several towns in Picardy under his control, including the
strategically vital town of Amiens with its garrison of 300 men. Concini had given
these men 12,000 livres in order to try and guarantee their loyalty, but had additionally
installed Italian soldiers in the garrison to the chagrin of some members of the local
population and the duc de Longueville.25
Indeed, this rise to favour did not go unopposed, as Concini’s eventual violent
assassination in 1617 would most obviously show. Rohan commented on Concini’s
appointment as maréchal that ‘il n’y avoit point encore d’exmple d’homme honoré du
baton de mareschal de France qui n’eut jamais servit en armée’.26 However, before his
influence on central government became truly marked in 1615-16, the main difficulties
Concini faced were related to his attempts to build up his influence in Picardy, as this
brought him directly into competition with Henri d’Orléans, duc de Longueville, who
was gouverneur of the province. Concini had clearly attempted to exploit
Longueville’s minority: he was only fifteen in 1611, and the Comte de Saint-Pol, his
uncle, had exercised the charge of gouverneur for him. By the revolt of 1614,
Longueville tried to stamp his authority over the town, and thus the province, through
24 Duccini, Concini, pp. 92-103. Dubost has stated that ‘as a marshal of France, Concini owned his own
regiment’. There is no evidence to suggest that being a maréchal de France gave a nobleman the right
to own a regiment in the 1610s: Dubost, ‘Between Mignons’, p. 75.
25 Pouy, Concini, pp. 24. The figure of 300 men is taken from the 1610 état, BnF Na.Fr. 24842, ff. 10v-
11r.
26 ‘Histoire du marechal et de la marechalle d’Ancre, 1610-1617’, AAE MD 768, f. 86v.
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a failed attempt to take Amiens’ citadel by force. Whilst much of the causation of the
revolts between 1614 and 1617 can be ascribed to the anger of certain members of the
high nobility against Concini’s rise and, in their view, usurpation of power,
Longueville thus had a particular casus belli against the Italian. Longueville would
score a victory over Concini at the peace negotiations at Loudun in 1616. In the wake
of this treaty, Concini was forced to resign his various positions in Amiens, and swap
the position of lieutenant général of Picardy for that of Normandy with Hercule de
Rohan, duc de Montbazon.
Loudun did not end the kingdom’s internal instability, and Condé’s subsequent
arrest would provoke a resumption of revolt by certain members of the high nobility.
Daniel’s explanation for the levy of the régiment de Normandie comes from this time.
He claimed that Concini raised the regiment to guard Condé at Vincennes in the wake
of his arrest in September 1616. This explanation is not entirely convincing, as
between March and May 1616 six revues can be found for this self-same regiment of
the maréchal d’Ancre. Moreover, these revues all took place in Picardy, at Amiens,
Querrieu, and Clermont.27 Despite the Peace of Loudun, it would seem unlikely that
Concini completely disbanded these troops after May 1616, given the continued
precariousness of his situation. The original composition of Normandie was thus
probably of troops from Picardy in areas under Concini’s control.
Admittedly, it is impossible to prove whether some of the troops garrisoned in
towns such as Amiens may have been formed from the remnants of the ‘vieilles
bandes de Normandie’, and thus Norman soldiers may have been present in
Normandie from its conception. However, the real Norman tone to the unit was
probably given after September 1616, when Concini retreated to the province of which
he was now lieutenant général. In October 1616, Concini then returned to the court,
‘accompagné de quantité de Normans’.28 This foreshadowed the more extensive levies
of early 1617. As revolt re-emerged, Concini levied 6,000 infantry in March 1617, of
which 2,800 were French who Daniel plausibly contends were probably levied in
Normandy.29
27 Given the location of the other two places, ‘Clermont’ would most likely refer to the town also known
as Clermont-de-l’Oise, located in the south of the province. Revues, BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (168, 172, 175-
6, 178, 180).
28 Andilly, Journal inédit (1614-1620), p. 217.
29 Figures from Daniel, Milice, pp. 385-6. Daniel states that these figures were taken from a letter from
Ancre to the king from March, 1617.
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This, therefore, is the likeliest origin of Normandie. As its original name
suggests, this regiment began life as Concini’s private defence force, levied between
late 1615 and early 1616 when his position was under threat. It is quite probable that
he was merely levying anyone in first Picardy, and subsequently Normandy, whose
loyalty he could trust or buy in the mid-1610s, and Andilly certainly notes how
Concinis’ clients were being appointed to captaincies in the regiment by late-
November 1616.30 Indeed, it appears that Concini further exploited the clientage links
he had developed in Picardy in order to raise further regiments alongside Normandie
that were headed by his supporters in the same period.31
Dubost’s claim that the regiment was part of Concini’s aim to ‘establish a
permanent royal army worthy of the name […] ready to operate at the first sign of
trouble’ is therefore rather doubtful, if by royal he means it was not shaped heavily by
faction.32 Richelieu’s management of the 1616-1617 war effort was certainly
complicated by the shadowy motives Concini stated with regard for his need for
money and troops, especially with regard to the levies he made in Liège.33 If Concini
was motivated by a desire to protect the monarchy, this was only because his own
position was so intimately linked to the continuation of the status quo by 1617.
The perception of Normandie as a dynastic possession of the Concini is
enhanced by the fact that in May 1616 the command of the regiment was given to
Concini’s thirteen-year old son, Henri Concini, comte de La Pesne. Concini was
undoubtedly trying to maintain the overall security and position of his family, in
reaction to the uncertainty engendered by Condé and Longueville’s ostensible triumph
over him at Loudun. Indeed, if Susane is correct, and the regiment changed its name to
Normandie during the period it was under the control of Pesne, this may have been
due to Concini’s desire to deflect criticisms from his detractors that this unit was a
virtually independent body primarily under his control, even if it did contain a
significant Norman element by late-1616. Normandie’s creation was thus a result of
the instability and factionalism of the mid-1610s, and Concini’s general ambition to
30 Andilly, Journal inédit (1614-1620), p. 233.
31 Concini’s relationship with the marquis de Portes, the uncle of the duc de Montmorency, meant that
he had been able to use the influence of Portes’ sister, the abbess of Caen, to raise a regiment of twelve
companies of 100 men in the revolt of 1615-16, i.e. at the same time that the regiment de maréchal
d’Ancre appears to have been levied. These men do not appear to have been part of Concini’s own
regiment, and were known as the ‘regiment de Portes’: Fontenay-Mareuil, Mémoires, p. 90; Dubost,
‘Between Mignons’, p. 76.
32 Dubost, ‘Between Mignons’, p. 75.
33 Joseph Bergin, The Rise of Richelieu, (New Haven and London, 1991), p. 159.
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protect the elevated position that he had earned for himself within the kingdom, rather
than any drive by the monarchy itself to expand the existing regimental system.
That this was the case can further be seen by the regiment’s fate after Concini’s
assassination in April 1617. Pesne was removed from the position of mestre de camp
and Honoré d’Albert, sieur de Cadenet (later duc de Chaulnes) was put in his place.
His appointment was part of a strategy by which his brother, Charles d’Albert, duc de
Luynes, set about consolidating his rise to predominance within the royal government
and court. Subsequently, much of Luynes’ strategy was based on placing family
members and allies in positions of importance. This included further building up the
influence of the family at court, but also the acquisition of further military positions
for his kin. Cadenet would go on to become a maréchal de France in 1619. Leon
d’Albert, sieur de Brantes, another of Luynes’ brothers, was made a captain in the
Gardes in 1617, before becoming a lieutenant in the compagnie des chevaux-légers de
la garde ordinaire du roi and a chevalier des ordres du roi. Seven of Luynes’ kin and
twelve of his clients held the position of gouverneur over fortress towns.34 After first
receiving the position of captain of a gendarme company in May 1617, this family
strategy would reach its apotheosis with Luynes’ appointment as Constable in 1621.35
However, Luynes’ extensive influence over military appointments clearly preceded his
elevation to this office, as it stemmed largely from his position as royal favourite; this
can be seen through the Albert’s manipulation of Normandie after Cadenet had taken
control.
First, according to Père Daniel, Normandie had taken its rank as a vieux, albeit
at a rank below the other five, by 1619 at the latest. Daniel states that as Cadenet was
Luynes’ brother, Normandie was treated with ‘toute sorte de distinction’ from 1617,
especially after he received the position of maréchal de France in 1619. The rapid
ascension of the regiment to the level of a vieux can only have been achieved due to
the favour that the Albert enjoyed in the late 1610s; there is no other plausible reason
as to how Normandie could have attained this status, especially as it was created after
regiments considered as mere petits-vieux, such as Bourg, Nerestang or Vaubecourt.
As the mestres de camp of the other vieux were too secure to arbitrarily replace, the
only means to secure a prestigious regiment had been to remove it from the control of
the defeated Concini faction, and then artificially inflate its importance in order to
34 Kettering, Power and Reputation, pp. 134-5.
35 La Chesnaye, I, pp. 110-111, 120, 124.
109
benefit the new family in control. Certainly, the removal of Pesne from his office of
mestre de camp in 1617 appears to be a rare moment where the security of regimental
office appears to have been undermined, and is a testament to the extent of the purge
of Concini kin and clients after his assassination.36 Whilst overstating the case
somewhat, there is thus a kernel of truth in the accusation of one contemporary author,
who stated that Normandie existed solely so that the Albert could ‘avoir la force & la
puissance des armes entre leurs mains’.37 As such, there may have been a clear-out of
captains appointed by Concini to the regiment: none of the four captains found on
revues of the regiment de maréchal d’Ancre in 1616 are found on a 1620 état of
Normandie. Even if these captains had left the regiment owing to more natural causes,
the Albert appear to have been successful in placing family allies within the unit. The
Berthélemy de Le Vernet found on both an état and revue from 1620, is surely the
‘Barthelemi de Vernet [sic]’ listed in La Chesnaye as marrying Luynes’ sister,
Antoinette, in June 1605.38 Similarly, the ‘Du Mons’ found on the 1623 état is
possibly Antoine de Villeneuve, sieur de Mons who married another of Luynes’
sisters, Louise, in 1616.39
Thus, Normandie became part of the standing army in the mid-1610s thanks to
the dynastic strategies of two great antagonists during the highly-factional 1610s:
Concini and Luynes. Concini had probably initially created the force in the mid-1610s
as he grew increasingly concerned about the hostility towards himself of certain
grands, specifically Longueville. The regiment may well have been made up of largely
Norman troops by late 1616/early 1617, but, if so, this may have reflected a change in
Concini’s own political circumstances, as he was forced to decamp to this province in
the aftermath of the Peace of Loudun. In the wake of Louis XIII’s coup of 1617,
Luynes was able to place Concini’s former regiment under his brother’s command,
and subsequently increase the regiment’s status to that of a vieux so as to further
improve the prestige of the military positions his family held. There is also evidence to
36 The only comparable example appears to have been Boisse-Pardaillan’s removal from the head of
Navarre during the revolt of 1615-1616. However, according to the negotiations surrounding the Peace
of Loudun, he was restored to this position after the revolt’s end: ‘Articles de gratifications particulieres
accordez de la part du Roy [...]’, 3 May 1616, BnF Ms.Fr. 3807 f. 124r.
37 Unnamed author quoted in Daniel, Milice, II, p. 385.
38 La Chesnaye, I, p.110; revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25845 (247).
39 La Chesnaye, I, p.110. Kettering does not mention a Normandie captaincy among the posts held by
Mons, but does show how he held a series of military charges, including maréchal de camp, and
gouverneur of the Provençal fortress of Les Baux. Kettering, Patrons, Brokers, and Clients, p. 16.
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suggest that Luynes’ clients and allies were placed into regimental charges, and that
these commissions could become secure by the campaigns of the early 1620s.40
In this respect, the early history of Normandie can be usefully compared to
that of La Marine. This regiment was created by Richelieu in 1635 and by 1640 had
been elevated to the rank of a vieux. Even Susane admitted that ‘il ne reste aucune
trace’ of evidence that this regiment was connected to a ‘corps plus ancien’, despite
the fact it had taken such a prestigious rank so rapidly.41 Just like Luynes, Richelieu
had created a regiment in order to meet his own dynastic needs and those of his
clients; and, just like Normandie, it was necessary that this regiment held a rank
amongst the army’s highest regiments in order that a commission within it possessed
sufficient social gravitas. That it was necessary for Concini and Richelieu to create
entirely new regiments in order to advance their power within the infantry further
reinforces aforementioned arguments regarding the security of office within the vieux
already in existence. This also suggests that, in at least two crucial cases, the royal
standing army was expanded primarily in order to cater for the interests of royal
favourites, again placing noble dynastic ambition at the centre of this period’s military
developments.
III - Religion, the Frontier, and Dynastic Advancement: Vaubecourt
The centrality of dynastic politics to the newer regiments can be seen in a different
context in the case of the petit-vieux regiment, Vaubecourt. This regiment was named
after the Vaubecourt, who formed a branch of the Nettancourt. A few salient factors
can be noted about this family. Firstly, whilst Bourquin has claimed that the family
had inhabited the French bailliages of Vitry-le-François and Sainte-Ménéhould in
Champagne since the early sixteenth century,42 in reality the family inhabited a
geographical area of ambiguous sovereignty. They occupied a position on the
borderlands between France and Lorraine, meaning that the family had a degree of
flexibility in deciding which ruling dynasty to serve. Moreover, any decision to serve
the duke of Lorraine had further complications given ‘Lorraine’ was in fact an
amalgamation of territories. It was comprised of the duchy of Lorraine itself (‘a
40 Despite being at the forefront of these campaigns, twelve of the eighteen captains named on the 1620
état reappear on a similar document from 1623.
41 Susane, Ancienne, III, p. 236.
42 Bourquin, Noblesse Seconde, p. 126.
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“protectorate” of the Empire since 1545’), the duchy of Bar (‘through which the duc
owed homage to the king of France’), and ‘various small territories in the Holy Roman
Empire’.43 The Nettancourt’s position thus realistically allowed them to choose
whether to enter into the service of either the French monarchy, the duke of Lorraine
or the Holy Roman Emperor. To call them and their regiment ‘Lorrain’, as Susane
did,44 is probably an exaggeration, but it does demonstrate that their decision to levy
troops for the French monarchy was not automatic. Secondly, elements of the
Nettancourt were Protestant. Mark Konnert has implied that certain family members
converted in the 1560s; the Haag brothers similarly stated that one branch of the
family, the Bettancourt, embraced Protestantism. This situation appears to have
prevailed until the 1630s.45 Lastly, the Nettancourt can be described as belonging to
the noblesse seconde as they occupied a stratum of the nobility which was below the
grands and above the petite noblesse.46 As such, they had resources at their disposal
which exceded that of most company captains.
These factors are important when attempting to determine how and why the
family entered royal military service. Even if the family was only partially Protestant,
this may still have deterred its Catholic members from entering French service in the
1580s, due to the potential of being roped into the Guises’ Ligue campaigns.47 It also
does not appear that the family raised an infantry regiment for the French monarchy
before 1610, even if members of the Nettancourt had served in royal forces since the
1580s. Jean IV de Nettancourt, sieur de Vaubecourt had held a cavalry commission
since 1586 and had fought at the battles of Ivry and Fontaine-Françoise, returning to
Champagne in the mid-1590s to tend to his wounds. He does not seem to have
commanded an infantry regiment.48
Whilst the Dossiers bleus note the possibility that Jean IV’s cousin, Louis I de
Nettancourt, chevalier and sieur de Nettancourt, commanded an infantry regiment in
43 Phil McCluskey, ‘French Military Occupations of Lorraine and Savoie, 1670-1714’ (Ph.D.
dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2009), p. 39.
44 Susane, Ancienne, IV, p.51, VIII, p. 68.
45 Mark Konnert, Local Politics in the French Wars of Religion: the Towns of Champagne, the Duc de
Guise and the Catholic League, 1560-1595, (Aldershot, 2006), pp. 59-60; Haag, La France protestante,
VIII, pp. 14-15.
46 As stated in the introduction, the description of the Nettancourt as noblesse seconde should not be
taken to imply an acceptance of Bourquin’s wider theory that such families were used by the monarchy
to reduce the power of the grands in Champagne: Bourquin, Noblesse Seconde, pp.126-127.
47 Carroll has shown that during the 1550 and 1560s ‘many’ Guise clients had Protestant relatives.
However, he also implies that, unsurprisingly, the affinity became more hard-line during the period of
the Ligue. Caroll, Noble Power, pp.139-43, 253.
48 Genealogy, BnF DB 486 (12744), ff. 3r-v.
112
the 1580s and 1590s, it is far more likely that he merely held the lieutenancy in
Brienne’s Gendarme company during the 1590 as this is the only military position that
Henri IV noted him as having held in a letter from 1606.49 Louis I was chosen to
command the garrison in Sedan after the successful royal campaign in 1606 against
Henri de La Tour d’Auvergne, duc de Bouillon, who had essentially been in a state of
rebellion against the crown since his implication in the Biron conspiracy of 1602.50
Not only did Henri IV quite clearly feel he could rely on Louis I’s loyalty (due to the
Nettancourt’s prior royal service), he was also a Protestant, and his appointment could
thus help assuage Huguenot fears over the royal occupation of a significant Protestant
stronghold.51
It is nevertheless highly doubtful that Louis I levied Vaubecourt in 1606. The
Treaty of Donchery, which set out the terms of Bouillon’s surrender, stated that he
would receive a captain appointed by the king into the château at the head of a
garrison of fifty men, which Henri IV confirmed would be under the sieur de
Nettancourt.52 Only twenty months later, in December 1607, this garrison was
disbanded, and there is no record of Vaubecourt on the 1608 to 1610 états.53 It is
likely, therefore, that Louis I did not raise an entire infantry regiment during or after
the Sedan campaign, and instead had been called upon to raise a small company of
troops to garrison the town after operations had ended. Indeed, the experiences of the
Nettancourt prior to 1610 seem to suggest that they belonged to a political borderland;
one in which even serving Champenoise nobles might have a stronger regional as
opposed to royal orientation. The monarchy clearly saw the Nettancourt as a useful
family to call upon for its military actions, but they had not become part of the
permanent military establishment by the time the 1610 état was signed in late 1609.
The person who would bring the family more firmly into royal service was
Jean IV’s son, Jean V de Nettancourt, sieur and subsequently comte de Vaubecourt.
Jean V only entered French service shortly before the Peace of Vervins, and it seems
49 Henri IV to La Force, 5 April 1606, LMHIV, VI, p. 602.
50 Bouillon had inherited Sedan from his wife, Charlotte de La Marck, in 1594. Hodson, ‘Sovereigns
and Subjects’, pp. 271-274, 282-295.
51 Moreover, the fact that Louis’ younger brother, Georges de Nettancourt, sieur de Bettancourt was a
lieutenant in Bouillon’s Gendarme company might also explain why Bouillon may have been happy to
assent to Louis I’s appointment in the Treaty of Donchery. Genealogy, BnF DB 486 (12744), f. 5v.
52 Treaty of Donchery, 2 April 1606, AAE MD 766, f. 217r; Henri IV to La Force, 5 April 1606,
LMHIV, VI, p.602.
53 Mémoire for the lieutenant of the Sedan garrison, 30 December 1607, AAE MD 767, f. 21r.
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unlikely that he managed to achieve a position of mestre de camp before 1598.
However, it is almost certain that it was he who was given a commission to levy a
regiment of 10 companies of 200 men in April 1610, not his first-cousin once-
removed, Louis I.54 An entry in the family’s Dossiers bleus mentions that Jean V’s
eldest son, Nicolas de Nettancourt, baron d’Haussonville and subsequently comte de
Vaubecourt, became ‘mestre de camp d’un regiment d’infanterie entreteneu crée en
faveur de son pere’, and Courcelles validates this assertion.55 It would thus seem that
1610 is the first moment that a Vaubecourt infantry regiment can be justifiably noted
as coming into existence.
The decision to give Jean V a commission to levy this regiment was based, in
part, on the same considerations that had led to Louis I being given command of the
Sedan garrison. Both the proposed and undertaken campaign to Jülich required the
royal army to rendezvous in Champagne before heading into Lorraine, pushing into
the Empire, and travelling north, as the ability to take a more direct route through the
territories of the Habsburg Netherlands was only granted to the French after the siege
of Jülich had concluded in September 1610. The monarchy thus took advantage of the
Nettancourt as a family with military experience in its service, and which was based in
the area through which the army would pass. Troops could be levied locally, easing
logistical difficulties. Moreover, Claude de La Châtre, the lieutenant général of French
forces sent to Jülich, noted that he had thanked the duke of Lorraine for allowing
French forces to pass through his ‘terres’; employing a family with connections to the
duke may have thus eased matters in this respect. Finally, the family’s mixed
confessional status may have been used to temper some of the marked religious
tensions relating to the 1610 campaign.56
Another element also certainly influenced the decision to employ Jean V: the
fact he did have considerable military experience by 1610, which had been accrued
outside of French service. After 1598, Jean V, like many other demobilised
Frenchmen, had entered into Imperial service as part of the Long War against the
54 ‘Commission donnée a Monsieur de Vaubecourt [...]’, 24 April 1610, SHDAT A112, f. 43.
55 Genealogy, BnF DB 486 (12744) f. 4r; Jean Baptiste de Courcelles, Histoire généalogique et
héraldique des pairs de France […], (3 vols., Paris, 1822-4), II, Nettancourt section, pp. 10-12. In
addition, Courcelles states that Jean V also levied both a ‘régiment’ and a ‘compagnie franche’ of light-
cavalry for the 1610 campaign.
56 ‘Les memoires et receuil de ce qui c’est passé au voyage de Cleves et prinse de la ville et chasteau de
Julliers, en l’année 1610’, BnF Dupuy 193 ff. 113r, 114r-v, 117v-118r, 132r. This document is a first-
hand account of the expedition by La Châtre, ff. 110r-134v.
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Ottoman Empire.57 After distinguishing himself in the sieges of Raab and Belgrade,
the Emperor attempted to attach Jean V permanently to his service, giving him the
governorship of Savarin, the title of Chevalier and baron of the Empire, and a pension.
However, his reputation had grown to the extent that Henri IV also wished to recall
him to French service. By 1609, Henri had given Jean a pension, a gouvernement, a
variety of charges (including gentilhomme of the royal chambre and conseiller d’état),
and a range of diplomatic roles with relation to the Empire. Choosing to enter into the
service of Henri IV, Jean V returned to France in the late 1600s, and subsequently
levied the Vaubecourt regiment in 1610.58 After proving their military worth to both
Henri IV and the Emperor, the Nettancourt’s position on the periphery of France,
Lorraine and the Empire had thus allowed them to sell the future military service of
their family to the highest bidder. Whilst their ties to France may have been slightly
stronger due to their geographical origin, Henri IV had to give Jean V an array of
titles, honours and money in order to convince him to become part of the French
military establishment. Not only had military service thus increased the Nettancourt’s
family standing, their decision to enter French service was based on the best means to
further advance the status of their dynasty, rather than an overt centralising plan by the
monarchy.
Nonetheless, and despite its service in 1610, the status of Vaubecourt as
entretenu was not immediately assured. At the conclusion of the Jülich campaign, the
regiment was subject to réformation down to a single, mestre de camp company. The
regiment was then levied again in February 1614, before being disbanded shortly
afterwards in the same year.59 Whilst both Courcelles and Susane have stated that the
regiment was permanently maintained from 1616, the unit appears to have been
subject to similarly short periods of levying and disbanding throughout the second half
57 This conflict had begun in 1593, would end in 1606, and is often referred to as the ‘Long Turkish
War’. Peter Wilson, The Thirty Years’ War: Europe’s tragedy, (Cambridge, MA, 2009), pp. 97-102.
The only recent study of this confrontation is in German, and focuses mainly on diplomatic history: Jan
Paul Niederkorn, Die europaischen mächte und der “Lange Turkenkrieg” Kaiser Rudolfs II (1593-
1606), (Vienna, 1993). The closest to a study of the war in English is: Caroline Finkel, The
Administration of Warfare: the Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606, (Vienna, 1988).
Finkel also appears to be the only writer to have focused on French involvement in this conflict: C.F.
Finkel, ‘French Mercenaries in the Habsburg-Ottoman War of 1593-1606: The Desertion of the Papa
Garrison to the Ottomans in 1600’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 55, (1992),
pp. 451-471.
58 Genealogy, BnF DB 486 (12744), ff. 3v, 9v.
59 Fontenay-Mareuil noted the levying of Vaubecourt in 1614, stating that it had been ‘licenciés’ on its
return from Jülich in 1610. However, his contention that the regiment was permanently maintained from
1614 does not appear correct. Fontenay-Mareuil, Mémoires, p. 73.
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of the 1610s and into the early 1620s.60 It was only during this later period, when the
regiment was charged with the protection of the Champagne border in 1622, and
subsequently formed part of the army group sent into the Valteline under the
command of François Annibal d’Estrées, marquis de Coeuvres in 1624, that the
stability of the regiment seems to have been truly assured. A revue from March 1623
states that Jean V was ‘mestre de camp dung regiment de douze enseignes de
cinquante hommes de guerre a pied Francais’, ostensibly confirming the regiment’s
permanent status from around this date. If this had not been the case, it would have
been re-disbanded in the retrenchments that occurred in the period of peace between
the end of 1622 and 1624.
Despite the regiment’s instability in the 1610s, certain captains seem to have
achieved a degree of security with regard to their commissions in the regiment prior to
the early 1620s. Jean-Jacques de Montesquiou, sieur de La Serre received a ‘brevet of
capitaine entretenu’ in May 1610.61 In February 1614, he received another brevet to
become one of the ten captains of 200 men to be included in the reconstituted
Vaubecourt regiment, and in June 1614 he was awarded the ‘continuation
d’appointements’ despite ‘la refforme entiere de Vaubecourt’. He then received
commissions to levy or ‘licentier’ his company in all the years between 1615 and
1618, and it was only from 1619 that his company appears to have truly achieved
stability.62 However, it is telling that La Serre seems to have maintained his captain’s
commission even when his company was subject to réforme, and that Vaubecourt was
consistently called upon to organise a regiment throughout the 1610s. This may
suggest that both were ‘retenuz’, as either mestre de camp or captain, from the mid-
1610s. Alternatively, they may merely have been on royal pensions of a non-specific
military type. Moreover, Jean V may have actually profited from the instability of his
regiment. Susane has even claimed that, on at least one occasion, Jean V sold troops
from Vaubecourt for one écu per head to the monarchy, when in 1615, 1619 and 1624
troops from the regiment were incorporated into Picardie and Normandie.63 This
would suggest that many of the men in Vaubecourt were subjects of Lorraine or the
60 Genealogy, BnF DB 459 ff. 43r-44v.
61 He was a distant cousin of the Montesquiou de Sainte-Colombe found in the Gardes, reinforcing the
argument that some families were active in several standing army regiments by the 1610s, and this was
not confined within the vieux.
62Genealogy, BnF DB 459 ff. 43r-44v.
63 Susane, Ancienne, IV, p. 51.
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Empire, as it is unlikely that Jean V could have sold French soldiers to the monarchy
in this manner.
True or not, the overall tone of this allegation is correct: the Vaubecourt
regiment was a nakedly entrepreneurial, if not outright mercenary venture, which had
entered into French service to aggrandise the wealth and status of the Nettancourt in
return for their service to the monarchy. This contention is borne out by studying
appointments within the regiment. The commission of 1610 made clear that the
responsibility for filling the regimental charges had been left to Jean V, with the
exception of one company which was to be managed by Épernon in his capacity as
Colonel général. No états and only fourteen revues of the regiment survive from the
1598 to 1629 period, of which eleven date from 1623 to 1624. These revues show that
in addition to the company he commanded by virtue of his mestre de camp
commission, both Jean V’s second son and brother – Henry de Nettancourt, baron de
Vaubecourt and Henry de Nettancourt, sieur de Passavant, respectively – held
captaincies in the regiment.64 Other Nettancourt captains in Vaubecourt included
Francois, sieur de Passavant d’Autrecourt, son of Henry, sieur de Passavant, and Louis
II, sieur de Nettancourt, son of the Louis I who had garrisoned Sedan.65 Jean V’s
eldest son, Nicholas, had become a lieutenant in his father’s regiment by 1620, before
being made captain in 1623. In 1628 Jean V resigned his position as mestre de camp
and managed to pass the position to Nicholas. Nicholas would subsequently hold the
commission until either 1646 or 1649, having been appointed maréchal de camp in
1642, and, ultimately, lieutenant général of the armies of Flanders and Champagne in
1651, completing his ascension through the military hierarchy. In addition, he would
hold, at various times, the command of gouvernements such as Verdunois, Perpignan,
Metz and Châlons. The Nettancourt’s regiment thus allowed one family member to
rise from the rank of lieutenant to lieutenant général, and to receive significant
additional benefits in the process. Their regiment was thus a means by which the
family’s service to the monarchy could be performed and noted, with progressive
improvement of their social standing as their reward.
The Nettancourt were also able to appoint family allies to the regiment.
François de Savigny, sieur de Lemont, captain in a revue from 1618, was probably
related to Jean V’s first wife, Catherine de Savigny, whom he had married in 1599. A
64 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25845 (220); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (324); revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (326)
65 Genealogy, BnF DB 486 (12744), f.6v; Haag, La France protestante, VIII, p.14.
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document from 1605, at the very least, talks of a long-standing alliance between the
Savigny and Nettancourt.66 Whether they were allies or not, the Nettancourt also
acquiesced in the monopolisation of company charges by other regimental captains,
such as the Montesquiou de La Serre. A revue from 1623 showed Jean-Jacques de
Montesquiou, sieur de La Serre had Bertrand and Louis de Montesquiou as his
lieutenant and ensign, both of whom were his nephews. Bertrand would subsequently
become a captain in the regiment himself, although whether he assumed command of
his uncle’s company is not clear.67 Other families were thus also able to use the
Vaubecourt regiment for their own ends of dynastic self-improvement, through the
acquisition and monopolisation of military charges.
The reality of the creation of Vaubecourt is thus of a relatively autonomous
family living in a border region, which raised forces for the monarchy in return for
social ascension. Whilst the family had been reasonably powerful under Jean IV’s
father, Georges II de Nettancourt, they had seemingly only had the dukes of Lorraine
as patrons by the mid-sixteenth century. The civil wars in France, and the war against
the Ottomans in Hungary, allowed the Nettancourt to exploit their position of living on
the border of the French kingdom, Lorraine and the Empire to choose military service
under the patron who could afford the family the most benefits. This choice may in
part have been influenced by religion, although Jean V was happy to serve under the
ex-Ligue grandee the duc de Mercoeur in Imperial forces during the early 1600s.
Indeed, had the war against the Ottomans continued past 1606, Jean V might even
have remained in Imperial service, with Vaubecourt never coming into existence. The
Emperor certainly attempted to persuade Jean V not to return to French service, but
after Henri IV showered Jean V with gifts in the late 1600s, and the subsequent
levying of Vaubecourt in 1610, the Nettancourt remained wedded to French service
thereafter. Clearly, consistent loyalty to the monarchy from the 1610s onwards
brought the family considerable improvement in its social standing. By around 1622/3
Vaubecourt had become fully entretenu, and the power of company appointment
appeared to have been devolved almost entirely to Jean V for him to manipulate as it
best suited him.
66 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25845 (219); letters patent, February 1610, BnF DB 486 (12744), f. 56v; La
Chesnaye, X, p.717.
67 Revue BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (327); genealogies, BnF DB 459, ff. 45r, 376r.
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The creation and entrenchment of Vaubecourt as a permanent part of the royal
army was thus driven by the tangible benefits it could accrue to the noble family
which had raised the regiment, as much as any initiatives on the part of the monarchy
to rationally improve the army or engage in ‘state-building’. Consequently, the
regiment illustrates, from the perspective of the complex frontier regions of France,
how the monarchy gradually found increasing numbers of the nobility to serve under
long-term commissions in the infantry officer corps. Whether they would achieve
similar ascension or not, the Nettancourt surely gave hope to other members of both
the middling and lower French nobility that through military service they too could
achieve advancement.
Dynastic ambitions was thus central to the process by which the petits- and lesser-
vieux became permanent additions to the standing army. Noble families were choosing
to join, or even levy, these new regiments as it enabled them to achieve or consolidate
social ascension without necessarily having to join the vieux. The standing army was
thus able to expand during the early seventeenth century because many noble families
demonstrably wished to acquire royal offices within this structure, yet could not do so
due to the security of tenure afforded to vieux officers. As the monarchy fought new
wars in the 1610s and 1620s, new military opportunities became available in recently
formed units, and some regiments were subsequently able to acquire security as
permanent entities. Whilst it was warfare that allowed these units to come into
existence, it was the potential for social advancement that drew these additional
families, from both the petite noblesse and noblesse seconde, into permanent royal
military service. Indeed, a family which was able to levy an entire new regiment
should be considered as part of the upper-middling nobility or noblesse seconde, as
opposed to the petite noblesse who have formed the bulk of the discussion in this
thesis hitherto.
Just as the mestres de camp of the vieux had done, officers within these newer
regiments argued over the status of their unit within the royal military hierarchy,
because the prestige of their regiment affected the worth of the office they held, and
hence the social status it could afford them. Luynes managed to deflect these
arguments by using his favour to give Normandie the status of a vieux. This measure
‘ne laissa pas de faire murmurer’ other nobles and gave rise to ‘libelles seditieux [sic]’
against Luynes and his family, showing not all were pleased with his manipulation of
119
the regimental hierarchy.68 Yet it also demonstrated Luynes’ shrewdness as a political
operator. He recognised the rising importance of charges within the standing army to
the social worth of noble families; and if sufficiently prestigious charges did not exist,
or were not available, it was necessary to create them. By doing so, Luynes not only
took advantage of both the political volatility of the 1610s, but also a new military
system that remained malleable below the level of the vieux.
Regimental status within the standing army remained up for grabs throughout
the period of this dissertation. This situation was aided by the ambiguous origins of
many petits-vieux, as the main ways by which a regiment’s position in the infantry
hierarchy was determined – the date of its foundation and/or the date on which the first
mestre de camp had received his commission – were often unclear. An edict from
1624, which appears to put the regiments in order of hierarchy, placed Chappes below
Normandie and above Vaubecourt as the highest petit-vieux. Yet by 1635, Chappes
(now Nerestang again) was only the third most senior regiment, below Rambures and
Maugiron (previously Bourg), whilst a document from 1666 has Rambures, Castelnau
(formerly Nerestang/Chappes) and Auvergne (previously Bourg) all declared equal in
hierarchy.69 Even this document, however, did not fully end the disputes over
regimental seniority, which continued to rumble on into the eighteenth century.
Whether it had intended to do so or not, the monarchy had thus created an
attractive system of military service due to the emergence of permanent military
offices within the standing army, and the crown now had a corps of officers at its
disposal who were closely tied to royal patronage structures. Indeed, the disputes over
the hierarchy of the new regiments are perhaps evidence of the changing horizons of at
least a section of the lower and middling nobility, who had begun to believe that their
status, honour and prestige could best best be asserted and enhanced within the power
structures of royal military institutions. How such developments affected the highest
strata of the nobility, the grands, will be considered in the final two chapters of this
thesis.
68 Daniel, Milice, II, p.385.
69 ‘Estat’, 2 May 1624, SHDAT X15, n.p.; Hierarchy of regiments, 1635, BnF Cangé, 5, f.278r-282r.
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Chapter Five
‘La première charge de l’épée’? The Constable of France, 1593-1626
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The first four chapters of this thesis have largely focused upon the relationship
between the petite noblesse, the noblesse seconde and the emergence of the standing
army. The remaining two chapters will now look at those members of society who had
traditionally held the key to the raising and deployment of military force in France, the
grands. Specifically, the following chapters will investigate how two of the
monarchy’s most prestigious supra-regimental offices, those of Constable and Colonel
General of the Infantry, were affected by the rise of the system of permanent
regiments in France. More generally, there will be a consideration as to whether a
mutation in the nature of the monarchy’s military forces led to a change in the
relationship between the grands and the crown during the early seventeenth century.
The office of Constable was one of the monarchy’s oldest and most prestigious
military dignities by the period of this dissertation.1 Indeed, many contemporaries
sought to emphasise the power that the position gave to its holder. An anonymous
discourse from 1606 stated that the Constable held ‘le permier lieu des armées, mene
les batailles en labsence du Roy et porter lespée devant luy en ceremonies’.2 Claude
Trabit wrote that the Constable was the ‘premier Officier de la Couronne’.3 Richelieu
went one step further in his Mémoires, stating that the position was abolished in 1627
as it had become ‘très-dommageable, par l’abus de l’absolue autorité qu’elle donnoit
des armes du Roi’.4 Accordingly, the Constable has sometimes been seen as a charge
which could give its holder, usually a grand or at least a noble of significant stature, an
amount of influence over royal armed forces which could rival or even trump that of
the monarchy itself.
However, a harangue made by Henri IV in 1593, when appointing Henri I de
Montmorency-Damville, duc de Montmorency as Constable, gave a more nuanced
impression of the actual authority entrusted to the office by the late sixteenth century.
Henri IV stated that due to the great divisions within the country, it was necessary to
find ‘grand et dignes personages’ to assist him in the current warfare. As such, the
Constable was the king’s lieutenant général, ‘representant nostre personne’ in all
places, both inside and outside the kingdom. Yet, the Constable was also to ensure that
1 Daniel listed Constables dating back to the early thirteenth century: Daniel, Milice, I, pp. 185-7.
2 ‘Autres discours de rang et precedences’, AAE MD 776, f. 206r.
3 Claude Trabit, Le pouvoir et jurisdiction de messieurs les connestable et mareschaux de France,
(Paris, 1668), pp. 3-4.
4 Richelieu, Mémoires, I, p. 242.
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‘noz gens de guerre tant de noz ordonnances que autres’ would live in ‘bon ordre,
police & discipline’, whilst also overseeing the payments made to royal soldiers.5
Thus, certain historians have emphasised how the position was closer to that of an
administrator responsible for discipline and certain aspects of military payment, rather
than that of an all-encompassing generalissimo of royal forces.6
Recent works have advanced an even more limited appraisal of the Constable’s
authority. David Parrott argued against the view that the Constable’s abolition in 1627
was part of Richelieu’s drive to reduce the ‘excessive power’ that the ‘great
aristocratic commanders’ enjoyed over the army. Instead, the fleeting exigencies of
factional politics drove the abolition, and the action was not considered as definitive –
the office came close to being revived during later political developments in the 1640s
and 1650s. Indeed, Parrott’s wider comments about the position of Constable were
largely disparaging. He stated that the office had been in ‘obvious decline since its
expedient revival in 1594’, and that its ‘powers had become vague and narrowly
defined’ to the extent that it implied ‘no specific military function’ by the early
seventeenth century.7
However, Parrott conceded that the Constabulary was still a ‘prestigious
office’ in 1627; had it not been, one might presume that Richelieu would not have
bothered with its abolition, temporary or otherwise. Much of the following discussion
will thus attempt to investigate more thoroughly the nature of the office of Constable
during the early seventeenth century, and, in particular, how it was affected by the new
standing army. It will contend that the office was one which continued to be coveted
and exalted by even the highest echelons of the French nobility. It could be used as a
reward to encourage grands to remain in royal service, or as a means by which certain
persons could attempt to solidify their ascension to the higher reaches of the French
nobility. Yet, the office had few definite powers with relation to the new standing
army. As such, the Constable, occupied a slightly odd position by the 1620s, whereby
it was the most prestigious military office of the realm, whilst also being, ultimately,
5 ‘Declaration du Roy du Pouvoir de Monseigneur le duc de Montmorency, pair & connetable de
France’, BnF Cangé 1, ff. 159v-161.
6 Trabit, pouvoir, pp. 11-28; André Corvisier, ‘Les Guerres de Religion, 1559-1598’ in P. Contamine
and A. Corvisier (eds.), Histoire militaire de la France, vol. 1: Des origines à 1715, (Paris, 1992), p.
307; Kettering, Power and Reputation, pp. 202-3.
7 Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, p. 470. The position was left vacant after the death of Anne, duc de
Montmorency from 1567 until 1593, not 1594 as Parrott states. Daniel, Milice, I, pp. 184, 186-7;
Greengrass, ‘Noble Affinities’, p. 275.
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expendable. Indeed, as the standing army had lessened the monarchy’s reliance upon
the high nobility for the operation of the royal army, the monarchy and its ministers
could dispense with the position if necessary.
I – The Constable’s Influence over Royal Military Forces during the 1590s
After Montmorency’s accession to the office in 1593, the perception that the
Constable was the second-in-command over royal forces held firm for much of the
1590s, as the emergence of the standing army had only begun to crystallise. Indeed,
the Constable received correspondence asking for his favour in a variety of royal
military affairs. For example, Montmorency received several letters in 1597 and 1598
from Lesdiguières about the campaign he was undertaking against the duke of Savoy.
Lesdiguières stated in March 1597 that he had written to the king about delays in
receiving finance for infantry levies, but that he had felt it was prudent to write to
Montmorency as well as he was the ‘principal pilotte’ in matters such as these. Indeed,
in a subsequent letter, Lesdiguières wrote that he now had a ‘tres grande obligation’
towards Montmorency, as he had apparently moved to ensure that Lesdiguières
received the funds he had requested. However, two subsequent letters from July 1597
contain references to the money not having been received, and by October
Lesdiguières was still complaining of the financial advances that he’d been forced to
make from his own credit, in order to sustain the army in the field.8
Whether Montmorency fully fulfilled Lesdiguières’ requests or not, these
letters reflected the perception amongst the grands that Montmorency’s favour was an
important factor in the distribution of royal military finance due to his position as
Constable, and that nobles could become indebted to Montmorency through his
assistance. Indeed, correspondence between other grands and Montmorency
demonstrates the extent of his influence over financial affairs. In 1596, Charles de
Gontaut, duc de Biron asked that Montmorency favour Burgundy in the ‘lestat des
garnisons’ that was currently being drawn up for that year.9 Nevers wrote to
Montmorency in May 1598 to try and ensure that the peace treaty with Spain did not
8 Lesdiguières to Montmorency, 29 March, 30 April, 9 July, 12 July, BnF Ms.Fr. 3578, ff. 60r, 67r, 71r,
73r; Lesdiguières to Montmorency, 18 October 1597, ACL, I, p. 314.
9 Biron to Montmorency, 17 January 1596, BnF Ms.Fr. 3578, f. 46r.
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lead to the under-funding of Champagne’s garrisons.10 Henry de Bourbon, duc de
Montpensier even wrote to Montmorency in June 1597 to ask him to intercede with
the king and gain some form of relief from the taille for the inhabitants of ‘mon pais
de Beaujollais jointz avec ceux de Lyonnois’. His justification was the ‘miseres’ that
the people of these areas had suffered ‘durant ces guerres’, displaying how
Montpensier tried to give a military aspect to this request.11 Yet, the letter also
demonstrated how Montmorency’s authority as Constable would appear to have
sprawled over into a wider influence over general taxation by 1597.
Montmorency also appears to have maintained some form of relationship with
certain regimental officers within the standing army. A letter from ‘Campagnol’ in
June 1598, asked Montmorency to ensure that a montre was paid to the Boulogne
garrison. Given the location, one can presume that this letter was written by Bertrand
Patras, sieur de Campaigno, the Gardes captain, or at least a member of his family.12
A letter to Montmorency from Bernard de Cassagnet, sieur de Tilladet, another Gardes
captain, requested assistance in the recovery of a debt his family was owed.13 Antoine
de La Grange de Montigny, sieur d’Arquien, wrote to Montmorency in October 1597
to apologise for his absence from the siege of Amiens. The tone of the letter suggests a
relationship may have existed between the La Grange and Montmorency, which might
have helped Arquien achieve his promotion to the position of lieutenant colonel of the
Gardes during this period.14
In addition, Montmorency had relatives within the vieux. One of his
illegitimate sons, Annibal de Montmorency, can be found as a captain in Navarre on
muster rolls from 1598 and 1610, and on the 1597, 1610 and 1620 états.15 Annibal’s
lieutenant on revues of 1598 and 1610, David de Laur, may well have been a relative
of another Navarre captain, Jacques de Laur, thus demonstrating a connection between
the Montmorency and other families in Navarre.16 A separate branch of the dynasty
10 Nevers to Montmorency, 12 May 1598, BnF Ms.Fr. 3582, f. 80r.
11 Montpensier to Montmorency, June 1597, BnF Ms.Fr. 3582, f.11r.
12 ‘Campagnol’ to Montmorency, 1 June 1598, AMC, L, XLII, f. 1.
13 Sieur de Tilladet to Montmorency, 10 July 1598, Ibid., f. 212.
14 ‘Anthoine La Grange sieur d’Arquien’ to Montmorency, October 1597, AMC, L, XXXVII, f. 216.
15 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1511); revue, BnF Ms.Fr 25833 (1511); BnF Ms.Fr. 25842 (28). On the
relation between Montmorency and Annibal: Rohan, Mémoires, I, p. 382; Courcelles, Histoire
Généalogique et Héraldique, II, Montmorency section, p. 10.
16 Jacques de Laur can be found on several reviews between 1597 and 1611, and on the 1597, 1610 and
1620 états as a Navarre captain. He would go on to die whilst serving in royal forces during the siege of
Montauban. BnF Ms.Fr 15832 (1393); BnF Ms.Fr 25832 (1393); BnF 25835 (1692); BnF 25839 (1991);
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can also be found in the vieux: Josias de Montmorency-Bours, a distant cousin of
Montmorency, who held a captaincy in the Gardes from some point in the 1590s until
his death in 1616.17
Finally, the Constable’s perceived authority over the gendarmerie also
contributed to his elevated status within royal military structures.18 Whilst this branch
of arms had undergone a significant decline during the second half of the sixteenth
century,19 many members of the grands continued to hold positions of command
within the gendarmerie, and directed requests towards Montmorency with regard to
their companies. Some appealed for money. La Châtre asked Montmorency in January
1596 to ‘avoir memoire de moy en mes affaires et spéciallement pour lentretien de ma
compagnye’.20 In 1596, Biron, amongst other requests, asked that Montmorency divert
funds towards his gendarme company.21 Nobles also made requests to Montmorency
concerning both the composition of gendarme companies, and the staff who
administered them. In December 1596, La Châtre asked that a certain sieur du Bois
was maintained as a commissaire des guerres over the gendarmerie despite the
retrenchments of officers that were occurring in this area. This appears to have
granted, as, in 1601, La Châtre asked Montmorency to ensure that du Bois was
maintained in his position for another year.22 Indeed, these requests continued into the
1600s, when even princes du sang wrote to Montmorency with requests for the
gendarmerie. In September 1611, the prince de Conti asked Montmorency to ensure
that the ‘Sieur la Clere’ who had previously been a ‘commissaire en ma compagnie’ be
continued in his charge of doing the ‘monstres de ma compagnies’.23 Thus, as many
BnF 25843 (86); Louis Batcave, ‘La maison du roy a Orthez’, Bulletin de la société de Borda, 16,
(1891), p. 54; Correspondence of a M. de Vaubourg, 25 April, 1686, AN G7113, ff. 102r-104v.
17The Bours-Montmorency line of the family was also Protestant: Haag, La France protestante, VII, pp.
492-3.
18 Indeed, Richelieu cited the Constable’s control of the revenues of the ordinaire des guerres, the
treasury which had responsibility for the payment of the gendarmerie, as a contributory factor to the
abolition of the charge. Parrott has disputed this contention, due to the limited proportion of royal
military expenditure that the ordinaire represented: Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, p. 469.
19 It has been beyond the realms of this thesis to enter into a sustained consideration of the changing
nature of the gendarmerie during the Wars of Religion. However, based on the correspondence received
by Montmorency, and the existing historiography on the subject, it is hard to disagree with Greengrass’
assertion that the gendarmerie was a ‘battered remnant’ of its former glories by the 1590s. Mark
Greengrass, France in the Age of Henri IV: the Struggle for Stability, (2nd ed., 1995, London), pp. 222-
226; Wood, King’s Army, pp. 144-152; Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite, pp. 68-78.
20 La Châtre to Montmorency, 17 January, 1596, Lettres inédites du Maréchal Claude de La Châtre
(1536-1614) (ed.) Baudouin-Lalondre, (Bourges, 1895), p. 229.
21 Biron to Montmorency, 17 January 1596, BnF Ms.Fr., 3578, ff. 46r-v.
22 La Châtre to Montmorency, 21 December, 1596, 19 December 1601, Châtre, Lettres, pp. 247, 284.
23 Prince de Conti to Montmorency, September 1611, BnF Cangé, 7, f. 182r.
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grands continued to maintain gendarme companies into the seventeenth century,
Montmorency’s position of influence over these units gave him an enviable position
within the ‘economy of favour’ that existed amongst the military nobility.
Thus, it would appear that in the years immediately after his appointment as
Constable, Montmorency enjoyed a considerable degree of authority with regard to the
operation of royal forces. Not only did members of the grands frequently address him
with their military requests, Montmorency also held a degree of influence over the
vieux. Thus, royal military offices existed which could help tie even the highest
members of the nobility more closely into royal service, thanks to the patronage
opportunities attached to such charges. However, the position as Constable did not
guarantee Montmorency a position of pre-eminence within royal military forces.
Indeed, much of the authority wielded by the Constable in the 1590s was largely the
result of the favour in which Montmorency was held by Henri IV. From the late
1590s, other figures were gradually able to usurp the prominent military position that
Montmorency had previously enjoyed, due to the relative lack of defined military
functions that the position of Constable entailed.
II – Commander-in-Chief? Sully, Villeroy, and the Marginalisation of the Constable,
c.1597-1614.
The emergence of the standing army, combined with the rising importance of artillery
to the conduct of early modern warfare, meant that the Constable became
progressively marginalised by those who held royal offices possessing more defined
powers over these arms of service. Indeed, between 1597 and 1614, the position of the
Constable became clear: it remained a coveted and prestigious office amongst the
nobility, but one which was increasingly expendable in relation to the operation of the
royal army.
These trends began to come into focus during the siege of Amiens in 1597.
Initially, at least in an administrative sense, Montmorency appeared to fulfil the
traditionally conceived role of the Constable being the king’s second-in-command
over the army, taking the lead in the organisation of troops and finance for the siege.
These tasks appear to have superseded any tactical or strategic responsibilities that
Montmorency might have fulfilled. Indeed, by early April the duc de Biron was
commanding the royal forces at Amiens, with both Henri and Montmorency searching
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for finance until the start of the summer.24 From late June, however, Sully was given
an ever-growing responsibility for finding the money and supplies necessary for the
royal army at Amiens.25 This included issues relating to the supply of the royal
artillery, despite the fact that Sully was not yet its Grand maître. By early July, Henri
asked Sully not to leave Paris for Burgundy to deal with personal business, as it would
bring ‘trop de prejudice’ to royal affairs. As Henri put it to Sully by mid-July, without
Sully’s presence on the Conseil des finances ‘je desespererois du payement du
cinquiesme mois de mon armée’.26 Whilst it is easy to overestimate the role played by
Sully in 1597, Henri himself clearly felt that Sully’s contributions had been vital to the
siege’s success.27
However, neither his pre-eminence nor the Constable’s marginalisation was
guaranteed in late 1597. For one, Montmorency had been present for much of the latter
part of the siege with Henri, thus accounting for his diminished role in finding military
finance. Sully never occupied a position of critical military leadership during the siege,
despite the impression that he would later give in his memoirs.28 Moreover, the
Constable continued to be tasked with vital military operations. After the successful
conclusion of the siege at Amiens, for instance, he was ordered to guarantee the
security of the north-eastern frontier, whilst Henri undertook a campaign in Brittany
against the Ligue. Henri thus gave Montmorency considerable authority over one of
the most heavily militarised areas of the French kingdom, stating that ‘Je remets à
vostre prudence ce qui est requis pour la seurété de la dicte frontiere’.29
Sully’s ascent to a position of considerable influence over royal military
structures was only achieved due to his acquisition of two key offices in 1598 and
1599: that of Surintendant des finances, and Grand maître de l’artillerie. Sully’s
promotion to the charge of Surintendant des finances in 1598 gave him control over
the drawing up of the état du roi, which detailed royal income and how it would be
24 Henri IV to Montmorency, 24 March, 5 April, 6 April, 8 May, 4 June, 9 June, 10 June, 13 June, 15
June 1597, LMHIV, IV, pp. 717-718, 732-734, 735, 760-1, 775-776, 778-781, 783, 784-5
25 This was due, in no small part, to the esteem in which he was already held by Henri IV: Barbiche and
Dainville-Barbiche, Sully, pp. 23-73.
26 Henri IV to Sully, 13 July 1597, LMHIV, IV, p.810.
27 For letters which emphasise the importance that Henri ascribed to Sully’s ability to organise and find
finance for the siege, see Henri IV to Sully, 2 July, 6 July, 8 July, 27 July, 28 July, 10 August, 12
August, 18 August 1597, Ibid, IV, pp.794, 802-4, 814-6, 822-3, 827, 828-9.
28Sully, Mémoires, I, pp.247-255.
29 Henri IV to Montmorency, 15 March , 1 April 1598, LMHIV, IV, pp. 929-30, 944. Quote from p.929.
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spent.30 As Grand maître, Sully had authority over all artillery personnel, and oversaw
the production and maintenance of artillery pieces and munitions. Holding both
positions allowed Sully to divert funds to the artillery after he assumed the position of
Grand maître de l’artillerie in 1599. Thus, in contrast to the general retrenchment of
royal military spending that occurred after 1598, the artillery was notably expanded.31
This process was partly driven by political considerations; as Rowlands put it, Sully
and Henri ‘recognised the centrality of artillery to royal power’. To help maintain
domestic peace, Henri increasingly sought to monopolise the monarchy’s right to own
and use artillery, whilst, in terms of actual conflict, effective artillery was recognised
as vital in a period dominated by siege warfare.32 Overall, the position of dominance
over royal finance and the artillery enjoyed by Sully allowed him to overtake the
Constable and achieve a position of supremacy over the new standing army, and thus
the royal military as a whole, during the 1600s.
The first real indication of Sully’s increased importance to royal military forces
would occur during the Savoy War of 1600-1601. Again, one must not uncritically
accept the heroic role Sully attributed to himself in his memoirs. He was not present
with royal forces at the start of the campaign, nor was he given command of either of
the two main army groups that launched the initial assault on Savoy in mid-August
1600. These were commanded by Biron and Lesdiguières.33 They would remain the
leading figures in royal forces for most of the campaign, to the extent that a dispute
emerged between the two regarding who should enjoy overall pre-eminence in
command.
This disagreement may not have arisen if Montmorency had been present. The
king clearly wanted Montmorency to participate in the war, but a ‘doulz de genouil’
prevented the Constable from serving in the campaign, and the king ultimately
30 Barbiche and Dainville-Barbiche, Sully, pp.84-88, 107-8; David Buisseret, Sully and the Growth of
Centralised Government in France, (London, 1968), pp.56-73.
31 Barbiche and Dainville-Barbiche, Sully, p. 116. The Actes de Sully shows the considerable number of
contracts Sully entered into to acquire powder, munitions, and guns between 1600 and 1610: Les actes
de Sully passes au nom du Roi de 1600 à 1610, (ed.) F. De Mallevoüe, (Paris, 1911)..
32 Guy Rowlands, ‘The Monopolisation of Military Power in France, 1515 to 1715’, in Ronald G Asch,
Wulf Eckart Voß and Martin Wrede (eds.), Frieden und Krieg in der Frühen Neuzeit. Die europäische
Staatenordnung et die außereuropäische Welt, (Munich, 2001), pp.147-148; Buisseret, Sully, pp. 143-
153. For Sully’s overall financial policy, see: Greengrass, Henri IV, pp.131-148; Bonney, King’s Debts,
pp. 54-72. For the importance of sieges to warfare in the first half of the seventeenth century, see
Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, pp. 56-59.
33 Anonymous account of the Savoy war, BnF Ms.Fr. 7138, ff. 458r-v; Henri IV to Montmorency, 14
August, 1600, LMHIV, V, pp. 273-4; Charles Dufayard, Le connétable de Lesdiguières, (Paris, 1892),
pp. 236-7.
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accepted that Montmorency would not be able to play an active role in the war.34 Yet
it is far from clear that his office would have guaranteed him a position of command
pre-eminence had he served. In July 1600, Villeroy had written to Montmorency to
inform him that Henri IV had already decided that royal forces would be split into two
army groups, one of which the king would command personally (but in reality would
largely be under Lesdiguières’ management), and the other under Biron.35 Whether
this would have changed if Montmorency had been present is debatable, especially
given the strong ties Biron and Lesdiguières had to both the region and some of the
auxiliary troops used in the campaign. Indeed, the tone of Villeroy’s letters suggests
that whilst Henri desired Montmorency presence during the campaign, in order that he
could give advice to the king, the Constable would not necessarily be the commander-
in-chief of royal forces.
Once the war had begun, it does not appear that the Constable played a
considerable role in military organisation from afar. Whilst the king maintained an
active correspondence with Montmorency throughout the campaign, Henri IV’s main
concern was to ensure that the Constable used his influence in Languedoc to levy local
forces. In July, he asked Montmorency to muster his gendarme company, and ensure it
was ready to serve in Savoy. He also asked Montmorency to help organise ‘toutes les
aultres trouppes et compagnies qui se trouveront derriere’ and that they ‘s’acheminent
en deçà le plus tost que faire se pourra’. Henri’s correspondence with the Constable
for the rest of the campaign was mainly concerned with either keeping him abreast of
events in Savoy, or asking him to attend to Languedoc’s own military affairs, such as
payments to the province’s garrisons. The Constable does appear to have been
involved in the organisation of royal forces during the post-war demobilisation, with
Henri favourably noting that Montmorency had offered troops from Navarre to Biron
in order to garrison Bourg.36 Overall, however, Montmorency played a limited role
during the Savoy War.
34 Villeroy to Montmorency, 22 August and 13 September 1600, BnF Ms.Fr. 3591, ff. 120r, 142r; Henri
IV to Montmorency, LMHIV, V, p. 274.
35 Villeroy to Montmorency, 18 July 1600, BnF Ms.Fr. 3591, f. 117r.
36 Henri to Montmorency, 12 July, 14 August, 16 August, 1 September, 25 October 1600, 10 February
1601, LMHIV, V, pp. 250, 273-5, 293-5, 330-2, 376-7. Montmorency’s post-war influence can also be
seen in the letters written to him by Lesdiguières, in which he sought the Constable’s advice on how to
garrison captured Savoyard territories, Lesdiguières to Montmorency, 1 February, 11 February 1601,
ACL, I, pp. 366, 368.
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By contrast, Sully’s position as Surintendant des finances gave him a
considerable level of authority over royal forces during the war. It was a measure of
his growing importance that, in late June, Henri had entrusted Sully with the
movements of key royal units – such as the Gardes, light-cavalry companies and the
artillery – to Lyon. Days after the campaign began, Henri asked Sully to ensure that
the army received its montres, and to provide for other expenses, ‘auxquelles nous
n’avons aucun moyen de pourveoir sans vous [Sully]’. Later in the campaign, he was
placed in charge of ensuring logistical supply to certain captured fortresses, and was
given significant responsibilities relating to the army’s demobilisation, including the
reduction in size of the vieux regiments.37 Equally as important for Sully’s military
influence was his command of the artillery, especially given that The Savoy War
consisted almost entirely of sieges. Whilst not present at every siege, Sully’s
management of the artillery was crucial to the capture of several key fortresses, and,
critically, much of the campaign’s overall glory was ascribed to him in many
contemporary pamphlets.38
In mid-October 1600, Henri had written to Sully to tell him that he held ‘les
deux plus importantes et utiles charges du Royaume’, through his authority over royal
finances and artillery.39 The Savoy War does much to bear out this contention, as the
offices allowed him to oversee the means by which the royal army could deliver its
punches. Thus, over the next nine years Sully, rather than the Constable, essentially
became Henri’s second-in-command over the royal army. This was in no small part
due to the vague powers enjoyed by the charge of Constable compared to the specific
functions with which Sully’s positions were endowed.
Thus, on occasions where conflict did arise between 1601 and 1610, the
Constable played only a marginal role. In the Sedan campaign of 1606,
Montmorency’s only involvement appears to have been when Henri wrote to the
Constable in mid-March, asking him to send his gendarme company, and to come to
the army if his health permitted it.40 During the organisation of the proposed 1610
campaign, the only military matter that Henri discussed with the Constable was to
ensure that the levying of troops in Languedoc went smoothly. Sully was clearly in
37 Henri IV to Sully, 26 June, 18 August, 19 November 1600, 20 March 1601, LMHIV, V, pp. 244, 277,
352, 396-7
38 Stéphane Gal, Lesdiguières: Prince des Alpes et connétable de France, (Grenoble, 2007), p.85;
Buisseret, Sully, pp.156-157.
39 Henri IV to Sully, ‘vers la mi-Octobre’ 1600, LMHIV, V, p. 323.
40 Henri IV to Montmorency, 24 March 1606, Ibid., VI, p. 591.
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charge of the administration of the main force being assembled to attack in the
Empire, with Lesdiguières given responsibility over the smaller army which was to
operate in northern Italy.41 After Henri’s death, Claude de La Châtre was placed in
command of around 8,000 royal troops which were sent to the siege of Jülich in
August 1610. Montmorency played no part in this campaign, and Sully, in the months
immediately following Henri’s death, was still the most influential figure in the
military administration.42 After La Châtre returned from Jülich, he even stood in for
Montmorency as Constable at Louis XIII’s coronation in October 1610, possibly in
reward for the successful conduct of French troops in the Empire.43 Even after Sully’s
disgrace in 1611, the Constable would not regain a position of dominance over royal
military forces before his death in 1614.
It could also be contended that the Constable’s authority over royal military
affairs suffered from the growth in power of certain Secretaries of State.44 From the
1590s, one Secretary, Villeroy, was gradually able to monopolise control over
correspondence with French ambassadors thanks to the favour he held with Henri IV,
thereby effectively turning himself into the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.45 As
no similar specialisation occurred in terms of a different Secretary gaining primary
responsibility over the conduct of war until at least the late 1610s, Villeroy also gained
a degree of influence over the royal military before this date. This development may
well have eroded some of Montmorency’s authority as Constable, even in terms of the
gendarmerie. For instance, Montmorency wrote to both Sully and Villeroy in 1606 to
ask them to favour the appointment of a ‘sieur le Noble’ to the Queen’s gendarme
company.46 On at least one occasion, Villeroy also seems to have acted as an
intermediary between the king and Montmorency during the drawing up of the états
41 Henri IV to Montmorency, 20 March 1610, Henri IV to Sully, 27 February, 8 March, 10 March, Ibid.,
pp. 877, 851, 855, 856; Buisseret, Sully, p.161; Dufayard, Lesdiguières, pp. 327-335.
42 ‘Mémoire et receuil’, BnF Dupuy 193, f. 112v.
43 Paul Phélypeaux de Pontchartrain, Mémoires concernant les affaires de France sous la régence de
Marie de Médicis [...], in Joseph-François Michaud and Jean-Joseph-François Poujoulat (eds.),
Nouvelle Collection des mémoires pour servir à l’histoire de France depuis le XIIIe siècle jusqu’à la fin
du XVIIIe siècle – 2e série, (10 vols., Paris, 1837-1838), V, p. 305.
44 For the development of the secretaries of state, see Orest A. Ranum, Richelieu and the Councillors of
State of Louis XIII: A Study of the Secretaries of State and Superintendents of Finance in the Ministry of
Richelieu, 1635-1642, (Oxford, 1963), pp. 49-58. For a more specific discussion of the Secretary of
State for War, see Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, pp. 367-373.
45 After being dismissed and alienated by Henri III in 1588, Villeroy had joined the Ligue, and only
rejoined royal service as a Secretary of State in 1594, after the conversion of Henri IV. Edmund H.
Dickerman, Bellièvre and Villeroy: Power in France under Henri III and Henri IV, (Providence, 1971),
pp.5-6; Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, pp. 367-370.
46 Montmorency to Sully, 11 July 1606, AMC, L, LXXXV, f. 97.
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for garrisons, even if Montmorency’s ‘advis’ for the distribution of funds was usually
accepted.47
Five years after Montmorency’s death, a regulation of 1619 was promulgated
to try to settle the disputes between the various secretaries over who held authority for
correspondence concerned with warfare.48 It asserted that one secretary of state should
have responsibility over at least the ‘premiere et principale armée’ in any campaign,
but that the authority over any other forces would be based on which Secretary had
power over the geographical department in which the force was operating. More
pertinently for this chapter, the regulation stated that, ‘les provisions des estats et
offices de connestable grand maitre de lartillerie et colonel general de l’infanterie
seront faicte par le secretaire de la guerre’.49 Whilst the position of Constable was
vacant in 1619, the regulation thus signalled that any future Constable, along with the
other great offices of the crown, would at least have to liaise more closely with one of
the Secretaries of State in the future.
Thus, between 1597 and 1614, Montmorency was not able to exercise the pre-
eminent level of power over royal forces which has often been ascribed to the
Constable. Whilst Montmorency took a leading role in the events at Amiens, he played
only a slight role in the Savoy War, the Sedan Campaign, and both the planning and
execution of the Jülich campaign of 1610. This relative marginalisation was partly due
to prosaic factors, such as ill-health. But, it is also reasonably clear that the relative
lack of formal powers enjoyed by the Constable over the new standing army allowed
other figures to usurp his position of influence over royal military structures. In
particular, Sully’s two offices of Surintendant des finances and Grand maître de
l’artillerie allowed him to more effectively control both the royal infantry and the
artillery. This, coupled with the growing royal favour in which Sully was held from
the late 1590s, gradually allowed him to become the most influential figure within the
royal army, due to the overwhelming importance of these two branches of arms.
47 Villeroy to Montmorency, 26 October and 27 November 1599, BnF Ms.Fr. 3580, ff. 29r, 31r.
48 Ranum, Richelieu, p.53.
49 ‘Reglement de monsieurs les secretaries d’estat sur le fait de la guerre’, 29 April, 1619, AAE MD
772, ff. 83r-84r;
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III – Remnants of Prestige: the Office of Constable by 1614
The influence of the Constable was not, however, completely marginalised during the
first two decades of the seventeenth century. Montmorency’s authority was
demonstrably strengthened due to certain specific functions that the charge entailed,
but also due to the overall gravitas that it continued to give the holder within the
economy of prestige and favour then existing among the French nobility. Indeed, had
it been a position of no consequence, it would be hard to explain why the office was
revived in 1621.
Firstly, the Constable exercised a degree of authority through the jurisdiction
that he and the maréchaux de France held at the Table de Marbre in the Palais de
justice de Paris. The authority that could be exercised through this body was
theoretically quite considerable, covering a variety of matters relating to military
discipline and payment.50 In reality, the Constable’s jurisdiction often translated itself
into requests for the arbitration of disputes between soldiers from a range of social
levels. These included the grands, such as the 1602 disagreement between the prince
de Joinville and Charles de Valois, comte d’Auvergne.51 Other nobles of lesser social
standing, such as the future mestre de camp Charles de Rambures, wrote to the
Constable when they encountered difficulties with the enforcement of ordinances
pertaining to military matters, such as the prohibition against carrying firearms.52
Thus, the Constable continued to be looked to as a source of adjudication on military
discipline and disputes, in conjunction with the tribunal of maréchaux, who continued
to exercise such an authority after the Constable’s abolition.53
The ambiguous nature of the Constable’s powers could also, occasionally,
benefit the position. Petitioners asked for Montmorency’s favour over a variety of
military issues, on which they hoped he could bring to bear his influence as Constable.
For example, due to the almost complete lack of military hospitals and veteran care in
this period, one area in which Montmorency’s support was constantly requested was
the welfare of old and/or crippled soldiers. Condé, Épernon, and Bouillon all wrote to
the Constable during the 1600s to ask him to place certain soldiers on the ‘roolle des
50 Trabit, Pouvoir, pp. 20-29.
51 ‘Recit de “l’accommodement faict par monsieur le connestable de Montmorency et Monsieur le duc
de Mayenne entre messieurs le prince de Joinville et le comte d’Auvergne’, 1 May 1602, and
Montmorency to Henri IV, March 1602, BnF Ms.Fr. 3585, ff. 16r, 18r.
52 Rambures to Montmorency, 23 June 1600, Ibid., ff. 81r.
53 See, for instance, ‘Accord fait par les “marechaux de France” ...’, 31 May 1627, Ibid., f. 93.
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estropiez’, whereby they would be granted pensions reflecting their former royal
military service and subsequent old-age or disabilities.54 Presumably these soldiers
were clients of the grands who wrote on their behalf. So thanks to the Constable’s
perceived influence over the list of pensions granted to estropiés, he became involved
with the high nobility’s efforts to reward their clients for military service.
Despite the growth in Sully’s power, petitioners also continued to ask the
Constable for his favour in matters of royal military finance during the 1600s. In 1601,
Bouillon asked Montmorency to help ensure both that the payment of the Sedan
garrison occurred, and that officials chosen by Bouillon would be allowed to oversee
the process. Interestingly, it seems that Villeroy was in charge of drawing up the actual
état for the Sedan garrison, and that Bouillon merely wanted Montmorency to use his
influence to speed up the payment process.55 Similarly, Charles de Lorraine, duc de
Guise, wrote a series of desperate letters to Montmorency in early 1601, in which he
asked for assistance in the payment of troops who had been placed in Provence in the
aftermath of the Savoy War.56 While his influence over these two matters might only
have been informal, the Constable appears to have held some formal powers over
royal military finance, including the extraordinaire des guerres. In 1603, La Châtre
told Montmorency that a ‘sieur de Sedenay’ had been made contrôleur général de
l’extraordinaire des guerres. As all such offices, and commissaires des guerres, were
ultimately responsible to the Table de Marbre, Sedenay had to present himself and
make his oath before the Constable who would then admit him to the charge.57 All
three examples thus depict members of the military nobility who placed themselves
into Montmorency’s debt due to the formal and informal influence he wielded as
Constable over areas of the military budget.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there remained a perception that the
Constable remained the premier military office of the crown, and that it conferred a
substantial degree of gravitas to its holder. That the position could benefit its holder in
this manner can be seen by Sully’s attempts, from the late 1600s, to secure the future
ownership of the charge. In 1608, Henri offered Sully both the position of Constable
and the gouvernement of Normandy, when they became vacant, on condition that both
54Épernon to Montmorency, 21 February 1608, BnF Ms.Fr. 3550, f. 89r; Bouillon to Montmorency, 23
June 1608, f. 96r; Condé to Montmorency, March 1608, BnF Cangé, 1, f. 180r.
55 Bouillon to Montmorency, 21 February 1601, BnF Ms.Fr. 3596, f. 31r.
56 Duc de Guise, 18 February and 23 Feburary 1601, BnF Ms.Fr. 3582, ff. 19r-v, 22r-v.
57 La Châtre to Monmorency, August 1603, La Châtre, Lettres, p. 301.
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he and his son converted to Catholicism. Sully refused this offer, and instead began a
campaign of self-promotion to demonstrate his stature in society and importance to
government, in order that the king would grant him the position without having to
convert.58 Sully’s attempts to obtain the constabulary did not come to fruition before
his disgrace in 1611. Whilst it is notable that Sully refused to abjure his faith to
receive the position, the fact that he desired the office is a testament to its enduring
appeal to the higher French nobility by the mid-1610s. Whilst being Grand maître de
l’artillerie had given Sully a considerable degree of tangible power over the royal
military machine, being Constable gave its holder a degree of symbolic gravitas which
was greater than any other royal military office. In Sully’s case, the acquisition of the
constabulary would have crowned his ascension in influence over the royal army.
Indeed, in the ten years which followed Montmorency’s death, the office maintained
much of its symbolic capital within French society, and became a potent factor in the
political machinations of the period.
IV – The Attempt to Acquire Gravitas: Luynes as Constable, 1621.
Thus, despite the office’s lack of formal powers over the new standing army, the
position of Constable continued to be seen as a potential means to bolster the social
and political standing of members of the high nobility during the regency of Marie de
Médicis. As such, several figures attempted to acquire the position. In late 1610,
Condé had requested the survivance of the charge but was rebuked; after being
appointed maréchal de France in 1613, Concini also had ambitions towards the
office.59 Indeed, that the charge was left vacant after Montmorency’s death in 1614
until Luynes’ appointment in 1621 may in itself have been a political calculation.
Montmorency had not secured the survivance of the charge for his son before his
death. To grant the position to any other noble family might have provoked the ire of
those who had been denied.60 In particular, the appointment of Concini to the role
could only have strengthened the revolts against the regency government that emerged
after 1614. The absence of a Constable between 1614 and 1621 was thus possibly a
testament to the position’s continuing gravitas, due to its capacity to provoke
58 Barbiche and Dainville-Barbiche, Sully, pp. 309-316.
59 Estrées, Mémoires, p.26; Kettering, Power and Reputation, p. 102.
60Rowlands has made a similar suggestion for why the position of Colonel General of the Infantry was
not filled after 1661, Rowlands, Dynastic State, p. 189.
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discontent amongst unsuccessful pretenders to the charge in an already fractious
political climate.
That the office of Constable continued to be viewed as one of the realm’s most
prestigious charges after 1614 can be seen through a debate that was sparked in 1620
due to rumours of its re-establishment. One pamphlet, written by ‘un bon Francois,’
appeared implacably hostile to the position, based on the perception that the Constable
enjoyed considerable authority. The Constable would cause royal ‘forces’ and
‘commandemens’ to be parcelled out, causing the ‘manifeste affoiblissement’ of the
monarchy. Moreover, deciding who should receive the position was problematic. The
title could not be given to a member of the lesser nobility, as this would infuriate
members of the grands, who were the only figures worthy of holding the office. Yet to
grant the position to a grand could increase their authority to a dangerous degree, and
exacerbate the factionalism that currently riddled the country. Altogether, the position
of Constable could threaten both the monarchy, and wider social stability.61 In
response to this pamphlet, another anonymous author defended the office. They stated
that previous Constables had proved themselves vital to the organisation of French
forces, and that a Constable could never become mightier than the king, due to the
inherent grandeur of the monarchy. Whilst ‘grands Seigneurs’ were preferable, the
author asserted that previous monarchs had given the office to lesser gentlemen. The
only caveats the pamphlet placed on appointment were that the king should make the
decision himself, and, notably, that Protestants such as Bouillon or Lesdiguières
should not be allowed to hold the charge, as they practised a religion ‘contraire à celle
de nostre Roy’.62
Whether they agreed on the need to re-establish the position or not, the
pamphlets demonstrated a shared belief in the power and prestige of the Constable.
Neither text went into detail about the exact extent of the Constable’s authority, or his
relationship to the new standing army, save for rather generic assertions regarding his
position as the second-in-command of royal forces after the king. Yet, the overall
perception that the Constable remained a position that could potentially grant its
holder a leading role in royal military forces is the key to understanding why Luynes,
61 ‘L’Advis au Roy, sur le restablissement de l’office de Connestable’, 1620, BnF Cangé 1, ff. 186r-
193v.
62 ‘Response au livre intitules advis au Roy sur le restablissement de la charge de Connestable’, 1620,
Ibid., ff. 194r-200v.
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the royal favourite during the late 1610s and early 1620s, was appointed to the
position in April 1621.
As Kettering has argued, ‘the balance of power’ in the relationship between
Louis and Luynes probably rested in Luynes’ favour in early 1621. He may well have
demanded the position of Constable as a condition for accompanying Louis in the
campaign.63 Moreover, Luynes also had clients on the council of state, and the support
of prominent figures such as Condé, for his appointment.64 The machinations by which
Luynes’ acquired the charge are less significant than why he sought to acquire it.
Whilst he enjoyed significant royal favour by early 1621, and had been made a duke
and councillor of state, without any military experience or offices he could not
automatically claim a leading role in any proposed military campaign. This was
crucial, as it was predicted in early 1621 that the Midi campaign could last for several
months. Luynes knew that if he was separated from the king for this length of time, his
position as favourite would come under serious threat. The acquisition of the position
of Constable thus allowed him to take up a significant role within the military high
command during the 1621 campaign. Overall, Luynes’ appointment, and the
extravagant ceremony which accompanied it, was not only to ‘gain the respect of the
grands’, as Kettering has contended, but was an attempt by Luynes to prove that he
had become a grand himself, capable of leading royal campaigns.65
Unfortunately for Luynes, precisely because the office of Constable was still
viewed as an extremely prestigious office, his appointment was viewed by many as a
travesty. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Henri IV had stated that it
was necessary that the Constable should be a ‘bon, grand & notable personage,
capable & experimenté au faict de la guerre & autres affaires de nostredit royaume’.66
Luynes did not fit this description in 1621. In a quip which demonstrated the prestige
in which contemporaries held the charge, the comte de Brienne stated that ‘l’on
regarda comme une chose bien nouvelle qu’un homme qui n’avoit jamais tiré l’epée
pour le service du Roi fût élevé à la première charge de l’épée’.67 As Fontenay-
Mareuil put it, Luynes did not have a reputation as a ‘grand capitaine’, and his
63 Kettering, Power and Reputation, p. 167.
64 Fontenay-Mareuil, Mémoires, p. 157.
65 Kettering, Power and Reputation, p.168.
66 ‘Declaration du Roy’, BnF Cangé 1, f. 160r.
67 Brienne, Mémoires, I, p. 350. My emphasis.
138
appointment to such a ‘haute dignité’ was widely condemned.68 Brienne would also
criticise Luynes’ actions as Constable, stating that instead of ‘tenir au camp comme
connetable’, he merely presided over councils far behind the royal army’s siege lines,
comfortably out of danger.69 Even Kettering, in her attempt to prove that Luynes was
‘not responsible for the failure of the siege of Montauban’, conceded that he was
‘militarily inexperienced [...] and his overall performance as Constable was poor’.70
Despite these criticisms, acquiring the office of Constable did allow Luynes to
play a leading role in the campaign – the primary reason why he had sought the office.
Indeed, Brienne’s portrayal of Luynes as a ‘desk-general’ is not entirely fair. At Saint-
Jean-d’Angély, Luynes took part in the final assault on the town, whilst at Montauban
he inspected royal trenches, observed enemy attacks at close-quarters, and commanded
one of the three royal army groups. He may not have consistently been the heroic
military leader that certain contemporaries expected of a Constable, but he certainly
placed himself in harm’s way.71
Aside from his role in combat, Luynes was able to exercise a variety of
‘advisory and administrative’ duties during the campaign deriving from his office.72
Luynes ordered the execution of three royal soldiers for infractions of the peace after
the surrender of Clairac, demonstrating that the Constable had retained a degree of
authority over military discipline.73 He also appears to have influenced military
appointments. Bassompierre noted how he, along with ‘Crequy, Saint Luc, [and]
Termes’, had been removed by Luynes from their position as maréchaux de camp to
make way for the Constable’s clients and relatives.74 Luynes also played a role in the
councils of war that were regularly held by the king, and in the overall planning of the
campaign.75 The Constable was also given a leading role in the monarchy’s attempts to
negotiate the surrender of important Protestant rebels, such as the duc de Rohan.76
However, whether Luynes can be considered the commander-in-chief of royal
forces directly because of his office is questionable. Once again, the Constable’s lack
of explicit powers over the new standing army allowed other grands to usurp the
68 Fontenay-Mareuil, Mémoires, p. 157
69 Brienne, Mémoires, p.356
70 Kettering, Power and Reputation, p. 204.
71Ibid., pp. 203-4; Bernard, Guerres, p. 193.
72 Kettering, Power and Reputation, p. 202.
73 Bernard, Guerres, p. 195.
74 Bassompierre, Mémoires, II, pp. 286-7.
75 Ibid., II, pp. 338-40; Bernard, Guerres, pp. 163, 193.
76 Rohan, Mémoires, I, pp. 193, 196-7.
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Constable’s supposed leading position of command. At the siege of Saint-Jean-
d’Angély, Épernon’s secretary claimed that whilst Luynes was Constable in name,
Lesdiguières ‘en faisoit toutes les fonctions’.77 Indeed, Luynes’ exact role in command
is often difficult to deduce due to the exceedingly chaotic command structure found in
the royal army. By the siege of Montauban, Luynes theoretically enjoyed the position
of commander-in-chief, as Constable, under the king, the supreme commander. Yet, at
Montauban, the army was actually divided into three parts, under three different
section commanders: Luynes, Lesdiguières and Henri de Lorraine, duc de Mayenne.
The section commanders each had a great degree of authority over their area of the
siege, and the level of superiority that Luynes enjoyed over Mayenne and Lesdiguières
was negligible. If anything, Mayenne grew in influence during the siege to the extent
he was ‘acting as commander-in-chief’ when he died in September. On his death,
Lesdiguières assumed this implicit role, rather than Luynes. Finally, and in a manner
reminiscent of Sully during the Savoy War, Schomberg probably wielded a greater
influence than Luynes at Montauban due to his position as Surintendant des finances
and acting Grand maître de l’artillerie.78
Thus, Luynes’ appointment and performance as Constable highlight many of
the ambiguities of the office by the early 1620s. On the one hand, many
contemporaries continued to view the charge as perhaps the most prestigious office of
the realm, and one which afforded its holder a prominent role in the high command.
Accordingly, much like the lesser nobility within the regiments, Luynes attempted to
use and shape royal military office to bolster his and his family’s status and interests.
Clearly, this effort was not entirely unsuccessful, due to the prominent role that
Luynes occupied whilst the army was on campaign. Yet, because the Constable had
few defined powers over the most important areas of the royal army by the early
seventeenth century, the permanent regiments and the artillery, Luynes did not become
commander-in-chief during the campaign of 1621. Indeed, that much of the gravitas of
the office was seen in symbolic terms, and as a reward for past military service, further
reduced the benefits that Luynes accrued via the charge. His tenure as Constable is
perhaps best understood through a quote by Arlette Jouanna, which described the
king’s wider power to shape societal perceptions of nobility. As she put it, ‘Le roi
pouvait faire un noble; mais il ne pouvait faire un gentilhomme: seuls le temps et la
77 Girard, Espernon, III, p. 267.
78 Pontis, Mémoires, I, p. 287; Kettering, Power and Reputation, p. 202.
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reconnaissance sociale y parvenaient’.79 The king could appoint a Constable; but
neither he, nor the office, could automatically make a commander-in-chief. For the
Constable to be seen as the true leader of the new standing army, he had to have
already proved his military stature and worth.
V –Lesdiguières as Constable, 1622-1626.
The office of Constable could have remained unfilled after Luynes’ death in late 1621,
as its relevance to the new military forces under the monarchy’s command had quite
considerably diminished. As will be seen in the case of Lesdiguières’ elevation to the
position in mid-1622, that the office was revived says more about its function as a
means by which the monarchy attempted to bind certain leading members of the
military nobility more closely into its service, through the distribution of a coveted yet
largely symbolic reward, rather than the position’s status as a necessary part of the
high command. Indeed, acquiring the position does not appear to have significantly
increased Lesdiguières’ military authority, either within or without the royal army.
Lesdiguières’ appointment as Constable in 1622 stemmed from persistent
doubts about his political loyalty to the monarchy, due to his religion. Despite his
consistent allegiance to the crown during the rebellions of the early 1620s, rumours
about his trustworthiness had surfaced on more than one occasion. His enemies on the
royal high command had, for example, accused him of consorting with the Protestant
rebels during the siege of Montauban.80 By 1622, fears about Lesdiguières reached
such a state that the king’s councillors told Louis to either ‘cut off his [Lesdiguières’]
head, or to engage him more firmly in his Majesty’s Service’.81 The means to achieve
the latter option was to offer him the charge of Constable, on condition of his
conversion to Catholicism.
This act may not have been as difficult for Lesdiguières as he attempted to
portray.82 For one, he was to receive a position that was still widely held to be the
most prestigious military office of the realm, despite Luynes’ tenure in the charge, and
which continued to be widely coveted by the high nobility. Moreover, rather than
79 Jouanna, Devoir, p. 29.
80 Guichard Déageant, The Memoires of Monsieur Deageant [...], (London, 1690), pp. 198-200;
Dufayard, Lesdiguières, pp. 457-478.
81 Déageant, Memoires, p. 205; Dufayard, Lesdiguières, pp. 479-498.
82 ‘Instruction’, ACL, II, p. 364.
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seeing Lesdiguières’ return to Catholicism as a sudden, shocking act of apostasy, Gal
plausibly placed it at the end of a pathway of spiritual curiosity that had begun in the
early seventeenth century.83 Lesdiguières also received other benefits during the
negotiations for his appointment and conversion. He was able to acquire the means to
support an army against the rebel strongholds in the Vivarais in 1622, and was made a
chevalier of the Ordre du Saint-Esprit, an exalted order which was open only to
Catholic grands. This can only have further placated his sense of honour.84
The question remains, however, as to whether being appointed Constable
notably affected Lesdiguières’ military authority, and his overall stature within
society. The brevet of July 1622 which appointed him to the charge stated that
Lesdiguières had earned the office through sixty years of military service, and had thus
‘commandé plusieurs armées, assiégé places, [et] donné batailles’ on many occasions.
Lesdiguières was thus recognised as already being a military grandee, and, whether
conscious or not, this statement would appear to implicitly question the legitimacy of
Luynes’ appointment. The powers it ascribed to the Constable were essentially a
restatement of those made by Henri IV in 1593 when appointing Montmorency. It
stated how the Constable had a broad authority over military discipline, supplies, and
payment, and would be the ‘lieutenant général’ of the king in all places where he was
absent.85 The brevet’s overarching tone thus appeared to emphasise that the Constable
held a significant degree of military authority. However, and just as with
Montmorency and Luynes, it remained somewhat ambiguous over the exact role the
Constable would play in the high command of the new standing army.
Indeed, Lesdiguières’ appointment does not appear to have measurably
improved his position within royal forces in the short-term. He did not form part of the
high command of the main royal army during the 1622 campaign until the siege of
Montpellier, which had begun in late August. Until this point, he had spent the
majority of his time attempting to maintain the peace in the Vivarais, and may have
even sought to avoid joining the main royal force due to the factionalism that was
83 If anything, Gal saw neo-stoic ideas as perhaps the greatest philosophical influence on Lesdiguières’
behaviour. Gal, Lesdiguières, pp. 209-316. Gal’s overall portrayal of Lesdiguières as a person who was
always ‘dehors d’une stricte confessionalisation’ and ‘entre protestantisme et catholicisme’ is
reminiscent of the ideas found in Thierry Wanegffelen, Ni Rome ni Genève: des fidèles entre deux
chaires en France au XVIe siècle, (Paris, 1997).
84 Louis de Marillac to Richelieu, 3 July 1622, AAE MD 775, f. 178v; ‘Recit Véritable [...]’, 24-25 July
1622, ACL, III, pp. 426-430.
85 ‘Provisions du connétable de Lesdiguières et dispense de serment’, 6 and 14 July 1622, ACL, III, pp.
416-420.
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besetting its high command. When Lesdiguières did arrive at Montpellier, he was first
commanded to try and form a rapprochement with Rohan, before retiring from the
army, with Louis’ permission, to levy troops in the Dauphiné. It was only from mid-
September, when Louis’ favour towards Bassompierre, Praslin and Condé had been
exhausted, and he was in need of a senior military figure, that Lesdiguières took a
leading role in the high command.86
Despite being Constable, Lesdiguières was thus relatively sidelined from the
main royal army group during the 1622 campaign, not least because suspicions of his
political loyalty remained. On 10 October, Louis de Marillac noted that the Huguenots
wanted the Constable and Créquy to be in charge of the execution of any treaty’s
conditions, but that the king wished to give the responsibility to the prince de Joinville.
Both the king and Marillac believed that Lesdiguières and Créquy had secret
‘desseins’ and ‘intelligence’ with the Huguenots ‘de deca’, and thus could not be fully
trusted.87 Ultimately, Lesdiguières and Créquy were left in Montpellier, with Picardie
and Normandie, to enforce the peace treaty, yet it is clear that the king, and others in
the high command, had not been keen to entrust them with this duty. Thus, at least in
the short-term, his appointment as Constable does not appear to have removed the
doubts concerning his political loyalty which had preceded it. Indeed, combined with
the lack of explicit powers that the office wielded over the new standing army,
acquiring the office of Constable did not significantly improve Lesdiguières’ position
within the royal high command, and he was marginalised for the majority of the 1622
campaign.
Lesdiguières’ final campaigns before his death were undertaken in northern
Italy between 1624 and 1626. Due to Spain’s reluctance to cede control of certain
Alpine passes found in the Valtelline, as stipulated by the treaty of Madrid of 1621, by
late 1624 the French crown had signed a treaty to attack Genoa, a Spanish ally, in
conjunction with Venice and Savoy. 88 The choice of Lesdiguières to command French
forces in this expedition was unsurprising. He had considerable operational experience
in northern Italy from the wars against Savoy between the late 1580s and early 1600s,
86 Dufayard, Lesdiguières, pp. 519-524; Louis de Marillac to Richelieu 6 September, AAE MD 775, ff.
204r-205v.
87 Given Richelieu’s location in Lyon, ‘de deca’ can roughly be translated as ‘down here’. Marillac thus
probably referred to the wider Huguenot population in the south of France: Louis de Marillac to
Richelieu, 10 October 1622, AAE MD 775, f. 211v; Richelieu to Madame de Longueville, 30
Septembre 1622 (from Lyon), Avenel, I, p. 732; Bergin, Rise, p. 239.
88 For the wider strategic situation during these campaigns, see:Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, pp. 85-8.
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and from his incursions to assist Savoy against Spain in 1616-1617.89 Moreover, he
had been chosen by Henri IV in 1610 to lead the proposed invasion of Spanish
territories in northern Italy. In short, it is unlikely that Lesdiguières’ position as
Constable had an enormous bearing on his choice as commander.
Once chosen, it is far from indisputable that Lesdiguières had been given a
‘carte blanche’ by Louis XIII to ‘lever des troupes et diriger la politique Italienne à
son gré’ as claimed by Dufayard.90 Prior to leaving for Italy, Lesdiguières had levied
6,000 infantry and 500 cavalry in 1624. Several of the permanent regiments had been
added to this number, including Normandie, Sault, Chappes, and Vaubecourt. Had
Lesdiguières truly been operating ‘à son gré’, it might have been presumed that he
would have kept these units, which as part of the vieux or petits-vieux, formed the elite
of the French infantry. Instead, Louis XIII ordered Lesdiguières to send these
regiments, along with munitions and supplies, to the marquis de Coeuvres, who was
commanding a smaller, separate French force against the Spanish in the Valtelline.
Consequently, Lesdiguières was forced to make new levies before he departed for
Italy in late 1624. By the time of a revue which occurred in February 1625, he had an
army of 23,000 men at his disposal, one-third of which was French.91
However, almost as soon as Lesdiguières began his campaign in Italy, the
monarchy’s attentions switched to dealing with the Huguenot revolt that had emerged
in the late spring of 1625 under Benjamin de Rohan, prince de Soubise. As Parrott has
stated, whilst there is no reason to doubt that Richelieu was sincere in his desire to
remove the threat of independent Huguenot military power to the French monarchy,
the revolt allowed him to ‘back away from an Italian venture that was unlikely to be
resolved in French favour’.92 As such, the forces under both the command of Coeuvres
and Lesdiguières soon became starved of reinforcements and supplies. Lesdiguières’
force withered away to less than 10,000 men by mid-June. Indeed, such was the
attrition in troop-numbers, Lesdiguières was forced to defend himself from
accusations that he had stolen part of the payments destined for the army up to early
August.93
89 Dufayard, Lesdiguières, pp. 343-72.
90 Ibid, p. 539.
91 Ibid., p. 541.
92 Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, p. 88.
93 Lesdiguières to Louis XIII, 6 August 1625, ACL, II, p. 414.
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Whilst Lesdiguières may thus have enjoyed a reasonable degree of operational
independence in 1625, he remained heavily reliant on troops, supplies and finance sent
to him from the monarchy. He also remained dependent on the crown’s assessment of
the wider strategic situation. For Lesdiguières, the campaign of 1624 to 1626 was part
of his desire to form a pan-European coalition to attack Spanish power in the Italian
peninsula, and thus reduce its overall influence in Europe.94 Accordingly, he attempted
to gain the monarchy’s support for an ‘army of Italy’, which was to be composed of at
least 20,000 troops, together with the support of Britain, the United Provinces, certain
Imperial princes and the Swiss. This force would end attempts to fight the Spanish by
diversion, and instead directly attack the duchy of Milan.95 Whilst initially appearing
to back such a scheme, Louis eventually fell into agreement with Richelieu’s belief
that the monarchy’s resources should be focused against the Huguenot rebels.
Furthermore, Louis stated that he doubted the success of expanded operations in Italy
because Lesdiguières had failed to maintain the infantry regiments placed under his
command at an effective strength. The forces controlled by Lesdiguières should
instead be placed in garrison in Piedmont for the winter, as the king did not want to
harm his own military reputation by allowing a campaign which would be doomed to
failure.96 Lesdiguières thus returned to France, and the monarchy authorised the
signing of the treaty of Monzón with Spain in March 1626.
Lesdiguières thus did not enjoy anything near complete operational
independence during the Italian campaign of the mid-1620s. The Constable’s minimal
influence over the new standing army meant Lesdiguières could not prevent the
redeployment of troops from the permanent regiments from his force to that of
Coeuvres. Once in Italy, Lesdiguières did not have the authority to prevent his army
being significantly undersupplied. Finally, his belief that the Italian theatre should be
expanded into a wider conflict was ignored in favour of Richelieu’s opinion that the
destruction of Huguenot military power was the more pressing concern facing the
French monarchy. Thus, due to the Constable’s lack of explicit powers over the new
royal army, even a grandee such as Lesdiguières remained largely reliant on royal
favour for army groups under his command to function in a successful manner. And if
this favour had been diverted elsewhere, as it was to Richelieu in the mid-1620s, the
94 Gal, Lesdiguières, pp. 209-224.
95 ‘Dernieres Memoires’ of Lesdiguières to Louis XIII and his council, October 1625, BnF Na.Fr. 7052,
ff. 362r-364r.
96 Response of Louis XIII to Lesdiguières’ memoire of 25 November 1625, Ibid., ff. 365r-v.
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limits of the Constable’s authority, on the eve of the office’s abolition, are brought
sharply into focus.
It would not be an exaggeration to argue that the rise of the new standing army in
France, allied to the increased importance of artillery to the conduct of early modern
warfare, significantly affected the position of the Constable within royal military
structures. Put simply, the office’s relative lack of explicit powers over these areas
meant the Constable had little definite authority over the new royal army that emerged
in the early seventeenth century. Consequently, the position was increasingly subject
to the vagaries of political fortune and favour, and to marginalisation by royal office-
holders who held positions which did allow them to influence the new key areas of the
army’s operation. Sully’s offices in royal finance and artillery, for example, granted
him a greater degree of tangible authority over the royal military structures than
Montmorency enjoyed as Constable. In 1621, Luynes found that being Constable did
not automatically entitle him to the position of commander-in-chief over an army
dominated by the permanent regiments. Even a figure such as Lesdiguières struggled
to impress his opinion on the king whilst Constable, not just due to persistent doubts
over his faith, but because Richelieu could quite easily dominate a military office-
holder with few definite powers over the new royal army.
The office of Constable was thus simultaneously one of the most prestigious
and expendable charges of the realm by the 1620s. Its almost mythological past as the
leader of the monarchy’s older armed forces ensured that it continued to be held in
reverence by many French noblemen. Indeed, it was a position which the monarchy
could use to reward the most powerful military noblemen of the realm, such as
Montmorency and Lesdiguières, and, in doing so, engage them more fully in royal
service. Yet the position’s inability to adapt fully to the new military forces at the
monarchy’s disposal made it, ultimately, a dispensable part of the high command. By
the mid-1620s, the office could only survive if the monarchy, or its leading ministers,
could find a means to advantageously use the position. Indeed, the charge had retained
a sufficiently powerful aura that Richelieu did not want to see it fall into the hands of a
figure who was not a close ally, such as the most likely candidate to follow
Lesdiguières, Henri II, duc de Montmorency. Yet, it had become enough of an
anachronism that it could be abolished without a great deal of difficulty.
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The experience of the Constable thus hints at a wider change between the
monarchy, the grands and the royal army during the early seventeenth century.
Overall, the office is an example of how the monarchy was becoming less reliant on
the grands for both the construction and operation of its armed forces during the early
seventeenth century due to the rise of the new standing army. The crown could instead
rely on a core of families, drawn mostly from the petite noblesse and noblesse
seconde, to be the officers of its army. As these men increasingly placed service to the
monarchy before that to the grands, the crown’s new force was thus more monarchy-
centred than previous royal armies, in which the grands had often rivalled the crown
as centres of authority. Moreover, and as can be seen through Lesdiguières’ experience
during the 1620s, many members of the high nobility were increasingly willing to
accept a more servile role within royal forces than they had previously enjoyed. As
will be seen in the next chapter, this may well have been because the standing army
had notably reduced the grands ability to successfully undertake military action
without the monarchy’s consent.
147
Chapter Six
The duc d’Épernon, the Colonel General of the Infantry, and the New Standing
Army
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Much has been written to suggest that the office of Colonel General of the Infantry
enjoyed considerable authority over the royal infantry during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries.1 In particular, it has been claimed that during the reign of Henri
III the office was given extensive powers of appointment over the infantry. Certain
historians have thus contended that the Colonel General nominated, and due to his
power effectively appointed, all officers within the infantry from the 1580s.2 Others
have been somewhat more circumspect, with Avenel, for example, stating that the
Colonel General’s power of nomination may have applied to company ranks within
the régiments entretenus, but that the Colonel and the king had alternating precedence
over nomination to these positions.3 The effect, however, was apparently the same. As
Russell Major put it, by the early seventeenth century the Colonel General had ‘filled
the royal army with his clients’.4 Moreover, the Colonel General was the captain of the
premier company – the colonelle – in each of the permanent regiments, and also
enjoyed a degree of disciplinary authority over the infantry due to his position as a
‘disciplinary executive’in the prévôts des bandes.5 In sum, Camille Rousset contention
that the Colonel General ‘n’était pas seulement le chef de l’armée dans son ensemble,
il était le chef de chaque régiment en particulier’ is far from unique.6 Indeed, Richelieu
appeared to validate this argument when he stated that the Colonel’s powers were ‘de
très-dangeureuse consequence et du tout insupportables’.7
This chapter will seek to reassess the nature of the authority exercised by the
Colonel General during the early seventeenth century. It will build upon the relatively
brief remarks made by Parrott, Rowlands, and Drévillon, who have all sought to
emphasise the more limited nature of the power wielded by this office during the first
1 The position can be found for the first time in 1542. There were originally two Colonels General, one
each for the bandes ‘deçà’ and ‘delà les monts’. These offices were combined in 1569. Parrott,
Richelieu’s Army, p. 471; Roger Doucet, Les institutions de la France au XVIe siècle, (2 vols., Paris,
1948), II, p. 643; Susane, Infanterie, I, pp. 96-98.
2 Daniel, Milice, I, pp. 270, 281-3; Louis André, Michel Le Tellier et l’organisation de l’armée
monarchique, (Paris, 1906) p.160; Léo Mouton, Un demi-roi: le duc d’Épernon, (Paris, 1922), pp.
91,142; Camille Rousset, Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire, (4 vols.,
Paris, 1879), I, p. 175. The most recent adherent to this view is James Collins, The State in Early
Modern France, (2nd ed., Cambridge, 2009), p. 57.
3 Georges d’Avenel, Richelieu et la monarchie absolue, (4 vols., Paris, 1884-90), III, p. 60.
4 J. Russell Major, ‘The Revolt of 1620: A Study of Ties of Fidelity’, French Historical Studies, 14,
(1986), p. 394.
5 Parrott, Richelieu’s Army , p. 471.
6 Rousset, Histoire, I, p. 175.
7 Richelieu, quoted in Avenel, Richelieu, pp. 161-2.
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half of the seventeenth century than the figures noted above.8 Indeed, it should be
recognised that historians who have emphasised the powers of the Colonel General
have often taken their cue, in part at least, from royal propaganda surrounding the
position’s abolition in 1661. Whilst Louis XIV did want to bring the infantry under
greater royal control, he undoubtedly exaggerated the Colonel General’s authority in
order to inflate the benefit brought to the monarchy through the position’s eradication.
Indeed, factors other than entrenchment of royal absolutism were quite clearly at work
in 1661, such as the vagaries of dynastic politics, and the fact that the office was
already in decline in relation to the Secretary of State for War.9
Whatever the office’s authority by the early 1660s, this chapter will firstly
argue that it was never a position which entitled its holder to supreme power over the
infantry or regimental appointment during the early seventeenth century, even if it was
a position of notable influence. Indeed, the exact authority of the Colonel General
largely reflected the level of favour that its incumbent between 1582 and 1642, Jean
Louis de Nogaret de La Valette, duc d’Épernon, enjoyed with the crown or regency at
any given point in time.10
As seen in the first four chapters, the entrenchment of certain regiments as
permanent bodies of force meant that the monarchy had a core of infantry officers at
its disposal whose social standing was closely bound to their royal service. As already
hinted at in the last chapter, this chapter will more explicitly argue that as long as the
monarchy could satisfy the dynastic ambitions of the petite noblesse and noblesse
seconde who served in the standing army, the authority of the grands within royal
military structures would be weakened. Regimental officers, and thus a section of the
military nobility, would be more closely tied into royal service, as few officers would
be willing to imperil the social benefits they had earned in the standing army by
placing service to grands before their duty to the crown. In turn, grands, such as
Épernon, would be forced increasingly to redefine their social status on the basis of
their own royal military service, in offices such as that of Colonel General, rather than
placing overwhelming weight on their capacity for independent military action. This
8 Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, pp.470-5; Drévillon, L’Impôt, pp. 25-30; Rowlands, ‘Monopolisation’, p.
153.
9 Rowlands, Dynastic State, pp. 188-189.
10 For a consideration of the importance of favour to Épernon’s career see Le Roux, Faveur. Moreover,
the revival of the Colonel General’s influence during the 1640s and 1650s was largely due to the favour
that Épernon’s son enjoyed with the Mazarin-led regency government: Rowlands, Dynastic State, pp.
350-351.
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was due to their fading ability to influence the lower nobility within royal forces, and,
consequently, the crown’s lessening dependence on the grands for military action. In
short, the early seventeenth century would show how the standing army had the
potential to loosen, but admittedly not destroy, the bonds between the higher and
lower nobility which had contributed so greatly to the civil wars of the sixteenth
century. Such a development was, however, by no means definite or beyond recall by
1635.
I – The Importance of Favour: The Powers of the Colonel General, 1582-1605
The extensive authority sometimes ascribed to the position of Colonel General was, in
reality, a temporary phenomenon of the 1580s, which arose out of factional court
politics. Since the late 1570s Henri III had attempted to re-assert his authority in the
face of a considerable increase in Guise influence stemming from their position at
court, their power over royal offices, and their leading position in the Ligue. From his
group of mignons, or favourites, Épernon was marked out as one of the men whom
Henri III had decided to elevate from the provincial nobility into loyal grands, in order
to bolster royal authority. In Épernon’s case, this partly took the form of enormous
salaries and pensions, gifts of land, and certain positions at court. But it also entailed
him being used to ‘reassert[...] royal control in the army’, via his appointment as
Colonel General of the Infantry in 1581.11
By placing a royal favourite at the head of the infantry, and subsequently
entrusting him with a wide authority over appointment, Épernon could not only place
trusted clients within royal units, but could also make clear to existing officers that
unless they looked towards him, and thus the monarchy, they would not enjoy further
progression. Consequently, the influence of other, less quiescent grands over royal
military structures was reduced, which inevitably stoked the ire of figures such as the
Guises. Before Henri III’s death, Épernon would also acquire the gouverneurments of
Provence, Metz and Boulogne, and command over the Mediterranean fleet, as part of a
calculated wider effort to re-assert crown authority over its military forces.12
11 Stuart Carroll, Martyrs and Murderers: the Guise Family and the Making of Europe, (Oxford, 2009),
p. 238.
12Carroll, Martyrs, pp. 221-242, 262; Le Roux, Faveur, pp. 525-533.
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Whilst Épernon had received the position of Colonel General in 1581, the
charge would not become a grand office de la couronne until 1584, a move which
placed it on a par with other major royal offices, such as that of Amiral de France.
According to his secretary and biographer, Guillaume Girard, Épernon enjoyed far-
reaching powers after this date. Girard ascribed to Épernon the power of nominating ‘à
toutes les charges vacantes dans les Bandes Françoises, sans excepter même de cette
nomination, celle de Mestre de Camp du Regiment des Gardes’.13 Contemporaries
noted that this manoeuvre was successful in reducing the influence of figures such as
the Guises over the army. As René Lucinge put it, in ‘toutes les armées du Roy il ne
s’en trouvera pas un seul [officier] qui aye esté au duc de Guise’.14
However, even during the 1580s, the Colonel General never enjoyed the power
of direct appointment to infantry charges, except to an extremely small number of
compagnies colonelle of certain, still embryonic, vieux regiments.15 Aside from these
companies, the Colonel General could only nominate persons for an infantry
officership, and whether this nomination became an appointment depended on
Épernon’s relationship with the crown. Thus, due to the enormous favour Épernon
enjoyed with Henri III between 1584 and 1588, his regimental nominations were
‘accepted unconditionally’, but this authority was short-lived.16 By 1588, the Guises,
using the power of the Ligue, had achieved Épernon’s disgrace and his temporary
suspension from the office. Under Henri IV, Épernon would be reinstated in his
charge, but would never again enjoy the same levels of influence over regimental
appointment. Henri IV appears to have been unhappy with the authority that Épernon
had retained over royal military structures by the late 1590s, and thus attempted to
counteract it by limiting Épernon’s right to nomination.
Matters between Henri and Épernon came to a head in 1605 when the mestre
de camp of the Gardes, Louis de Berton, sieur de Crillon, resigned his charge, and
was replaced by Charles de Blanchefort, marquis de Créquy, the duc de Lesdiguières’
13 For ‘Bandes Françoises’, one can read regiments, by the mid-1580s. Girard dated Épernon’s
promotion to the position of Colonel General to 1585; this would not tally with the more thoroughly
researched dates given by Le Roux, above. Guillaume Girard, Histoire de la vie du duc d’Espernon, (4
vols., Paris, 1730) I, pp. 100-104.
14 René de Lucinge, quoted in Le Roux, Faveur, pp. 530-1.
15 Indeed, on the 1588 état only two regiments out of nine are listed as having a compagnie colonelle:
the Gardes and Picardie. Champagne does not have one, nor do the other regiments listed. This list
admittedly, does not include Piémont. Moreover, Navarre was not yet part of the royal army. For more
on the Compagnies Colonelle see Section II of this chapter.
16 Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, p. 471.
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son-in-law. Henri IV had chosen Créquy for the position in an attempt to cement his
relationship with Lesdiguières, who certainly appeared pleased with the
appointment.17 When Henri IV wrote to Épernon about the matter in May 1605, he
stated that he had not wished to proceed until he had discussed it with Épernon; yet
this was something which Henri felt he had achieved via the letter. Henri thus
attempted to present the appointment as non-negotiable, claiming that Créquy was so
suitable for the charge that Épernon would have advised Henri to make the
appointment himself, ‘si vous estiés auprés de moy’.18
Whether Henri had intended the appointment to be an attack on the authority of
the Colonel General or not, Épernon perceived it as such, especially as he had enjoyed
close relations with the previous mestre de camp, Crillon.19 Moreover, Girard stated
that Épernon could not accept Créquy’s appointment on principle. Épernon could not
‘souffrir l’infraction’ of the ‘prérogatives extraordinaires’ given to the Colonel
General by Henri III. These included the right to name the new mestre de camp of the
Gardes when the position was vacated. Épernon thus demanded a meeting with Henri
IV in order to express his unhappiness at an appointment being made to the position
without his consultation.20 This was granted, but Henri told Épernon to be ‘bien resolu
de suivre mes volontez’.21 Indeed, Épernon was unsuccessful in making Henri IV
reconsider the appointment, and angrily left the court, travelling to his gouvernement
in Angoulême. Épernon’s brief withdrawal was viewed dimly by Henri, and he made
his displeasure clear to Épernon’s allies. This, together with the example of what had
happened to Biron only three years previously, was enough to bring Épernon back to
obedience.22
As an act of conciliation, Henri told Épernon that Créquy would ‘prester en vos
[Épernon’s] mains le serment de la charge’. In addition, Girard stated that Créquy had
to take his ‘attache’ from Épernon.23 An ‘attache’ was a form of countersignature by a
17 Lesdiguières to Bellièvre, 29 May 1605, ACL, I, p. 498.
18 Henri IV to Épernon, 13 May 1605, LMHIV, V, pp. 427-30
19 Le Roux has contended that Crillon was an ‘ami’ of Épernon, and that their ‘amitié’ was sufficient to
assure Épernon’s ‘[...] autorité sur le régiment des gardes’. Épernon certainly trusted Crillon enough to
send him, with the Gardes, to assure Boulogne in 1587. Le Roux, Faveur, pp. 517, 557, 583.
20 Girard, Épernon, II, p.244-6. Girard dated these events to 1602, and the aftermath of the Biron
rebellion. Consequently, so has Parrott, due to his use of Girard as a source. However, letters written by
Henri IV and Lesdiguières show that the appointment, and its attending controversy, occurred in 1605.
Indeed, Chagniot dated Créquy’s appointment to 31 May 1605. Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 111.
21 Henri IV to Épernon, 21 May 1605, LMHIV, V, p. 432.
22 Henri IV to Épernon, 6 June 1605, Ibid., V, pp. 447-8.
23 Drévillon, L’Impôt, p. 26.
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Colonel General which activated royal regulations or commissions, and allowed
officers to formally take up their functions. It did not constitute the right to veto royal
appointments, but did require new office-holders to essentially make an act of
deference to Épernon, as Colonel General of the Infantry, before they could take up
their new positions. Despite his willingness to go along with this, Créquy was forced
to wait for an entire day at the door of Épernon’s chamber, and then several days ‘à sa
suite’ before Épernon granted his ‘attache’ and received Créquy’s oath, clearly a
statement of defiance by the disgruntled Colonel General24
Épernon’s discontent with what he saw as an attack on his privileges as
Colonel General led to Henri issuing a traité which delineated the rights of
appointment that the Colonel General would subsequently enjoy.25 The king would
reserve the right to appoint the mestres de camp of all vieux regiments, although he
conceded to the Colonel General that these officers would have to receive his ‘attache’
before they could take up their office. The Colonel General would have the right to
make a nomination to the captaincy of every other Gardes company which became
vacant, and to all the captaincies of the other vieux and nouveaux regiments.26 He
would not have the power to make nominations to any of the lower company grades.
Moreover, unlike under Henri III, this power of nomination did not effectively equate
to appointment, but merely of superior recommendation to the king of potential
candidates. Finally, the Colonel General’s power over appointments to the compagnies
colonelles was affirmed, as was his right to appoint a variety of other regimental
officers, including disciplinary and auxiliary staff, such as sergeant majors, chaplains
and surgeons.
Thus, by the mid-1600s, Henri IV had wrestled back to the crown almost all of
the influence over the choice of regimental officers that the Colonel General had
temporarily enjoyed during the 1580s. Indeed, as the Colonel General had never held
the explicit right to make appointments to the regiments, the greatest change between
1588 and 1605 in the office’s power was the loss of royal favour suffered by Épernon,
at least in comparison to the huge esteem in which Henri III had held him. Indeed,
rather than a considerable degradation of the office’s formal powers, Épernon had
24 Girard, Épernon, II, pp. 247-9.
25 Girard doesn’t give a specific date for this traité, but implied that it was passed in the aftermath of the
Créquy controversy. As such, Girard dated it to 1602, but, as he incorrectly dates the controversy, it was
probably passed in 1605 when the affair actually took place. Ibid, II, pp. 249-251.
26 As Parrott pointed out, in the mid-1600s nouveaux probably referred to the nascent petits-vieux,
which would have only included Bourg and Nerestang at this time.
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merely lost the massive leeway over appointments that had been vaguely, and
temporarily, accorded to him by Henri III. That the traité of 1605 allowed Épernon to
make nominations to particular regimental positions, and forced certain officers to
receive his ‘attache’, ensured that he, as Colonel General, retained a position of
prominence within the standing army. Yet neither of these powers constituted an
absolute right to appointment, nor, as seen in the case of Créquy, a veto over royal
appointees. It would seem, therefore, that Henri had succeeded in reducing the
influence of Épernon over the standing army. However, to more accurately flesh out
the influence that Épernon, and thus the Colonel General, held over the infantry, a
more thorough investigation into the wider relationships that existed between Épernon
and officers within the royal regiments is necessary.
II – Épernon’s Relationships with Infantry Officers, 1589-1619
Certain general points need to be made before attempting to judge the relationship that
Épernon maintained with officers within the standing army. Firstly, Épernon’s position
as a ‘military power-broker in south-west France’ was vital to his stature, as was his
control of key fortresses in Metz and Boulogne. The south-west of France was a ‘key
area for recruitment’, not only of ordinary soldiers, but also for many regimental
officers, but even more important were the eastern frontiers, including the zones of
Épernon’s influence around Metz and Boulogne.27 Épernon’s authority in these areas
was such that, during his revolt against the crown in 1619, there were concerns that the
1,500 soldiers under Henri de Mayenne’s command would not be enough to secure the
province of Guyenne.28 This geographical basis of Épernon’s power was crucial to his
relationship with certain officers in the infantry. Secondly, the factors discussed in the
first three chapters of this thesis should be borne in mind. The longevity of service of
infantry officers, coupled with dynastic politics and customs relating to promotion and
venality, not only meant that a limited number of infantry officerships became
available, but that Épernon’s nomination was far from the only consideration taken
into account during the process of appointment.
27 Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, p. 483.Chagniot has noted the presence of many Gascon officers, or at least
men from families of Gascon origin, in the Gardes. However, he also stated that many of these men
subsequently left the south-west for more northerly provinces. Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, pp. 112-113.
28 Déageant, Memoires, p. 135.
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If Épernon’s authority as Colonel General in the 1580s had allowed him to
construct ‘un réseau de fidelités militaires extrêmement large’,29 the remnants of this
influence were still being felt in the early seventeenth century, thanks to the security of
tenure that was increasingly being afforded to officers in the vieux regiments. A
certain number of the clients that Épernon had placed into regimental office during the
1580s remained in their posts until the end of Henri IV’s reign, and even beyond. For
example, Pepin de Bonnouvrier had gained his captaincy in the Gardes in 1583, and
held it until his death in 1617, and had clear ties to Épernon. Bonnouvrier was noted as
having commanded ‘toute l’Infanterie du Duc d’Epernon’ at some point prior to 1583,
and Épernon can be found using Bonnouvrier as a messenger to the king in 1600. It is
also likely that Épernon engineered Bonnouvrier’s appointment as the royal lieutenant
in the citadel of Metz, at some point between 1610 and 1612.30
Ties between Épernon and the Patras de Campaigno, another family of Gardes
captains, can also be found.31 Bertrand Patras had earned a captaincy in Picardie and
‘commanda Bourg, sous M. d’Épernon’ before being promoted in 1584 to a captaincy
in the Gardes.32 That he maintained his connection to Épernon after this date can be
seen through Bertrand’s installation as the captain of the garrison of Boulogne, one of
the towns over which Épernon was gouverneur.33 That Épernon was in firm control of
this town after his appointment as gouverneur in 1585 is reasonably clear.34 Indeed, in
1619, Épernon was easily able to secure Boulogne for the rebellion led by him and
Marie de Médicis against Luynes’ dominance in government.35 Due to his connections
with this town, Épernon may have also shared the links that the Patras de Campaigno
maintained with the Montlezun de Busca.
Aside from clients he had managed to place in the regiments, the compagnies
colonelles also provided Épernon with a potentially consistent source of authority in
the infantry throughout this period. The compagnie colonelle was seen as the premier
company of each regiment, and was listed first on infantry états. The lieutenant of the
29 Le Roux, Faveur, p. 531.
30 Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, p. 253; Épernon to Montmorency, 1 December 1600, BnF
Ms.Fr. 3550, f. 73r; receipt of payment, BnF PO 413 (9211), piece 6; Fontenay-Mareuil, Mémoires, p.
40. Épernon’s influence over Metz will be described in more detail below.
31 Le Roux, Faveur, p. 532.
32 Luppé, Mémoires, p. 200.
33 Bertrand can be found on the 1608-1610 états in this position as the ‘sieur de Campagno’: états, BnF
Na.Fr. 24841, ff. 81r-v, 179v-180r; BnF Na.Fr. 24842, ff. 8v-9r.
34 La Roux, Faveur, pp. 556-558
35 Deageant, Memoires, p. 139; Andilly, Journal inédit (1614-1620), p. 419
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colonel company was not only the de facto captain of the company, but was also
known as the lieutenant colonel of the regiment. It was thus a prized office, and its
incumbent was required to have held a regimental captaincy before they could accede
to the position. As Épernon theoretically controlled appointments to this charge, he
therefore wielded influence over one of the most coveted positions for regimental
officers of the middling and lower nobility.
Épernon clearly realised the value of these offices, and attempted to ensure that
as many compagnies colonelles as possible were maintained in the regiments. A
compagnie colonelle is listed for each of the Gardes, Picardie, Piémont and Navarre
on all the états on which they appeared between 1588 and 1620, and it was always
placed first in the list of regimental companies.36 Not content with maintaining
compagnies colonelles in the vieux, Épernon sought to extend them to newer
regiments, including those which would become the petits-vieux. In the commission
given to levy Vaubecourt in 1610, it was specified that one of the ten companies of
two hundred soldiers was to be ‘composé, conduire et exploictez soubz lauctorite’ of
Épernon. A similar requirement can be found on a commission given to ‘monsieur de
Bioule’ to levy an infantry regiment in 1628.37
It does not appear, however, that Épernon was entirely successful in increasing
the number of compagnies colonelles. The 1608 to 1610 états do not list a compagnie
colonelle for Bourg or Nerestang. By the état of 1620 neither of these regiments, now
under the name of Lauzieres and Chappes, had a compagnie colonelle, nor did two
other petits-vieux listed, Beaumont and Rambures. Only Normandie, a new regiment
but, as seen in Chapter Four, technically a vieux, had a compagnie colonelle alongside
the Gardes, Picardie, Navarre, Piémont, and Champagne.38 However, other petits-
vieux regiments, such as Vaubecourt, may have had a compagnie colonelle by this
point, and others could have been created after this état. Indeed, on a revue of the
compagnie colonelle of the Gardes in early 1621, Épernon was specified as being the
‘cappitaine particulier de neuf compagnies’ in this and other regiments.39
Yet, even if Épernon had succeeded in extending the numbers of compagnies
colonelles, it is far from certain that he had unimpeded choice over appointments to
36 Curiously, no compagnie colonelle is listed for Champagne until the état of 1620.The reasons for this
anomaly are unclear.
37 ‘Commission donnée a Mr de Vaubecourt [...]’, SHAT A112, piece 43; Commission to Monsieur de
Bioule, BnF Cangé 22, f. 123r.
38 État, BnF Ms.Fr. 16718, ff. 250r-324v.
39 Revue, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (272).
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these units.40 This was not least because the position of lieutenant colonel could only
be received by a person who already held a regimental captaincy, placing a degree of
structural restraint on the appointment.41 Bertrand de Mazelière, for example, can be
found as, first, captain in 1593 and then by 1601 lieutenant colonel of Navarre, and
continued to hold this position into the 1610s.42 Because Navarre has been Henri IV’s
private possession as king of Navarre before it became a French royal regiment, it is
thus unlikely that Épernon had played a role in Mazelière’s original appointment to
captain – Henri IV, we know, had a clear antipathy to Épernon’s influence over
regimental appointments. He may have become a client of Épernon in the intervening
period before he became lieutenant colonel, and, if not, could well have become one
after receiving the charge. But the importance of Mazelière’s seniority to his
appointment, measured in terms of the length of his regimental service, should not be
discounted, nor should it be in the case of his successor, the sieur de Joffre.43 It would
appear, therefore, that by the early seventeenth century, Épernon could not parachute
anyone he wished into the colonel company due to customs relating to promotion.
Indeed, the case of Antoine de La Grange de Montigny, sieur d’Arquien,
lieutenant colonel of the Gardes from around 1597 to 1610, says much about both
Épernon’s authority over the compagnies colonelles, and his overall influence over the
standing army during the second half of Henri IV’s reign. Arquien had obtained a
Gardes captaincy in 1577. Given this date, he probably gained the position before
Épernon’s influence over the infantry regiments had become marked in the 1580s; it
seems unlikely that he gained it on the basis of being Épernon’s client. Indeed, it
would also appear that his subsequent promotion to the position of lieutenant colonel
by 1597 probably did not arise due to Épernon’s influence. Noeufville stated that
Arquien had gained the position due to his ‘ancienneté’ and ‘merite’, whilst the La
Grange also had ties to the Constable, Henri I, duc de Montmorency, a figure with
whom Épernon had a relatively cordial, yet ultimately competitive relationship for
influence within royal military structures.44 Moreover, the La Grange were a powerful
military family in their own right. Arquien’s elder brother, François de La Grange,
sieur de Montigny, already had sufficient standing to command the light cavalry at
40 As opposed to the assertions found in Le Roux, Faveur, p. 531.
41 As seen in Chapter Three, Section I, above.
42 Revue, BnF 25826 (857); revue, BnF 25834 (1655). État of 1610.
43 As suggested in Chapter Three, Section II.
44 Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, p. 59. Also, see Section I of this thesis’ chapter on the
Constable.
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Amiens in 1597, and would be made a maréchal de France in 1616.45 That Arquien
was probably not a client of Épernon, and had not received his position through
Épernon’s influence, can be seen more clearly in the 1600s. Indeed, whether or not
Arquien had been a client before 1597, by 1610 Fontenay-Mareuil stated that Arquien
knew that ‘M. d’Espernon ne l’aimoit pas’.46
This dislike probably stemmed from Henri IV’s actions in the intervening
period, during which he had used both Montigny and Arquien to challenge Épernon’s
power in Metz and the surrounding area. Metz was one of the most important
fortifications of the French kingdom. It guarded military passageways into the Empire,
and was a ‘gateway’ for allowing or preventing the flow of German mercenaries into
France.47 Control of this area was thus critical to the security of the kingdom, and it
appears that Henri IV was not entirely satisfied with Épernon’s dominance in this
region. Épernon had been made gouverneur and lieutenant général of Metz, the pays
Messin, Toul and Verdun, and the citadel of Metz during the 1580s. Since this period,
he had been able to place relatives and clients in local military positions, and thus
enjoyed a considerable degree of authority in the area.48 However, in 1603, Montigny
was appointed as royal lieutenant for the gouvernement of Metz and the pays Messin,
and, in 1604, Arquien was made lieutenant of Metz’s citadel. In addition, Arquien was
made commander of the town of Metz, in the absence of Épernon and Montigny.
Arquien gained his position in the citadel of Metz at the expense of Roger de
Comminges, baron de Saubole, who was a cousin of Épernon.49
In the short-term, the La Grange may have been successful in reducing
Épernon’s power in Metz. Arquien had been able to place troops loyal to him in the
citadel, with Girard claiming that ‘l’autorité absolue’ that Épernon had previously
enjoyed had been ‘entierement perduë’ since Saubole’s replacement in 1604.50 This
was probably an overstatement as events in 1610, after Henri’s assassination,
demonstrated. Arquien resigned his post as lieutenant colonel in the Gardes, and
45 Anselme, Histoire, VII, p. 424.
46 Fontenay-Mareuil, Mémoires, p. 40.
47 Major, ‘Fidelity’, p. 394. La Châtre had passed through Metz, Verdun and the surrounding area
during the 1610 expedition to Jülich: ‘Memoire’, BnF Dupuy 193, f. 114v.
48 Le Roux, Faveur, pp. 547-555.
49 Anselme stated that Montigny had been appointed gouverneur of Metz in 1603, but the 1608 état
showed that Montigny was only the town’s royal lieutenant, with Épernon maintaining his position of
overall authority. Anselme, Histoire, VII, p.424; État, BnF Na.Fr. 24841, f.95r. For Sobole: Le Roux,
Faveur, pp. 551, 557; Lacolle, Gardes, p. 80.
50 Girard, Espernon, II, p. 360.
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travelled to Metz to try and entrench his position in the town’s citadel, rather than
serve under Épernon, who had taken control of the Gardes in the immediate aftermath
of the assassination, and deployed the regiment around Paris to maintain order.
However, Arquien’s manoeuvre was defeated by the actions of Gardes captains
stationed in Metz who were clients of Épernon: the sieurs de Frémigières and
Tilladet.51 The latter, in particular, had been successful in placing troops loyal to
Épernon in the citadel and winning over a number of Arquien’s followers, before the
latter arrived in the town. Arquien was thus not able to exercise his lieutenancy as
Épernon re-established his dominance in Metz. Bonnouvrier was subsequently
appointed as lieutenant of Metz’s citadel. To placate the La Grange, Arquien was
given the gouvernement of Calais, vacated in 1610 due to the death of Dominique de
Vic.52
Thus, and whilst the exact number is hard to quantify, there remained a number
of captains within the vieux who remained steadfastly loyal to Épernon by the end of
Henri IV’s reign. Within the Gardes alone, Épernon’s clients in Metz had moved to
shore up the duc’s authority during the crisis that followed Henri IV’s assassination,
with other captains willing to follow Épernon’s orders in Paris. The persistence of
these clients was not only based on Épernon’s position as Colonel General, but on the
selective regional influence that he had managed to gain from the 1580s. However, by
appointing dependable royal servants to regimental positions – with some men
obviously receiving commissions against Épernon’s wishes – Henri IV manifested a
desire to counteract Épernon’s authority over the infantry. Yet the general stability of
the regiments, and the overall lack of regimental offices which were becoming
available from the 1590s, may have aided Épernon’s attempts to maintain clients in
royal service, as it limited Henri’s opportunities for further appointments of men
without connections to Épernon.
With Henri gone, it might be presupposed that Épernon had an opportunity to
re-establish the authority over the infantry that he had held prior to 1589, especially
during the politically unstable decade following the assassination. Fontenay-Mareuil
was certainly of this impression, stating that the office of Colonel General was ‘la plus
51 Frémigières and Tilladet are noted as being ‘serviteurs’ of Épernon in Girard, Espernon, II, p. 357.
52 Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, pp. 59-60 ; Girard, Espernon, II, pp. 355-365 ; Fontenay-Mareuil,
Mémoires, p. 40 ; François Annibal d’Estrées, Mémoires du maréchal d’Estrées sur la régence de
Marie de Médicis (1610-1616) et sur celle d’Anne d’Autriche (1643-1650), (Paris, 1910), p. 27; Lacolle,
Gardes, pp. 80-81.
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belle’ charge of the kingdom once the regency government had begun, because it
allowed Épernon to ‘nommoit à toutes les companies’, including the Gardes.
Moreover, Marie de Médicis gave the survivance of the office to Épernon’s son, the
marquis de La Valette, in the period immediately after Henri IV’s death.53
Épernon certainly does seem to have had some success in appointing allies and
clients to the regiments after 1610. Jean Bernard de Biran, sieur de Gohas, was
appointed to a Gardes captaincy in 1614, and ‘etoit etroitement uni d’amitié’ with
Épernon, especially after Gohas was appointed as gouverneur of Antibes in 1596.
Indeed, such was the bond between the two, Henri IV had even written to Gohas to
remind him where his primary loyalty lay.54 In March 1617, Louis XIII and Secretary
of State Richelieu wrote two letters to Épernon which also appear to demonstrate the
influence of his charge. Louis informed him that a captaincy in Beaumont was being
filled by the sieur de Contamine, largely due to ‘l’estime’ in which he was held by
Épernon. Louis also stated that he did not wish to appoint a certain captain to Navarre,
until Épernon judged the nominee ‘digne de la remplir’. Richelieu’s letter was of a
similar tone, asserting that he did not want to fill a captaincy in Piémont until he had
Épernon’s opinion on the matter.55
The captain who secured the succession to Bonnouvrier’s company in the
Gardes in 1617, Albert de Grillet, sieur de Brissac, may also have had links to
Épernon. Albert’s brother, Gabriel, baron de Brissac, had ‘s’attacha dans la suite’ of
Épernon in the 1580s, whilst Albert himself is noted as having been raised as a page of
Henri III. It is thus eminently possible that Albert could have come to the attention of
a mignon like Épernon.56 Albert’s initial entry into the Gardes was as an ensign in the
mestre de camp company of Crillon (also of Avignonese origin), who may well have
been an ally of Épernon, and it is possible that Albert maintained links to both men, or
that he easily switched to Épernon after Crillon’s resignation from the Gardes in
1605.57 Thus, it is probable that Épernon’s influence helped enable Albert to leap from
the lieutenancy of one Gardes company to the captaincy of another, especially as it
was one which had previously been held by a client of Épernon. The perception that
53 Fontenay-Mareuil, Mémoires, p. 34.
54‘Genealogie de la Maison de Gouhas de Biran d’Armagnac’, BnF Cabinet 46 (1135), ff. 5r-6v.
55 Louis XIII to Épernon, 10 March 1617, Richelieu to Épernon, 12 March 1617, Avenel, I, pp. 375-6,
378-9.
56 Genealogy, BnF DB 555 (8474), f. 1v.
57 Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, pp. 111-112.
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Épernon could potentially manipulate appointments in this manner may have helped
him to maintain or even gain clients within the regiments during the 1610s.
However, other appointments to the regiments demonstrate that the Colonel
General’s authority does not appear to have exceeded that agreed in the 1605 traité
with Henri IV, despite Épernon’s attempts to push its boundaries. For instance, in
1612, the Gardes was expanded from eighteen to twenty companies.58 Épernon
attempted to name candidates for both new captaincies, but was only allowed to
nominate one person, Jean d’Acarie, sieur de Bourdet, who was subsequently
appointed captain.59 In 1615, the Gardes company of Pierre du Bellay, sieur de La
Courbe became vacant due to his death. Épernon had, according to Girard, ‘aimé’
Pierre, and thus interceded to try and obtain the vacant captaincy for Pierre’s son, Guy,
who had been the company ensign. However, following the unwritten customary rules
then evolving, the captaincy was instead given to the company lieutenant, Abraham de
La Besne, to the great discontentment of Épernon.60
Thus, at least in the case of La Besne, Épernon’s desire to influence
appointments to the standing army had been defeated by burgeoning ideas, shaped in
part by regimental officers themselves, of progressive promotion through the company
grades in return for long-term service. His angry response to this failure to secure the
appointment of a potential client mirrors his actions in 1605: frustrated by the growing
influence of Concini he now left court for Angoulême and may have subtly given
assistance to the 1616 rebellion. Whilst he continued to maintain a significant number
of clients and ‘amis’ within the infantry, Épernon’s actions in 1615 highlighted his
frustration at the relative marginalisation of his charge of Colonel General and his
limited influence over the regiments, in comparison to that which he had enjoyed in
the 1580s. Even during the politically volatile 1610s, he had only been able to reclaim
this authority partially, and was instead largely held to the stipulations of the 1605
traité. Indeed, the true test of the influence that the Colonel General held over the
permanent regiments was about to emerge when Épernon entered into rebellion
against the crown in 1619 and 1620.
58 Probably to fit the requirements of the 1611 état discussed in Chapter one, Section II.
59 États (with commentary), BnF Cangé 5, f. 9v.
60 Girard, Espernon, III, pp. 18-27.
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III – The Limits of Clientage: Defections of Regimental Officers to Épernon during the
Revolts of 1619-20.
After Concini’s assassination, Épernon’s dissatisfaction at the continuing reduction in
his power as Colonel General contributed to his decision to support Marie de Médicis’
revolts of 1619 and 1620 against the Luynes-dominated government of Louis XIII.61
These events are commonly known as the Wars of the Mother and Son.62 Through
analysing the number of regimental units and officers that defected to Épernon and
Marie’s cause during these rebellions, the true extent of the Colonel General’s
influence over the infantry can be gauged. Indeed, the revolts constituted a form of
acid test for the strength of the bonds of affinity that Épernon held with regimental
officers.
The number of regimental defections which occurred during the first ‘war’ of
1619 – which in reality lasted barely two months, and should be considered little more
than a mobilisation – can be seen in an untitled document of August 1619.63 In this
text, Marie sought to restore officers who had joined her rebellion to their former
positions. This included Épernon being ‘remettre [...] en la jurisdiction de sa charge’
of Colonel General, and Boulogne and Metz being put back to ‘l’estat auquel ilz
estoit’, i.e., under his authority. Interestingly, a number of regimental captains who
had joined the rebellion were also named on the document, including officers within
the Gardes. Marie asked that be ‘restablie les srs du Plessis, de Fromageries, du
Bourdet son lieutenant et ensign, de la Hilliere, de Loustelnau, Signan ensign, La
Fousserye ensign au Gardes’. Of this number, Frémigières and Bourdet have already
been identified as both Gardes captains and clients of Épernon. ‘Loustelnau’ can be
found prior to 1620, as Jephte Loustelneau, a lieutenant in Emmanuel de Valence’s
Gardes company on revues taken between 1598 and 1605.64 Whether he had been
promoted to the position of captain after this later date is unclear, but he does not
61 Épernon had additional grounds for discontentment in 1619. He blamed Luynes for the failure of his
son, Louis de Nogaret de La Valette, Archbishop of Toulouse, to obtain the position of cardinal.
Épernon had also argued with the Keeper of the Seals, Guillaume du Vair, over precedence at Court.
Fontenay-Mareuil, Mémoires, p. 133; Girard, Espernon, III, pp. 48-56; Brienne, Mémoires, pp. 334-5.
62 For overviews of the two revolts, see Bergin, Rise, pp. 178-212, Pierre Chevallier, Louis XIII, roi
cornelian, (Paris, 1979), pp 214-222.
63 Untitled list of requests from Marie de Médicis, 16 August 1619, AAE MD 772, f. 115r.
64 Revues: BnF Ms.Fr. 25832 (14121); BnF Ms.Fr. 25838 (1492).
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appear as such on any subsequent états or revues. Arnaud d’Andilly noted that La
Hillière was the sergeant-major of the Gardes, and thus had probably been appointed
by Épernon under the terms of the 1605 traité.65 None of the others appear on the
musters or états of the Gardes studied for this thesis, yet this does not rule out the
possibility that they held positions within this regiment.66
Outside of the Gardes, several other regimental officers were named. In all,
Marie requested that two captains from Vaubecourt, three from Rambures, and two
from Piémont were re-established in their posts. Of these men, three can possibly be
matched to officers found on revues: ‘La Serre’ from Vaubecourt and both Piémont
captains, ‘Breuil’ and ‘Bigaret’.67 The document also requested that all the
‘lieutenants, enseignes et officiers’ of these captains from Vaubecourt, Rambures, and
Piémont were restored, implying that they had been able to carry their entire
companies with them into rebellion. This is in contrast to the officers named from the
Gardes, whose ranks were specified, potentially signifying that not all officers and
soldiers within their units had joined Épernon and Marie.
Louis’s response to Marie’s requests was largely favourable.68 It was the king’s
pleasure that Épernon ‘jouisse de touttes les functions attribuent a sa charge’, although
the exact extent of these ‘functions’ was not specified. The sieur de Mun, an Épernon
client, would be re-established to the position he had previously held in Boulogne.69
Louis also agreed that all the captains from Rambures, Vaubecourt, and Piémont
would be reinstated to their former positions. However, Louis appeared hesitant to
restore officers from the Gardes who had defected, due to the close position this
regiment occupied with regard to the ‘conservation de sa personne’. This attitude
exemplified his conception of the Gardes as the foremost infantry formation of the
realm, in which only the premier and most loyal regimental officers could serve.
Behind this facade, however, the regiment does not appear to have been subject to a
65 Andilly, Journal inédit (1614-1620), p. 438.
66 The exception appears to be ‘Plessis’, who, in the response made to Marie’s requests, is specified as
being ‘sergent de Bastille’. He may, however, have held this charge in conjunction with a Gardes
commission. AAE MD France 772, f. 191r.
67 ‘Breuil’ - Henry du Breuil: Piémont Revues from 1599 and 1616, BnF Ms.Fr. 25833 (1545), BnF
Ms.Fr. 25844 (164). ‘Bigaret’ - Jean-Jacques de Fau, sieur de Bigarré: Piémont Revues from 1606 and
1616, BnF Ms.Fr. 25839 (2019); BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (158). ‘La Serre’ - Jean Jacques de Montesquiou,
sieur de La Serre: Vaubecourt Revue from 1623, BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (326).
68 Untitled document (clearly a response to Marie’s requests of 16 August 1619), AAE MD France 772,
ff. 191r-v.
69 Girard noted a ‘Mun’ acting for Épernon in the Arquien/Metz affair of 1610, Girard, Espernon, II, pp.
355-6. The exact position that Mun held in Boulogne is not stated.
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ruthless purge of the disloyal. Whilst it is not possible to track the subsequent careers
for all the Gardes officers named, the fates of Frémigières and Bourdet showed that
the royal response was more ambivalent than Louis might wish it to appear. That
Frémigières’ resigned his captaincy in 1620 may well have been due to his implication
in the 1619 rebellion. However, far from being arbitrarily cashiered, he was allowed to
sell his charge to Toiras, thus making, in some respects, a short-term profit.70 Bourdet
retained his charge and would fight in the Gardes during the 1621 campaign,
eventually succumbing to illness at the siege of Montauban. Indeed, Bourdet’s actions
in 1620 do not appear to have blackened the family name; both his sons held vieux
captaincies after his death.71
Louis’ leniency in 1619 may have contributed to new defections of royal
regimental officers and units during the much larger Second War of the Mother and
Son that broke out in early 1620. Fontenay-Mareuil wrote that regimental defections
had ‘notablement affoiblie’ royal forces. In Piémont alone, Fontenay-Mareuil claimed
that four captains and their companies, along with 18 lieutenants and ensigns, joined
Marie’s army. Girard stated that around fifteen to twenty regimental captains
abandoned royal forces. Some sent brigades of troops under their sergeants, whilst
others were able to bring their entire company with them, leading to some 1,500 men
joining the rebel armies. Andilly stated that twelve to thirteen vieux companies
defected, specifying that five were from Piémont and two from Picardie. The
nineteenth-century historian Belhomme even claimed that eighty captains and
lieutenants from the ‘vieux corps’, together with ‘beaucoup’ of the soldiers under their
command, joined either Épernon in Angoulême, or his son the marquis de La Valette
in Metz. Whatever the exact figure, it is undeniable that a notable number of officers
and companies from the permanent regiments joined Épernon’s forces in 1620. For
Girard, the reason for this was simple: ‘Il y avoit fort peu d’officiers dans les vieux
70 Baudier, Toiras, p. 12; Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, p. 240. Noeufville stated that
Frémigières sold his office for 40,000 écus. This figure would appear far too high, given the prices
named in Chapter Three.
71 Bourdet can be seen on the full état of the Gardes regiment taken at Bordeaux in September 1620,
and his death is noted by Andilly, Journal, I, 1621, pp. 89-90. Also see, Jules Sottas, ‘État militaire de
l’Angoumois, Saintonge et Brouage entre les années 1599 et 1623’, Revue de la Saintonge et l’Aunis,
34, (1914) pp.165-166.
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corps qui ne fussent des Creatures du Duc [d’Épernon][...] & qui ne lui fussent obligez
de leurs fortunes’.72
However, the 1620 rebellion also demonstrated the limits of Épernon’s
influence over the permanent regiments. Firstly, most of the defections that occurred
were as much, if not more, due to Épernon’s power over certain provinces, rather than
the authority he held by virtue of his office as Colonel General. The majority of vieux
defections appear to have occurred among the section of royal forces which were
operating in Champagne and the eastern border regions, with officers leaving royal
forces to join the marquis de La Valette in Metz. Indeed, in Girard’s account, the
adherence of these officers to Épernon’s cause only occurred at the very end of the
rebellion, when he ordered the marquis de La Valette to disarm in order to facilitate
peace negotiations. The marquis had only then called for the regiments’ protection, in
response to the rumours that the town’s citizens planned to assassinate him. Other
defections also display aspects of regional influence. Both ‘Verdelin’ and ‘Realz’,
named as rebel officers by Girard, can be found stationed in Angoulême in March
1620, a notable centre of Épernon’s power.73 Épernon’s ability to pull officers and
companies into rebellion thus seems to have been largely based not on a general
influence that he enjoyed over all regimental officers but whether they had been
stationed, or were operating, in areas in which he enjoyed regional authority. There
does not appear to have been the same level of defections in the main body of royal
forces which operated in the north and west of the country during 1620.
Indeed, the majority of officers did not join the rebellion of 1620, and instead
stayed loyal to Louis. There is no evidence to suggest, for instance, that any Gardes
troops or officers joined rebel forces, as had occurred in 1619. Before the critical battle
of Les Ponts-de-Cé, a general montre of royal forces took place at La Flèche, where,
amongst other troops, Andilly noted that the regiments of Gardes, Picardie, Piémont,
Champagne, Navarre, Normandie, Rambures were subject to revue.74 Only seven
montres remain from that day, but they hint at the overall loyalty of the permanent
72Fontenay-Mareuil, Mémoires, p. 148; Girard, Espernon, III, p. 232; Andilly, Journal, I, 1620, p.19;
Belhomme, Histoire, I, p. 327. As will be seen below, it would appear that the figures cited by
Belhomme are far too high.
73 État: BnF Ms.Fr. 16718, ff. 186r-v. A Jacques de Verdelin can also be found in Angoulême in a revue
from 1616, hinting at possible long-term ties to Épernon. BnF Ms.Fr. 25844 (188). One of the other four
captains recorded in Angoulême in March 1620 is Breuil, suggesting that his bond to Épernon
continued after Breuil’s involvement in the 1619 rebellion, and his subsequent near-disgrace.
74 Andilly, Journal, I, 1620, p. 36.
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regiments.75 Many of these units were subsequently deployed in battle, and were
sufficient to defeat Marie’s forces.76 By the time of another general revue of the
regiments which occurred in Poitiers on 3 September 1620, only weeks after Pont-de-
Cé, the majority of vieux regiments were close to their full complement of twenty
companies, as designated in 1611.77 The presence of the compagnie colonelle in each
of the regiments at Poitiers even suggested that many lieutenant colonels had remained
loyal to Louis XIII.78 Indeed, both Louis and Marie were present at the revue, which
Louis undertook himself. He felt confident enough of his officers’ overall devotion
that one regimental captain was even dismissed for blatant muster fraud.79 The revue
at Poitiers was thus largely a symbolic demonstration of Louis’ military strength to a
rebel leader, as much as an administrative affair; an attempt to display the core of
regimental units that had remained loyal to him during the rebellion.
The presence or absence of a regimental captain and/or company at the revues
of 1620 does not necessarily imply they did or did not defect to Épernon in 1620 – it
would have been possible for a company to have joined and left the rebellion by early
September 1620. Yet it is telling that the companies of known rebels, such as Verdelin
and Realz, were absent from the September revue, and that Piémont, as suggested by
Andilly, appeared to have the highest number of missing companies. As such, the
revues of September 1620 would seem to reinforce the view that only around a dozen
or so regimental companies defected to Épernon in 1620, out of a potential number of
100-120 vieux companies; a figure which was both notable, but, ultimately, relatively
small.80
Indeed, it may have been the overall loyalty of the permanent regiments which
led to Louis, again, showing relative leniency to officers who had joined the rebellion.
75 Revues: BnF Ms.Fr. 25845 (260); BnF Ms.Fr. 25846 (261-266).
76 Although, the dramatic last-minute defection of the duke of Retz, and his 1,200 infantry troops, from
the rebel forces certainly helped matters.
77 Navarre: seventeen companies; Picardie: nineteen companies; Champagne: twenty companies;
Piémont: fifteen companies; Normandie: nineteen companies. Additionally, twelve companies of
Rambures and seven of Beaumont were present, but it is not possible to judge the reduction in size that
these regiments had undergone, as it is unclear what the normative number of companies per regiment
was for petits-vieux at this time. États: BnF Ms.Fr. 16718, ff. 205v-208r, 221v-223v, 236r-237v, 250r-
252v, 266v-269v, 281r-282v, 291v-292r. The Gardes, who do not appear to have been mustered at
Poitiers, were subject to a general revue at Bordeaux in late September 1620. All twenty companies
were present (albeit with two companies mustered in nearby Blaye), États, BnF Ms.Fr. 16718 ff. 156v-
163r.
78 The lieutenant colonels of Piémont, Picardie, and Champagne are listed as present.
79 Andilly, Journal, I, 1620, p. 44.
80 120 if Normandie is included, 100 if not. This figure would also not include the approximately 20
companies of Beaumont and Rambures, and any other petits-vieux.
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According to Girard, Épernon placed pressure on Louis to ensure ‘l’oubli’ of the
affair, meaning that the majority of rebel captains were reinstated, despite the
‘dangereux exemple’ that they had set.81 However, Louis did initially hesitate over the
reinstatements, and Russell Major suggested that rebel captains may have been forced
to wait until new openings arose in the regiments, with Louis bringing in other
captains to fill the posts they had vacated by joining Épernon.82 For example, a ‘Realz’
who can be found as part of Champagne in 1623, may well be the rebel Realz found in
Piémont in 1620. Rebel officers were thus largely forgiven, but their rehabilitation in
the regiments was not necessarily immediate.
In August 1618, Will Becher wrote in his diplomatic correspondence that he
believed that the Gardes would support the Queen Mother if rebellion were to
materialise. Girard backed this assertion, stating that the Gardes was essentially
‘composé des Creatures du Duc [d’Épernon]’ in 1618.83 Yet only a handful of Gardes
officers joined Épernon’s rebellion in 1619, and even fewer, if any, did so in 1620.
This does not completely invalidate either Becher or Girard’s statements; many
regimental officers who stayed loyal to the monarchy may well have owed varying
proportions of their careers to Épernon’s assistance. It does, however, show that only a
small number of regimental officers were now willing to put their loyalty towards a
patron, even one such as Épernon, before serving the monarch, especially as Louis had
passed his majority and was now ruling as well as reigning. Whilst the amount of
regimental defections in 1620 was thus not negligible, Épernon’s waning influence
over appointment, and the relatively few opportunities to place clients in the
regiments, had undoubtedly sapped much of his influence as Colonel General. Yet
given the amount of officers who did defect, it would appear that not even all of those
who had some form of link of affinity or ‘amitié’ to Épernon joined the rebellion.
Overall, it would appear that few regimental officers, even amongst those with links to
Épernon, wished to lose the benefits of their charge through entering into revolt
against the crown. As such, the overwhelming majority of officers remained loyal to
the crown. The monarchy’s ability to directly reward a small set of noble officers,
largely from the petite noblesse and noblesse seconde thus meant that it had a nucleus
of loyal soldiers permanently available in the form of the new standing army. Whether
81 Girard, Espernon, III, p. 242
82 Major, ‘Fidelity’, p. 405.
83 Becher to the English Secretary of State, 4 August 1618, NA SP 78/68, f. 91r; Girard, Espernon, III,
p. 57.
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intended or not, this could only decrease the independent military authority of military
grands such as Épernon, and his charge of Colonel General, by placing limits on the
strength of any bonds of clientage that he could form with regimental officers.
IV – Honour and Service: The Colonel General during the 1620s
Finally, it is worth considering the influence of Épernon as Colonel General in the
decade after the Second War of the Mother and Son. Among the few statements made
about the extent of the Colonel General’s power in this period, Belhomme wrote that
Épernon completely lost the right to make future nominations of regimental captains,
lieutenants and ensigns after the revolt of 1619, and was reduced to merely
countersigning royal appointments. Thus, if Épernon’s droit de nomination had been
limited and contested since the early 1600s, it had effectively disappeared by the early
1620s.84 Yet, it would be wrong to contend that Épernon’s power over the royal
infantry, and specifically the influence he bore due to his office as Colonel General,
had been completely eroded by the 1620s. In 1622, for example, one of Épernon’s
illegitimate sons, Jean-Louis de Nogaret, known as the Chevalier de La Valette, was
given the captaincy of the Gardes company previously held by Mathurin de Castelnau,
who had died at the siege of Montpellier.85 Whilst this nomination may well have been
an anomaly, rather than the norm, it suggests that Épernon had not entirely lost the
influence he had previously enjoyed over regimental appointments and appointees. If
nothing else, a regulation of 1624 reaffirmed that all mestres de camp and captains of
the regiments had to take their ‘attache’ from the Colonel General.86 This forced these
officers to make an act of obeissance to Épernon, even if it did not constitute an
effective act of veto over appointment to the standing army.
Similarly, according to Avenel, all new officers received into the regiments
remained, technically, bound to ceremonially receive their hausse-col (a gorget) from
the Colonel General before they could accede to their positions.87 The extent to which
84 Belhomme, L’infanterie, I, p. 327. Parrot accepts Belhomme’s assertions: Richelieu’s Army, p. 473.
85 Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 111; Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, p. 250. One of Mathurin’s sons,
Louis, would subsequently buy the captaincy back from the Chevalier de La Valette in 1633. Whether
the Chevalier de La Valette’s appointment was made in spite of a claim from a member of the Castelnau
is unclear. BnF DB 157 (4109), f. 23.
86 ‘Pouvoir de Commettre aux Offices pour le Colonel General de L’Infanterie Françoise’, 31 December
1624, BnF Cangé 21, f. 274r.
87 Avenel, Richelieu, III, p. 61. The hausse-col was a piece of armour worn over the neck and
collarbone. By the nineteenth century, this piece of armour retained only symbolic value, but it may still
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this prescription was practically enforced is unclear, but certain officers certainly seem
to have undertaken the ceremony. After Pontis’ appointment to the position of
lieutenant in the Gardes in 1623, he visited Épernon to be formally presented with the
hausse-col that Pontis had, in actual fact, already received from the king. Pontis stated
that the hausse-col was a mark of authority given to him by the king, but that the right
to present it to officers belonged to Épernon. Épernon was apparently ‘un peu surprise,
mais très-satisfait’ by this request, suggesting that this ceremony was probably not
frequently undertaken, yet remained an effective means by which regimental officers
could defer to Épernon, and by which the Colonel General could retain a degree of
gravitas within the infantry. Indeed, the tone of Pontis’ account implied that
regimental officers recognised that it was preferable for them to maintain good
relations with the Colonel General, even if they were not his clients.88
It is also undeniable that Épernon was heavily involved in the royal high
command during the campaigns of the 1620s, even if the authority he held was far
from constant. The invasion of Béarn in late 1620 was an almost immediate
opportunity through which Épernon could demonstrate both his contrition and
continued importance to the king.89 Louis appears to have recognised that, despite
Épernon’s recent indiscretions, he was a vital figure in the achievement of any military
success in Béarn, due to his ability to mobilise men and credit in the south-west of
France. As such, he was tasked with bringing Béarn to obedience, and laying the
ground for the enforcement of the Edict of Nantes in the province. Épernon was even
given ten companies from Picardie to facilitate this effort, demonstrating the trust in
which Louis held his regimental officers. Whilst it could not completely erase his
recent disloyalty, Épernon’s success in this expedition may have helped to bring him
back into Louis XIII’s favour and thus inflated the authority of the Colonel General.90
During the subsequent campaigns of the 1620s, Louis continued to try and
accommodate Épernon within the royal high command, despite the frequent problems
caused by Épernon’s conception of his status and honour. When Épernon arrived at the
siege of Saint-Jean-d’Angély in 1621, for example, he found the duc de Lesdiguières
have been used for practical purposes in the early seventeenth century. François Sicard, Histoire des
institutions militaires des Français, (4 vols., Paris, 1834), III, p. 303.
88 Pontis, Mémoires, I, pp. 390-1.
89 For an overview of the invasion, see Christian Desplat, ‘Louis XIII and the Union of Béarn to
France’, in Mark Greengrass (ed.), Conquest and Coalescence: the Shaping of the State in Early
Modern Europe, (London, 1991), pp. 68-82.
90 Girard, Espernon, III, pp. 251-60.
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effectively in command, because of both his position as maréchal de camp général
and Constable Luynes’ willingness to leave the majority of military matters to him.
Épernon told Louis XIII that ‘il n’avoit jamais recue Commandement que des Rois ses
Maistres’ and would thus refuse to receive orders from Lesdiguières, especially as
Épernon felt he was a ‘plus ancien General d’armée, plus ancien officier de la
couronne, & beaucoup plus ancien que lui dans toutes les dignitez où ils étoient tous
constituez’. Girard claimed that this request was accorded; Épernon would only,
effectively, take orders from the king, despite Lesdiguières’ position of superiority at
the siege.91 In the aftermath of the siege of Saint-Jean-d’Angély, Épernon was sent
with a separate force of around 5,000 troops to blockade and isolate La Rochelle from
wider Huguenot forces. Girard stated that Épernon had been chosen for this role due to
his authority in the surrounding gouvernements of Aunis, Saintonge, and Angoumois,
and because the king could trust him not to enter into any form of conspiracy with the
Huguenot rebels in La Rochelle.92 However, his appointment to this position may also
have been to defuse any problems within the high command that stemmed from
Épernon’s refusal to accept orders from anyone but the king. His office of Colonel
General could be used, in part, to justify such an arrangement of marginalised
superiority.
If Louis XIII was willing to make concessions to Épernon in 1621 over his
position in the high command, he appeared less willing to do so in 1622. Whilst
Épernon was sent to carry out the initial investments of Royan in late April 1622, the
situation at the siege soon turned against his favour. According to Louis de Marillac,
Épernon wanted to secure the town before the arrival of the bulk of royal forces, in
order that he could acquire ‘la gloire de la prise de cette place’. Not only did he not
achieve this, but he was soon forced to serve under Louis de Bourbon, comte de
Soissons (a prince du sang) after he arrived at the town as the king’s lieutenant
général in early May. Épernon publicly voice his displeasure at having to serve under
Soissons, and was also unhappy that the gouvernement of the town was eventually
given to the Gardes captain, Isaac du Raynier, sieur de Droué.93
By mid-May, Épernon made his discontent even clearer when the king
decided to send a force of 10,000 men back to La Rochelle under the command of
91 Ibid., III, pp. 267-271.
92 Ibid., III, pp. 277-8;Bernard, Guerres, p. 202.
93 Louis de Marillac to Richelieu, 29 April, 3 and 4 May 1622, AAE MD 775, ff. 148r-149r, 154r-155r,
156r-157r.
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Soissons. Épernon was offered the position of Soissons’ lieutenant, but maintained his
earlier stance, stating that as he had enjoyed the honour of serving ‘le roy
directement’, he ‘ne se peult resoudre a lestre sous un autre’. He did not contest
Soissons’ appointment, due to his status as a royal prince of the blood. Instead,
Épernon asked to serve in royal forces with no official charge, other than always being
near the king’s person.94 He appears to have been granted this relatively ambiguous
role, which guaranteed him a degree of independence from other members of the high
command, at the cost of occupying a more prominent position within royal forces.
Indeed, Girard does not ascribe to Épernon a particularly leading role in royal
operations until the siege of Montpellier where, despite being called to the military
council convened by the king, his advice was frequently ignored. Épernon continued
to acquire positions of independent command away from the bulk of royal forces
during the later 1620s. Most of these operations were focused on Guyenne, a province
of which he had been made gouverneur in 1622.95 In 1625, he was given a detachment
of 3,000 royal troops to pillage the environs of Montauban, which had declared itself
in favour of the Huguenot rebellion of that year. Similarly, in 1628, he refused the
position of lieutenant général under Condé in the campaign undertaken in Languedoc,
in order to continue his own independent operations in Guyenne, again stating that he
did not wish to lose the privilege of directly serving the king.96
Thus, in the campaigns of the 1620s Épernon’s position as Colonel General
probably added strength to his requests to take orders directly from the king, rather
than other members of the high-command. Épernon’s authority was further inflated
due to the location of much of the warfare, the south-west of France, where he had
retained a great deal of military power outside of royal structures. However, his
insistence on retaining a position of independence from other members of the high
command led to his progressive marginalisation, especially when he refused to serve
under princes of the blood. By the 1620s, the position of Colonel General itself
therefore did not guarantee Épernon any form of pre-eminent role within the royal
army whilst it was on campaign. That Épernon preferred the command of lesser forces
under direct royal control, rather than larger forces which placed him in a subordinate
94 Louis de Marillac to Richelieu, 12 May 1622, Ibid., ff. 162r-163r.
95 Thus showing he was not completely out of favour during this period. Girard, Espernon, III., pp. 323-
349.
96 Ibid., III., p. 403, 460-6, quote on p. 463.
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position to another grand, says much about the perception he held of his honour and
status.
One final area in which the authority of the Colonel General was not only
maintained during the 1620s, but perhaps even increased, was that of upholding
discipline and order within the infantry. A regulation of late 1624 stated that the
Colonel General was to personally appoint the sergeant-major, aide-major and certain
other disciplinary officers to the regiments. This was in order to replace the current
situation in which mestres de camp had taken control of these appointments, with the
result that order within the regiments had become lax, as disciplinary officers were
only willing to enforce regulations in a manner pleasing to their regimental patrons.
The Colonel General was also given the ultimate authority over the granting of leave,
in the form of a signed document called a congé, to regimental officers and soldiers.
This was, again, to make up for the deficiencies in the oversight previously held by
mestres de camp in this area, who had purportedly given out congés too easily.97
This document, in many respects, merely restated powers that the Colonel
General supposedly already held. Under the terms of the traité of 1605, Épernon was
declared responsible for the appointment of ‘sergens, & aides de Sergens Majors,
Prevôts, [et] Marêchaux des Logis’.98 Indeed, Pontis recounted an incident from 1621,
where the aide-major of Picardie had refused to obey his orders during the defence of
Montech, despite Pontis having been given temporary command of the regiment. The
aide-major stated that he was an ‘officier de M. d’Épernon, colonel de l’infanterie’ and
that in this quality he could not obey Pontis, as he was merely the ‘lieutenant de la
Mestre de camp, de laquelle M. d’Épernon en la personne de ses officiers ne vouloit
point recevoir d’ordre’. In the aftermath of the successful defence of the town, the
aide-major accused Pontis of trying to undermine Épernon’s charge, and a serious
dispute between Pontis and Épernon was only narrowly avoided through the
intercession of other officers.99
The incident thus displayed how Épernon’s power over regimental disciplinary
officers had possibly come into question by the early 1620s, with figures such as the
mestres de camp attempting to contest this authority. The regulation of 1624 was thus
97 ‘Pouvoir’, BnF Cangé 21, ff. 274r-v.
98 Girard, Espernon, II, p. 251.
99 Indeed, the subsequent homage that Pontis paid to Épernon through the ceremony of the hausse-col
was probably a means by which Pontis attempted to ensure that no ill-feeling continued to exist between
them. Pontis, Mémoires, I, pp. 320-332, quote on p. 320.
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a powerful sign that the monarchy wished to maintain the eminence of the Colonel
General over discipline within the infantry, in the face of encroachment by other
regimental figures. The utility of the Colonel General being able to make
appointments of disciplinary officers, and thus the utility of the position per se, was far
from negligible. As the episode at Montech displayed, it allowed Épernon to maintain
clients at a regimental level who would pursue his interests wherever possible.
An incident described by Pontis also demonstrated how the Colonel General’s
disciplinary authority worked in practice by the late 1620s, and, particularly, how it
was used to end disputes between the noblemen who inhabited the regimental officer
corps. In 1628, Pontis had become involved in a dispute with the sieur de Canaples,
who had effectively been made mestre de camp of the Gardes in 1621.100 Canaples
had reneged on a promise to allow Pontis to command the enfants perdus in a
proposed attack on the English.101 The disagreement between the two became
sufficiently heated for Pontis to draw his sword, and for Canaples subsequently to
accuse Pontis of trying to assassinate him. The affair was adjudicated by Épernon. He
stated that he saw the position of Colonel General as essential to preventing the
‘désordre’ that existed among overly ambitious infantry officers, who were attempting
to assume powers above their station. The good favour that Pontis enjoyed with
Épernon by 1628, born in no small part from acts of deference such as that involving
the hausse-col, was critical to Pontis’ acquittal; although it is notable that the king told
Épernon to take the advice of the maréchaux and other ‘principaux officiers de
l’armée’ before a definitive decision was reached. Pontis’ description of Épernon as
the ‘premier juge’ of the infantry by the late 1620s may well, therefore, have been
true.102
In some respects, the authority of the Colonel General was a function of the level of
royal favour in which Épernon was held. The lofty influence of the office during the
1580s can thus be explained as a temporary anomaly, springing largely from the
privileged position enjoyed by Épernon under Henri III. As he descended from his
towering position as a royal mignon and lost favour under Henri IV, his ability to
100 Créquy would technically continue to hold the position until 1633. Susane, Ancienne, II, pp. 1, 44-5
101 The enfants perdus were essentially a small detachment of advanced forces which would lead forces
into battle.
102 Moreover, Canaples’ own father, Créquy, declared himself in favour of Pontis in the matter. Pontis,
Mémoires, pp. 24-38, quotes on pp. 34, 37.
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make regimental nominations was restricted, for the new Bourbon ruler wished to
significantly diminish the clout that Épernon held within the infantry. Accordingly, he
never again enjoyed the level of dominance that he had possessed under Henri III. Yet,
the new-found stability of the regiments helped ensured that at least some of the men
Épernon had been able to appoint to officerships in the 1580s remained in their posts
by the 1610s. Moreover, Épernon’s ability to influence appointments was never fully
eradicated after 1589, and he succeeded in placing a certain number of clients in the
regiments. A wider number of regimental officers may have recognised that they owed
some part of their careers to him, even if to describe them as Épernon’s ‘clients’ would
be an exaggeration. Overall, the vagaries of royal favour are thus insufficient to
explain fully the changing nature of the Colonel General’s power during the period of
this thesis.
Instead, Épernon’s authority as Colonel General was more clearly affected by
the transformation of a number of royal regiments into the core of a new standing
army during the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth century; a transformation which
reconfigured the relationship between the higher and lower echelons of the nobility
within the royal army. Already, in the 1600s and 1610s, Épernon’s ability to nominate
clients to company positions was challenged, even within the compagnies colonelles,
by the growing idea that the permanent regiments constituted a ‘career army’ in which
long-term service should be rewarded by progressive promotion of existing officers
through the company ranks. Yet, the effects of the emergence of the standing army can
be seen most clearly during the revolts of 1619 and 1620. In both years, Épernon was
only able to convince around 10% of regimental officers, at most, to defect and join
the rebel forces. Moreover, the officers who defected were often long-term followers
of Épernon, or were operating in geographical areas in which he held sway, and thus
provide stronger evidence for Épernon’s provincial power than a general authority he
held over the infantry by virtue of his office of Colonel General. Overall, the vast
majority of infantry units and officers remained loyal to the king in both rebellions.
Given the potential consequences of rebellion, for 10% of the army to defect
was still a notable amount. That this figure was not higher nevertheless attests to the
fact that the overwhelming majority of regimental officers did not wish to imperil the
social advantages they had gained via service in the standing army by following a
grand into rebellion. The clear dynastic benefits of relatively direct service to the
crown within the royal regiments had thus fragmented and weakened the bonds
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between, on the one hand, grands who held positions of supra-regimental authority
and, on the other, officers from the petite noblesse and noblesse seconde. Links of
affinity and ‘amitié’ continued to exist between the higher and lower echelons of the
nobility who held royal military office, yet the emergence of the standing army meant
the monarchy had a body of force at its disposal which was fundamentally more loyal
to the crown than its previous armies. One could thus argue that the monarchy had
made progress towards achieving a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence
within France by the late 1620s. As long as service within the standing army continued
to satisfy the family ambitions of the nobles who formed the regimental officer corps,
not even a grand such as Épernon would be able to take the majority of the royal army
with them into rebellion. Indeed, the standing army meant the monarchy could be less
beholden to the whims of the grands during its military operations.
Further consequences for the grands of this shift towards a more monarchy-
centred army can be seen in Épernon’s experiences in the 1620s. In many respects, the
Colonel General remained an influential figure within the royal army. He was able to
acquire his own army groups; infantry officers were theoretically meant to pay
homage to him during their accession to office; and the Colonel remained a leading
figure in military discipline – in this case, the Colonel General was clearly an asset to
the crown in its overweening struggle to impose order on an extremely unruly society,
including the army. Indeed, Épernon himself seems to have increasingly moved
towards basing his status and honour on the military service he performed for the
monarchy in his role as Colonel General, instead of his capacity for military action
outside of the aegis of royal military structures. Thus, the standing army encouraged
not only the lower nobility holding office within the regiments, but grands holding
positions of supra-regimental authority, to place themselves much more firmly within




The Army, the Nobility and the Monarchy.
177
French infantry forces did not appear from nowhere in 1598. The bandes and
temporary regiments levied before the 1590s displayed similarities to later methods of
infantry administration. The more continuous nature of the conflicts that the royal
army had engaged in from the mid sixteenth century helped to create a segment of
noble society which viewed themselves, and the male members of their families, as
career soldiers. The changes described in this thesis could not have occurred without
such earlier developments. Yet, it was not until the aftermath of the Peace of Vervins
in 1598 that certain royal regiments were given the stability required for a true change
in the nature of the French infantry, and hence military system, to occur: in short, this
was the rise of the standing army. This army was based on certain premises, the most
fundamental of which was that regimental office could be securely held in the long-
term, usually until the death or resignation of its incumbent, rather than being created
and then disbanded before and after periods of warfare.
It is important to note again that the primary purpose of such a force was to
achieve certain aspirations of the Bourbon dynasty, and hence the French monarchy.
The decision to permanently maintain a core of infantry units in royal service after the
Peace of Vervins may well have been influenced by the crown’s desire to ensure that it
was not caught unawares by the outbreak of conflict, as the Valois had been in the
early 1560s. Thus, after 1598, the permanent regiments formed the nucleus around
which temporary units, often organised by loyal grands, coalesced when the monarchy
undertook periods of military campaigning. Yet, notwithstanding the crown’s
centrality in the creation of new military offices, this thesis has argued that the rise of
the standing army was only possible because long-term service within the royal
regiments had sufficient appeal for the dynastic ambitions of at least certain French
noble families.
During the early seventeenth century, around 300 permanent military offices
became available at a company level within the vieux regiments, and as the petits-
vieux joined the standing army, hundreds more such positions arose. As has been
shown, these charges were rapidly monopolised by certain noble families, who
primarily emanated from the petite noblesse and noblesse seconde. Families desired
these offices due to the tangible benefits regimental service could bring. As many
noble officers came from relatively humble backgrounds, the wages and allowances
they received could constitute a significant increase in their income, perhaps even
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saving them from destitution. Yet even for those nobles who only gained a marginal
financial advantage through their service, or none at all in net cash-flow balance, the
social and longer-term economic benefits of acquiring regimental office were
potentially considerable. Even though military service, as opposed to merely managing
the estate, might require significantly greater financial outlays, officers had the
satisfaction of no longer festering in provincial backwaters with low-grade social
interaction. The career nature of the new standing army meant service could lead to
progressive promotion to higher military and even non-military charges. Nobles could
enjoy the general improvement of social stature and honour that was achieved by
being seen as close to, and often recognised by, the king. Such proximity to royal
power notably improved the patronage opportunities wielded by regimental officers,
and also brought them into contact with exalted patrons. Indeed, the influence that
captains themselves held over appointing officers to their companies meant that they
could confuse the lines between a ‘patron’, ‘broker’ and ‘client’, as described by
Sharon Kettering, and enhance their own standing.1 Moreover, being an officer within
the standing army allowed a nobleman to raise himself and his family into a new
social milieu. Families of similar social standing entered into horizontal alliances with
each other, transcending narrow provincialism, and better marriage prospects brought
opportunities for capital and asset acquisition on a higher level than before, which was
not an unimportant matter for officers who needed to subsidise their own service or
even subsidise their units.2 Regimental service thus allowed men to enter a world
where they could more easily pursue their overall family strategy of social ascension.
Indeed, this thesis has argued that the rise of venality within the regiments was not
merely a reflection of the practical costs of military service, but of the widespread
recognition that these offices held considerable social value, which allowed nobles to
sell them for a premium.
Holding regimental office also appealed to the cultural instincts of the nobility,
and especially the continuing importance that many nobles ascribed to military service
for their self-definition and self-worth. That the monarchy attempted to play to these
instincts can be seen in the Code Michau of 1629. This document stated that the crown
wanted both its permanent infantry and cavalry companies to be ‘remplies des enfans
1 Kettering, Patrons, Brokers and Clients, pp. 3-11.
2 For example, Fabien de Biran, an officer in the Gardes, received a dowry of 3,000 livres when he
married Françoise de Briqueville in 1617. BnF Cabinet 46, f. 16r.
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de nostre noblesse, & qu’en chacune Compagnie il y en ait au moins la quatriesme
partie’.3 The monarchy thus proposed that the nobility were not only to command the
standing army, but that they were also to fill a proportion of the body – in the rank-
and-file – that far exceeded the percentage of wider society that it represented.4 Based
on the strength of contemporary ideas which linked warfare to noble status, the
monarchy even toyed with the idea, in 1626, of ennobling the families of common
soldiers who had undertaken lengthy periods of military service.5 Admittedly, this
measure was not enacted, and participation in warfare was never a precondition of
noble status during the early seventeenth century. Yet, evidently, it was widely felt
that holding office within the standing army could help to prove, consolidate or even
improve the perception of a family’s status within the nobility, due to the ‘moral and
physical qualities’ that were required in warfare and military command.6 That the
crown desired its armed forces to be dominated by the nobility also demonstrated the
privileged position that this estate held with respect to acquiring royal offices.
Thus, members of the petite noblesse and noblesse seconde were enticed into
joining the standing army’s officer corps due to the financial, social and cultural
benefits that such service could bring to themselves and their families. Had these
rewards not existed, the monarchy would not have been able to find the body of men
who became its regimental officer corps. Indeed, as the first three chapters of this
thesis have demonstrated, families attempted to hold regimental charges for as long as
possible once they had acquired them, in order to accrue as many dynastic advantages
from their positions as they could, unless in the meantime they acquired higher office.
If anything, prior to 1635, a major problem with the standing army was that it did not
provide enough opportunities for long-term service. The expansion of the standing
army to incorporate the petits-vieux was possible, at least in part, because more nobles
wanted to acquire regimental offices than were available in the vieux. Given the
further expansion of the army after 1635, and the rush of nobles in the mid-1630s to
take up freshly-created positions in new units, it can be postulated with reasonable
3 Code Michau, art. 200, my emphasis.
4As with so much of the Code Michau, it is unclear whether this measure was enacted, given the
reluctance of much of the French nobility to serve in the infantry ranks, a problem that had been
apparent since at least the 1580s. Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, pp. 55-56.
5 An unenforced ‘reglement’ from 1626 proposed that the children of any soldier who died after twenty
years of military service, or who was killed in action after ten years, would receive noble status: ‘Projet
de Reglement de Guerre’, January 1626, BnF Cangé 22, f. 46r.
6 Parrott, ‘Military Enterprise’, p. 78.
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certainty that the standing army during the early seventeenth century never fully met
the demands of the nobility for military office. Indeed, the participation of Frenchmen
within foreign armies during this period might partly be explained by the lack of
opportunities which were available in a relatively small number of native permanent
regiments.7
Continuing a process which had begun with the Habsburg-Valois wars of the
first half of the sixteenth century, the civil wars of the second half of the century had
thus shaped and stimulated, mainly from the 1580s and beyond 1598, new and more
reliable frameworks for royal military patronage through which the nobility could be
more firmly drawn into crown service. These ‘opportunités de la Guerre’ helped to
create an ‘interdependence’ between a section of the nobility and the monarchy.8
Certain nobles were increasingly reliant on new royal offices within the standing army
for the status of their family within French society, whilst the monarchy became
dependent on these men to form the core of its armed forces. The process of early
modern military change, that at least in some respects went hand-in-hand with the
emergence of the monarchical or ‘absolute’ state, was not inherently threatening to the
nobility and, indeed, the co-operation of this estate was necessary for military
evolution to occur.
However, it is possible to argue that the creation of a force based on a more
direct relationship between the monarchy and a section of the petite noblesse and
noblesse seconde did negatively affect another part of the nobility, the grands. Clearly,
the high nobility remained important, if not vital, to the operation of royal forces,
particularly during periods when it was necessary to rapidly levy large numbers of
temporary units to add to the core of permanent forces. Yet, the authority of the
grands over royal military structures diminished as the body became a standing army.
Certain prestigious supra-regimental offices, such as that of Constable, afforded their
incumbents few definite powers over the new force. The influence of such positions
7 The service of French soldiers, whether commoners or nobles, in foreign forces during the sixteenth
and early seventeenth century is a topic which has received insufficient attention, especially due to its
importance in matters such as military education, and the construction of cross-border dynastic and
confessional networks. Works which have addressed, but in a short way, the issue include: Parrott,
Richelieu’s Army, pp. 29-32; D. J. B. Trim, ‘Huguenot Soldiering, c. 1560-1685, The Origins of a
Tradition’, in M. Glozier and D. Onnekink (eds.), War, Religion and Service: Huguenot Soldiering,
1685-1715, (Aldershot, 2007), pp. 9-30; Dewald, Aristocratic Experience, pp. 48-49; Finkel, ‘French
Mercenaries’, pp. 451-471. For contemporary examples of such service, see, for example,
Bassompierre’s participation in the Imperial armies in 1603-1604, or Pontis’ various escapades during
the1600s: Bassompierre, Mémoires, I, pp. 98-154; Pontis, Mémoires, I, pp. 228-242.
8 Bourquin, Noblesse seconde, pp.37-57; Potter, War and the Provinces, p.114.
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could thus be marginalised by other nobles who now held offices that could more
explicitly affect how the regiments operated, including ostensibly non-military
charges such as the Surintendant des finances. The patronage opportunities of offices
such as the Colonel General were also considerably reduced after the reign of Henri
III, particularly in matters such as appointment. On the other hand, such positions still
had their uses. They were still considered prestigious rewards and affirmations of a
grandee’s power, and could be of real practical assistance in subsidising, administering
and controlling a still-fractious officer corps and ill-disciplined troops. However, and
perhaps more importantly, the informal influence that the grands wielded over the
lower nobility was weakened by the new offices within the standing army. Few nobles
within the regiments now wished to jeopardise the advantages that they gained for
their families through regimental service.
Consequently, whilst links continued to exist between the higher and lower
nobility within the standing army, many of the latter were increasingly unwilling to
champion the interests of a grand before those of the crown. This can be most clearly
seen in the revolts of 1619-1620, when only a small minority of regimental officers
followed Épernon into rebellion. Indeed, there may well have been a rising sense of
military professionalism amongst regimental officers by the late 1620s, due to the
career nature of the army, which encouraged a sense of pride and duty in their service
to the monarchy. This bears out Rowlands’ argument that the standing army helped to
dissolve the ‘rather static, fixed province-orientated bonds between grands and the
lesser nobility’. Inter-regimental promotion and long-term service ensured that officers
might serve under several mestres de camp, whilst the social advancement that could
be achieved through long-term service in the standing army meant the ambitions of the
lower nobility were more closely tied to the monarch than any individual grand.9 But,
it has been a contention of this thesis that in smaller but still significant ways this
process was already in motion well before the second half of the seventeenth century,
the era in which this development is more often placed.
Thus, the standing army was a far more monarchy-centred body of force than
had previously existed in France, and the crown was significantly closer to achieving a
monopoly over the use of armed force by 1635 than in 1598, especially after the Peace
of Alais in 1629, the real end of the Wars of Religion. This had only occurred as the
9 Rowlands, ‘Monopolisation’, p. 159. See also, Rowlands, Dynastic State, pp. 349-361, especially p.
360.
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new standing army responded to the ambitions of French noble families in a number of
ways. Despite the peace treaties of 1598, the nobility had clearly lost little of its
proclivity for warfare or, perhaps, violence more generally. The beginnings of a
professional officer corps through the regimental system allowed, to quote Stuart
Carroll, the ‘more systematic redeployment of those whose profession was arms, [and]
who claimed the right to violence’ into the monarchy’s service.10 They did so as the
monarchy increasingly monopolised ‘le don de charges, d’honneurs et d’argent’ in the
military domain, and thus made itself ‘celui qu’il était le plus avantageux de servir’.11
As part of the lower nobility recognised this new state of affairs, it engaged itself more
directly in royal service than before. Moreover, many of the grands also began to
assert their status more according to the royal offices they held than the weight of their
autonomous military entourages, as their ability to influence the military lower
nobility was proportionally reduced.
Overall, by the early 1630s, the mutation in the nature of royal armed forces
had led to two fundamental changes in the nature of the relationship between the
monarchy and the nobility. Firstly, the nobility, even up to the level of the grands, had
begun to define itself more openly in terms of being a royal ‘military service élite’12 in
return for ‘les bienfaits du roi’. Secondly, and closely linked to the first change, the
standing army was helping to construct a situation where, as Ronald Asch has put it,
‘the authority and status of noblemen was defined more in terms of privileges granted
by the state and less in terms of autonomous power than in the past’.13 However,
neither of these trends was immutable, and the potential for the grands to re-empower
their position within royal forces after 1635 was there, and would be realised.
Given these developments, it is perhaps worth contemplating at this juncture
whether changes in the nature of the royal army during the early seventeenth century
were reflective of the emergence of a new type of overall political organisation in
France. Indeed, the first half of seventeenth century has often been seen as giving birth
10 It should be noted that Carroll argued that this process began with the ‘creation of a standing army in
the fifteenth century’ and culminated with the ‘militarization of the nobility under Louis XIV into a
professional officer corps’. I would instead stress the importance of the new standing army based on
infantry regiments, rather than the older body of the gendarmerie, to this process, and that a
professional officer corps was created before Louis XIV’s reign. Carroll, Blood and Violence, pp. 332-
333.
11 Jouanna, Devoir, p. 84.
12 To reiterate the point made by Scott and Storrs, ‘Introduction’, p. 46.
13 Asch, Nobilities, p. 154. Jouanna makes similar points specifically about the French nobility,
Jouanna, Devoir, pp. 111-116.
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to a new form of government in France: absolutism. Whilst the exact meaning of this
term has been contested by historians, Bonney has plausibly stated that the ‘simplest
definition’ of ‘absolute power’ is a form of government in which the monarch enjoyed
‘“freedom [...] in practice from institutional checks on his power”.14 To achieve this
state of affairs, an absolute monarch was a ruler who attempted to monopolise all
contemporary marques of sovereignty. These included matters such as the right to
conduct foreign policy, to make law, to enforce taxes, and, critically for this
discussion, the sole privilege to authorise the use of military force.15 The prince was
thus the unique source of legitimacy for all public power, and for all the privileges that
certain members of society enjoyed. However, an absolute monarch did not wield
unlimited power, and ‘he had to operate within bounds fixed by society as a whole.’16
The findings of this thesis would suggest that between the 1590s and the early
1630s, the rise of the early standing army meant that the crown was moving noticeably
towards a monopoly over the legitimate use of armed force in France, and hence made
significant movement towards the construction of absolute monarchy. The emergence
of new royal offices within the regiments bolstered the impression that only positions
within the royal army possessed ‘legitimate military authority’.17 Elements of the
nobility accepted the emphasis on the ‘absolute’ nature of the monarchy’s military
power, as it underlined the legitimacy and prestige of the royal offices that they held
themselves. The consequent reduction in the power of the grands within the standing
army, as demonstrated in Chapters Five and Six, is further evidence that the monarchy
was moving towards a situation in which the standing army both positively and
negatively helped the crown achieve a monopoly of the use of legitimate force.
Indeed, the rise of the standing army was only part of the monarchy’s attempts
to enforce its sole right to possess and employ armed force during the early
seventeenth century. Articles within the Code Michau stated that the crown wanted to
restrict the possession of artillery to royal arsenals. Since the 1600s, there had also
been a relatively successful effort to dismantle France’s internal fortresses, which had
14 Bonney, ‘Absolutism’, p. 94.
15 Hodson, ‘Sovereigns and Subjects’, pp.29-30; Robert Oresko, G. C. Gibbs and H. M. Scott,
‘Introduction’, in Robert Oresko, G. C. Gibbs and H. M. Scott (eds.), Royal and Republican Sovereignty
in Early Modern Europe, (Cambridge, 1997), pp. 1-5; Guy Rowlands ‘Response to Jim Collins' review
of Guy Rowlands, The Dynastic State [...]’ H-France Review, 5 (2005). <http://www.h-
france.net/vol5reviews/rowlands.html> [8 November, 2010].
16 Collins, The State, pp.xix. My emphasis.
17 To use the phrase employed by Rowlands, ‘Monopolisation’, p. 139.
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multiplied during the civil wars.18 The campaigns against the Huguenots during the
1620s also put an end to a significant domestic challenge to the monarchy’s military
power. Perhaps the most naked sign of the crown’s intentions was article 216 of the
Code Michau, which declared that no person could arm themselves without letters
patent from a Secretary of State, enclosed by the crown’s ‘grand sceau’.19 The crown
was thus clearly confident enough by 1629 to pass measures which stressed its unique
privilege to levy and possess armed force within the French kingdom; a situation
which was further reflected by the formal interdiction of military venality. The
existence of a standing army, staffed by the nobility, and in which even members of
the grands had begun to redefine their status more overtly as based on their service to
the monarchy, can only have encouraged the crown further in making such claims of
‘absolute power’.
Yet, for the monarchy to achieve a real monopoly over legitimate military
authority in France, there had to be a much greater ‘political and ideological’
acceptance of this fact on the part of the French nobility than existed by the early
1630s. Arguably, it required the Frondes and the firm grip of a monarch ruling as well
as reigning after 1661 for this to transpire.20 Moreover, whether one wishes to label
the monarchy as ‘absolute’ or not by 1635, one has to recognise the sheer extent of the
concessions that the crown was required to make to elements of the nobility in order
for them to join its officer corps, as evidenced in this thesis.21 The new French polity,
which the standing army had helped produce, was thus a complex amalgam by the
early 1630s. The royal government enjoyed a higher level of undivided theoretical
sovereignty and stronger practical power due to the emergence of new structures of
monarchical offices. However, such a state could only arise if these offices satisfied
the ambitions of at least a certain number of French noble families. Were the interests
of noble office-holders not respected, both the theoretical and actual limits of royal
sovereignty and power could potentially be reduced.
18 Code Michau, arts. 213, 214; Rowlands, ‘Monopolisation’, p. 147.
19 The ‘attache’ of the gouverneur of the province in which the armament was occurring was also
required. This measure was probably included in order that gouverneurs could more easily determine
whether provincial nobles had made authorised or unauthorised levies, as all nobles had to receive
authorisation from the gouverneur at some stage for a levy to be considered legitimate.
20 Rowlands, ‘Monopolisation’, p. 160.
21 Indeed, James Collins has recently argued against the continuing use of absolutism as an explanatory
tool for the early modern French monarchy, as it frequently misleads non-specialists into the belief that
the crown wielded despotic power. He instead prefers to use the term ‘monarchical state’ to describe the
form of government seen in France during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Collins, The State,
pp. ix-xxv.
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Thus, the situation described hitherto would appear to give credence to Wood’s
contention that ‘developing government institutions’ in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries ‘might have been forced to accommodate themselves to the prevailing
aristocratic society as much as the nobility was forced to conform to the political
regime.’22 This was not least the case with regard to the army, because much of the
military evolution that occurred during the early seventeenth century had not been
explicitly planned or ordered by the monarchy. Even the decision to maintain
permanently a certain number of regiments in 1598 should be seen as a largely
pragmatic manoeuvre which eventually had far reaching changes, rather than a
purposefully revolutionary moment in French military history. Indeed, the fact that no
substantial sets of military ordonnances appear after 1598 until the mid-1620s
demonstrates that the royal government was largely reacting to changes in the nature
of French infantry forces by this later date, rather than driving the process forward
itself. The transformation of royal forces into a standing army was largely an organic
affair. And, if anything, by the 1620s the crown had begun to display a certain degree
of uneasiness with the manner in which royal forces had evolved over the previous
twenty years.
Such disquiet can be seen in the ‘projet de reglement de guerre’ of 1626.
Whilst the document does not appear to have been enacted, it gives a fascinating
glimpse into the monarchy’s fears regarding the emergence of the standing army. The
text begins by stating its displeasure at the ‘commandement trop continu’ that many
had enjoyed in ‘places fortes’ but also ‘dans nos troupes de gens de guerre’. This had
reached a point in the past where some commanders had been able to use their
positions against royal authority. As, however, the text also noted that others had
joined past rebellions due to the lack of opportunities for royal military service, the
regulation attempted to strike a balance between forging a military establishment with
prospects for service, whilst rigorously asserting the complete authority of the
monarchy over all military charges.
Accordingly, the draft ‘reglement’ proposed that a permanent infantry force of
30,000 men should be maintained, but explicitly stated that the king alone would hold
the right to nominate all regimental positions above that of ensign. The king’s
prefence in making such appointments would be to choose the ‘plus anciens et
22 Wood, Nobility, p. 170.
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valeureux’ who were already enrolled in the army. Aside from the Gardes retaining its
predominance, all other regiments were to be held in equal stature. All regiments were
also to be named after a royal province, rather than a mestre de camp, again
emphasising that the units belonged to the monarchy and were thus, aside from one
elite unit, inherently equal. Crucially, within the regiments, the monarchy moved to
ensure that no captain could wield untrammelled power over the ‘compagnie qu’il
commandera pour notre service’. Captains and subalterns were not even to be written
on the roll of any particular company ‘pourcequ’ils ne doivent point estre
particulierement attachés a aucune compagnie’, and would hence change the company
that they commanded from year to year. 23
Whilst the crown had thus evidently accepted the benefits of maintaining a
standing army, which if anything it wished to increase in size in order to improve the
nobility’s prospects for service, it was also clearly worried about the level of authority
that certain regimental officers held over their companies. This was despite the fact
that only a small minority of officers appear to have defected to rebel forces during the
late 1610s and 1620s. Consequently, the draft regulation seriously contemplated
measures which would break the bond between nobles and ordinary soldiers, by
forcing officers to take up new company commands on a yearly basis. Whilst this
would diminish regimental esprit des corps, it would also lessen any likelihood that
officers could persuade their companies to follow them into rebellion, were this
eventuality to arise. The measures relating to appointment displayed that the monarchy
was ostensibly willing to respect some of the customs that had organically emerged in
the early standing army, namely that progressive promotion through the regimental
grades would occur in return for long-term service. However, the insistence that the
monarch was responsible for the nominations to all regimental posts signalled that the
crown wished to make its power over appointment more explicit, perhaps in an
attempt to counter the belief amongst some regimental captains that they now
effectively held the right to name company subalterns, and to designate the successor
to their company command.
The proposed regulation thus more aggressively foreshadowed the Code
Michau of 1629, as both texts sought to place definite limits on the level of
sovereignty that the crown was prepared to devolve to its military officers. As shown
23 ‘Projet de Reglement de Guerre’, January 1626, Bnf Cangé 22, ff.30r-46r, quotes from ff., 30r, 35v.
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in Chapter Three of this thesis, the Code Michau again demonstrated that the
monarchy was prepared to offer progressive promotion, and hence social
advancement, in return for regimental service. However, the document also explicitly
outlawed the purchase and sale of royal military offices, emphasising that regimental
officers did not own their charge and could technically be removed from their position
at any time by the crown.
The regulation of 1626 was not enacted, and many of the measures contained
within the Code Michau, such as the interdiction of venality, were only spasmodically
enforced when convenient. Nonetheless, the documents of 1626 and 1629 are
extremely revealing of the monarchy’s somewhat troubled mindset by the early 1630s
with regard to its armed forces that had been evolving rather too organically for
comfort. The royal government had recognised many of the advantages of having a
standing army, both in relation to the increased military power of the crown, but also
in terms of improving its relationship with the nobility. Indeed, the crown clearly
wanted its standing army to be dominated by the nobility, and to openly reward the
men who served within it. Yet, the monarchy also wanted to prevent the emergence of
any force which would potentially confuse the distinction between royal and private
military property. Given the previous seventy years of intermittent civil warfare, such
a concern was perhaps understandable. But, it meant that one of the most important
foundations upon which the standing army had been forged was beginning to be
brought under question: the ability of the nobility to hold military office securely in
the long-term, during which period the dynastic benefits of service could be accrued.
The timing for such a development could not have been worse, as it almost
perfectly coincided with the beginning of a major war against Spain in 1635, and
France’s much wider involvement in the Thirty Years’ War. Because certain officers
had achieved their dynastic aspirations through service in the permanent regiments,
other members of the French nobility flocked to the infantry officer corps once it
began to notably expand in the 1630s. Due to the paucity of positions within the vieux
and petits-vieux, noblemen began to take positions within newly formed units, which
may have appeared to have been an expansion of the existing standing army. Yet, due
to the continuing official prohibition against regimental venality after 1629, the
monarchy was able to disband, reduce or reorganise these units at will. Indeed, Parrott
has shown that the threat of enacting such measures was systematically used by the
crown in order to ‘persuade commanders to support the upkeep of their units with their
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own funds’.24 Nobles who refused to advance their credit, particularly within the
newer regiments, risked losing their office with no compensation in return.
Ultimately, such a system was counter-productive. Captains were loath to
maintain their units at anything but the minimum number of troops required, due to the
fear that they could lose their commissions at any moment. The bulk of the French
army after 1635 was consequently witness to low-unit strengths, appallingly high
levels of unit turnover and wastage, and a force mainly comprised of inexperienced
officers who frequently deserted due to the financial pressures of service. As both the
monarchy and its officers struggled to meet the army’s financial requirements, military
payment structures collapsed. Consequently, desperate soldiers began to prey more
and more on civilians, threatening the kingdom’s wider societal stability. By the
1640s, France began to edge towards the abyss of breakdown.25
Much of Richelieu’s ability to field a larger royal army after 1635 was thus
achieved through his exploitation of the good will that had emerged between elements
of the nobility and the monarchy due to the early standing army. Ambitious
newcomers wanted to join this force in order to achieve similar social advancement to
the existing officer corps; instead, they were essentially forced into becoming a
subsidiary, transient part of the royal army, where they formed little more than
temporary bodies of muscle and credit for the monarchy to exploit. Richelieu was able
to manipulate the new officers in this manner as no official guarantees of the
permanency or ownership of regimental office were given by the monarchy – a
situation which reflected the official, but not actual manner in which the standing
army had operated prior to 1630. Indeed, newcomers were essentially being asked to
join something closer to the pre-1598 infantry, which had mainly consisted of
frequently reformed and reorganised regiments, rather than the considerably more
secure post-1598 system witnessed in the vieux and petits-vieux. Consequently, as the
relationship between the monarchy and many of its noble office-holders in the army
broke down after 1635, so did the effectiveness of its armed forces, which contributed
to the kingdom’s wider social instability by the 1640s. Such a sequence of events says
much about both the nature of the relationship between the monarchy and the nobility,
and also the nascent ‘absolute’ state, during the early seventeenth century.
24 Parrott, Richelieu’s Army, p. 329.
25 Ibid., pp.328-364, 543-546.
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Thus, rather than being presented as a transitional force, the army of the early
seventeenth century studied in this dissertation should perhaps be seen as
representative of a particular, sui generis era of military development. The specific
political, social, and cultural circumstances of the early seventeenth century permitted
the creation of a small standing army in a manner which had not previously been
possible, and which differed sufficiently to the forces which would precede and
succeed it for it to be considered unique. Indeed, at least within the seventeenth
century, French military development appears to have occurred in at least three largely
self-contained periods of time, rather than in a consistent movement towards
progressively improved forces.26 Particular conditions conspired to produce the early
standing army between c.1598 and 1635, the near collapse of this body from c.1635 to
1660, and the reconstruction and expansion of this force from c.1660 to the 1690s.
There might even be the potential for further sub-divisions within these eras, to reflect
other relatively unique periods of military change. In each of these phases, while the
varying needs of domestic and international politics shaped the size, or projected size,
of the army, the fundamental determinant of the real strength and character of the
royal army was the monarchy’s relationship with the nobility. Only by understanding
the development of the royal army in these terms, as a constantly mutating body which
reflected specific historical conditions, will a fuller understanding of French military
development be achieved.
26 Parrott has made a similar argument when he stated: ‘the personal rule of Louis XIV may better be




Companies and Captains of the vieux Regiments.
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Appendix One is comprised of two tables.
The first table will note the number of companies within the vieux at certain dates
between 1588 and 1623. The dates for this table have been chosen on the basis of
remaining états, as these are the only documents which consistently record the total
number of companies within a regiment at a given moment in time during the period
of this thesis.
The second table contains the name of every captain and mestre de camp within the
vieux regiments found on the revues and états analysed for this thesis, which cover
most of the period between 1588 and 1629 (see above, p. 15). Additionally, instead of
listing the duc d’Épernon as a captain, the various lieutenant colonels have instead
been included, due to their role as the de facto captain of the compagnie colonelle.
Cases where a person was a lieutenant colonel, a mestre de camp or a ‘captain
“retenuz”’, rather than an ordinary captain, have been noted.
Captains who appear on multiple occasions within the revues and états have been
grouped together in the same entry. Where it has not been possible to categorically
confirm that the repeated appearance of a similar name on a revue or état relates to the
same individual, entries have been left separate. Possible connections between an
identified individual and unidentified namesakes have been noted.
Finally, and unlike in the rest of the dissertation, Normandie has been included as part




P/C: Possible connection to another entry.
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I – the Number of Companies per vieux Regiment, 1588-1623
1588 1597 1610 1620 1623
Gardes 12 20 18 20 -
Picardie 17 46 15 23 20
Piémont - 20 18 23 -
Champagne 14 27 19 27 20
Navarre - 25 20 19 -
Normandie - - - 19 20
A dash indicates that either no état exists, or that none has been located, for the
regiment for the date in question.
As previously stated, each company contained a captain, lieutenant and ensign,
together with a varying amount of lower officers such as sergeants and corporals. The
total number of soldiers per company varied (see Chapter One, Section III).
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II – the Captains of the vieux Regiments, 1588-1629
Surname First Name Seignurie(s) Place(s) Regiment(s) Date(s) Source(s) Notes
Acarie Jean d' sieur du Bourdet Bordeaux Gardes 27/11/1615,21/09/1620
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25844/151;
État, Ms.Fr. 16718, 160v
Achart N/S Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 163v Captain 'retenuz'














État,Ms.Fr. 16718 f. 266v;
État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.244v. Mestre de camp
Angest N/S Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 163v Captain 'retenuz'
Anthon Baron d' baron d'Anthon Meurier Champagne 20/03/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.186r

















État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.131r;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25845/204,






















Piémont 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Arques Provence Piémont 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.141v.
Arques Bernard d' Aubenton; Piémont 08/10/1598; Revue, Ms.Fr. 25833/1510; P/C: ‘Arques’.
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Antibes. 10/06/1602. État, Ms.Fr. 16701,f. 43v.





















État, SHDAT X14, January
1597, n.p.; Revue, Ms.Fr.
25835/1667; Revue, Ms.Fr.
25837/1899; Revue, Ms.Fr.




État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.222r;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25846/295;
Revue, PO 126 (2579)
p.10.
























État, SHDAT X14, January

















État, SHDAT X14, January




24842, 134r; État, Ms.Fr.
16718 f.222r.
Baradat Jean de sieur de Cahusac La Fère; N/S Picardie 01/1597;1610
État, SHDAT X14, January




Baron Pierre de sieur de Cachedat Boulogne Picardie 25/03/1601 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25835/1663













État, Ms.Fr. 16701, f. 37v;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25842/54.
P/C: ‘Thomas’
Bastide Metz Champagne 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.
Bastier Poitiers Piémont 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.237v
Baure Jean de Guise Piémont 11/09/1623 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25847/339
Beaudez Rue Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Beault Ruben Toulon Navarre 04/06/1602 État, Ms.Fr. 16701,f. 37r
Beaumanoir Poitiers Piémont 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f. 238r
Beaumanoir Charroux Champagne 05/01/1621 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 ,f.265r
Beaupuy Jacques de sieur deBrignemont
La Haye
(Tourraine) Piémont 04/02/1616 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25844/159
Bellefonds Montpellier Normandie 26/02/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.246v
Bellocq
Ramefort Provence Champagne 12/08/1588
État, SHDAT X14 , 12
August 1588, n.p.
Bellot Montreuil Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.















État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.141r;
État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.222v.




Berault Provence. Navarre 1610. État, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 141r.
Bernet Provence Champagne 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.





État, SHDAT X14, January





Beron Poitiers Picardie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.207v




État, SHDAT X14, 12
August 1588, n.p.; État,
SHDAT X14, January
1597, n.p.; Revue, Ms.Fr.
25835/1717.
Mestre de camp
Bidache Corbie Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Bidache N/S Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.163r Captain 'retenuz'






















État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.
159v; Revue, Ms.Fr. 25849
/537.
P/C: ‘Casteljaloux’.
Biran Jean-Bernard de sieur de Gohas Paris; Bordeaux Gardes 02/07/1618;21/09/1620
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25845/224;
État, Ms.Fr. 16718, 161r.
Blaignac Charron Piémont 13/11/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.241r
Blaignac Poitiers Piémont 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.238r
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État, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 131r;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25843/116;
État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.157r.
Mestre de camp
Blasan N/S Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.163v Captain 'retenuz'
Blécourt Claude de sieur de Betancourt Clermont Maréchal d'Ancre 20/02/1616 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25844/172
Blere Poitou Picardie 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.
Boisverdin Poitiers Navarre 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.223r
Bonnault Bresse Champagne 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.143r
Bonnault Provence Champagne 18/03/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.195r
Bonnault Poitiers Champagne 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.251v
Bonnault Sanneterre Champagne 26/01/1621 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.264r
Bonnault Balthasar Vaulx Champagne 16/04/1602 État, Ms.Fr. 16701,p.40v P/C: ‘Bonnault’
Bonne Foy Metz Piémont 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Bonne Foy N/S Piémont 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 134v
Bonnefins René de sieur de Fioux Calais Picardie 08/08/1598 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25833/1492
Bonneuil N/S Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r
Bonneuil Poitiers Picardie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.206v












État, SHDAT X14, 12
August 1588, n.p.; État,
SHDAT X14, January






413 (9211) p.4; Revue,
Ms.Fr. 25841/2186; Revue,
Ms.Fr. 25841/2237; État,
Na.Fr. 24842, f. 131r;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25844/152.
Borderes Poitiers Piémont 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.237v
Borderes Charron Piémont 13/11/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.240v
Bossonniere Fort Louis (LaRochelle) Champagne 04/04/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.296r
Boulaye Picquigny Navarre 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Bouleuze Rocroi Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Bouleuze Provence Champagne 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.141v
Bouleuze Provence Champagne 18/03/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.195r












État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f. 252r;
État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.264v;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25846/314;
État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.
294v.
Bourrouillan Anaille Piémont 23/12/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.242r Lieutenant colonel
Bourrouillan Poitiers Piémont 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.236r Lieutenant colonel
Bouvault Fort Louis (LaRochelle) Champagne 04/04/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.294r
Brasse N/S Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 163v Captain 'retenuz'
199
Brasse Louis de La Fère Picardie 01/1597;24/07/1597




Briquemont Angoulême Piémont 20/03/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.187r





Piémont 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Broulz N/S Piémont 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 134v
Bruel Martin sieur des Boulletz Montreuil Navarre 03/10/1598 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25833/1505 P/C: ‘DesBoulletz’.
Brussailles Saint-Quentin Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Brussailles N/S Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 163r Captain 'retenuz'
Brussailles Poitiers Picardie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f. 207v






















État, SHDAT X14, January



















État, SHDAT X14, January





État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.
158v; Revue, Ms.Fr.
25846/271
Calinet Poitou Picardie 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.
Camp Remy N/S Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Campagnol Montpellier Normandie 26/02/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f. 244r
Canonville Alexandre de sieur de Raffetot Querieu(Château) Maréchal d'Ancre 22/03/1616 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25844/178
























État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.157v.
Casteljaloux Boulogne Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.












État, SHDAT X14, January








Castelz Poitou Picardie 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.
Casteras Beaune Navarre 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Casteras N/S Navarre 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 134r
Casteras Poitiers Navarre 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f. 222v
Caulaincourt Robert de Clermont Maréchal d'Ancre 24/03/1616;10/05/1616
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25844/168;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25844/180
Cersin N/S Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, 163r Captain 'retenuz'






Mirabeau Jacques de comte de Charny Maubert-Fontaine Champagne 01/1597
État, SHDAT X14, January
1597, n.p. Mestre de camp















Chastillon Poitiers Piémont 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.237v
Chastillon Charron Piémont 13/11/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.240r
Châteaulandon Poitiers Navarre 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.223v











État, SHDAT X14, 12



























2225, 2234; État, Na.Fr.
24842 f.131r; État, Ms.Fr.
16718, f. 163r
Chesne Maubert-Fontaine Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.



















État, SHDAT X14, January
1597, n.p.; Revue, Ms.Fr.
25835/1700; Revue, Ms.Fr.
25838/1948; Revue, PO
739 (16878), p.2; Revue,
Ms.Fr. 25841/2236, 2184,
2209, 2230, 2232; État,
Na.Fr. 24842 f.131r; État,
Ms.Fr. 16718, f. 159v;
Revue,Ms.Fr. 25846/273.
Chisse N/S Champagne 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.164v Captain 'retenuz'
Cochart Metz Champagne 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X14, B.d.RCangé, 12 August 1588
Cochefilet Andre de comte de Vaucellas N/S; Berru(Champagne). Piémont
1610;
14/04/1610.
État,Na.Fr. 24842, f. 134v;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25841/2254. Mestre de camp
Colombat Poitou Picardie 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.




Comminge Charles sieur de Comminge Lyon Gardes 25/07/1629 Reevue, Ms.Fr. 25849/544
Concini Concino marquis d'Ancre Clermont Maréchal d'Ancre 24/03/1616 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25844/176






État, Ms.Fr. 16701, f.42r.
Conflans Baron de baron de Conflans Poitiers Champagne 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.251v
Cosseins N/S Gardes 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.
Courtault Mascon Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.





























État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134v.
Lieutenant colonel
Des Boulletz N/S Navarre 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 134r
Des Chappelles Poitiers Picardie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f. 208r
Des Chappelles Montpellier Picardie 23/03/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f. 205r
204
Des Combes Pont Dormy Navarre 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Des Estangs Fort Louis (LaRochelle) Champagne 04/04/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.296r
Desguyets Montreuil Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Desmarets St Quentin Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.



























État, SHDAT X14, January







2189, 2214, 2224, 2229,
2235; État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.
131r.
Du Boulle N/S Champagne 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.164v Captain 'retenuz'
Du Breuil Angoulême Piémont 20/03/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.186v-187r
Du Breuil Poitiers Piémont 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.236v
















Saint-Bonnet Jean marquis de Toiras Blaye (Guyenne) Gardes 21/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, 163r
Du Corel François sieur Dancourt Doullens Navarre 05/11/1623 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25847/353






État, Ms.Fr. 16701, f.44r;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25838/1910. PC: ‘Du Four’.
Du Fresne Picquigny Navarre 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Du Jar Donchery Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.


















Rocheguyon Montpellier Picardie 23/03/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.203v Mestre de camp
Du Pont Maubert-Fontaine Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Du Praet Poitiers Normandie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.268v
Du Praet Montpellier Normandie 26/02/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.244r






















2208; État, Na.Fr. 24842
f.131r; État, Ms.Fr. 16718,
f. 158r.
Du Terte Fort Louis (LaRochelle) Champagne 04/04/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.296v
Du Val Montpellier Picardie 23/03/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.206v
Du Val François marquis deFontenay-Mareuil Poitiers; Charron. Piémont
03/09/1620;
13/11/1620.
État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.236r,
239v. Mestre de camp
Du Vernet Charron Piémont 13/11/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.240v
Dupre Metz Champagne 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.
Duquez Provence Piémont 17/05/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.194v
Durban David sieur de St Jullien Calais Picardie 11/06/1605;09/08/1606.
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25838/1932;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25839/2009.
Durbois Mouzon Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Durbois Champagne 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.164v Captain 'retenuz'
Egumont Rue Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
1 4,
January 1597, n.p.
Esclanvillier Rue Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Esclassan Gabriel d' sieur d'Esclassan Boulogne Picardie 30/05/1598 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25832/1467.
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Esclasson Metz Piémont 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Escodeca Pierre d' baron de Boisse-Pardaillan Picquigny; N/S Navarre
01/1597;
1610
État, SHDAT X14, January







Piémont 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Escurac N/S Piémont 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 134v
Escurac Angoulême Piémont 20/03/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.186v
Escurac Poitiers Piémont 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.237r
Escurac Charron Piémont 13/11/1620 État,Ms.Fr. 16718, f.240r
Escurac Pierre d’ Verdun Piémont 17/04/1605;11/06/1605.
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25838/1916,
1933. P/C: ‘Escurac’.
Esparbez Antoine d' sieur de Coignac Boulogne;Ardres. Picardie
01/1597;
22/07/1599.
État, SHDAT X14, January
1597, n.p.; Revue, Ms.Fr.
25833/1563.









État, SHDAT X14, January
1597; Revue, Ms.Fr.
25839/2019; État, Na.Fr.














État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.205v;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25849/518.










État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r;
État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.207r;
État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.204r.





État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.162v;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25848/459.
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Fertin Rue Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Fioux Montreuil Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Folleville N/S Gardes 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Fos Dauphiné Champagne 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.
Foucaudiere Péronne Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.




Revue, Ms.Fr. 25841/2211. P/C: ‘Lorme’.
Frelandiere Mouzon Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Gacheda Boulogne Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Gallois Pont Dormy Navarre 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Gallois N/S Navarre 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134r
Gamardes Jacques de Pontoise Picardie 31/10/1589 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25817/30
Gariez La Fère Picardie 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, August
1588, n.p.
Garrané Bertrand de sieur de Pépieux Boulogne Picardie 30/05/1598;25/03/1601
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25832/1468;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25835/1664. P/C: ‘Pepieux’.
















Piémont 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Gavarret N/S Piémont 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134v




Revue, Ms.Fr. 25835/1684. P/C: ‘Gavarret’.
Gentil Erye sieur de Pugeolle Saint-Tropez Champagne 07/06/1602 État, Ms.Fr. 16701, f.41v
Genton Claude de sieur de Coudron Verdun (ville);Han. Piémont
20/11/1623;
16/03/1625.
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25847/ 360,
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Germaincourt Daniel de sieur de Buffé N/S; Paris. Gardes 01/1597;29/10/1598.
État, SHDAT X14, January
1597, n.p.; Revue, Ms.Fr.
15833/1515.











État, SHDAT X14, January





Grand Maison Mascon Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Grandmont N/S Navarre 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.




État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.162r;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25835/1716;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25848/460.
















234; État, Ms.Fr. 16718,
f.160v; État, Ms.Fr. 16726,
f.186r; Revue, Ms.Fr.
25848/ 476
Guytault Bresse Champagne 13/04/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.197v
Guytault Poitiers Champagne 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.252r
Guytault Sanneterre Champagne 26/01/1621 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.264v
Guytault Montpellier Picardie 23/03/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.206r
Guytault Fort Louis (LaRochelle) Champagne 04/04/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.294v


























État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.206v;
État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.204r
Hamond Metz Piémont 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.





Haulterive Rocroi Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.




Houillez Dauphiné Champagne 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p. Mestre de camp
Jarmon N/S Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.









État, SHDAT X14, January
1597, n.p.; Revue, Ms.Fr.
25833/1491; État, Na.Fr.







Preuil Lyon Gardes 25/07/1629 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25849/543
La Bastye Montpellier Picardie 23/03/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.205v








État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.197r,
250r, 262r Mestre de camp
La Besne Abraham de Bordeaux Gardes 21/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.161v
La Borye Montreuil Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
La Borye N/S Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.163r Captain 'retenuz'
La Brande N/S Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.163v Captain 'retenuz'
La Burthe Boulogne Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
La Burthe N/S Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.163v Captain 'retenuz'
La Chapelle Metz Piémont 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
La Chapelle Provence Piémont 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.141v
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La Chapelle Provence Piémont 17/05/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.194v
La Chapelle Poitiers Piémont 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.237r
La Chapelle Charron Piémont 13/11/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.240r








La Cledye Fort Louis (LaRochelle) Champagne 04/04/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.296v
La Condamine Provence Champagne 29/04/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.195v
La Condamine Poitiers Champagne 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.252r
La Condamine Cuiray Champagne 05/01/1621 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.265r
La Condamine Fort Louis (LaRochelle) Champagne 04/04/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.297r
La Coste Metz Champagne 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.
La Coudrelle Montpellier Normandie 26/02/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.246r
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La Courtain Montreuil Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
La Fay N/S Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, 163v Captain 'retenuz'
La Ferriere N/S Navarre 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, 134r
La Ferriere Poitiers Navarre 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.221v
La Fontaine N/S Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
La Fontan N/S Navarre 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
La Gauchapt Fort Louis (LaRochelle) Champagne 04/04/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.295v
La Grange Charles-Etienne de sieur de Villedonné
La Haye
(Tourraine) Piémont 04/02/1616 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25844/161
La Grange de











État, SHDAT X14, 12





État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.131r.
Lieutenant colonel:
1598, 1601, 1610.
La Guesle Alexandre de marquis d'O N/S Champagne 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.135v Mestre de camp
La Haye Boulogne Picardie 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.
La Hilliere Donchery Piémont 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
La Hilliere Piémont 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134v
214
La Hilliere Gilles de sieur de Garousset St Quentin Piémont 01/12/1610 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25842/36 P/C: ‘La Hilliere’.
La Magdelaine Montpellier Normandie 26/02/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.247v
La Mairie Robert de Amiens (citadel) Maréchal d'Ancre 22/02/1616 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25844/175
La Marque Poitiers Piémont 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.238r
La Marque Charron Piémont 13/11/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.241r
La Marque Isaac Beaumont(Argonne) Piémont 18/02/1625 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25847/393 P/C: ‘La Marque’.
La Morelie Rocroi Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
La Morelie Fort Louis (LaRochelle) Champagne 04/04/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.293v

















État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.135v;
État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.251r;
État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.263v;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25846/312
P/C: ‘La Morelie’.
La Mothe Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r
La Mothe Pierre de Sieur d’Arnaud Fort Louis (LaRochelle) Champagne 04/04/1623 État, 16726, f.293r Mestre de camp
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La Mothe
Chantouin Poitiers Picardie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.206v
La Motheallard Maubert-Fontaine Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.










État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.205v;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25849/520
La Roche
Irlandois Corbie Navarre 01/1597
État, SHDAT X14, January
1597, n.p.
La Roche
Menardiere Corbie Navarre 01/1597
État, SHDAT X14, January
1597, n.p.
La Rocheallart Picquigny Navarre 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
La Rocheallart N/S Navarre 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134r
La Salle Montreuil Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
La Saludie Poitiers Normandie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.269r
La Saludie Montpellier Normandie 26/02/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.246r




La Serre Monteuillin Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
La Serre Poitiers Picardie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.206r
La Serre Montpellier Picardie 23/03/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.203v











État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25842/74.
La Taillade Angoulême Picardie 20/03/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.185v
La Taillade Poitiers Picardie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.207v
La Taillade Montpellier Picardie 23/03/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.204v
La Taillade Charles de Montpellier Picardie 10/02/1623 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25846/320 P/C: ‘La Tailade’.
La Tallauresse Villefranche Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
La Tallauresse Bresse Champagne 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.143r
La Tallauresse Bresse Champagne 05/04/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.198r
La Tallauresse Poitiers Champagne 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.251r
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La Tallauresse Sanneterre Champagne 26/01/1621 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.263r
La Tallauresse Fort Louis (LaRochelle) Champagne 04/04/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.297r
La Tallauresse Jean de Bellay Champagne 20/04/1602 État, Ms.Fr. 16701, f.40r P/C: ‘LaTallauresse’.
La Toucheperre Corbie Navarre 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597
La Toucheperre Navarre 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, 134r









La Vallee Villefranche Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
La Vergne Montpellier Picardie 23/03/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.205r
La Veronniere Bresse Champagne 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.143r
Lambert Picquigny Navarre 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Lambert Poitiers Piémont 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.238r
Lambert Charron Piémont 13/11/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.241r
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Lambert Jean sieur des Escuyers Péronne (ville) Piémont 15/11/1623 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25847/355 P/C: ‘Lambert’.











État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.207v;
État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.204v.
Lannoy Claude de sieur de Seraud Seuilly Navarre 15/03/1622 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25846/293
















État, Ms.Fr. 16701,f. 43r;
État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.
141v; État, Ms.Fr. 16718
f.194v; Revue, Ms.Fr.
25846/266; État, Ms.Fr.
16718 f.237r; État, Ms.Fr.
16718 f.240r.























État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134r;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25843/86;
État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.222r.
Laval N/S Gardes 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p. Lieutenant colonel
Laverdin Poitiers Champagne 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.252v
Laverdin Charron Piémont 13/11/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.241r
Lazenay Poitiers Picardie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.207r




État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r P/C: ‘Lazenay’.
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23/08/1611. Revue, Ms.Fr. 25842/76.
Le Bruette Metz Piémont 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Le Courroy N/S Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.




























2008; État, Na.Fr. 24842
f.133r; État, Ms.Fr. 16718
f.185v.
Le Vernet Montpellier Normandie 26/02/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.244v







État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.267r.
Lezines Poitiers Champagne 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.252v
Lezines Poitiers Picardie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.208r
Lezines Charroux Champagne 05/01/1621 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.265v










État, SHDAT X14, January





Lezines Charles de La Flèche Champagne 05/08/1620 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25845/261 P/C: ‘Lezines’.
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Limailles Picquigny Navarre 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Lisle N/S Gardes 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.
Lorme Corbie Navarre 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Lorme N/S Navarre 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134r
Maguers Xaintes Picardie 24/03/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.185r
Mainville La Fère Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
















Maleyssye Henry de Montauban(camp) Gardes 02/06/1629 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25849/540
Mallevault Mascon Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Manicau Montpellier Normandie 26/02/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.247v




Mansan Paul de Pontoise Picardie 31/08/1589;30/11/1589.
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25817/11,
40.
Marcillac Charles de Verdun (ville) Piémont 16/03/1625 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25847/399
Marossan Poitiers Normandie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.268r
Mauduy Mouzon Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Mauduy N/S Champagne 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.135v
Mausieulx N/S Piémont 1610 État,Na.Fr. 24842 f.164v Captain 'retenuz'






État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134r.
Lieutenant colonel
















État, Ms.Fr. 16701, f.40r;
État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.143r;
État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.197v;
État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.250v;
État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.263r;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25846 no.
313; État, Ms.Fr. 16726,
f.297r.
Meressart Rue Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Meslé Baron de baron de Meslé Poitiers;Montpellier Normandie
03/09/1620;
26/02/1623
État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.268r;
État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.245r
Mesples Dauphiné Champagne 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.
Miraumont Maubert-Fontaine Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Miraumont Poitiers Picardie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.208r
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Miraumont Montpellier Picardie 23/03/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.205r
Miraumont le
jeune Poitou Picardie 12/08/1588
État, SHDAT X14, 12
August 1588, n.p.
Monbeton Charron Piémont 13/11/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.239v Lieutenant colonel
Monchauvere St Quentin Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Monmas Bertrand Metz (ville) Champagne 15/02/1605 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25837/1898
Mons Boulogne Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Monson Rocroi Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.






État, SHDAT X14, January











Montamel Péronne Navarre 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Montamel sr de sieur de Montamel Picardy Navarre 28/09/1597 Revue, Ms.Fr. 15832/1391
Montault François de Pontoise Picardie 31/10/1589;1589
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25817/33,
59.
Montduzer Phillippe de Doullens Picardie 22/03/1601 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25834/1659
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État, SHDAT X14, 12
August 1588, n.p.; État,
SHDAT X14, January











Montferier Poitiers Normandie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.268v
Montferier Montpellier Normandie 26/02/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.244r













État, SHDAT X14, January
1597, n.p.; Revue, Ms.Fr.
25835/1665; Revue, Ms.Fr.
25838/1958; État, Na.Fr.
24842 f.133r; État, Ms.Fr.
16718 f.206r; État, Ms.Fr.
16726, f.203v.
















État, SHDAT X14, January
1597, n.p.; État, Ms.Fr.
16701, f.36v; Revue,
Ms.Fr.25833/1511; État,
Na.Fr. 24842, f. 141r;
Revue,Ms.Fr. 25842/28;
État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.188r





État, SHDAT X14, January










Piémont 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14,
January 1597, n.p.
Moreau Michel de sieur de Moreau Blagny; Verdun Piémont 01/06/1598;06/04/1601
Revue, Ms.Fr.25832/1472;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25835/1673 P/C: ‘Moreau’.
Mouton Metz Piémont 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Nantas Poitiers Piémont 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.237v
Nantas Charron Piémont 13/11/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.240v
Nargonne Poitiers Champagne 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.250v
Nargonne Mouzon Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Nargonne Provence Champagne 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.141v
Nargonne Provence Champagne 18/03/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.195v
Nargonne Sanneterre Champagne 26/01/1621 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.262v
Nargonne Fort Louis (LaRochelle) Champagne 04/04/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.294v






État, Ms.Fr. 16701, f.41r
P/C: ‘Nargonne’.
Nogaret de La
Valette Jean Louis de
chevalier de La
Valette Paris Gardes 29/06/1627 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25848/480
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Octovio Vinge Villefranche Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.













État, SHDAT X14, January




Ms.Fr. 16718 f.251r; État,
Ms.Fr. 16718 f.263r.





État, SHDAT X14, January
1597, n.p.; Revue, Ms.Fr.
25833/1495.
P/C: ‘La Ferriere’.
Pagan Poitiers Normandie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.269r
Palais N/S Navarre 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Palliez Poitiers Normandie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.268r
Patras Michel Boulogne;Bordeaux Picardie
12/08/1588;
21/09/1620
État, SHDAT X14, 12
August 1588, n.p.; État,
Ms.Fr. 16718, f.162v.













État, SHDAT X14, 12
August 1588, n.p.; État,
SHDAT X14, January






Pépieux Boulogne Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Pépieux N/S Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r
Periac Boulogne Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Periac N/S Piémont 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134v
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Perigal Poitiers Navarre 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.223r
Petinnes Montpellier Normandie 26/02/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.247r
Pigeolet Provence Champagne 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.141v
Pigeolet Poitiers Champagne 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.250r Lieutenant colonel
Pigeolet sr de sieur de Pigeolet Villefranche Champagne 23/06/1598 Revue, MS.Fr. 25833/1479 P/C: ‘Pigeolet’.







État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.269r.
Pineau Boulogne Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.




État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.208r.
Plaisance Bresse Champagne 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.143r
Plaisance Bresse Champagne 10/03/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.197v
Plaisance Poitiers Champagne 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.251v
Plaisance Charroux Champagne 06/01/1621 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.264r
Plaisance Michel de Bourg Champagne 18/04/1602 État, Ms.Fr. 16701, f.38v P/C: ‘Plaisance’.
Plantiers Montpellier Picardie 23/03/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.206r






Thémines Poitiers Navarre 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.221r Mestre de camp


















État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134r;
État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.222v;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25846/290
P/C: ‘Pugnet’.
Ragagnac Poitiers Navarre 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.221v
Ramel Poitou Picardie 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.
Realz Donchery Piémont 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Realz Angoulême Piémont 20/03/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.186r














État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.
134v;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25842/1, 2.
P/C: ‘Realz’.
Repaire Poitiers Normandie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.268r
Repaire Montpellier Normandie 26/02/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.247v





Ribon Monunq Picardie 12/11/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.212r
Robert Mouzon Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Robert N/S Champagne 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.135v
Robert Provence Champagne 18/03/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.195r
Robert Poitiers Champagne 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.250v
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Robert Oléron Champagne 23/01/1621 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.262v








Robineau Vienne(Dauphine) Navarre 31/03/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.188v
Rochechouart Guy de sieur de Chastillon La Flèche Piémont 05/08/1620 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25846/265 P/C: ‘Chastillon’.
Rocquart Poitiers Normandie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.268r
Rocquart Jacques de Getz (nearGeneva) Normandie 27/03/1627 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25848/474
Roger Calais Picardie 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.
Roger Poitou Picardie 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p. Lieutenant colonel
Roquart Montpellier Normandie 26/02/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.246v






















État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.135v;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25845/241;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25846/262;
État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.251v,
264r.
























État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.222v;
Revue, Ms.Fr. 25846/291.
Saint-Denis Montreuil Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Saint-Dizier Poitiers Normandie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.267v
Saint-Dizier Montpellier Normandie 26/02/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.245r





État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.209v;
Revue- Ms.Fr. 25846/321. Lieutenant colonel
Saint-Julien Boulogne Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14,
January 1597, n.p.
Saint-Nazere Poitiers Normandie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.268v
Saint-Nazere Montpellier Normandie 26/02/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.245v
Saint-Pierre Provence Navarre 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.141r
Saint-Pierre Metz Piémont 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Saint-Pierre N/S Piémont 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.134v
Saint-Pierre Poitiers Piémont 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.236v
Saint-Pierre Charron Piémont 13/11/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.239v









Saint-Quentin Boulogne Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Saint-Quentin N/S Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r
Saint-Quentin Antoine de














Salbeuf Jean de N/S Gardes 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Salcède N/S; Poitiers. Picardie 1610;03/09/1620.
État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r;
État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.205v. Lieutenant colonel
Salerne N/S Gardes 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.
Salerne N/S Gardes 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.





Sarred N/S Gardes 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.
Sarrocque Poitiers Normandie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.267v
Saubole Metz Champagne 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.
Sausson Rocroi Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Sereuil N/S Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.163v Captain 'retenuz'













Brueres 06/08/1609 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25841/2210.




Normandie 07/02/1620 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25845/248 P/C: ‘Saint-Nazere’.
Sociondo Bresse Champagne 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.143r
Sociondo Johannes de Montreuil Champagne 18/04/1602 État, Ms.Fr. 16701,f.39r
Tajan Poitou Picardie 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p. Mestre de camp
Tassancour Montreuil Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.





Normandie 01/07/1620 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25845/256
Thianges Jonathan de sieur de Roulet N/S Gardes 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Thibault Bresse Champagne 02/04/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.198r
Thibault Poitiers Champagne 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.252r
Thibault Charroux Champagne 05/01/1621 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.265r
Thibault Fort Louis (LaRochelle) Champagne 04/04/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.295r
Thomas Maubert-Fontaine Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Thomas Bresse Champagne 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.143r
Thomas Poitiers Champagne 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.250v
Thomas Charroux Champagne 05/01/1621 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.262v
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Thomas Fort Louis (LaRochelle) Champagne 04/04/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.296v
Tournier Metz Piémont 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Tournier N/S Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r
Tournier Poitiers Picardie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.207r
Tournier Joachim de Metz Picardie 19/10/1606 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25839/2014
Trion Corbie Navarre 1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Trion Poitiers Navarre 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.221v
Trion François de Bourg de Latellé(near Poitiers) Navarre 16/01/1622 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25846/292 P/C: ‘Trion’.






État, Na.Fr. 24842, 134r.
P/C: ‘Trion’.
Trumelet le
Jeune Villefranche Champagne 01/1597
État, SHDAT X14, January
1597, n.p.
Vaillac Montpellier Normandie 26/02/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.246v
Vaillant N/S Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT
14, January
1597, n.p.































Vallon N/S Gardes 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.
Valpergue Maubert-Fontaine Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Vassant La Fère Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Vaucocour Jean de chevalier et sieurde Repaire
Getz (near
Geneva) Normandie 27/03/1627 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25848/475.
Vaudray Rocroi Champagne 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Vaudray Provence Champagne 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f.141v
Vaudray Cuiray Champagne 16/01/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.263v
Vaudray Provence Champagne 18/03/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.195v
Vaudray Poitiers Champagne 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.251r
Vaudray Fort Louis (LaRochelle) Champagne 04/04/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.293v







Verdelin N/S Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r
Verdelin Angoulême Piémont 20/03/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.186v
Verdelin Provence Picardie 03/05/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.194r
Verdelin Jacques de Angoulême(ville) Piémont 31/12/1616 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25844/188 P/C: ‘Verdelin’.
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Verdelin La
Jeune N/S Piémont 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842, f. 134v
Vernegue Montpellier Normandie 26/02/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.247r
Vezilly Fort Louis (LaRochelle) Champagne 04/04/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.294r
Vezilly Baron de baron de Vezilly Oléron Champagne 23/01/1621 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.263v
Viaspre St Quentin Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Ville Charles de sieur de Saint-Béarn La Flèche Picardie 05/08/1620 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25846/263
Ville Ferme Montreuil Picardie 01/1597 État, SHDAT X
14, January
1597, n.p.
Villegaignon N/S Picardie 1610 État, Na.Fr. 24842 f.133r
Villegaignon Poitiers Picardie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718 f.206v
Villegaignon Montpellier Picardie 23/03/1623 État, Ms.Fr. 16726, f.204r
Villeluysant Metz Champagne 12/08/1588 État, SHDAT X
14, 12
August 1588, n.p.




Normandie 07/02/1620 Revue, Ms.Fr. 25845/249
Zamet Jean de baron de Murat Poitiers Picardie 03/09/1620 État, Ms.Fr. 16718, f.206r Mestre de camp
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Appendix Two
Biographical Details of vieux regiment Captains
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The following appendix consists of brief biographical details of those captains within
the vieux regiments who have been firmly identified. Captains have only been
included within this appendix if source material in addition to revues and états has
been found for their existence. The appendix contains the biographies of fifty-eight
captains, out of the 531 captains listed in Appendix One.
All manuscript sources relate to the BnF, unless otherwise stated.
ACARIE, Jean d’, sieur du Bourdet.
Son of Jacques Acarie and Catherine Goumard. Received Gardes captaincy in
1612. Client of Épernon and named as a rebel captain in 1619. Died at siege of
Montauban, 1621, whilst fighting in royal forces. Married Catherine Belcier in
1581, daughter of René Belcier, baron de Cozes, and Catherine de Boulainvilliers.
Notable children:
1) René d’Acarie, sieur de Crazannes. Captain in Navarre. Died at the
siege of Montpellier in 1622. Married Angélique de La Rochefoucault in
1611, daughter of Louis de La Rochefoucault, sieur de Bayers and de La
Bergerie, and Suzanne de Beaumont Bressurie.
2) Louis d’Acarie, sieur du Bourdet. Captain in the Gardes. Appointed
maréchal de camp in 1649. Married Philippe or Catherine du Chemin,
dame de Boisredon in 1608.
3) Charlotte-Margueritte d’Acarie. Married Charles Poussart de Linieres.
(Above, pp. 161-163; Sottas, ‘État militaire’, pp. 165-166; Anselme, Histoire, IV,
p. 454; DB 2 (35).)
ALBERT, Leon d’, sieur de Brantes, later duc de Luxembourg et de Piney.
Received a Gardes captaincy in 1617; resigned this commission prior to the état
of 1620. Chevalier des ordres du roi in 1619. Pair de France in 1620. Appointed
lieutenant in the compagnie des chevaux-légers de la garde ordinaire du roi in
1621. Gouverneur of Blaye. Died in 1630. Married Maguerite-Charlotte, duchesse
de Luxembourg in 1620, oldest daughter of Henry de Luxembourg, duc de Piney
and Medelene de Montmorency, dame de Thoré. Notable relatives: Brother of
Charles d’Albert, duc de Luynes and Honoré d’Albert, sieur de Cadenet.
237
(Above, pp. 84, 108, Chapter Four, Section II; Anselme, Histoire, IV, p. 274; DB
8 (213).)
ALBERT, Honoré d’, sieur de Cadenet, duc de Chaulnes,
Mestre de camp of Normandie between 1617 and 1627. Appointed maréchal de
France in 1619. Given the Gouvernement of Picardy in 1633. Married Claire-
Charlotte d’Ailly, daughter of Philibert-Emmanuel d’Ailly, sieur de Pequigny,
and Louis d’Ognies, dame de Magny. Notable relatives: brother of Charles
d’Albert, duc de Luynes and Leon d’Albert, sieur de Brantes.
(Above, p. 108, Chapter Four, Section II; Susane, Ancienne, III, p. 176; Anselme,
Histoire, IV, p. 272; DB 8 (213).)
ANTIST, Paul d’, sieur de Mansan.
Captain in the Gardes from 1598 and his death in 1631. Possibly a captain in
Picardie prior to 1598. Conseiller du roi, and gouverneur of Gaston d’Orléans
during the 1600s.
(Noeufville, Abrégé Chronologique, III, p. 203; DB 25 (569); Luppé, Mémoires,
p. 214.)
AUBOURG, Charles d’, sieur de Porcheux,
Son of Charles, sieur de Porcheux, lieutenant du roi at Chalon-sur-Saône, and
Anne de Clery, daughter of Pierre de Clery, sieur de Freminville. Held a Navarre
captaincy from an unknown date prior to 1597 until his promotion to a Gardes
captaincy in 1626. Died in 1628. Married Judith de Chaumont d’Orneville,
daughter of Gilles de Chaumont, sieur de Bellestre and Anne de Fouquesoler.
Notable children:
1) Charles, sieur de Porcheux. Made a captain in Navarre in 1622, before
buying Saint-Preuil’s Gardes company in the 1630s. Married Genevieve
Bontin, daughter of Pierre Bontin, sieur de Victor, bailli of Caen and
Morant. Killed in action in 1643. Related to an unnamed nephew who
inherited the captaincy of his Gardes company after his death in 1643.
2) Philippes, sieur de Clery. Died whilst holding an unspecified command
in royal forces on the Isle-de-Rè in 1627.
3) Henry, sieur de Boissy. Captain in Navarre.
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4) Louis, sieur de Saint-Eloy. Captain in Navarre.
(Above, pp. 64-5, 91-92, DB 37 (333); PO 126 (2579).)
BARADAT, Jean de, sieur de Cahusac.
Received the captaincy of a Picardie company at unknown date before 1597. Had
been reduced to ‘retenuz’ status by 1610. Married to Marguerite de Copin,
daughter of Mathieu, sieur de Cahusac.
Notable relatives:
1) Eldest brother: Guillaume, sieur de Damery, baron de Thou. Captain of
Monceaux. Married Suzanne de Romain in 1593.
2) Younger brother: Lizander, vicomte de Verneuil, see below.
3) Nephew: François de Baradat, sieur de Damery. Premier gentilhomme
de la chambre du roi in 1626. Favourite of Louis XIII. Captain of Saint-
Germaine-en-Laye, lieutenant général of Champagne, gouverneur of
Châlons. Disgraced in 1627. Died in 1682. Married in 1632 in Brussels to
Gabrielle de Coligny, daughter of Marc, sieur de Crecia, and Catherine
de Blaigny.
(Above, p. 64; DB 55 (1288).)
BARADAT, Lizander de, vicomte de Verneuil.
Captain in Navarre from an unspecified date before 1597. Still holding the
captaincy in 1613. Captain and gouverneur of Château-Thierry. Married Anne des
Essarts, relative of Charles des Essarts, gouverneur of the town and citadel of
Montreuil. Notable children:
1) Gaspard de Baradat, vicomte de Verneuil. Captain of a company of
chevaux-légers, and made gouverneur of Aumale in 1647. Married Marie-
Angelique du Mesnil, daughter of Antoine, sieur de Chaumenil and
Françoise de Saint-Simon.
Other Notable relatives: see under entry for Jean de Baradat, above.
(Above, pp. 54, 70; DB 55 (1288).)
BELLOY, Theseus de, sieur de Saint-Martin.
Appointed captain in Navarre at an unknown date between the 1597 état and a
revue of August, 1599. Gouverneur of Crotoy, chevalier de l’ordre du roi,
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gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi and a maitre de l’hôtel du roi. Died
at the siege of Montpellier in 1622.
(Hozier, L’impôt, I, p. 174.)
BERTON, Louis de, sieur de Crillon.
Son of Gilles Berton, sieur de Crillon, and Philippe Grillet. Avignonnais heritage.
Mestre de Camp of the Gardes from 1584 to 1605. Chevalier de l’ordre du saint-
esprit. Chagniot has suggested that Crillon used his influence within the Gardes to
acquire several positions for Avignoese allies, including Joachim de Montagu,
sieur de Frémigières, and the initial entry into the regiment of future captain
Albert de Grillet-Brissac as an ensign in Crillon’s mestre de camp company. Did
not marry.
(Above, pp. 42, 79, 89, 151-152; Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, pp. 111-112 Susane,
Ancienne, II, p.1; Anselme, Histoire, IX, p.93.)
BIRAN, Barthélemy-Scipion, sieur de Casteljaloux.
Son of Blaise, sieur de Casteljaloux, and Marie de Malvin. Barthélemy-Scipion
was appointed to a Gardes captaincy in 1597, which he retained until an unknown
date between 1631 and 1640. Barthélemy-Scipion was the oldest of his eight
siblings. Married Louise de Montagu. Notable children:
1) Jean. Ensign of Barthélemy-Scipion’s company by 1631.
2) Agnès. Married, in 1623, Jean-Jacques de La Barthe, sieur de Giscaro,
captain in the Gardes.
Other notable relatives:
1) Brother: Alexandre, sieur de Carbon. Appears as Barthélemy-Scipion’s
lieutenant in revues of 1613 and 1629. Appears to have succeeded
Barthélemy-Scipion to the company captaincy during the 1630s. Resigned
the post in 1640.
2) Brother: Fabien, sieur de Osseboc. Appears as Barthélemy-Scipion’s
Gardes ensign in revues of 1613 and 1629. Gentilhomme ordinaire de la
chambre du roi. Married Françoise de Briqueville, dame de Osseboc,
daughter of Issac de Briqueville, gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du
roi and captain of fifty hommes d’armes, and Charlotte du Quesnel.
Joachim de Montagu, sieur de Frémigières was present at the marriage.
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3) Sister: Jeanne. Married the sieur de Vioues.
4) Sister: Susanne. Married Fabien de La Feitte, sieur de Vignardes.
The Biran de Casteljaloux and Biran de Gohas, below, were two branches of the
same family which had split in the 1470s.
(Above, pp. 49, 68; O’Gilvy and Bourrousse de Laffore, Nobiliaire, I, p. 245; La
Chesnaye, III, p. 235; Cabinet 46 (1135); DB 98 (2344).)
BIRAN, Jean-Bernard de, sieur de Gohas.
Son of Antoine de Biran de Gohas, mestre de camp of an infantry regiment in the
1560s, and captain of a gendarme company. Jean-Bernard was appointed to a
Gardes captaincy in 1614. Gouverneur of Antibes. Client of Épernon. Married
Margueritte de Narbonne in 1620. Notable children:
1) Susanne. Married Pierre de Faudoas, Baron de Sérillac, a nephew of the two
Faudoas brothers who held captaincies in Picardie, (see below).
(Above pp. 67, 160; Cabinet 46 (1135); DB 98 (2344).)
BLANCHEFORT, Charles de, marquis de Créquy.
Son of Antoine, sieur de Saint-Javarin, and Chrètienne d’Auguerre. Appointed
mestre de camp of the Gardes in 1605; held the position until 1633. Appointed
maréchal de France in 1621. Chevalier de l’ordre du saint-esprit. Married
Madeleine de Bonne in 1595, daughter of François de Bonne, duc de
Lesdiguières, and Claudine de Bérenger. Played a leading role in the royal high
command on during the 1620s and 1630s. Died in 1638. Notable children:
1) François, duc de Lesdiguières. Named as the designated heir of
Lesdiguières in 1613.
2) Charles, sieur de Canaples. Apears to have been the de facto mestre de
camp of the Gardes for most of the 1620s.
3) Françoise. Married in 1609 to Maximilien II de Bethune, marquis de
Rosny (son of Sully).
4) Madeleine. Married in 1617 to Nicolas de Neufville, duc de Villeroy,
pair et maréchal de France, gouverneur of Louis XIV.
(Above pp. 42, 79, 151-153; Susane, Ancienne, II, p. 1; Anselme, Histoire, IV, p.
191, VII, p. 462.)
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BONNOUVRIER, Pepin de
Appointed to a Champagne captaincy in 1575, before being promoted to a Gardes
captaincy in 1583, which he held until his death in 1617. Appointed lieutenant du
roi in the citadel of Metz between 1610 and 1612. Client of Épernon. Married
Charlotte de Garges, dame de Yèvre-le-Châtel, daughter of François de Garges,
sieur de macquelines, chevalier de l’ordre du roi, and Gabrielle de La Grange.
Notable relatives:
1) Philippe de Garge. Ensign found in Bonnouvrier’s company in a revue
of 1615. Exact relationship to Bonnouvrier unknown, but Philippe was
probably the brother or nephew of Pepin’s wife.
(Above, p. 51, 155; Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 111; DB 112 (2764); PO 413 (9211).)
BUROSSE, Julien de, sieur de Burosse.
Son of Jean, sieur de Burosse and Jeanne de Caubois. Julien was appointed
captain in Navrre in 1585, then Champagne in 1596, and finally the Gardes in
1613. Gouverneur of the château of Monitgny in 1606. Married Hilaire de La
Morre, daughter and heiress of Jean, sieur de La Barrère and Anne de La Roche.
Notable children:
1) Jean de Burosse d’Uzenh. Captain in Piémont in 1630, captain of
a company of chevaux-légers in 1649, and captain in the Gardes in 1650.
Married, in 1638, Françoise de Bourouillon, dame d’Espas et de Labory,
daughter of Louis de Bourouillan and Aymée de Forgues.
2) Brandelis de Burosse. Royal page.
3) Jean de Burosse, sieur de Mendoce. Captain in Piémont.
4) Françoise de Burosse. Married the sieur de Sonpets, who served in the
maison du roi.
(Courcelles, Dictionnaire Universel, III, pp. 121-122.)
CAILLEBOT, Louis de, sieur de La Salle.
Eldest son of Robert de Caillebot and Jacqueline d’O, daughter of Etienne d’O,
sieur de Fresnes, and Madeline Gerard. Louis received his Gardes captaincy in
1596, which he held until his death in 1624. Maréchal de camp. Married Léonore
de Molitard, daughter of François de Molitard, chevalier de l’ordre du roi,
gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi, and Catherine de Cambrai. Isaac du
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Raynier (see below) was present at the wedding, as he was the brother-in-law of
the bride’s father. Notable children:
1) Louis, sieur de La Salle. Amongst other positions: appointed captain in
the Gardes in 1640, maréchal de camp in 1649, inducted into the ordre du
saint-esprit in 1651, conseiller d’état in 1652. Married Anne Madeleine
Martel, daughter of Cahrles Martel, sieur de Monpinson and Alphontine
de Balzac.
2) Jacques. Found as an ensign in his father’s Gardes company in a revue
of 1621.
Other Notable relatives:
1) Brother: Louis. Lieutenant in his brother’s company on multiple revues
between 1598 and 1621. Inherited his brother’s captaincy in 1624; stripped
of the position due to muster fraud in 1627/8.
(Above, p. 55, 67; Carrés 145; DB 148 (3722).)
CASSAGNET, Bernard de, sieur de Tilladet.
Received a Gardes captaincy in 1589, which he held until his death in 1622.
Gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi, gouverneur of Bourg-sur-mer.
Married Jeanne de Narbonne, daughter of Jean de Bezolles, sieur de Bezolles.
Notable children:
1) Paul-Anthoine, sieur de Tilladet. Inherited his father’s Gardes company
in 1622. Maréchal de Camp in 1637. Died 1664.
2) Gabriel, sieur de Tilladet. Conseiller du roi, lieutenant général des
armées du roi. Married Madeleine Le Tellier, sister of Michel Le Tellier,
Chancellor and Keeper of the Seals.
3) Roger. Lieutenant in his brother Paul-Anthoine’s Gardes company by
1623. Received the survivance of his father’s gouvernement of Bourg-sur-
Mer.
(Above, pp. 52-53; DB 156 (4069); PO 609 (14320).)
CASTELNAU, Mathurin de, sieur du Rouvre en Touraine.
Younger son of Pierre de Castelnau, premier maitre d’hôtel of Francois, duc
d’Anjou, and Marguerite de Sigonneau, daughter of Macé, sieur de Perdrilliere,
and Jeanne d’Amours. Mathurin was a Gardes captain from 1596 until his death
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in 1622, and a gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi. Married Marie
Ianton, daughter of Durand, sieur de Milandres. Notable children:
1) Charles, sieur de Quincy. Married Gabrielle, daughter of Claude de
Vieurre and Marguerite de l’Estang.
2) Louis, sieur de Rouvre. Bought his father’s old Gardes company from
the Chevalier de La Valette in 1633. Appointed Maréchal de camp after
1643. Married Marguerite de Pallvau, daughter of Denis, sieur de Pallvau,
a conseiller in an unspecified parlement, and Magdelaine de Motholon.
3) Gabrielle. Married René de La Reteloire.
(Above, pp. 40, 55, 90; DB 157 (4109); Cabinet 79 (2066).)
CHAUMEJEAN, Blaise de, sieur then marquis de Fourilles.
Youngest of three children of Gilbert de Chaumejean and Genoise du Pont. Blaise
was appointed captain in Picardie in 1587, before receiving a company in the
Gardes in 1594. Made maréchal de camp in 1617, and resigned the command of
his Gardes company in the same year. Died in 1621 at the siege of Montauban.
Married Hippolite-Louise de Piovene, daughter of Scipion, comte de Castel-
Gombert, premier écuyer du roi, and Claudine Robertet. Notable children:
1) René, marquis de Fourilles. ‘Nourri enfant dhonneur’ beside Louis XIII.
Lieutenant in his father’s Gardes company, before assuming the
company’s captaincy in 1617. Conseiller d’état in 1632, and grand-
maréchal de logis in 1638.
2) Michel-Denis, marquis de Fourilles. Lieutenant in his brother René’s
Gardes company from 1617, before assuming the captaincy in 1632.
Lieutenant colonel of the Gardes from 1655 to 1667. Maréchal de camp in
1649, conseiller d’état in 1656, and lieutenant général des armées du roi
shortly after this latter date. Married 1) Genevieve Foulé in 1632, daughter
of Jacques, maître des requêtes, and Marie Charon, 2) Anne de Croisille,
daughter of Nicolas, conseiller d’état and Anne de Tufani.
Other notable relatives:
1) Sister: Antoinette. Married Jean-Jacques de Montesquiou, sieur de
Sainte-Colombe in 1610, lieutenant colonel in the Gardes (see below).
(Above, pp. 35, 50, 53, 62, 67; La Chesnaye, IV, p. 389; DB 178 (4640).)
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CHESNEL, Charles de, sieur de Meux.
Appointed to a Gardes captaincy in 1596, which he held until at least 1626.
Married Suzanne de Gouy.
Notable children:
1) Anne de Chesnel. Possibly married Pierre de Giugneaudeau, sieur de
Montigny, another Gardes captain (see below).
(Beauchet-Fillet, Dictionnaire, IV, pp. 601-602; Noeufville, Abrégé
Chronologique, III, p. 261; PO 739 (16878).)
CONCINI, Concino, marquis d’Ancre.
Native of Florence, arrived in France in 1600 after marrying one of Marie de
Médicis’ ladies-in-waiting, Leonora Galigaï. Became a prominent favourite of
Marie de Médicis during the early 1610s, and was a key figure in the factional
disputes of this decade. Assassinated on Louis XIII’s orders in 1617. Appointed
maréchal de France in 1613.
(Above, Chapter Four, Section II.)
DU BELLAY, Pierre, sieur de La Courbe.
Son of Eustache, baron de Comequiers and Guyonne d’Orange, dame de La
Feuillée et de La Courbe. Client of Épernon. Gentilhomme ordinaire de la
chambre du roi. Appointed to a Gardes captaincy prior to 1596, which he held
until his death in 1615. Married Barbe d’Aunieres, dame de Raguin, daughter of
Bonaventure, sieur d’Aunieres and Françoise de Hatton, dame de Raguin. Notable
children:
1) Guy du Bellay, sieur de La Courbe. Can be found as the ensign in
Pierre’s Gardes company in 1609. Fought a duel with Gardes captain
Abraham de La Besne (see below for La Besne).
2) Barbe du Bellay. Married Jean de Loubes.
(Above, pp. 80-81, 161; Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, pp. 212; Cabinet
37 (873); DB 81 (1848).)
DU CAYLAR DE SAINT-BONNET, Jean, marquis de Toiras.
Son of Aymar, and Françoise de Claret de Saint-Félix. Named to a number of
court positions by Louis XIII during the 1610s, including capitaine de la volière.
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Purchased the Gardes company under the command of Joachim de Montagu (see
below) in 1620. Appointed mestre de camp of Champagne in 1624. Subsequently
appointed maréchal de camp in 1625 and maréchal de France in 1630.
Gouverneur of Auvergne. Disgraced by Richelieu owing to the involvement of a
number of Toiras’ brothers in the rebellion of Henry II, duc de Montmorency in
the early 1630s. Notable siblings:
1) Elder brother: Jacques, sieur de Resteinclères. Gouverneur of Lodéve,
sénéchal of Montpellier.
2) Elder brother: Simon, sieur de La Forêt, gouverneur of the château de
Foix. Briefly held the captaincy of the Gardes company after Paul (see
below), but sold the company captaincy in 1628. Conseiller du roi.
3) Elder brother: Claude, abbé de Saint-Gilles, évêque de Nimes.
4) Younger brother: Paul. Named as the successor to Rolin’s Gardes
company (see below), but was killed at the Île de Ré before he could
assume its command.
5) Younger brother: Rolin. Assumed command of Toiras’ Gardes
company in 1624 when he resigned its command. Died during the defence
of the Île de Ré.
(Above, p. 62; Balincourt, ‘Toiras’, pp. 111-127; Noeufville, Abrégé
chronologique, III, pp. 240-1.)
DU RAYNIER, Elie
Eldest son of Jacques, sieur de Droué and Marie Madeleine de Saltun, daughter of
Mathurin, sieur de La Ville aux Clercs, maître d’hôtel of the cardinal de Bourbon,
and Madeleine de Villars. Appointed to a Gardes captaincy in 1591. Died in
1597. Notable siblings:
1) Younger brother: Isaac. (See below.)
2) Younger sister: Madeleine. Married Jean de Herce, sieur de Lignières,
gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi. Died after 1649. Jean can be
found as the lieutenant of Isaac du Raynier’s Gardes company on multiple
revues during the 1600s.
(Sources: see under Isaac du Raynier, below.)
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DU RAYNIER, Isaac, sieur de Droué.
For parents and siblings: see Du Raynier, Elie, above. Captain in Picardie prior to
acquiring a Gardes captaincy in 1597, which he held until 1629. Briefly
reassumed command of this company between 1632 and 1634 after the death of
the company’s captain, Isaac’s son, Valentin I. Appointed gouverneur of Royan in
1622, and maréchal de camp in 1640. Conseiller du roi, and a gentilhomme
ordinaire de la chambre du roi. Present at the marriage of Louis de Caillebot,
sieur de La Salle (see above). Married: 1) 1593, Madeleine de Molitard, daughter
of François, chevalier de l’ordre de Saint-Michel, sieur de Molitard, and
Andromaque du Plessis. Eleven children produced from this marriage. 2) 1644,
Lucrèce de Fromentières, daughter of Joachim, sieur de Montigny. This marriage
was childless. Notable children from his first marriage:
1) Charles, sieur de Boisseleau. Lieutenant in the Gardes. Died in 1622.
2) Marie. Married 1) Etienne de Vallée, sieur de Pescheray in 1618. 2)
Charles d’Angennes, sieur de La Loupe in 1632. Marie’s third daughter
from her second marriage, Madeleine, married Henri de Senneterre,
maréchal de La Ferté, in 1655.
3) Valentin I. Inherited the captaincy of his father’s Gardes company.
Died in 1632. Valentin de Coutances, ensign in Isaac’s company during
the 1600s, was his godfather.
4) Louis II, sieur de Droué and Montigny. Inherited his father’s company,
and was captain in the Gardes from 1634 to 1657.
5) Valentin II. Abbé of Madeleine de Chateaudun and Saint-Jean-
d’Angély.
6) René, sieur de La Fontenelle. Captain in the Gardes from 1648 to 1655.
Married Marguerie de Longueval. Gouverneur of Mirecourt and bailli of
Vosges.
(Above, pp. 51-2, 71-2; Leger, Droué, pp. 42-67; Noeufville, abrégé
chronologique, III, pp. 211, 225.)
DU VAL, François, marquis de Fontenay-Mareuil,
Mestre de camp of Piémont from 1616 to 1629. For more information see
Fontenay-Mareuil, Mémoires.
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ESCODECA, Pierre d’, baron de Boisse-Pardaillan.
Son of Jean, sieur de Boisse, and Marguerite d’Aspremont. Pierre was the
youngest of four brothers. Served firstly a captain in Navarre before being
appointed mestre de camp of the regiment in 1594, a position he held until 1617.
Appointed Maréchal de camp in 1619, and gouverneur of Monheurt and Sainte-
Foy in the early 1620s. Assassinated in 1621 whilst serving in royal forces.
Protestant. Married Marie de Ségur, heiress of Pardaillan. Notable children:
1) Armand, marquis de Mirambeau. Married Madelaine de Pons, daughter
of Jacques de Pons and Marie de La Porte.
(Haag, La France Protestante, IV, pp. 543-545; Susane, Ancienne, III, p. 1.)
ESPARBEZ, Antoine d’, sieur de Coignac,
Married Marguerite de Faudoas. Sister of Jean-François and Pierre Faudoas (see
below). A possible relation, Bertrand d’Esparbez, was present as an ensign in
Antoine’s Picardie company in a revue of 1599.
(La Chesnaye, VI, p. 266; revue, Ms.Fr. 25833/1563.)
FAUDOAS, Jean-François, sieur de L’Isle-Sérrilac.
Son of Jean, sieur de Sérillac, mestre de camp of the regiment that would become
Picardie between 1579 and 1585, and Brandelise de Bouzet, daughter of Pons de
Bouzet, sieur de Roquepine and Marguerite de Madirac. Jean-François was
appointed to a Picardie captaincy in 1621, and died in 1630 without having
married. Notable siblings:
1) Elder brother: Pierre, sieur de La Mothe-Sérillac (see below).
2) Sister: Marguerite. Married Antoine d’Esparbez, sieur de Coignac,
captain in Picardie (see above).
Other notable relatives:
1) Uncle: Jean-Gilles. Known as the ‘capitaine de Sérillac’. Captain in the
Gardes.
2) Uncle: Bernard. Known as ‘capitaine de La Mothe’. Captain in the
Gardes.
3) Aunt: Catherine. First marriage was to Carbon de Marrast, sieur de
Mons, captain in the Gardes.
(La Chesnaye, VI, pp. 265-266.)
248
FAUDOAS, Pierre de, sieur de La Mothe-Sérillac
Captain and susbequently lieutenant colonel in Picardie. Gouverneur of the town
and château of Sommieres. Died in 1628. For parents, siblings and relatives see
under Jean-François de Faudoas, above.
(La Chesnaye, VI, pp. 265.)
FAURE, François de, sieur de La Roderie.
Appointed captain of the Gardes company previously commanded by Leon
d’Albert (see above) at an unknown date between 1617 and 1620. Died in 1628
whilst still in command of the company. Married Jeanne Gyves.
(Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 110; Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, p. 266.)
GERMAINCOURT, Daniel de, sieur de Buffé.
Captain of a Gardes company for an unknown period of time prior to his death in
1600.
(Above, p. 84; Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 105; revue, Ms.Fr. 25848/459.)
GONTAUT, Jean de, baron de Saint-Blancard et Biron.
Son of Armand, baron de Biron, maréchal de France, lieutenant général and
gouverneur of La Rochelle, pays d’Aunis et Saintonge, and Jeanne, dame
d’Ornezan and Saint-Blancard. Jean was mestre de camp of Picardie between
1597 and 1617. Conseiller d’état and maréchal de camp. Died in 1636. Married:
1) Jacqueline de Gontaut de Saint-Geniez, daughter of Helie de Gontaut, sénéchal
of Béarn, and Jacqueline de Bethune; 2) Marthe-Françoise de Noailles, daughter
of Henry, sieur de Noailles, comte d’Ayen, gouverneur and lieutenant général of
Auvergne. Notable children (all from second marriage):
1) Henry-Charles, baron de Biron, mestre de camp of the régiment de
Perigord.
2) François de Gontaut, marquis de Biron, baron de Saint-Blancard.
Mestre de camp of the régiment de Perigord, lieutenant général des




1) Elder brother: Charles de Gontaut, duc de Biron, pair et maréchal de
France, chevalier des ordres du roi, lieutenant général in Burgundy and
Bresse. Executed for high treason in 1602.
(Anselme, VII, pp. 305-306.)
GRILLET, Albert de, sieur de Brissac.
Son of Alexandre, baron de Brissac and Jeanne de Gerard. Albert was the ensign
of Louis de Berton, sieur de Crillon’s Gardes company by 1601, and had been
promoted to lieutenant of the same company by 1609 (now commanded by
Créquy). Appointed captain of the Gardes company previously commanded by
Bonnouvrier in 1617. Spent his early life as a page of Henri III. Commander of
the citadel of Nancy in 1635. Possible client of Crillon and/or Épernon. Married
Catherine de Tardieu, a fille d’honneur de la reine, daughter of François Tardieu,
conseiller du roi and maître des requêtes de l’hôtel du roi, and Anne-Martin de
Maleyssie, dame d’honneur de la reine. Notable children:
1) François. Became a captain in the régiment d’Orléans. Married
Elizabeth des Etangs.
2) Albert. Commanded the régiment de cuirasseurs du roi. Married Claire
Marie Harnier in 1664.
3) Henry. Became ‘premier capitaine’ in régiment de Le Cloque Caval.
Other Notable relatives:
1) Elder brother: Gabriel, Baron de Brissac. Client of Épernon. Mestre de
camp of a disbanded infantry regiment during the 1590s.
(Above, pp. 61-64, 79, 160; Cabinet 174 (4411); DB 333 (8474).)
GUIGNEAUDEAU, Pierre de, sieur de Montigny
Son of Pierre, sieur de Migronneau et Montigny, and Esther Moreau. Pierre can
be found as the ensign of the compagnie colonelle of the Gardes in 1598 and 1610
before receiving a captaincy in the Gardes in 1610. One of his sons inherited the
command of this company in 1642, and held the office until 1647. Married Anne
de Chesnel in 1620, daughter of another Gardes captain, Charles de Chesnel.
Notable children:
1) Eutrope, sieur de Burie, Montigny et Rochereau. Captain and Brigadier
of the ‘gardes du Corps’.
250
2) Pierre-Alexis, lieutenant in the Gardes.
3) Anne. Married Joseph-Roch Chasteigner, comte de Saint-Georges.
(Above, p. 67; Noeufvile, Abrégé chronologique, III, p. 256; Beauchet-Filleau,
Dictionnaire, IV, pp. 601-602.)
HAMES, Paul de, sieur du Fresnoy, vicomte d’Willy et Pargnan.
Son of Claude, sieur de Fresnoy and Barde de Cailleu, daughter of Nicolas, sieur
de Forestel and Madelene Adenin. Held a Picardie captaincy between 1596 and
1624. Designated ‘premier capitaine’ of the regiment during this period.
Gouverneur of Nerac. Married Ester Marie d’Hervilly in 1607, daughter of Jean,
sieur de Hervilly and Sara de Flavigny. Notable children:
1) Charles de Hames, sieur de Merval, vicomte d’Willy et Pargnan.
Married Marie d’Avanne, daughter of Cesar, sieur de Villeneuve,
Bouresches et Suzanne de Radinguard.
Other notable relatives:
1) Younger brother: Abdias, sieur de Carempay. Lieutenant in Paul’s
company from at least 1611.
2) Sister: Marie. Married 1) Pierre de Mores, sieur de Jaudrais,
gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du roi; 2) Jean de Chapuisa, sieur de
La Fosse.
(Above, pp. 50, 80; DB 345 (8902); PO 1471 (33,351).)
JOFFRE, sieur de.
Served in Navarre from at least 1597 to at least 1622. By 1602, was designated
‘premier capitaine’ of Navarre, and was appointed lieutenant colonel of Navarre
in 1617. His name was also occasionally recorded as ‘Jeoffre Martin’, and his
ancestors styled the family name as ‘Martin de Joffre’ by the 1670s. Married to
Catherine Edsein, daughter of Ollivier Esdein, sieur du Plessis-Gédon, maréchal
des logis ordinaire du roi, and Symone de Roullin.
(Above, p. 78; Martellière, ‘Généalogie’, pp. 122-123; Bassompierre, Mémoires,
II, p. 185.)
JUSSAC D’AMBLEVILLE, François, sieur du Saint-Preuil.
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Appointed ensign of the compagnie colonelle of Picardie in 1622. Bought the
captaincy of Gaspard de Coligny, sieur de Saligny’s Gardes company in 1627. In
1629, Louis de Pontis (author of Pontis, Mémoires) was the lieutenant of Saint-
Preuil’s Gardes company. Gouverneur of Arras. Maréchal de camp. Disgraced by
Richelieu and executed in 1641.
(Above, p. 42; Pontis, Mémoires, I, p. 347, II, pp. 16-23; Parrott, Richelieu’s
Army, pp.493-494; revue, Ms.Fr. 25849 (543).)
LA BESNE, Abraham de.
After holding the positions of ensign and then lieutenant of Pierre du Bellay’s
Gardes company, Abraham assumed the captaincy of this company on Pierre’s
death in 1615. Married Isabelle Justiniani, dame d’honneur of Marie de Médicis.
Died in 1631 at the siege of Montmélian.
(Above, pp. 80-81, 160; Cabinet 43 (1061); Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique,
III, p. 212.)
LA GRANGE DE MONTIGNY, Antoine de, sieur d’Arquien.
Son of Charles de La Grange, sieur de Montigny, chevalier de l’ordre du roi,
gouverneur of Charité-sur-Loire, and Louise de Rochechouart, dame de Boiteaux,
daughter of Guillaume, sieur de Jars et de Breviande, and Louise d’Autry.
Antoine was appointed to a Gardes captaincy in 1577, and was made lieutenant
colonel of the regiment by 1597, a position he resigned in 1610. Appointed
lieutenant of Metz’s citadel in 1604. Gouverneur of Calais, Sancerre et de Gien.
Not a client, and probably even an opponent, of Épernon. Married 1) Marie de
Cambray, daughter of Jean, sieur de Villemenard and Genevieve le Maréchal; 2)
Louis de La Châtre, daughter of Claude, maréchal de La Châtre, and Jeanne
Chabot-Jarnac; 3) Anne d’Ancienville, dame de Prie, daughter of Louis
d’Ancienville, baron de Reveillon and Françoise de La Platiere, dame des Bordes.
Multiple children from marriages 1) and 2) (see Anselme, VII, pp. 427-429).
Notable siblings:
1) Elder brother: François, sieur de Montigny, maréchal de France.
(Above, pp. 77-78, 157-159; Anselme, Histoire, VII, pp. 425-429; Noeufville,
Abrégé chronologique, III, pp. 59-60.)
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LA MOTHE, Pierre de, sieur d’Arnaud
Mestre de camp of Champagne from 1622 to 1624.
(Susane, Ancienne, III, p. 92.)
LAUR, Jacques de.
Son of Gabriel de Laur and Isabeau de Gaschessans. Jacques was made a captain
in Navarre between the état of 1597 and a revue of September 1597.
Gentilhomme de la chambre du roi, gouverneur of Navarreux, captain of Parsan,
and maître de l’artillerie of Béarn by 1614. Died whilst serving in royal forces at
the siege of Montauban, 1621. Protestant. Married Magdeleine de Moreuil.
Another Navarre captain, Gratian de Saint-Cricq, was present at the wedding.
Notable children:
1) Jacques. Married Jeanne de Lons.
(Above, p. 33, 48, 67, 124; DB 386 (378); Batcave, ‘La maison du roy’, p. 54;
correspondence, AN G7113, ff. 102r-104v.)
LE TOURNEUR, Jacques
Son of Jean Le Tourneur, sieur de la Baussonnière et du Plessis, and Antoinette
Le Bascle, his second wife. Jacques was still serving in the royal infantry in 1630.
Gouverneur of Talmont. Possible client of Épernon. Appears to have died
childless. Notable relatives:
1) Nephew: René Le Tourneur. ‘Capitaine’.
2) Nephew: Jean Le Tourneur. Major in Champagne.
3) Sister: Perrine. Married Charles de Pernes.
(Sottas, ‘État militaire’, pp. 177-178.)
LE VERNET, Berthélemy de
Married Antoinette d’Albert in June 1605, sister of Charles d’Albert, duc de
Luynes.
(La Chesnaye, I, p. 110; above, Chapter Four, Section II.)
MAZELIÈRE, Bertrand de
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Captain in Navarre from an unknown date prior to 1593; promoted to the position
of lieutenant colonel of Navarre by 1600. He continued to hold this position into
the 1610s.
(Above, pp. 39, 78, 157; Le Roux, Faveur, p. 531.)
MONTAGU, Joachim de, sieur de Frémigières.
Appointed to a Gardes captaincy between 1588 and 1596. Client of Épernon, and
possibly also Crillon. Named as a rebel captain in 1619. Sold his captaincy to
Toiras in 1620. Present at the marriage of Fabien de Biran, son of the Gardes
captain Barthélemy-Scipion de Biran (see above). Ambassadeur de l’ordre de
Malte between 1617 and 1624.
(Above, pp. 37, 68, 90, 159, 162-164; Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 111; Petiet, Le roi, p.
604; Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, p. 240.)
MONTESQUIOU, Jean-Jacques de, sieur de Sainte-Colombe
Son of Antoine de Montesquiou, sieur de Sainte-Colombe, lieutenant of the duc
d’Anjou’s gendarme company, and Anne de Mondenard, daughter of François,
sieur de Moncaup. Jean-Jacques was appointed as captain of a Gardes company in
1577, was recognised as the regiment’s ‘premier capitaine’ by 1600, and was
promoted to lieutenant colonel of the Gardes in 1610. He was still holding this
latter position in 1629. Married Anne de Chaumejean in 1610, sister of the Gardes
captain Blaise de Chaumejean (see above). Notable children:
1) Bernard, baron du Faget. Maréchal de camp.
2) Jean-Charles, baron de Londat. Married Miramonde Piger.
On revues of 1621, 1627 and 1629, a ‘Bernard de Montesquiou’ is named as the
ensign of the compagnie colonelle. Given the date of Jean-Jacques’ marriage, this
may have been his first cousin once removed, Bernard-Antoine de Montesquiou
(who married in 1618), rather than his son Bernard, who could only have been
eleven years old by 1621. Alternatively, it could display the young age at which a
person could enter into regimental office. Jean-Jacques was also a distant cousin
of the Montesquiou de La Serre who captained a company in Vaubecourt.
(Above, pp. 67, 78, 114, 117; Noeufville, p. 256; La Chesnaye, X, pp. 338-339;
DB 459)
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MONTLEZUN, Barthélemy de, sieur de La Busca.
Son of Martin de Montlezun. Named as the lieutenant of Michel Patras’ Picardie
company in 1587. Received a Picardie captaincy in 1589, whcih he still
maintained in 1632. ‘Premier capitaine’ of Picardie by 1610. Serving in the royal
‘paneterie’ in 1607. Lieutenant du roi in the Boulonnais. Married 1) Madeléne de
Martines in 1587, daughter of Nicolas, procureur in the généralité of Calais and
Antoinette de Bresse; 2) Marie de Blaizel, daughter of Guillaume, sieur de
Florinetay and Antoinette du Amant. Notable children:
1) Jean, sieur de Saint-Léonard. Eldest son from his first wife. Named
ensign in Barthélemy’s Picardie company in 1622. Married Marie
Frameri, daughter of Jean, sieur de Hambresent, lieutenant civil et
criminelle of the sénéchaussée of the Boulonnais, and Jacqueline Morel.
Two members of the Patras – Antoine, sénéchal of the Boulonnais and
Pierre - were present at the wedding.
2) François de Montlezun, sieur de Lianne. Eldest son from his second
wife. Named as ensign in Barthélemy’s Picardie company in 1632.
Married Marie de Tustal, daughter of Etienne de Tustal, sieur d’Andique.
(Above, pp. 40, 50, 63, 69-70, 83, 155; DB 466 (12, 440); Cabinet 246 (6504).)
MONTMORENCY, Hannibal de
Bastard son of Henri I de Montmorency-Damville, Constable of France.
Appointed to a Navarre captaincy at an unknown date before 1597, which he held
until an unknown date after 1620. Possible connection to the Laur (see above), as
a David de Laur can be found as his lieutenant in revues of 1598 and 1610.
(Above, p. 134; Rohan, Mémoires, I, p. 382; Courcelles, Histoire Généalogique et
Héraldique, II, Montmorency section, p. 10; revue, Ms.Fr 25833 (1511), Ms.Fr.
25842 (28).)
MONTMORENCY, Josias de, sieur de Bours.
One of fourteen children of Jean de Montmorency, sieur de Bours and Bernarde
Gaillard. Josias was appointed to a Gardes captaincy during the 1590s, which he
held until his death in 1616. A distant cousin of Henri de Montmorency-Damville.
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Protestant. Married 1) Marie de Grouches, daughter of Henri, sieur de Griboval
and Claude Girard; 2) Louise Hotman. Notable children:
1) Jean, sieur de Bours. Only son from first marriage. Served from the age
of fourteen in his father’s company. Appears as an ensign under Charles
d’Applaincourt, who had assumed control of Josias’ company on his
death. Died in 1622.
(Above, pp. 81, 125 ; Haag, La France protestante, VII, pp. 492-493; Belleval,
‘Les Montmorency’, p. 253; revue, Ms.Fr. 25846 (275).)
NOGARET DE LA VALETTE, Jean Louis, chevalier de La Valette.
Bastard son of Épernon. Was appointed captain of the Gardes company
previously commanded by Mathurin de Castelnau in 1622 after his death. Sold the
captaincy of the company in 1633 to Louis de Castelnau, Mathurin’s son and the
lieutenant of La Valette’s company. Subsequently entered into Venetian service,
before returning to French service at an unspecified date between 1645 and his
death in 1650. Appointed lieutenant général des armées du roi between 1645 and
1650. Married Gabriel Aymar in 1610, daughter of Honoré Aymar, sieur de
Montsalier, maître des requêtes and subsequently président of the parlement of
Provence, and Eleonore de Forbin Souliers. Notable children:
1)Felix de La Valette. Lieutenant général des armées du roi in 1688.
(Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 111; Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, pp. 119-120;
DB 157 (4109) (Castelnau).)
PATRAS, Bertrand, sieur de Campaigno.
Captain in Picardie prior to his appointment as a Gardes captain in 1584. Client
of Épernon. Appointed sénéchal of the Boulonnais, and made ‘commandant’ of a
company in the Boulogne garrison, in 1597. Maintained close ties to Boulogne
until his death in 1617. Notable relatives:
1) Brother: Michel Patras. (See below.)
2) Nephew: Antoine de Patras. Inhertied the position of sénéchal of the
Boulonnais from Bertrand.
(Above, pp. 41, 69-70, 124, 155; Chagniot, ‘Gardes’, p. 110; Luppé, Mémoires, p.
200; Lefebvre, Histoire, II, p. 408; Cabinet 246 (6504) (Montlezun).)
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PATRAS, Michel
Assumed the captaincy of his brother Bertrand’s Picardie company in 1584,
which Michel had resigned by the état of 1597. Barthélemy de Montlezun (see
above) was the lieutenant of Michel’s Picardie company in 1587. Subsequently
assumed the captaincy of Bertrand’s Gardes company at an unknown date
between 1609 and Bertrand’s death in 1617. Michel sold the company in 1622 to
Gaspard de Coligny, sieur de Saligny. Notable relatives: see above: Patras,
Bertrand.
(Sources: same as for Bertrand Patras.)
SAINT-AUBIN, Guillaume de
Son of Alexandre de Saint-Aubin and Marie-Anne de Bar. Married Huguette de
Saubiez. Notable children:
1) Gabrielle. Married Jean du Val, sieur de Praslay, Mornay etc.,
lieutenant of the king’s company of chevaux-légers.
(Nicolas Viton de Saint-Allais, Nobiliaire universel de France [...], (21 Vols.,
Paris, 1814-1843), I, p. 343.)
SAINT-CRICQ, Gratian de
Present at the wedding of a Navarre captain, Jacques de Laur.
(DB 386 (378) (Laur).)
SALERNE, Gaillard de
Appointed to a Gardes captaincy prior to 1598, which he held until his death in
1601.
(Chagniot, Gardes, p. 105.)
THIANGES, Jonathan de, sieur de Roulet.
Appointed to a Gardes captaincy between 1588 and 1596. Died at the siege of
Amiens in 1597.
(Noeufville, Abrégé chronologique, III, p. 203; Hozier, L’impôt, III, p. 326.)
TRION, Pierre de, sieur de Dancourt
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Appointed to a Navarre captaincy before 1599, a position which he still held in
1617. By 1625 he was described as a former holder of a Navarre captaincy.
Appointed gouverneur of the town and chateau of Roye at an unknown date after
1626. Listed in 1617 as écuyer de la petite écurie du roi. Married Louise de
Roguée, widow of Louis de Caurel, écuyer, sieur de Dancourt. Notable children:
1) Charlotte. Married Charles de Séricourt, son of Antoine, sieur
d’Esclainvilliers, royal lieutenant in the town and citadel of Rue, and
lieutenant of the Gardes de Monsieur frère du roi, and Marie de Neufville.
Possible other relatives:
1) François de Trion. Navarre captain in 1622.
(Villefosse, ‘Histoire’, p. 157; Coët, Histoire, I, p. 137.)
ZAMET, Jean de, baron de Murat.
Son of Sebastien Zamet and Madeline de Clerc du Tremblay. Sebastien - who was
originally from Lucca, Italy and who came to France within the entourage of
Catherine de Médicis - became one of the foremost financiers within the French
kingdom by the 1580s. Jean was appointed mestre de camp of Picardie in 1617, a
position which he resigned in 1621/2. Gentilhomme ordinaire de la chambre du
roi, capitaine et surintendant des bâtiments at Fontainebleu, maréchal de camp.
Died at the siege of Montpellier in 1622. Married Jeanne de Goth, daughter of
Jacques, baron de Rouillac and Hélène de Nogaret La Valette, daughter of
Épernon.
(Anselme, Histoire, II, p. 236; Bergin, Rise, p. 41; Susane, Ancienne, II, p. 221;
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